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“Through the days of shame that are coming 
Through the nights of wild distress 
Though your promise count for nothing 
You must keep it nonetheless” 
 
Leonard Cohen, ‘Heart With No Companion’ 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Research theme 
This thesis explores the notion of deliberate breach of contract and its potential remedial 
consequences. In the major jurisdictions in Europe and in the United States the notion of deliberate 
breach of contract is generally not coherently and officially defined and acknowledged as an 
independent legal phenomenon. The ultimate added value of this thesis intends to be a first 
coherent comparative research on deliberate breach of contract and its potential consequences for 
the core standard remedies after breach of contract. 
A few examples provide a first idea of the existence and occurrence of deliberate breach of contract 
and of the questions in the sphere of remedies which accompany a coherent exploration of this 
phenomenon. A first example is the situation of a ‘double’ sale. A sells an old but complete collection 
of Dostoyevskiy writings in Russian to B for the amount of EUR 5000. B values the collection at EUR 
6500. A complete collection in this type of print is rare, but not unique.  After the conclusion of the 
contract between A and B, C approaches A and offers him EUR 7500 for the same collection. A sells 
and delivers the collection to C for EUR 7500. A relevant question in terms of remedies may be 
whether B may claim damages above a ‘normal’ expectation level – for example by relieving general 
bars on expectation damages, such as the limit of foreseeability or remoteness or by approaching 
allowing B access to account of profits as an equal alternative for expectation damages –, because 
the breach may be considered as a deliberate breach. Another relevant question may be what the 
status of a potential penalty clause containing a considerable penalty – e.g. EUR 8000 – is in relation 
to the deliberateness of the breach. 
A second example can be found in the area of building and construction contracts.  A agrees with B 
to build for B a swimming pool according to several specific contractual specifications. After finishing 
the pool it turns out that A used a different type of stones than contractually agreed and that he built 
the pool slightly shallower than contractually specified. A relevant question is whether B still has a 
valid claim for performance or a claim for expectation damages on the level of cost of reinstatement 
considering the potential deliberateness of the breach, even though the loss of value due to the 
breach may be minimal. Another question is whether B – in case of absence of loss of value of the 
pool – has a valid claim for partial termination or perhaps a claim for damages for immaterial loss, 
because A committed breach of contract deliberately without direct financial consequences. 
A third example is a specific case of breach of contract in insurance law. If B as an employee becomes 
disabled as a result of an accident at his workplace and he has a disability insurance, insurer A may 
commit deliberate breach by systematically and consistently refusing to cooperate by accepting 
liability and by ensuring a smooth payment schedule. This case is a specific example and raises 
several questions on the nature of the breach, but also on the potential remedial consequences. A 
first question is when a breach in this case should be considered to be deliberate, because an insurer 
should also have a possibility to defend himself against a claim of the insured. Nevertheless, when 
deliberate breach of contract in this case can be established, the question arises which remedies in 
private law B has to cover his losses – for example due to excessive delay of payment. Are for 




This thesis offers a structured approach to explore the notion of deliberate breach and to answer 
several of the questions just mentioned. A first goal of this thesis is to explore the features of the 
term ‘deliberate breach of contract’ in more detail. After a general exploration on the features of 
deliberate breach, various jurisdictions are explored on an eclectic basis in order to find explicit or 
implicit examples of deliberate breach of contract in case law, in legal provisions and in academic 
contributions. The goal of this exploration is not only to find examples of deliberate breach itself, but 
also to find concrete remedial solutions provided by courts or by other important legal sources for 
situations of deliberate breach.  
The results of the exploration lead to the statement that, although deliberate breach as an existing 
sequence of facts is not completely denied in various jurisdictions, a coherent and consistent 
approach of this notion, especially in terms of remedies, in general seems to be absent. The last part 
of this thesis argues that deliberate breach of contract as an independent legal phenomenon 
deserves explicit attention in the law of contract. It is argued that deliberate breach should not only 
be explicitly recognized as an independent notion, but remedies in contract should also be applied 
and eventually, on a case-by-case approach, adapted as a result of deliberate breach of contract.  
Finally, this thesis applies general recommendations on how remedies can be adapted as a result of 
deliberate breach of contract on eight concrete case studies. This thesis ultimately combines 
exploration of the notion of deliberate breach with the argument that deliberate breach of contract 
is a phenomenon which should be taken seriously in the law of contract and which should be 
approached consistently in terms of remedies.  
1.2  Research questions 
Four research questions pave the road to build the central argument of this thesis: 
1. What is deliberate breach of contract?  
 
2. Does deliberateness of the breach of contract play a role in existing contract law, more 
specifically in contract law related legal provisions – ‘law in the books’ –  or in case law –‘ law 
in action’ – , in the sense that deliberateness as a relevant factor influences the choice for 
application of remedies in contract and if so, how? 
 
3. Why should deliberateness of the contractual breach influence the availability and the extent 
of remedies in contract? 
 
4. How should deliberateness of the contractual breach influence the availability and the extent 
of remedies in contract? 
 
Research question 1 explores the notion of deliberate breach of contract from various perspectives. 
Before the element of deliberateness is explored, Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the 
traditional notions of contract, breach of contract and remedies in contract. These notions are 
explored in a comparative setting. The justification for using a comparative approach towards these 
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notions is to illustrate the conceptual diversity which accompanies these general notions. Moreover, 
the answers to the core research questions contain examples from various legal systems. 
Chapter 3 explores the notion of deliberate breach of contract from various perspectives, focusing on 
the potential meanings of deliberateness. The notion of deliberate breach will be compared to the 
notion of efficient breach of contract. The notion of deliberateness itself also needs elaboration from 
a tort law perspective, an empirical perspective and a criminal law perspective in order to 
understand why uniformity on the meaning of deliberate breach cannot be easily achieved. 
Research questions 2, 3 and 4 are tackled in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, but the research questions do not 
exactly match the content of the chapters. First, potential remedies are discussed in legal provisions, 
existing case law and law and economics literature (Chapter 4). Second, a theory of four touchstones 
will be developed which should play a role in every solution to a deliberate breach case. Moreover, 
six recommendations on the influence of deliberateness on remedies in contract result from the 
research done in the first three chapters (Chapter 5). Third, eight case studies are presented in the 
last chapter to provide a more concrete picture of the effect of the recommendations in concrete 
cases (Chapter 6). The last research question  - the ‘how’ question  - is partly answered in Chapter 5 
in  more general terms by presenting the recommendations  and partly in Chapter 6 by presenting 
concrete case law examples in which the recommendations return. 
1.3  Methodology and justifications for the chosen approach 
The four research questions may be answered in various ways. This thesis opts for a classic legal, but 
eclectic approach. The arguments for the chosen approach towards deliberate breach of contract are 
primarily drawn from comparative legal research – mainly in the form of studying court decisions, 
academic contributions and other common legal sources: the classic legal approach – and law and 
economics literature. Furthermore, on a secondary level, this thesis also relies on findings and 
arguments from legal theory, empirical legal studies and criminal law in order to deliver a well-
argued conclusion.  
The approach is eclectic in the sense that this thesis picks arguments and examples from various legal 
systems and legal theories, but it does not strive for completeness in any of these areas. An eclectic 
approach implies making choices. This approach is only defensible if these choices are justified. The 
notion of deliberate breach of contract is a relatively unexplored one. This thesis considers vital that 
the reader should be able to test statements of courts, other authors and the author of this thesis 
regarding deliberate breach on concrete cases. The main thread throughout this thesis will be a set 
of eight case studies which are briefly introduced in the introduction. These cases are important 
examples of deliberate breach and they show the versatility of the notion itself and its widespread 
occurrence. Whether the eight case studies provide a representative image of the manifestation of 
deliberate breach of contract is hard to prove in a statistical sense. In any case, the chosen case 
studies are based on concrete landmark court cases in various legal systems. Furthermore, some of 
these cases are also frequently used as examples in theoretical contributions both in the studies of 
law and economics and in empirical studies.  
The arguments and case law examples to explore the notion of deliberate breach and to support and 
illustrate the importance of the notion of deliberate breach as well as the solutions to deal with 
deliberate breach are derived from various legal systems. As far as comparative legal research is 
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concerned, this thesis does not strive for completeness. Without limiting itself to the following legal 
systems, this thesis primarily uses examples from US law, English law, German law, French law and 
Dutch law. US law is the only legal system which already developed coherent theories on deliberate 
breach. Within Europe, the classic dichotomy between common law and continental law systems 
proves to be relevant in describing and assessing deliberate breach. English law is the major 
representative of common law on the European continent. French law is the only major continental 
jurisdiction which has reluctantly attempted to assess deliberateness of a breach of contract as a 
relevant factor in remedies in contract. German law is the other major legal representative on the 
continent, whereas Dutch law provides some interesting examples of court cases where courts seem 
to circumvent the idea of mentioning deliberateness as a relevant factor in assessing remedies in 
contract. Taking into account these justifications, this thesis also uses examples from other legal 
systems and from legal vehicles – soft law or not – overriding national legal systems, such as the 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods – hereafter the CISG – , the Principles of 
European Contract Law – hereafter the PECL –, the Draft Common Frame of Reference – hereafter 
the DCFR – , the Common European Sales Law – hereafter the CESL –  and the Unidroit Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts – hereafter the PICC. 
This thesis explores a phenomenon – deliberate breach – and develops suggestions to deal with this 
phenomenon. These suggestions result in presenting solutions to the mentioned case studies. These 
solutions should also be justified. The analysis of deliberate breach of contract and its consequences 
for remedies in contract result in four major touchstones representing four vital perspectives on 
contract and breach of contract. The moral touchstone is the mutual trust of the parties in the 
performance of the contractual obligations and the value of the contract itself that it deals with non-
performance appropriately. The systematic touchstone is that private law and contract law in 
general, and the law of remedies in contract in particular governs relations between private parties, 
who may vindicate their contractual rights. Therefore, the law of remedies is systematically and 
structurally aimed at vindication and compensation, and not at satisfaction and punishment. They 
interact with each other differently in each legal system and in each different legal theory. The 
practical or procedural touchstone is the test of proof and access to affordable legal representation. 
Deliberateness is a motive which is hard to prove. Substantive remedies are only relevant if 
deliberateness can be proven in a reliable way. The economic touchstone is that contracts and 
contract law should stimulate welfare enhancing transactions. Contract law should therefore be also 
as efficient as possible. 
In most legal systems, the notion of deliberate breach is not really acknowledged as a noticeable 
legal phenomenon which deserves separate and explicit attention. As far as it is, the sequence of 
facts concerned is generally not labeled as deliberate breach. This thesis argues that the 
phenomenon should be explicitly acknowledged, which can be done by using the four touchstones 
mentioned. However, in every legal system the mentioned touchstones are intertwined differently. 
Moral, systematic, practical or procedural, and economic arguments are assessed differently in each 
legal system. More precisely, assessing deliberate breach on these touchstones reveals dichotomies 
between legal systems and legal cultures and between various schools of legal academic debate, 
such as empirical legal studies, legal theory and law and economics. Describing these dichotomies 
aims to bring the reader a step closer to the final part of this thesis, as it helps revealing and 




All in all, this thesis shows that dealing with deliberate breach always involves dealing with these four 
touchstones, but it also shows that not every deliberate breach can be dealt with the same way. 
Nevertheless, taking into account these preconditions, this thesis finally opts for a certain hierarchy 
within these touchstones based on the cases and arguments. The concrete solutions based on this 


























2  ‘Contract’, ‘breach of contract’ and remedies in contract 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter offers a comparative analysis of three main pillars in the law of contract: contract, 
breach of contract and remedies in contract. This analysis is necessary to support the research on the 
notion of deliberateness in subsequent chapters. All research questions mention at least one of these 
core notions. They need to be clarified before anything useful can be said on the notion of deliberate 
breach of contract and its potential influence on remedies in contract. This chapter is the foundation 
on which the core of this thesis will be built. The comparative analysis already hints at difficulties in 
defining deliberate breach of contract, because each of the notions discussed has a different 
meaning in different legal systems. This chapter presents the reader with various conceptions of 
these notions in these systems and prepares him for the inevitable confusion which will arise when 
attempting to describe the phenomenon of deliberate breach.  
The scope of this chapter is limited. It is evident that without any limit, this chapter could be endless 
on the one hand, because a vast amount of academic literature on all three notions could be 
analyzed and discussed.1 On the other hand, the existence of this vast amount of literature may also 
be used as a trigger to ask the legitimate question why this chapter is necessary at all, because it will 
repeat facts and analyses already mentioned and performed by other authors.  
The choice to incorporate a chapter with a more general comparative, though limited content needs 
to be explained. This chapter aims to describe the notions of contract, breach of contract and 
remedies in contract from a comparative perspective. The sometimes similar, but often different 
interpretation of these notions in various major legal systems offers an indication of difficulties 
arising in subsequent chapters. Deliberateness of the breach and its influence on remedies in 
contract can only be explored and analyzed against the background of a complex legal reality. The 
legal reality may differ from place to place. For example, a contract may entail other duties and rights 
for parties in German law compared to US law, because a contract is interpreted differently in 
German law compared to US law. Nevertheless, the comparative perspective should not discourage 
the author or the reader to establish similarities between legal systems and to establish core features 
which return in practically every interpretation of the notion of contract, breach of contract and 
remedies in contract.  A brief encounter with primary differences and similarities of these notions in 
various legal systems serves as a beacon for the exploration of the position of deliberate breach in 
the law of contract – which is the main task and goal of this thesis.   
Again, it should be emphasized that this chapter does not strive for completeness. Many standard 
academic works in all mentioned legal systems are available to find more in-depth information on 
contract, breach of contract and remedies in contract. This chapter refers to these contributions 
where necessary and limits itself by outlining the features of the three notions mentioned referring 
                                                          
1
 See for example a comparative, but technical contribution which specifically elaborates on the notions of 
contract, breach of contract and remedies Levasseur 2008. See for various definitions and further references 
also e.g. Beale 2010, p. 39-44; Von Bar & Clive 2009, art. II.1:101 with comments. 
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to major legal systems in Europe, to US law and sometimes to international bodies of private law – 
soft law or not – such as the DCFR, the PECL, the PICC and the CISG. This chapter focuses on the 
differences and similarities between the common law and the European continental law approaches 
to the three notions mentioned. The notion of ‘contract’ also needs some explanation from a 
theoretical perspective. Adding a theoretical perspective offers the reader useful information on the 
difference in opinion on what a contract exactly is in addition to the ‘hardcore’ information from the 
various legal systems. The relevance of a theoretical perspective on the notion of contract for this 
thesis becomes visible once the relationship between deliberate breach of contract and remedies in 
contract is analyzed.  
Overall, this chapter intends to be a first step anticipating on the subsequent chapters on deliberate 
breach of contract and its potential connection to remedies in contract. References to the core 
problems will be made in this chapter if necessary. The anticipatory and fundamental character of 
this chapter generally justifies its existence as well as its limited set-up. 
2.2 The notion of ‘contract’  
2.2.1 Preliminary remarks 
This section primarily illustrates differences between concepts of contract in various jurisdictions. In 
advance, it is safe to state that the concept of contract differs most substantially between  common 
law jurisdictions and European continental law jurisdictions. Furthermore, within a specific 
jurisdiction, the notion of contract is approached technically, in the sense that the legal constituents 
for the existence of a contract are discussed.  This section also mentions theoretical foundations of 
the institution of contract such as the principle of freedom of contract and the principle of the 
binding force of the contract in a comparative perspective, which may clarify some differences in 
approach towards the notion of contract signaled in this section. 
2.2.2 A common law approach  
Although in subsequent parts of this thesis references to other common law jurisdictions than English 
and US legal systems will not be avoided, this section only discusses the two main representatives of 
the common law: English law and US law. 
2.2.2.1 English law 
According to one of the standard textbooks on contract law, Chitty on Contracts, the common law of 
contract recognizes two competing definitions of contract, explained in subsequent editions of this 
standard work.2 The first defines a contract as a promise or a set of promises which the law will 
enforce.3 The second defines a contract as an agreement giving rise to obligations which are enforced 
or recognized by law. Both definitions emphasize a different aspect of the contractual relationship. 
Within the context of English common law, the first definition underlines the traditional 19th century 
idea of the contract: a simple transaction between commercial parties.4 Within this definition, one of 
the typical common law constituents of contract law, ‘consideration’, is a major element. A promise – 
                                                          
2
 Beale 2008, 1-001 (p. 4). 
3
 Guest 1989, 1 (p. 1). 
4
 Cartwright 2009, p. 157. 
8 
 
not a contract – can only be enforced if consideration is provided.5 Consideration as a legal doctrine 
attempts to represent the ‘quid pro quo’ principle. Gratuitous promises cannot be enforced, because 
there is no consideration. The discussion about this formal requirement has always been extensive, 
because the debate on the enforceability of promises at the same time encompasses a debate about 
the function of the common law of contract in general. Although this thesis is not going to elaborate 
on the notion of consideration, it is relevant to take notice of this point, because the concept of 
consideration shows that the common law is traditionally concerned with ethics of trade and not so 
much with ethics or the interests of the non-commercial individual. Nevertheless, in the second half 
of the 20th century the requirement of consideration increasingly led to criticisms. Although the 
requirement is certainly not a dead letter at this moment, the strict attitude towards the fulfillment 
of consideration has somewhat decreased over the past century.6 
English law recognizes another, alternative, way of making a promise legally enforceable, namely by 
way of a deed, a formal document.  In the past, a deed had to carry a seal, but it is now sufficient, if it 
is clear that a document is intended to be a deed.7 Once a deed exists, consideration is no longer 
necessary because the binding force of the promise is not dependent on contract.8 Furthermore, 
English law recognizes the notion of the intention to create legal relations. This notion can be 
relevant to constitute binding promises, but only in situations where this intention is not self-evident, 
e.g. in the relations between husband and wife. In commercial transactions, the requirement of 
consideration remains vital.9 
The second definition uses the term ‘agreement’. Chitty distinguishes agreement from the intention 
to create legal relations, because sole agreement is not sufficient to constitute a contract. The 
agreement to drink a cup of tea at 4 pm is not made in order to create legal relations and, for that 
matter, not enforceable. Moreover, under English law ‘agreement’ is a term with a certain degree of 
objectivity. ‘Agreement’ in the sense of a subjective meeting of the minds is not necessary to 
constitute a contract.  The manifestation of assent in the form of offer and acceptance is in most 
cases sufficient.10  
The enforceability of the contract in law should arise from the mutual agreement. In essence, the 
element of enforceability is the core difference between a contract and the agreement to drink a cup 
of tea at 4 pm.  The meaning of the term ‘binding force of the contract’ is therefore quite essential.  
It is a small step towards the question which promises are legally enforceable after the conclusion of 
a contract.  The starting point in English law is that ‘binding force’ means that (contractual) promises 
should be kept. Parties commit themselves financially, i.e. they are legally obliged to pay damages if 
                                                          
5
 Cartwright 2007, p. 138; Peel 2011, p. 72, 73. 
6
 See Whincup 2006, p. 97; Peel 2011, p. 169; McKendrick 2007, p. 252 ff. 
7
 First National Securities Ltd v Jones [1978] 67 Ch. 109, 111. 
8
 Peel 2011, p. 166. 
9
 Cartwright 2007, p. 139, 140. Cartwright argues for a change of English contract law towards informality – 
with emphasis on the intention of the parties as a sole requirement to constitute a contract in. See Cartwright 
2009, p. 173. Nevertheless, the use of the word ‘promise’ is interesting, because it suggests moral compliance 
to keep the promise. The relationship between promise and contract and a brief overview of theoretical 
conceptions of contract are mentioned in paragraph 2.3. 
10
 Beale 2008, 1-004 (p. 6). The notion of agreement is also limited due to the fact that many aspects of 
contracts are often not explicitly negotiated. See also Peel 2011, p. 2. The agreement is often, if not always, on 
the essentials of the contract: the object of contract and price. 
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they commit breach of contract, but nothing more.11 In essence, English common law has difficulties 
with assessing the value of the contract itself. The difficult relationship between the notions 
agreement, promise, obligation and contract entails that a clear-cut definition of ‘contract’ cannot 
easily be provided without a considerable risk of oversimplification. The vagueness of the notion of 
contract is a fact to be taken into account once the core research questions of this thesis are subject 
to research. From the perspective of English law, an important issue in this respect will be whether 
deliberate breach of contract is a form of inconsistent behavior – a promise to act in a certain way is 
not fulfilled – which should not only be discouraged, but also prevented, or whether a contract is not 
the vehicle to limit parties in their freedom of movement in a commercial setting as long as they pay 
damages to cover the inconsistent behavior. 
2.2.2.2 US Law 
For a good understanding of the notion of deliberate breach in a later stadium of this thesis, it is 
absolutely necessary to look into US law, because in fact this is the only jurisdiction which already 
paid systematically attention to this topic. A glance at the general notions in US law is inevitable in 
order to interpret the doctrinal discussion on deliberate breach. 
US contract law has a very specific position in this thesis. In fact, it is the ideal comparative 
jurisdiction, because it has a chameleonic nature. In this chapter, US law is positioned next to English 
law, because it is a common law oriented jurisdiction. The area of contract law is shaped by case law 
and the doctrines are generally comparable. In that sense, US law can be opposed to European 
continental jurisdictions. However, it is too simple to distinguish only this dichotomy. It is in fact 
slightly inaccurate to label contract law in the United States as US contract law, because at least in 
theory contract law is not only case law oriented, but also state law oriented.  Every state has its own 
contract law with its own rules.12 In order to systemize the enormous amount of case law since 1923, 
the American Law Institute has started to develop principles in the area of contract law, known as 
the Restatements.13 These Restatements are not enforced by law, but courts should have good 
reasons to deviate from the Restatements, because the Restatements are drafted and supported by 
a wide range of recognized and acclaimed legal scholars. In this sense, the development of the DCFR 
and its relation to European jurisdictions could be compared to US law. However, although the 
Restatements are important for the development and system of US law, only case law has  formal 
authority.14 
A first glance at the US concept of contract reveals a strong common law orientation. A contract is 
defined in the Second Restatement as follows in § 1: 
                                                          
11
 Chitty 2008, 1-019 (p. 16, 17); Holmes 1897, p. 5.  
12
 Klass 2010, p. 22. The most striking example is the State of Louisiana which is the only state with a legal 
system not based on the common law but on the French system. Louisiana is the only state with a civil code. 
13
 Farnsworth 2004, p. 26 ff. Restatements are eventually written for various branches of law, e.g. on Unjust 
Enrichment. The most important Restatements for contract law are the First Restatement in 1932 and the 
Second Restatement in 1981. Both Restatements were results from a long and thorough revision of case law 
and other structural developments.  
14
 Nevertheless, practically all States have adopted a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) since 1962, every State 
has its own Code. They are comparable, but they also contain differences. Louisiana is the exception, but this 
State has a unique Civil Code. See Farnsworth 2004, p. 32. 
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“A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the 
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.” 
Contracts are approached as sets of promises, which represent exchanges or ‘bargains’. Briefly said, 
the fact that a bargain is struck – exchanges have been made – makes a contractual promise 
enforceable.15 The idea of agreement between parties and intention to create legal relations is 
virtually absent. It seems on the other hand quite extraordinary that the doctrine emphasizes the 
enforceability of promises as a central concept, which seems to attach major value to the principle of 
the binding force of the contract. 
For a European continental lawyer, this idea may cause confusion at various levels. In the first place, 
the common law connection between contract and promise may be misleading. A promise in the  
area of contract law is not supposed to mean a statement with a moral content. That, at least, is the 
mainstream opinion in common law doctrine.16 It is necessary to emphasize this possible point of 
misunderstanding, because US legal doctrine heavily debates on the moral content of contract law. 
Where European – i.e. continental lawyers – may think that the idea of promises inevitably bears a 
moral element in it, it is not perceived as such in US law. 
In the second place, US common law opts for damages as a primary remedy. Enforced performance – 
i.e. specific performance of the contract – is an exceptional remedy at discretion of the court as in 
English law.17 However, there is a substantial difference between enforceability and the availability of 
enforced performance as a remedy. Scott and Kraus formulate as follows: 
“Most of the time, therefore, what we mean by enforcing a contract is not that the promisor is 
required to perform, but rather that, after a promisor has failed to perform (either deliberately or 
inadvertently), a court will order the defendant promisor to pay a specified amount of money.”18 
This quotation reveals the classic American attitude towards a contract. A breach of contract must be 
remedied, but the freedom of and to contract is predominant. The relative absoluteness of the 
principle of freedom of contract is a major factor which distinguishes US law from its legal ‘father’, 
English law.19 Protection of weaker parties such as employees or consumers  to the detriment of 
freedom of contract has relatively recently found its way in US law and is still not at the same level as 
in every European jurisdiction, including the United Kingdom.20 
                                                          
15
 Farnsworth 2004, p. 5. 
16
 Klass 2010, p. 28, 29. 
17
 See Holmes 1897, p. 5: “If you commit (to, MvK) a contract you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless 
the promised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference. But such a mode of looking at the matter 
stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can.” The 
position of the remedy of specific performance in English law is explained in subsection 2.4.2.2. 
18
 Scott & Kraus 2002, p. 97. 
19
 Slawson 1996 p. 12 ff.  
20
 See e.g. Whitman 2007, p. 402. The author argues that US law is generally pursues the economic interests of 
consumers, whereas the European approach focuses on consumer protection. 
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2.2.3 A continental law approach 
2.2.3.1 French law 
The French Civil Code dictates the concept of contract and its underlying structure. The French Civil 
Code defines a contract in art. 1101 Cc: 
“Le contrat est une convention par laquelle une ou plusieurs personnes s’obligent envers une ou  
plusieurs d’autres, à donner, à faire ou à ne pas faire quelque chose.” 
In French law, a contract is in theory a specialis of the convention, which in its turn is a specialis of 
the ‘acte juridique’. This building brick system is used in other continental legal systems as well. The 
‘acte juridique’, although not defined in the Civil Code as such, can be circumscribed as an act of will 
with an aim to create legal consequences.21 The ‘convention’ is essentially an ‘acte juridique’, 
constituted through more than one act of will with an aim to create legal consequences. If a 
‘convention’ creates obligations, the ‘convention’ has become a contract. 
In practice, the notion of ‘contract’ draws all the attention, be it only because the other two building 
blocks are not mentioned as independent notions in the Civil Code. Moreover, the three notions just 
discussed are mentioned as synonyms.22 
The French definition of contract mentions on the one hand  a reciprocal aspect – hidden in the term 
‘convention’ as explained and the term ‘envers’– , but it also focuses on the content of the 
obligations resulting from this reciprocal act. The definition suggests that parties voluntarily commit 
themselves to give or to do something towards each other.  According to Fabre-Magnan, the element 
of reciprocal will to be bound seems to be essential in the definition of contract, although the 
definition of contract is generally a topic of discussion.23 
If the element of will is apparently emphasized in contract theory, the French approach to the 
principle of the binding force of the contract may reveal something about the theoretical approach 
to deliberate breach of contract. What does the binding force of a contract according to French law 
mean? 
From the perspective of this thesis, - the relevance of the binding force of the contract for the 
approach to deliberate breach of contract and remedial hierarchy – the French approach is at first 
sight not very accessible. The approach is generally not prospective – what consequences does the 
binding force of contract have for the parties when the contractual obligations are not correctly 
performed?– but explanatory. How can the binding force of contract be explained and justified? The 
French approach is typical. Whereas other legal systems or philosophical theories generally 
emphasize party autonomy or reliance on mutual promises as essential elements of binding force of 
the contract, the French approach is more positivistic. 
Art. 1134 Cc embeds this principle as follows: 
                                                          
21
 The opposite notion is the ‘fait juridique’, which also creates legal consequences, but without the aim to do 
so. Compare the act of buying a CD (acte juridique) with the act of accidentally causing a collision (fait 
juridique), Fages 2007, p. 16, 17. 
22
 Fages 2007, p. 17. 
23
 Fabre-Magnan 2004, no. 74, p. 174. 
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“Les conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites (…)”. 
In essence this provision says nothing more than that ‘conventions’ – i.e. also contracts – are binding, 
because the law says they are. As Fabre-Magnan correctly notes, this approach raises the question of 
whether the law could also decide that contracts are not binding.24 This approach does actually not 
reveal anything about the underlying reasons for the necessity of the binding force of the contract, 
but it only provides for an authoritarian reason. On the other hand, the French approach of course 
recognizes the importance of party autonomy, which follows from the definition of contract in art. 
1101 Cc.25 
In summary, French law centralizes the notion of contract in its Civil Code. The notion of contract 
emphasizes the will of the parties and the fact that a contract creates obligations. The law enforces 
the contract, but it is not immediately clear why and therefore it also remains unclear how the law 
enforces contractual obligations in cases of breach and deliberate breach of contract: what is the role 
of actual performance as a contractual remedy and does the intentional dissociation from a  
contractual promise in the past create additional obligations for the debtor based on the principle of 
the binding force of the contract? These are questions to be tackled in a subsequent part of this 
thesis. 
2.2.3.2 German law 
The German Civil Code does not contain a definition of ‘Vertrag’ or contract. Nevertheless, the 
German approach towards a contract can be circumscribed as highly systematic. In this sense, the 
approach to the concept of contract is comparable to the French approach, but the systems 
themselves differ in a certain way.  According to § 311 s. 1 BGB , a contract is approached as follows: 
“Zur Begründung eines Schuldverhältnisses durch Rechtsgeschäft sowie zur Änderung des Inhalts 
eines Schuldverhältnisses ist ein Vertrag zwischen den Beteiligten erforderlich, soweit nicht das 
Gesetz ein anders vorschreibt.”26 
The structure of the German Civil Code is based on the term ‘Schuldverhältnis’, which can be 
translated as ‘obligation’ and not on the notion of contract.27 Next to the terms ‘Vertrag’ and 
‘Schuldverhältnis’ another abstract term comes into play, namely ‘Rechtsgeschäft’. This term is more 
or less comparable to an ‘acte juridique’ in French law.  
 According to a definition in a authoritative German legal dictionary, a ‘Vertrag’ or contract can be 
defined as follows: 
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 Fabre-Magnan 2004, no. 28, p. 61, 62. Fages on the other hand links the principle of the binding force to the 
moral, historical and technical duty of parties to abide by contractual obligations. Fages 2007, p. 201, but again, 
this principle not discussed in the remedies section, but in the general section of the ‘effects’ of the contract. 
25
 The elements ‘objet’ and ‘cause’ as vital parts of the French contract to make the contract valid will not be 
discussed, because they are not relevant for the purpose of this thesis. See inter alia art. 1108 Cc and Ghestin, 
2006. 
26
 A translation of § 311 s. 1 BGB, provided by http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de: “In order to create an 
obligation by legal transaction and to alter the contents of an obligation, a contract between the parties is 
necessary, unless otherwise provided by statute.” 
27
 At this point, it is perhaps wise to emphasize that an obligation in this sense is not synonymous with a duty: 
An obligation creates a right to performance of the obligation on the one hand (from the perspective of the 
creditor) and a duty to perform the obligation on the other hand (from the perspective of the debtor). 
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“Der Vertrag is ein rein formaler rechtlicher Begriff, der lediglich besagt, daß durch 
Willensübereinstimmung zweier oder mehrerer Beteiligter Rechtswirkungen erzeugt werden.”28 
This definition emphasizes three elements: a contract is a formal, legal notion, it is based on 
agreement of the parties involved and parties aim to create legal consequences. These elements are 
more or less comparable to the French approach to contract, but differences are also detectable, 
especially after reading the subsequent sentence: 
“Wichtigster Fall eines Vertrags is der schuldrechtliche Vertrag, durch den Leistungspflichten 
begründet werden”.29  
This sentence focuses on the performance-side of the contract: the existence of contractual 
obligations – i.e. Leistungspflichten – which are binding. German law distinguishes between contracts 
creating obligations secured by the according duties to perform and contracts which do not create 
obligations. The latter category incorporates for example contracts of marriage. The first type of 
contract is interesting, because the German circumscription is the first which explicitly mentions that 
obligations result in a duty to perform. The notion of contract may refer to the systematic process of 
formation  - achieving agreement by mutual consent of will, e.g. by ‘juridical acts’, but also on the 
result of the agreement – the obligations arising from the contract and the according duty to 
perform. Markesinis notes that  
“what a common law sees as a contract, the BGB would describe as a contractual relationship of 
obligation (Verträgliches Schuldverhältnis)”.30 
That may be correct, but German law seems to be more explicit on the duties of the parties bound to 
the contractual obligations than the common law. Whereas in other jurisdictions the principle of 
freedom of contract and the binding force of the contract are usually seen as an inseparable couple 
and treated as such, in German law only freedom of contract seems to draw attention of common 
textbook writers.31 However, binding force of the contract is very important for German law as well. 
This principle – referred to  as ‘pacta sunt servanda’ – is often linked directly to contractual sanctions 
in the case of “opportunistic behavior” of the contractual debtor.32 Moreover, § 241 s. 1 BGB clearly 
states the duties of the debtor of an obligation – including contractual obligations: 
                                                          
28
 Tilch 2001, p. 4578, 4579.  In this definition the connection between the juridical act (Rechtsgeschaft) and 
the contract is not clear. However, a contract according to German law is also based on the idea of the juridical 
act. For this approach see a definition provided by Staudinger/Bork 2010, Vorbem § 145 Rn 1 ff.: “Der Vertrag 
ist die zwei- oder mehrseitige rechtsgeschäftliche Regelung eines Rechtsverhältnisses, die von Vertragsparteien 
einverständlich getroffen wird”. 
29
 Tilch 2001, p. 4579. 
30
 Markesinis 2006, p. 25. 
31
 See for example Kötz 2009, p. 10-12 and Staudinger/Löwisch 2005, §311 Rn 2. More detailed literature on 
this topic is of course available. See e.g. Unberath 2007, p. 1-175, but his account is mainly theoretical. The 
practical part of his thesis is generally about contractual remedies.  
32
 Huber 1999, p. 27 and Kötz 2009, p. 12. In a further paragraph, Kötz elaborates on the idea of 
‘Rechtsbindungswille’, the idea that parties can only be legally bound if they want to be bound. This idea also 
relates to the binding force of the contract, but it is less clear that this principle is the complement of the 
principle of freedom of contract.   
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“Kraft des Schuldverhältnisses ist der Gläubiger berechtigt, von dem Schuldner eine Leistung zu 
fordern. Die Leistung kan auch in einem Unterlassen bestehen.” 
In addition, although no specific attention is paid to the principle of the binding force of the contract, 
Kötz makes a statement which seems to be very relevant for this thesis: 
“Vertrage würden nicht geschlossen werden, wenn die Parteien nicht darauf vertrauen konnten, dass 
der andere Teil den Vertrag erfüllen wird. Dass man sein Wort halt und ein gegebenes Versprechen 
nicht bricht, entspricht zwar einem Gebot der Moral. Aber niemand bezweifelt, dass das Moralische 
Gebotene in gewissem Umfang auch rechtlich erzwungen werden muss (…)”.33 
According to this statement combined with § 241 s. 1, in German law morals and law are not 
separable as far as performance of contractual obligations is concerned. Binding force of the contract 
implies a moral duty to perform contractual obligations. Without that, a contract would be 
powerless. This approach is, as will become clear in subsequent parts of this thesis, subject to 
debate, especially in common law jurisdictions. 
2.2.3.3 Dutch law 
The Dutch Civil Code defines the ‘overeenkomst’ in art. 6:213 s.1 BW: 
“Een overeenkomst in de zin van deze titel is een meerzijdige rechtshandeling, waarbij een of meer 
partijen jegens een andere een verbintenis aangaan.”34 
The definition in the Dutch Civil Code emphasizes the structural and dogmatic approach of the Dutch 
Civil Code towards the concept of contract. According to art. 3:33 and 3:35 BW, a juridical act is a 
declaration of will aiming at legal consequences. A multilateral juridical act presupposes agreement – 
a meeting of the minds – and an expression of the agreement by declarations of the parties. It should 
also be noted, that a contract as defined by art. 6:213 BW is only a specific type of contract, namely 
the contract resulting in and creating obligations.35 This type of contract as such is the only type of 
contract relevant for this thesis, but it should be taken into account that other multilateral juridical 
acts may also be labeled as ‘contracts’ in legal and daily vocabulary, such as for example the contract 
of marriage or the agreement between two private parties to meet in a restaurant at 5 p.m. The 
patrimonial nature of the definition of contract in the Civil Code is logical because this type of 
contract is the most common and most discussed type of contract. The principles underlying the law 
of contract specifically regards this type of contract. A contract not resulting in obligations – such as 
the contract of marriage e.g. – is less vulnerable for a different interpretation of the principle of the 
binding force. 
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 Kötz 2009, p. 12. 
34
 Art. 6:213 s. 1 BW: “A ‘contract’ within the meaning of this Title is a multilateral juridical act whereby one or 
more parties assume an obligation towards one or more other parties.” Translation from Warendorf 2009, p. 
697. 
35
 PG 1981, p. 837. Whereas the former Civil Code included an extensive part on obligatory contracts, the 
current Civil Code with its tiered structure does not, because it focuses on the concept of ‘juridical act’ (Book 
3). Only when a specific rule about a multilateral juridical act and indeed a contract is necessary, an additional 
rule is provided in Book 6. See Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-III 2010/5. 
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The Dutch Civil Code provides a structured scheme of the construction of a contract. A contract is 
concluded via offer and acceptance according to art. 6:217 BW. Offer and acceptance are both 
juridical acts. Both parties consciously aim at achieving a new legal situation, which the contract 
represents. The contract arises from juridical acts and is in itself a juridical act as well. Systematically, 
the will of the parties and the agreement on the terms are essential to build a contract. If the 
contract is established, the obligations arising from the contract should be performed. In this sense, 
the main principles of contract law are logically embedded in the structure of the Dutch Civil Code. 
Naturally, the picture is not complete. The law of remedies should shed some light on the strength of 
the obligations: which remedies a disappointed creditor has, once the debtor does not perform, is 
briefly discussed in section 1.3.3.3. 
2.2.4  ‘Contract’ in soft law bodies: PECL, DCFR and PICC 
The PECL ‘only’ sought a common core of contract law in legal systems in the European Union, i.e. 
the European Union in the 1990’s –  approximately 15 countries and as many jurisdictions plus Scots 
law. In finding a common core of private law the DCFR not only attempted to cover a wider area of 
private law next to general contract law rules –  i.e. rules of specific contracts, parts of tort law, 
property law, trust law and law of unjustified enrichment  –, but also covered a much wider area of 
jurisdictions. By 2009, when the final draft of the DCFR was finished, practically the complete 
European continent had been subject to this comparative research project. The PICC cover 
jurisdictions in the whole world, but with a focus on international commercial contracts. The drafters 
of these bodies of soft law faced the dilemma how to deal with the wide variety of notions of 
contract and how to merge them into a body which is supposed to represent a common core of 
contract, or even more ambitious, of private law. The most important lesson is that the approach 
differs from one body of soft law to another.  
The PECL serve many purposes as intended and formulated by the drafters36, but in essence they 
form a set of rules about contract law, construed after in-depth comparative research.  The PECL 
provide (semi) definitions of a few legal terms in art. 1:301 PECL, but not of the major term 
‘contract’. As the German and Dutch Civil Code, the PECL only provides a rule for the formation of 
contract. However, this provision reveals important information about the apparent result of seeking 
a common core of the notion of ‘contract’ 
Art. 2:101 s. 1 says: 
“A contract is concluded if: 
(a) the parties intend to be legally bound  
(b) they reach a sufficient agreement without further requirement.” 
The PECL base their concept of contract on a continental approach. A contract is not connected with 
the notion of enforceable promises, but with the intention of parties to be legally bound and 
subsequently, with the notion of ‘agreement’.  In the comments it is explicitly emphasized that any 
further requirement such as  the controversial requirement of consideration is not necessary to 
conclude a contract. However, although the PECL seem to opt for a fairly ‘continental’ concept of 
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 Lando & Beale 2000, p. xxiii. 
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contract, the absence of a clear choice is confusing. Art 2:107 PECL states that a promise which is 
intended to be legally binding without acceptance is binding. The concept of promise in the area of 
contract law is certainly in continental systems not very clear, if not absent. Therefore, the 
relationship between a contract and a promise within this soft law body remains unclear.  
The DCFR opts for a completely different approach. The Draft Common Frame of Reference consists 
of Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, as the official title of this 
academic body of comparative research states.37 Therefore, next to a wide variety of other legal 
definitions the DCFR defines the notion of contract. One of the reasons for incorporating definitions 
into the body of rules was the uncertainty arising from the PECL, because the terms used in the 
principles were not defined and not used consistently.38 
The DCFR at least attempts to partly prevent the problem. The DCFR defines a contract as follows in 
art. II.1:101 s. 1: 
“A ‘contract’ is an agreement which is intended to give rise to a binding legal relationship or to have 
some other legal effect. It is a bilateral or a multilateral juridical act.”39 
This definition is clearly based on a continental approach of a contractual relationship, because the 
juridical act as a basic construction stone for the contract is not known in common law jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, as the comments on this provision note, the notion of contract may as well define the 
agreement between the parties involved – as this definition does – as define the obligations arising 
from the agreement between the parties.  
In order to illustrate the diversity in opinions on defining the concept of contract, the PICC – i.e. the 
Unidroit Principles – should also be taken into account. The PICC restate existing rules for 
international commercial contracts, although they are used in other contexts as well. With regard to 
the concept of contract, the  drafters of the PICC did not opt for a unanimous definition of contract.  
The reason for it, according to an authoritative comment on the PICC, is as brief as it is slightly 
surprising:   
“A definition is not given and would indeed be hard to give in view of differences between legal 
systems. This does normally not lead to problems; the scope of the PICC can be derived from their 
provisions without the need for a definition.”40 
Although the first part of the comment as such is understandable, the conclusion may not be. The 
DCFR particularly illustrates that a wide variety in concepts essentially can be an important reason to 
choose for a specific definition of the concept of contract. However, one of the explanations may be 
the different historical background and the different purposes of both bodies. The DCFR is in the first 
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 See Von Bar & Clive 2009, Introduction. 
38
 Von Bar & Clive 2009, p. 10. “Ultimately, useful definitions cannot be composed without model rules and 
useful model rules can hardly be drafted without definitions”. It would be slightly awkward if the drafters had 
stated that models rules could not at all be drafted without definitions, because the value of the PECL would be 
questionable after this conclusion, whereas quite a few drafters of the DCFR were also involved in drafting the 
PECL.  
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 The DCFR also contains a list of definitions, in which the notion of contract is defined the same way. 
40
 Vogenauer & Kleinheisterkamp 2009, p. 32, 33. See also Oudin 2007, p. 520. 
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place an academic piece of work representing a common core of European private law. Moreover, 
the specific experience with its major predecessor, the PECL, learned that a lack of coherence in the 
terms used in the PECL led to a lack of clarity. Both elements support the idea for providing a 
definition of concepts with various interpretations, such as the concept of contract. The PICC on the 
other hand serve a much more practical purpose and are written for international and commercial 
contractual relations. The reason for not defining these elements either seems to be partly political, 
because the PICC is supposed to be based on many legal systems with various conceptions of 
contract and other legal terms.41 
2.2.5 The Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law: the notion of ‘contract’ 
The status of the DCFR as a potential hard law instrument – optional or not – has declined since 
serious political objections were raised against the DCFR as a harmonizing tool for European private 
law.42 As an academic text the DCFR retains its relevance, because it still contains valuable content 
for comparative research.  The urgency of making the DCFR politically relevant faded away since the 
recent introduction of a new European proposal on a Regulation for sales law, the regulation on  a 
Common European Sales Law (hereafter: CESL), introduced in October 2011.43 The explanatory 
memorandum accompanying the CESL explains the exact position of the CESL in the area of European 
private law and explains its objectives. The CESL aims to contribute to harmonization of the law of 
cross-border sales in Europe, especially in business-to-consumer relationships, but also in business-
to-business relationships where at least one party is a small or medium enterprise.44  
The CESL approaches the notion of contract as follows45: 
“‘contract’ means an agreement  intended to give rise to  obligations or other legal effects.” 
This definition is comparable with the approach in German and Dutch law. The political aims as well 
as the substantive aims of the CESL seem to be less ambitious than those of the DCFR, and therefore 
the CESL seems to be more balanced and less vulnerable to substantive and political criticisms. The 
specific provisions are nevertheless heavily inspired by their most recent academic predecessor, the 
DCFR. Difficulties still exist, especially regarding the various options member states have to widen the 
scope of the CESL, the implementation of the regulation in such a way that harmonization is indeed 
achieved and the potential overlap with other transnational instruments on sales law such as the 
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CISG, but these difficulties are already part of academic debate and some of them are also addressed 
in the CESL itself or its accompanying texts.46 
2.3 Contract, promise and obligation: various theoretical approaches 
A contract defines a specific relationship between the parties involved. The content of the 
relationship depends on the content of the contract and on the specific definition of the contract. 
However, it is fair to assume that parties involved in a contractual relationship show a certain 
commitment towards each other defined by the contract, which is absent  between strangers. 
Mutual commitment is an important aspect of a contractual relationship. The choice for a non-legal 
term here is deliberate, because the meaning and assessment of the commitment can differ 
substantially depending on the type of agreement between parties.  
A second aspect which should be mentioned is the voluntariness of the commitment. Parties 
voluntarily commit themselves via a contract. They are free to choose to conclude a contract, to 
choose with whom they conclude contracts and they are free to choose the content of the contract. 
The principle of freedom of contract is a basic principle, but the emphasized aspect at the moment is 
the voluntary action of the parties. They decide for themselves to be legally bound by a contract.47 
The objectives parties want to achieve by negotiating about an agreement are reflected by the level 
of commitment. Do parties rely on each other’s mutual gentlemen’s conduct or do they aim at 
creating legal consequences? The first situation does not require a contractual relationship, the last 
instance does. In general, the contract is the connection between intentions and consequences. If 
parties want to create legal relations between each other, they bind themselves via a contract. The 
contract consists of contractual obligations, which may be enforced once they are not fulfilled. 
These loosely formulated aspects of contracting are usually presented more generally as two key 
complementary principles:  freedom of contract on the one hand and the binding force of the 
contract on the other hand. These principles are present in every law of contract in every jurisdiction, 
but the content of these principles and their concrete position in the law of contract may – 
substantially – differ per jurisdiction. Therefore, this section does not intend to provide the ideal 
definition of a contract, but it intends to illustrate the differences in approach to the level of 
commitment via a contract. It has been said before, but the added value of this exercise in this 
chapter is that the problems with defining the notion of contract and other notions all have their 
impact on the approach of the concept of deliberate breach of contract.  
The approach to the notion of contract and the two core principles of freedom of contract and 
binding force so far is primarily a civil law approach. A common law approach towards the notion of 
contract emphasizes the economic aspect of the contract. This aspect is already strongly embedded 
in the common law, for example because of the ‘bargain’ aspect and the requirement of 
consideration in a common law context. Another important other aspect of a common law approach 
to the notion of contract is the role of the promise. The notion of promise itself has a strong moral 
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connotation. Several legal theory scholars have attempted to explain the relationship between 
promise and contract and the eventual moral aspect of the notion of contract. 
Fried has written extensively on the concept of contract. His approach towards contract is strongly 
influenced by moral considerations. He considers a contract itself as a promise. A promise has a 
strong moral basis. Fried says about this: 
“It is true that over the last two centuries citizens in the liberal democracies have become 
increasingly free to dispose of their talents, labor, and property as seems best to them. The freedom 
to bind oneself contractually to a future disposition is an important and striking example of this 
freedom (…), because in a promise one is taking responsibility not only for one’s present self but for 
one’s future self.”48 
Fried seems to acknowledge that a contract is about taking responsibility for future conduct. At this 
moment it is still unclear whether he also wishes to attach a moral component to this element of 
responsibility. It turns out he does: 
“The law of contract, just because it is rooted in promise and so in right and wrong, is a ramifying 
system of moral judgments (…)”.49 
Whereas it is clear that when Fried advances a promise principle in contract law with a certain moral 
content, he advances this argument in a common law context. 
“The natural expression of the promise principle in contract law is the disposition to hold a promisor 
to his word, to make him do what he has promised – or pay the equivalent of the promised 
performance.”50 
Keeping a promise is according to Fried apparently not the same as fulfilling the contractual 
obligation. This fundamental point of view to this phrase prominently returns in subsequent 
chapters, because for continental jurisdictions this essential point is not easily understandable. The 
concept is clear, but assessing performance and the financial value of the obligation as completely  
equal remedies is not a logical step for the continental lawyer. It is good to note this particular point 
early in this thesis, because it is a central element in the building process towards understanding the 
concept of deliberate breach. 
Smith provides a detailed account of theories of contract and contract law. He is not always clear in 
distinguishing between these two concepts, but he mainly theorizes on the law of contract, which 
goes beyond the concept of contract alone. This terminological problem is manifest in the title, but 
also elsewhere. More importantly, Smith approaches contract law from two perspectives: an analytic 
and a normative perspective. The first perspective elaborates on the question what the essential 
characteristics of a contractual obligation are.51 He describes several theories on which contract law 
may be based or, for that matter, the concept of contract itself. He describes promissory theories, 
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reliance theories and transfer theories without pretending to be complete. The promissory theory is 
explained by Fried. The basic idea of reliance theories is that  
“contractual obligations are obligations to ensure that others who we induce to rely upon us are not 
made worse off as a consequence of that reliance”.52 
The second, normative perspective elaborates on the questions how the enforcement of a 
contractual obligation should be justified. Smith elaborates on utilitarian or efficiency theories and 
rights-based theories to justify enforcement. Utilitarian theories justify contract law on the ground 
that contract law promotes well-being or ‘utility’, broadly defined.53 Rights-based theories regard 
contractual obligations as obligations not to infringe individual rights, and regard contract law as 
giving legal force to such obligations.54 Smith approaches these questions both from an analytical 
perspective and he argues that promissory theories best explain the characteristics of the contractual 
obligation, whereas the rights-based approach in his opinion is the best justification for the 
enforcement of the contractual obligation.55 
Kimel emphasizes the idea that an intention to create legal relations is a valid requirement in English 
law. However, he notes that little attention is paid to this requirement in the text books and in court 
cases. Parties should be aware not only of the voluntariness of creating an obligation, but of creating 
a legal obligation as well.56 Kimel theorizes on the notions of promise and contract and concludes 
that a promise is based on personal trust. Contract does not lack the personal trust element, but the 
enforceability of contracts renders the personal element less prominent. Contracts do not have the 
same intrinsic value as promises according to Kimel.57 
The interaction between promises and contracts is not a topic of discussion on the European 
continent, because promises are not considered as a constituent for creating contracts. The 
interaction between the notions of contract and contractual obligation and the enforceability of the 
obligation is naturally also a continental issue. The main principles of freedom of contract and 
binding force of the contract are relevant in determining the exact features of a contract. One of the 
most important issues is that the principle of the binding force seems to be an ambiguous term. On 
the one hand, this principle may be understood in the sense that it explains why a contract should be 
binding at all. On the other hand, the principle explains what binding force means for the parties who 
concluded a contract. What is the content of the binding obligation resulting from the contract?  
Whereas the first aspect generally attracts the major part of the attention, at least in academic 
literature, the second aspect is sometimes neglected, because it seems to be too obvious: a party to 
a contract should perform the contractual obligation. Hartkamp en Sieburgh even emphasize the 
second aspect in their leading work on Dutch private law: 
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“The more complex our society will become, the more types of contract will be needed by potential 
parties and the more urgent the confidence of the parties in performance of contractual obligations 
will become. Without this confidence, without the certainty that such promises (to perform) are 
kept, no society could develop itself economically.” 58 
The moral idea of keeping a contractual obligation is partially supported and partially denied by 
Oman, who offers an interesting view on the idea of contractual liability in general. According to him, 
a contractual relationship essentially contains a penalty clause in which the liable party may be 
subject to – physical - retaliation, if he does not perform the contractual obligation. Symbolically, 
such agreements were sealed by the hacking-up of an animal, e.g. a goat. Oman argues that modern 
litigation about breach of contract including the possible financial remedies of the creditor are just a 
more civilized version of the goat-ritual and its according promise. From this perspective, Oman 
explains several remedies in contract and the institution of contract and breach of contract. On the 
one hand, he seems to partially support the idea that contracts are more than financial bargains – a 
moral component in the form of a personal pledge is historically an element of the contractual 
relationship to solemnize the contract and make it more persuasive. On the other hand, he does not 
walk away from the idea that this historical account also leaves room for the idea that contracts 
provide economic incentives to show conduct compatible with contractual obligations without a 
further moral burden.59 
2.4 The notion of ‘breach of contract’ and remedies in contract 
2.4.1  Introductory remarks 
A common approach of all jurisdictions seems to be that a contract constitutes contractual 
obligations. Performance of these obligations is enforceable at law – i.e. the relationship between 
the parties is labeled as ‘contractual’ once it is enforceable at law. However, obligations may not be 
performed or not be performed correctly. Absence of performance or defective performance 
generally means a breach of the contractual obligations, which is mostly referred to as breach of 
contract. Breach of contract as a legal phenomenon is not approached equally in various legal 
systems as will be shown in the subsequent sections. It is important to note here that breach of 
contract can be generally approached along two yardsticks of seriousness.  
The first yardstick is the seriousness of the breach itself. Assessing the seriousness of the breach may 
be done in various ways, but one could imagine that breach of a secondary obligation may be less 
serious than breach of a primary obligation.60 For example, if A is obliged to deliver a new blue car to 
B on Monday 1 March, breach of the obligation to deliver a new car will be assessed more seriously – 
A offers B a second-hand car – than breach of the obligation to deliver on the 1 March in the form of 
a small delay – A delivers the car on Tuesday 2 March. Availability of remedy will often depend on 
the seriousness of the breach. This section highlights some of the ways legal systems deal with this 
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yardstick. An example is the notion of fundamental breach, which refers to a more serious breach 
than a non-fundamental breach. It is safe to say that every system recognizes that not every breach 
should be dealt with similarly, but every system chooses its own way to deal with this issue. 
A second yardstick of deciding on the legal consequences of breach is not the seriousness of the 
breach itself, but the degree of fault of the party committing breach. Apart from the seriousness of 
the breach itself, the reason of the debtor to commit breach, irrespective of the nature of the breach 
itself, may be relevant. A first distinction should be made between excusable and non-excusable 
breaches. A debtor may be confronted with extraordinary circumstances and as a consequence he 
may not be able to perform. The assessment of excuses and the role of fault is a topic on which 
differences exist between common law and continental law jurisdictions, but also within continental 
law jurisdictions. The borderline between excusable breaches and non-excusable breaches marks the 
potential liability. If the debtor is excused for the breach, he is not liable. If the debtor is not excused, 
he is liable. A further distinction, which is the core of this thesis, is a possible deliberate breach next 
to an ‘ordinary’ breach of contract. The contours of this second yardstick are presented in the third 
chapter.  
Breach of contract as a legal phenomenon is only relevant for a creditor to establish, if he may take 
legal action. The most important legal remedies which are generally available in case of a non-
excusable breach of contract are briefly mentioned and discussed as a preliminary outline for the far 
more elaborate discussion of remedies in contract in the sphere of deliberate breach of contract in 
Chapter 3 and subsequent chapters. These remedies are also discussed comparatively and the focus 
is on a claim of enforced performance, damages and termination. 
2.4.2 Breach of contract: a common law perspective 
Peel describes breach of contract as follows: 
“A breach of contract is committed when a party without a lawful excuse fails or refuses to perform 
what is due under the contract, or performs defectively or incapacitates himself from performing.”61 
This description needs some explanation. First, not every failure to perform can be labeled a breach 
of contract. Whether a breach of contract can be established, depends on the terms of the contract, 
express or implied. According to McKendrick, the breach lies in the failure to perform a contractual 
obligation.62 A few hurdles must be overcome to establish if a contractual obligation has been 
breached. The most important one is that the distinction between a promise and a mere condition is 
not always clear. It is for example not clear whether an estate agent who is engaged to find a buyer 
for a house makes any promise to do something.63 In order to establish breach, the obligation a party 
has to perform should be clear and unambiguous. However, that is not always possible. It may for 
example be questionable if an employer is obliged to offer the employee work under the 
employment contract (next to the obvious obligation to pay wages). Under circumstances, an 
employee seems to have a ‘right to work’, especially if reputation issues are at stake, but the validity 
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of this claim depends on the specific express or implied contract terms. Furthermore, performance 
must be due before a breach of the obligation can be established.64 
Second, if a party performs defectively, he can also be in breach of contract. Literally, defective 
performance is a contradictio in terminis, but the term has to be viewed in the light of complete non-
performance: the seller who delivers not at all next to the seller who delivers goods of a poorer 
quality or too late. The difference is relevant, because the effects of defective performance can be 
different from non-performance.65 
Third, the somewhat abstract phrase ‘incapacitation’ deserves explanation. For this thesis it is the 
most relevant way breach can occur, because the party who incapacitates himself from performing 
may do so deliberately. In the sphere of a sales contract of a specific thing a seller can incapacitate 
himself if he sells the good he promised to deliver to the original buyer to another buyer.66 He cannot 
perform any longer due to his own deliberate incapacitation. However, it is another matter if the 
deliberateness of the breach, in this case the self-induced incapacitation, adds anything special to the 
arsenal of remedies after breach of contract in comparison with ‘ordinary’ breach of contract.  
Last, under law many contractual duties are strict. Especially in cases where a buyer cannot pay the 
price or where the deliverer of generic goods cannot deliver the promised goods due to non-
performance of his own supplier or another reason, in general the other party does not have to 
establish fault to obtain a remedy due to breach of contract.67 Strict liability can be considered as the 
starting point instead of fault liability. However, it is very dangerous to make general statements like 
this referring to English law, as the bottom-up structure of English contract law seldom allows to 
generalize solutions and approaches chosen in specific cases.68 
The notion of breach of contract in US law is comparable to the English notion. Breach of contract 
generally constitutes liability and fault is not required to constitute breach of contract.69 In other 
words, justified non-performance cannot be labeled as breach of contract.70 Non-performance is not 
justified when performance comes due. Non-performance may be justified by an outside cause such 
as impracticability or frustration of purpose. 
2.4.3 Remedies in contract: a common law perspective 
In this section, the main possible remedies after breach of contract will be introduced, i.e. damages, 
actual performance of the contract and termination. 
Breach of contract is first and foremost a civil wrong. The concept of breach of contract does in itself 
not tell anything about the consequences of committing breach of contract. Breach of contract 
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creates the opportunity for the party affected by the breach to bring an action. At the same time, the 
party who breaches will be confronted with claims if the affected party chooses to do so.  
At this point a further difficulty concerning terminology emerges from English law. When actions of 
the claimant are going to be discussed, the objectives and nature of these actions should be 
established first, in order to understand the relative importance and scope of each reaction.  A first 
question would then be if the different reactions are to be considered as ‘right’ or as ‘remedies’ with 
the connected, secondary, questions what exactly these terms mean and what the difference is. A 
second question is which interests the various reactions seek to protect. Damages are primarily 
meant to be compensatory in the sense that a party will be compensated for lost expectations: 
damages are supposed to protect the expectation interest and the claimant receives expectation 
damages. It is not the purpose of this chapter to elaborate on this point extensively, but it has to be 
said that differences on this point exist.71 In any case, the way the different terms are used in this 
thesis should be accounted for. The term ‘remedy’ has a wide and a narrow meaning. If contrasted 
with ‘right’, a remedy in this situation represents a possible, legal reaction to a breach of contract. 
However, the creditor is not the actor to decide if and how the remedy should be used. He can ask 
the court to apply the remedy, but the court has discretionary powers and decides. In a wider sense, 
a remedy represents every possibility to react to a breach of contract and incorporates rights as well 
as remedies in the narrow sense. For example, the remedy of damages is available as of right to the 
creditor.  
A striking difference between US and English law regarding remedies after breach of contract is not 
the hierarchal structure – it is more or less the same: damages are available as of right, specific 
performance is the exception, but US law seems to recognize more flexibility in awarding other or 
additional monetary remedies than traditional damages: expectation or reliance damages. US law 
may generally accept breach of contract as an economic and sometimes efficient reality, but the 
possibilities to receive adequate financial compensation in a case of breach of contract seem to be 
more adequate than on the European continent.  Next to expectation and reliance damages and 
specific performance are restitution and punitive damages available as remedies in contract.72 These 
additional remedies may be available in cases of deliberate breach. It is already noteworthy that fault 
is generally not necessary to establish liability for breach of contract, whereas the degree of fault 
may influence the availability of certain remedies.  
At this point, it is not specifically relevant to discuss all remedies in English and US law in detail. 
Attention will be paid to the core standard remedies damages, specific performance and termination. 
2.4.3.1 Damages 
The first and most important remedy for breach of contract under English law is the remedy of 
damages. Damages are available as of right after a breach of contract. Peel alleges that a claim for 
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damages is one for compensation in money for the fact that the claimant has not received the 
performance he bargained for. 73  Most importantly, damages are primarily meant to be 
compensatory. The ultimate objective of damages is to bring the party who claims damages after 
breach of contract into a financial position as if the contract had been correctly performed, generally 
referred to as ‘expectation damages’. The key yardstick to assess the claim for damages and the 
amount of damages is the loss of the claimant and the eventual gain by the breaching party.74 In 
general, the victim may claim expectation damages: damages which reflect the justified expectations 
of the claimant had the contract been correctly performed. However, two other grounds for 
awarding damages can be used in appropriate circumstances. Firstly, the claimant may claim reliance 
based damages instead of expectation based damages. In such a case, the claimant should be 
brought into a position as if the contract had never been concluded. This option is for example 
relevant where the claimant has already made a substantial investment on the basis of the contract. 
The claimant could also have struck a bad bargain.75 In such a case he is better off by claiming 
reliance damages than expectation damages. More important for this thesis is the claim for 
restitution based “damages”. The claim pursued is actually not one for damages because a claim for 
restitution is not based on the claimant’s loss but on the gain of the defendant. In this situation a 
claim for restitution results in both parties being put into the situation as if the contract had not been 
concluded. The differences between these three major types of losses will not be discussed. A claim 
for restitution damages is not always available for the claimant, but as being stated before, for the 
purpose of this thesis it is relevant whether a claim can be established to reclaim any gain of the 
defendant after a deliberate breach of contract.76 The House of Lords decides that only under very 
specific circumstances a claimant can recover the gain of the defendant after breach of contract. 
2.4.3.2 Actual performance of the contract 
The second remedy which may be available to the victim in case of breach of contract is a form of 
specific relief, by way of injunction or specific performance. This remedy differs substantially from 
damages, because it is not available as of right to the victim. In general, damages are the primary 
remedy. The main rule is that only if damages are not adequate as compensation, specific 
performance may be available.77 However, the court has discretionary power to grant an order for 
specific performance. Of course, the court cannot use its discretion at will. The scope of this remedy 
in equity is limited by a variety of criteria or ‘Fallgruppen’. The approach which this thesis chooses to 
adopt regarding specific performance is the availability of specific performance in the case of 
deliberate breach of contract. Can any trace be found that deliberateness of the breach plays a role 
by awarding the claimant the remedy of specific performance? If so, the legal possibility to commit 
deliberate breach may be seriously reduced. One more general remark should be made at this point. 
The attention for specific performance as a serious and useful remedy has increased over the last few 
decades. However, the most recent leading case, Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores 
(Holdings) Ltd, reminds the reader that specific performance is still an exception.78 The combination 
of specific performance being the exceptional remedy and damages in principle only being available 
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on the basis of loss of the claimant, leads to a fundamental conclusion that committing deliberate 
breach is under English law for a possibility for the debtor, because the creditor does not have the 
critical tool – a claim for enforced performance – to avoid deliberate breach. 
Whereas specific performance as a secondary remedy is not available as of right, the hierarchy of 
remedies should be viewed differently where the obligation is for a specific amount of money.  In 
other words, in a simple sales or service contract, the rules on specific performance are only 
applicable on the obligation to deliver the goods or to perform the service concerned, but not on the 
reciprocal obligation to pay the price. The party who claims the price may rely on the action for the 
agreed sum. This action is in effect a claim for performance. The restrictions on the remedy for 
specific performance – only the court can order specific performance under specific conditions – do 
generally not apply if the aggrieved party claims payment of the price, because the action for the 
agreed sum is a different remedy.  If in subsequent chapters the influence of deliberateness of the 
breach is examined further in concrete cases, it is essential to keep in mind which obligation of the 
contract is breached: the core obligation after which the contract is generally named – i.e. the sale, 
the service etc. – or the payment of the price.79 
In addition to the standard remedies damages and specific performance, English law also recognizes 
the exceptional remedy of damages in lieu of specific performance. Only in exceptional 
circumstances may the court award damages in situations where a claimant does not have a claim for 
‘common law’ expectation damages.  The award for damages in lieu of specific performance means 
that damages may replace or be added to an honored request for specific performance. An example 
of such a situation is the case of an anticipatory breach of contract. When the aggrieved party does 
not accept the breach, the court may order specific performance after which damages may be 
claimed in lieu of performance.80 Damages may be awarded in addition to specific performance for 
delay in completion.81 
2.4.3.3 Termination 
In order to be complete, some attention should be paid to a third remedy which can be invoked, 
namely termination of the contract. In case of breach of contract the victim can under certain 
circumstances terminate the contract. Both parties are relieved from their obligations. Subsequently, 
the victim can also claim damages for the losses suffered due to the breach of contract. However, 
termination is a complicated remedy, because not every breach of contract offers the victim the right 
to terminate. Within the spectrum of this thesis, termination as a legal remedy after breach of 
contract does not seem to be very relevant, because the breaching party will not object to 
termination, as he has chosen to breach the contract himself, precisely because he does not want 
keep the contract alive. Termination only becomes relevant as a legal issue if the breaching party 
would rather keep the contract alive and puts up a defense consisting of the reasoning that he did 
not commit any substantial breach, if at all. However, the importance of this remedy is shown if one 
considers that termination is just one of the tools the aggrieved party may use to remedy breach of 
contract. The contract may not be kept alive, but the aggrieved party may achieve justice if the 
remedy of termination is available. 
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The difficulty regarding the remedy of termination is that it depends on the one hand on the type of 
breach – fundamental or not – and on the other hand on the type of the contract term which has 
been broken to assess whether termination is a possibility.82 A distinction in different types of 
contract terms is a typical feature of the common law. Civil law jurisdictions do generally not know 
such a distinction.83 In general, three types of terms can be distinguished: conditions, warranties and 
innominate terms. First, breach of conditions always allows the victim to terminate the contract. 
Second, breach of a warranty does not. The intermediate variant is breach of an innominate term. 
Whether termination is possible in this case generally depends on the seriousness of the breach, 
which is closely connected to the nature of the term. The difficulty is to establish what the nature of 
a contractual term is. This distinction can be contractually arranged and then it is relatively easy, but 
if not, much discussion can arise about this issue.84  Seriousness of the breach is also, as mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, closely connected with motive of the party committing breach, although the 
terms are not equal. Therefore, it is relevant to briefly introduce the way English law deals with the 
factor seriousness of the breach in assessing remedies. 
Under US legal terminology – i.e. according to section 2-106 of Uniform Commercial Code – 
‘termination’ is an available action for a party confronted with non-performance not being breach of 
contract, whereas ‘cancellation’ is the term reserved for the action of terminating the contract after 
breach.85 ‘Cancellation’ under US law is treated as a so-called defensive remedy. It can only be 
activated if breach of contract is ‘substantial’. Apparently, although every breach leads to liability in 
contract, not every breach is sufficient to make termination of the contract available. The defense 
component of the remedy is the fact that both parties after termination are not bound by the 
contract.  
2.4.4 The notion of ‘breach of contract’ and remedies in contract: a continental law perspective 
Several European continental systems treat breach of contract differently from common law 
systems. Breach of contract is preceded by the notion non-performance which may generally be 
imputable or not. However, for structural reasons it is already relevant to know that continental 
systems generally treat performance of the contractual obligation – after breach or not – as a right 
resulting from the contract. Therefore, it is not logical to discuss enforced performance as a remedy 
after breach of contract. Consequently, this section is not structured in themes, but in jurisdictions. 
2.4.4.1 French law 
French law recognizes three major actions which may be available after breach of contract: enforced 
performance, termination and damages. French law does not know the term breach of contract as 
such, but uses the term ‘inexécution de l’obligation’. A first remark should be that this term does not 
attach any label to the conduct of the party in breach. It only says that a contractual obligation has 
not been performed.  
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In general, French law provides the disappointed creditor with two options in the case of breach of 
contract: enforced performance – ‘exécution forcée’ –  or termination of the contract – ‘résolution’. 
This choice can be found in art. 1184 s.2  Cc.86 According to Fages, French law does not recognize a 
hierarchy in remedies in this respect . Parties are in principle free to prefer one remedy above the 
other in case of breach of contract.87 That seems to be slightly harsh, because according to art. 1184 
s.2 Cc, a party must request the court to resolve the contract. Moreover, according to section 3, the 
court may delay termination under certain circumstances. The disappointed party can, logically, not 
choose both. Either the contract remains existing and is enforced, or the contract is terminated.   
According to art. 1142 Cc the remedy of ‘exécution forcée’  is only available if the contract 
constitutes an obligation to give. However, this provision may sound somewhat misleading, because 
the courts may also allow enforced performance in cases of breach of obligations to do.88 Only 
obligations to do of a very personal nature cannot be enforced, at least not by the remedy of 
enforced performance.89 
Enforced performance is available as of right to the creditor. The occurrence of damage is not 
required. The absence of this requirement again places enforced performance ahead of another 
major remedy in the case of breach of contract: damages. The limits on enforced performance are 
not discussed in detail here. The most important aspect of this remedy seems to be its primary 
position in French law, at least in theory, although the real power of this remedy is somewhat hidden 
due to art. 1184 Cc and especially art. 1142 Cc. 
When the remedy of damages is studied more closely, a terminological issue should be resolved in 
the first place. The remedy of damages in French law is linked to the term ‘responsabilité 
contractuelle’ – liability in contract. In common law language breach of contract and liability in 
contract are almost synonymous, because damages are the primary remedy in common law. In other 
words, a situation of breach of contract is the standard situation in which a party is liable in contract 
and must pay damages. That is not the case in French law. A party in breach can be held liable in the 
sense that the disappointed party can claim enforced performance from the party in breach in case a 
contractual obligation has not been performed. The  disappointed party can also terminate the 
contract under certain circumstances. However, under French law a party is only liable in contract if 
the disappointed party claims damages. This terminological choice can be explained, because the two 
other remedies can generally be invoked without the presence of imputability on the side of the 
party in breach.  
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The primary provisions on damages are artt. 1146, 1147 and 1148 Cc. From these provisions, the 
main requirements to constitute liability for damages arise: breach of contract, damage, causality 
between breach and damage and imputability. It should be emphasized that imputability and breach  
of contract are treated as two separate requirements. Imputability arises when the debtor is at fault, 
but also if the debtor is not personally at fault, he can be liable for actions of his employees or for the 
use of malfunctioning objects. The breach is only not imputable in the case of a ‘cause etrangère’, so 
fault is not an essential requirement.90 
From the perspective of this thesis, the role of fault in holding the party in breach liable in damages 
deserves more detailed attention. According to Fages, it is not relevant to use the term ‘faute 
contractuelle’ (contractual wrong) in relation to breach of contract, because he equals breach of 
contract with contractual wrong. It is even less relevant to establish the seriousness of the wrong. 
Whether the debtor has committed breach by accident or intentionally, whether the seriousness of 
the wrong was high, normal or low, liability can always be established.91 
This statement seems to be somewhat sharp considering the structure of the remedy of damages.  
The breach of contract cannot be equivalent to the degree of wrongfulness of the party in breach, 
because if the breach is not imputable, the party in breach is not liable. Moreover, as we shall see, 
art. 1150 Cc recognizes the legal relevance of intentional conduct of the party in breach, because in 
the situation of intentional breach, unforeseen losses may also be claimed.  This is not possible in the 
case of ‘normal’ breach of contract.  
2.4.4.2 German law 
The German law of obligations has significantly been changed in the recent past. The new law of 
obligations came into force on 1 January 2002 and the structure of the BGB concerning  remedies in 
contract is now based on the European Directive 1999/44/EC on consumer sales.92 The use of the 
term ‘breach of contract’ suggests an overlap with the common law concept of breach of contract, 
but there are striking differences. 
The key term in German law regarding breach of contract is ‘Leistungsstörung’.93 A fundamental issue 
in German law is that breach of contract in order to cause liability in contract, unlike the common law 
term, includes fault of the debtor. A corresponding fundamental issue is that according to German 
contract law the contractual relationship should be kept alive. This concept of breach of contract has 
direct consequences for the available remedies and for the remedial hierarchy. German law 
considers performance of the contractual obligation as the most important remedy, the so-called 
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‘Primäranspruch’. This remedy is not exactly a reaction to breach of contract, because enforced 
performance as such is primarily based on the contract itself.94 Therefore, this remedy can also be 
qualified as a right to performance resulting from the contract. The creditor has a right to 
performance from the moment the contract is concluded – naturally taking into account the agreed 
time of performance. Other remedies, such as damages and termination, only become available 
when breach of contract is established – including fault of the debtor – and they attempt to remedy 
the harmful consequences of breach of contract. Relying on the secondary major remedy, damages, 
is qualified as ‘Sekundäranspruch’. The remedy of termination – ‘Rücktritt’– is available in the case of 
breach of contract in order to release the innocent party from the obligation to perform himself. 
Consequently, this remedy is only available in synallagmatic contracts.95 
2.4.4.3 Dutch law 
The notion of breach of contract is – in translation – not used in Dutch law. The more technocratic 
term ‘toerekenbare tekortkoming’ is the correct term. The tiered structure of the Civil Code allowed 
the lawmaker to introduce a difference between an imputable breach, a breach and a non-
performance. For purposes of understanding remedial relief in Dutch law, the only relevant thing to 
take into account is that damages are only available if breach of contract is imputable. 
The primary reason for such a distinction lies in the systematic approach of Dutch contract law, 
starting from the contract itself. The law centralizes the contract and provides everything to keep the 
contract and the underlying relationship between the parties alive. That is why enforcing the 
contract by awarding the aggrieved party actual performance of the contract as of right serves as the 
primary remedy. This statement is even inaccurate, because it suggests that actual performance is 
only a remedy after ‘breach of contract’. Actual performance of the contract – more specifically: the 
contractual obligation – may be claimed as of right. The only restriction is therefore that the 
contractual obligation is due. The primary position of this right is not directly present in the Civil 
Code, but art. 3:296 BW at least covers the procedural side of the right to performance, because it 
says that the court must honor a claim to performance without any discretion beyond the exceptions 
mentioned in the same article.  
In practice, the right to performance is not absolute taking into account the exceptions.96 Taking into 
account the primary position of actual performance as a right, directly resulting from the contract, 
‘breach of contract’ is not necessary for invoking actual performance.97 
According to art. 6:74 BW, the remedy of damages is generally only available after the debtor is given 
another chance to perform  – which indicates the secondary nature of this remedy  –  and only in the 
case of imputable breach of contract. Non-performance as such is not sufficient, something more is 
required. Technically however, it is the creditor who must prove the imputability of the breach. 
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Without any action of the creditor on this point, breach is assumed to be imputable. In any case, 
according to Dutch law liability in contract is not strict. Imputability should not be equalized with 
‘fault’, because it has a more extensive meaning. Certain risks outside fault can also be attributed to 
the debtor in order to make the breach imputable.98 Furthermore, Dutch law draws a sharp 
distinction between establishing liability and the subsequent award of damages. Damages are dealt 
with in a separate part of the Civil Code. Once the court has decided that the claim for damages of 
the creditor is valid, the court has several instruments at its disposal to adapt the level of damages to 
the particulars of the case. Damages in contract are generally assessed on the basis of a positive 
interest of the creditor. The debtor should pay damages to the level as if the contract had been 
correctly performed.99  
As far as termination is concerned, art. 6:265 BW allows the creditor to terminate the contract. 
Termination is also a secondary remedy, because in general the debtor should have had the 
opportunity – a second chance –  to perform correctly. Dutch law recognizes the possibility for a 
partial termination, in many cases this results in a price reduction. In the recent past Dutch law 
struggled with the remedy of termination in the sense, that is was not completely clear if termination 
could be invoked for every breach of contract or only for serious breaches of contract. Dutch law 
does not recognize the notion of fundamental breach of contract. However, art. 6:265 BW defines a 
minimal limit in order to make termination as a remedy available to the creditor. The creditor is not 
allowed to terminate if the breach does not “justify” termination which is the case when the breach 
itself is minor.100 The Dutch Hoge Raad decided in several cases that applicability of the exception of 
minor breach is exceptional and that in virtually all cases of breach of contract, termination is 
available as a remedy.101 On the other hand, it should be taken into account that seriousness of the 
breach is a factor which is taken into account in assessing the availability and extent of remedies in 
contract and possible defenses of the party in breach.102 
2.5 A curiosum? CISG, PICC, DCFR, CESL and the notion of fundamental breach 
The CISG provides content which proves to be useful in the preparation for the exploration of the 
notion of deliberate breach of contract. Although in force since 1980, The CISG has a long history, 
because it was already in the beginning of the 20th century that many countries realized that the 
sales contract was becoming the most important contract. An international provision to deal with 
this type of contract smoothly was therefore inevitable. Paradoxically, the CISG applies to contracts 
of sale of goods, but it does not define ‘sale’ nor ‘goods’ nor ‘contract of sale of goods’. Some 
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difficulties may arise, but generally the lack of a definition in this respect does not cause large 
problems.103 
The notion of ‘breach of contract’ in the CISG is specifically noteworthy, because the CISG follows the 
common law where fault as a requirement for the remedy of damages is not necessary. On the other 
hand, it is slightly confusing how the CISG faces the right or remedy of actual performance.  In 
principle, seller and buyer may require performance under the CISG. However, art. 28 CISG limits the 
possibilities of the buyer.  
Art. 28 CISG: 
“If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is entitled to require performance 
of any obligation by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a judgement for specific 
performance unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale 
not governed by this Convention.” 
This provision explicitly mentions specific performance for the benefit of common law systems, but 
more importantly, it does not choose the continental law approach whereby the right to 
performance is available as of right.104 
In addition to the CISG, it is also useful to take a closer look at the soft law bodies such as PECL, DCFR 
and PICC. The added value of these soft law vehicles is that they contain common cores of private 
law and, more specifically, contract law. What soft law vehicles do with notions with various and 
different interpretations such as contract, breach of contract and remedies in contract is relevant for 
this thesis, because in this thesis these notions are used in a context of specific jurisdictions or a 
comparative context. As far as traditional remedies are concerned, it is safe to state that in general 
PECL and DCFR choose a continental law model. This means that both sets of principles point out 
actual performance of the contract as the primary remedy. The influence of the common law 
remains visible and sometimes causes confusion in interpretation.105 
As far as the remedy of termination is concerned, some attention has to be paid to the notion of 
fundamental breach of contract. In the overview on common law concerning termination, this 
remedy attracted some attention, because it  could not be invoked in the case of every breach of 
contract. Only breach of a condition triggers the availability of termination as a remedy. The breach 
itself need not be more serious, but the part of the label ‘condition’ attributes the level of 
seriousness of the breach, because any breach of a condition opens the gate towards termination. 
Some supranational bodies of law or legal instruments, more precisely the CISG, the PICC and the 
DCFR, also recognize a qualified level of breach, but not in the same way. 
Art. 25 CISG: 
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“A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such detriment 
to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract, 
unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the same kind in the same 
circumstances would not have foreseen such a result.” 
Art. 8:103 PECL states: 
“A non-performance of an obligation is fundamental to the contract if: 
(a)strict compliance with the obligation is of the essence of the contract; or 
(b) the non-performance substantially deprives the aggrieved party of what is was entitled to expect 
under the contract, unless the other party did not foresee and could not reasonably have foreseen 
that result; or 
(c) the non-performance is intentional and gives the aggrieved party reason to believe that it cannot 
rely on the other party’s future performance.” 
Art. III.3:502 s. 2 DCFR states: 
“A non-performance of a contractual obligation is fundamental if 
(a) it substantially deprives the creditor of what the creditor was entitled to expect under the 
contract, as applied to the whole or relevant part of the performance, unless at the time of 
conclusion of the contract the debtor did not foresee and could not reasonably be expected to have 
foreseen that result or 
(b) it is intentional or reckless and gives the creditor reason to believe that the debtor’s future 
performance cannot be relied on.” 
Art. 7.3.1, s. 2 PICC states: 
“In determining whether a failure to perform an obligation amounts to a fundamental non-
performance regard shall be had, in particular, to whether 
(a) the non-performance substantially deprives the aggrieved party of what it was entitled to expect 
under the contract unless the other party did not foresee and could not reasonably have foreseen 
such result; 
(b)strict compliance with the obligation which has not been performed is of essence under the 
contract; 
(c) the non-performance is intentional or reckless; 
(d) the non-performance gives the aggrieved party reason to believe that it cannot rely on the other 
party’s future performance; 
(e) the non-performing party will suffer disproportionate loss as a result of the preparation or 
performance if the contract is terminated.” 
The CESL also contains a provision on the meaning of fundamental non-performance, art. 87 s. 2: 
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“Non-performance of an obligation by one party is fundamental if: 
(a) it substantially deprives the other party of what that party was entitled to expect 
under the contract, unless at the time of conclusion of the contract the nonperforming 
party did not foresee and could not be expected to have foreseen that result; or 
(b) it is of such a nature as to make it clear that the non-performing party’s future 
performance cannot be relied on.” 
The general idea is that termination of the contract should not be available as a remedy without a 
good reason. Terminating the contract is considered to be a tough remedy, which on the one hand 
cancels contractual obligations of the parties and on the other hand forces the parties to undo what 
they already did under the previously existing contract. A small breach of contract is not sufficient to 
make termination available, but even a ‘normal’ breach is not. Only a fundamental breach is 
sufficient to trigger the remedy of termination. The CISG, the DCFR , the PICC and the CESL all 
incorporated this notion. The question is what fundamental breach exactly means. When is a breach 
fundamental? As the three mentioned provisions show, the three instruments use different 
definitions. For this thesis, it is of course essential that the DCFR and the PICC explicitly define 
intentional breach as a fundamental breach, whereas the CISG and the CESL do not. All instruments 
recognize on the other hand that fundamental breach occurs when the aggrieved party is 
substantially deprived of the very object of the contract. Two questions are relevant in this section. In 
the first place the question arises why exactly ‘ordinary’ breach of contract cannot be sufficient to 
invoke certain remedies. This idea of ‘levels’ of breach already suggests that the level of seriousness 
of the breach plays a role. A second question concerns the significance of the motive of the 
breaching party and, more specifically,  why it is relevant in the context of the PICC and the DCFR, but 
as it seems not in the context of the CISG and the CESL. At this moment, it is almost sufficient to ask 
these questions. A start of an answer may be provided, but in the course of this thesis, the 
relationship between motive and seriousness of the breach is dealt with more extensively. 
The PICC contains the clearest explicated notion of fundamental breach and gives explicit attention 
to the notion of intentional breach as a form of fundamental breach. However, the importance of 
this notion is immediately downplayed a bit by the official comments on the PICC.106 In case a breach 
is intentional, but insignificant, the principle of good faith can block the non-performance to become 
fundamental. 
The PECL and the DCFR are also very brief about the connection between fundamental breach and 
intentional breach. Seriousness of the breach gets much attention, but this factor is not directly 
linked with the intention of the party in breach. It should be mentioned that the provisions in the 
PECL and DCFR do not qualify an intentional breach directly as a fundamental breach. A second 
requirement next to the deliberateness of the breach is that the aggrieved party must have reason to 
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believe that the debtor’s future performance cannot be relied on. In my opinion, an intentional 
breach by its very nature causes justified lack of confidence in the debtor’s future performance. The 
connection with future performance may therefore not only be a requirement but also a justification 
to qualify intentional breach as fundamental. In addition, there may be cases where a party 
intentionally withholds performance, e.g. because he is angry about another, unrelated transaction.  
In such cases the additional requirement may have added value.107 Although the wording of the 
provision in the CESL is similar to the wording of the comparable provision of the DCFR, the reference 
to intentional non-performance is omitted. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the minimal 
difference in formulation now implies that intentional breach is also covered by referring to the 
‘nature’ of the breach. 
The provision in the CISG does not mention that intentional breach may also constitute fundamental 
breach. The definition of fundamental breach reveals the most important precondition – substantial 
deprivation of what is to be expected from the contract –, but leaves out several others. Intention as 
a factor of interest is not mentioned, but neither is e.g. the level of damage of the aggrieved party.108 
However, in both cases one must be careful not to conclude that motive of the party in breach does 
not play a role at all. Some authors infer from the notion fundamental breach itself that intentional 
breach is fundamental.109 Moreover, in concrete situations intentional breach practically always leads 
to fundamental breach. An intentional, definite refusal to perform before or at the time when 
performance is due constitutes a fundamental breach, unless the refusal was justified. 110 
Furthermore, the text of the provision may at least include some sort of intention of the parties. The 
consequences of a breach of contract may not always be foreseeable, but in most cases parties will 
know the extent of the breach and the damage they cause by committing breach of contract.111 
However, the question whether a breach is fundamental, when the consequences for the aggrieved 
party are minimal whereas the breach itself was intentional, is not directly answered by the CISG. 
2.6 Breach of contract anticipated upon by parties: penalty clauses and exclusion clauses 
Standard remedies offer aggrieved parties a possibility to react on breach of contract, when no 
provision is incorporated in the contract with regard to breach of contract and its consequences. The 
principle of freedom of contract in general entails that parties are able to arrange the consequences 
of breach of contract in terms of remedies in the contract itself. Two possibilities deserve to be 
mentioned specifically, because deliberateness of the breach may influence their application too. 
2.6.1 Penalty clauses and liquidated damages clauses 
The first contractual arrangement which needs to be mentioned is the penalty clause. Parties may 
incorporate a clause into their contract which is connected to the primary obligation of the contract. 
If a party does not fulfill the obligation according to the contract, he receives a penalty according to 
                                                          
107
 Lando & Beale 2000, p. 366 and Von Bar & Clive 2009, p. 855. These comments mention several theoretical 
examples where intentional and fundamental breach come together – inter alia an example of double sale –, 
but there is no additional explanation of these examples. 
108
 Schlechtriem & Schwenzer 2005, p. 283. 
109
 Schlechtriem & Schwenzer 2005, p. 285; Honsell & Brunner 2010, Art. 25; OLG Hamburg, 14 december 1994, 
CISG-online 216 5. Zivilsenat, 14.12.1994, 5 U 224/93.  
110
 For example, in case of a retention right Schlechtriem & Schwenzer 2005, p. 293. 
111
 Zeller 2009, p. 199-203. 
36 
 
the penalty clause. The purpose of a penalty clause is in general twofold. First, the penalty clause 
serves as an incentive for the other party to perform correctly. In other words, a penalty clause with 
a substantive clause may be a mechanism to prevent breach of contract. Second, if breach occurs, 
the amount mentioned in the penalty clause may replace the amount of expectation damages the 
aggrieved party would be able to claim. In other words, a penalty clause may save costly proceedings 
on the exact level of damages. The penalty clause is therefore also a clause incorporating an 
agreement on damages. 
In comparative perspective, many legal systems recognize the possibility of parties to include a 
penalty clause into their contract, but important differences also exist, which will become especially 
relevant, once the potential influence of deliberateness of the breach on the validity of the specific 
clause is assessed.  
Briefly summarized, common law systems only recognize the clause which provides a pre-estimate of 
potential damages. This type of clause is generally referred to as a ‘liquidated damages clause’ or an 
‘agreed damages clause’. A clause implying only the element of the incentive for the party to perform 
correctly – or in other words – a clause in terrorem of the other party in case of non-performance is 
labeled as a ‘penalty clause’ and is generally not valid in common law jurisdictions.112 The ‘penalty’ 
element is difficult to accept for common law jurisdictions, because they tend to consider these 
clauses primarily as clauses arranging damages, whereas the standard remedy of damages in 
contract law only serves the objective of compensation and not – not even on a secondary level – the 
objective of punishment or deterrence.  Especially English law draws a sharp line between the 
liquidated damages clause and the penalty clause. Because parties may prefer to include this type of 
clause into their contracts for both reasons, the House of Lords and lower courts had to decide on 
the matter of labeling: which clauses are penalty clauses and not allowed? The landmark decision in 
this area is the case of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Ltd. v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd.113 The most 
important requirement for a clause to be labeled as a liquidated damages clause is that it must 
contain a genuine pre-estimate of the damages in case of a – future – breach of contract. The pre-
estimate need not be similar to the concrete amount of damages suffered. Although parties do often 
not explain their specific intentions on this type of clause, this system of a strict distinction between 
liquidated damages and penalty clauses does not only cause uncertainty for parties. When a clause is 
labeled as a liquidated damages clause, the court cannot easily mitigate the amount mentioned in 
the clause, even if it is substantially higher than the amount of actual damage.114 
In continental jurisdictions, the law is less strict towards the nature of a penalty clause. Whether the 
clause is meant to be a liquidated damages clause or a ‘pure’ penalty clause, is not decisive for its 
validity. Although parties have more freedom in this respect, this freedom is slightly made undone by 
the relatively large possibility for courts to mitigate the penalty mentioned in the clause.115 The 
competence to mitigate is not endless – it is for example in general not sufficient if the actual 
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amount damages is lower than the amount mentioned in the clause –, but in comparison to the 
common law approach courts have more space to intervene.  
In subsequent chapters it will become clear that the possibility to incorporate a clause into the 
contract with a substantial amount to pay for the party who commits breach plays an interesting role 
once deliberate breach of contract as a legal phenomenon is studied more closely. On the one hand, 
one can imagine that the validity of a pure penalty clause could have a preventive effect on 
deliberate breach of contract and on the other hand one could imagine that a deliberate breach of 
contract could have a negative effect on the willingness of the court to mitigate the concrete amount 
mentioned in the penalty clause. 
2.6.2 Exclusion and limitation clauses 
A second way for parties to anticipate on breach of contract is to incorporate an exclusion clause into 
the contract. Exclusion clauses may take into account the possible monetary consequences of breach 
of contract.  By limiting or even excluding liability after breach of contract, parties may exactly be 
able to calculate the risks of a contract. Clauses excluding or limiting liability exist in many variations. 
Parties may exclude liability for specific type of damage, such as economic loss or consequential loss. 
They may also exclude liability for damages beyond a certain fixated amount.  Although parties are in 
general allowed to arrange their own contractual relationship including the legal relationship arising 
after an eventual breach of contract, not every type of exclusion or limitation of liability is allowed 
under all circumstances. Sometimes, the lawmaker provides rules or guidelines on how parties may 
make use of exclusion clauses – e.g. from a perspective of consumer protection, European directives 
provide rules for the use of exclusion clauses in business to consumer contracts –, but courts also 
tend to assess each contract and each exclusion clause on its merits. Capacity of the parties, type of 
contract, type of exclusion clause: these circumstances in every legal system play a role once after a 
breach of contract a court must assess the validity of the exclusion clause.116 This thesis is not the 
place to analyze the specific differences between legal systems regarding the validity tests of 
exclusion clauses.117 Nevertheless, the influence of deliberateness of the breach on the validity of 
exclusion clauses is a perspective which returns in this thesis. This element is relevant, because 
deliberateness of the breach may not only be able to modify application of standard remedies after 
breach of contract, but also remedies in the contract itself such as exclusion clauses. 
The relation between deliberateness of the breach and the exclusion clause is explored in Chapter 4 
on a concrete level. A confusing element in the area of exclusion clauses is that a specific type of 
exclusion clauses already deals with deliberateness. Parties sometimes attempt to limit their liability 
for damages caused by intentional or grossly negligent behavior. They may do so by incorporating a 
specific clause mentioning damage caused after intentional or grossly negligent behavior or they may 
attempt to persuade the court that damage caused by intentional or grossly negligent behavior is 
also covered by a general exclusion clause. An example is the plumber who deliberately throws a 
pipe down the stairs after a reconstruction of a bathroom. When the pipe hits the wall, the wall gets 
damaged. If the plumber attempts to rely on an exclusion clause in his contract with his client, a 
court will generally deny the defense of the plumber referring to his intentional behavior which 
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causes the damage. This situation is an interesting one, but it is slightly different from the core 
perspective of this thesis.  In the example the plumber does not commit breach of contract in the 
sense that he deliberately demolishes the bathroom or in the sense that he does not show up at all 
because he accepted a better paid job. The question this thesis is primarily interested in is whether 
the plumber in the example can rely on the exclusion or limitation clause once he deliberately avoids 
performance of the core obligation or deliberately underperforms and how courts should react to 
this type of deliberate breach of contract. 
2.7 Conclusion 
After examining the general notions of contract and breach, some important conclusions can be 
learned before embarking on the core topic of this thesis: deliberate breach of contract.  
The general concepts discussed in this chapter, such as ‘contract’, ‘breach of contract’ and various 
remedies cannot easily be described and defined, because of terminological and systematical 
differences within and between every jurisdiction mentioned. A contract in a common law 
jurisdiction may be comparable to a contract in a civil law jurisdiction, but it is a different concept in 
both types of jurisdiction. Expectation damages may be a more or less similar remedy in common law 
jurisdictions as in civil law jurisdictions, but the remedy itself has another position in the remedial 
hierarchy in the jurisdiction concerned. Attempting to compare various notions in various systems 
inevitably leads to a certain degree of confusion. The creation of confusion is not an objective of this 
chapter, but the acceptance of the impossibility to create absolute clarity helps the reader in the 
process of understanding that deliberate breach of contract will likewise be difficult to handle. 
A general characteristic of the notion of contract is that this term in all legal systems describes a legal 
relationship whereby parties may bind themselves voluntarily. Within this overall concept, the 
notions mutual agreement, promise and obligation are used in different ways in various legal 
systems. It is especially interesting to note that the concept of promise, which has an intrinsic moral 
value in daily vocabulary, is paramount in common law jurisdictions. Traditionally, it is the exchange 
of promises – and the accompanying consideration with it –  with obligations attached which make 
these promises enforceable. This legal relationship can be qualified as a – common law – contract.  
The common law of contract is preoccupied with the question of enforceability of the contract and 
the underlying promises. This type of question often refers to matters of for example 
unconscionability or consideration issues. In the common law, the intention to be legally bound is not 
necessary for enforceability in this perspective. The relevance of this element is historically limited, 
because of the commercial, ‘bargain’ view on the contract as a set of promises which are binding as 
long as consideration is provided. The emphasis on the enforceability of the contract should not be 
confused with the right of parties to performance of the mutual contractual obligations. Contractual 
obligations cannot generally be enforced by the remedy of enforced performance, but only by paying 
damages. If these damages live up to the expectation of the aggrieved party on the basis of the 
contract, the contract is also enforced in common law terms.  
The continental contract seems to be much more concerned with the notion of mutual agreement 
and the fact that contracts create obligations. The enforceability of a contract is treated as a 
theoretical problem in a double sense. On the one hand, the principle of the binding force and 
enforceability is approached from the perspective of the questions why a contract is binding for the 
parties and what the exact content of the contract is. On the other hand, the enforceability of the 
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contract in continental jurisdictions is not an issue on the level of the possibility to claim actual 
performance of the contractual obligations. In German and Dutch and to a certain extent in French 
law, as well as in the PECL and the DCFR, the primary position of this right does – at least in theory –
not cause much discussion.  
Therefore, the concept of contract can be defined in many ways and these differences are important, 
but every jurisdiction always uses the term ‘contract’ for comparable legal relationships. 
Breach of contract generally describes the situation where a party does not correctly perform his 
contractual obligations. In the common law, breach of contract triggers liability without any further 
requirement. Liability in contract is strict and fault is not required. In continental jurisdictions, fault is 
generally required, albeit that the party in breach may have to prove that the breach was not caused 
by his fault. The fault requirement supersedes the element of personal fault – circumstances in the 
sphere of risk of the party in breach may also constitute fault. Therefore, ‘breach of contract’ is a 
slightly unclear term in continental law perspective. The term non-performance is the most neutral 
term. Non-performance for which a party is liable – i.e. a non-performance which is caused due to 
the fault of the party who does not perform correctly – may  be the closest synonym for breach of 
contract. 
The natural and primary position of the right to performance in continental jurisdictions may not be 
present very prominently in case law, but is of eminent importance to realize that this primary 
position has also effects on thinking about breach of contract and remedies. On the one hand, 
continental jurisdictions are designed to keep a contract alive. Damages are in theory the second 
best option. The right to performance arises out of the contract itself and is not necessarily preceded 
by breach of contract. The choice for keeping the contract alive has also consequences for the 
approach to the remedy of damages. In continental jurisdictions, damages seem to be quite strictly 
limited to compensation purposes.  
Common law jurisdictions are less attached to the idea that contractual obligations should be 
performed. Enforceability of the contract is not a guarantee for getting the contractual obligations 
performed. The primary way to achieve enforcement in common law jurisdictions is the award of 
expectation damages. The restrictive attitude towards actual performance may be somewhat levied 
once it becomes clear that common law jurisdictions, especially US law, are more open for other 
monetary relief, such as restitution or account of profits, than continental jurisdictions.  
This chapter finally mentions the distinction between standard remedies and remedies incorporated 
in the contract. These ‘party’ remedies are often included in order to distribute risks in advance, such 
as the liquidated damages clause and the exclusion or limitation clauses. Parties may have an interest 
in pre-estimating damages in order to avoid costly litigation. The eventual penalty element of the 
liquidated damages clause – penalty clause may also be used as a synonym – creates a distinction 
between common law – penalty clauses are not allowed – and civil law – penalty clauses are allowed. 
The relevance of this distinction and ‘party’ remedies in general emerges in the subsequent chapters 
once it becomes clear that these ‘party’ remedies are also potential weapons to use against 
deliberate breach of contract. 
The differences between common law and civil law jurisdictions in the law of remedies are classic 
and in itself not new. As the next chapters will show, from the perspective of deliberate breach of 
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contract, these difference are relevant for understanding how common law and civil law jurisdictions 













3  Deliberate breach of contract: a notion to be explored, but not 
defined 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter attempts to answer the following research question: 
What is deliberate breach of contract?  
This chapter approaches the concept of deliberate breach from various perspectives. The notion of 
deliberate breach will be explored and potential characteristics will be described.  This exercise does 
not necessarily lead to a clear, one-sentence definition of the notion of deliberate breach of contract. 
In the course of this chapter, it becomes clear that an authoritative definition created by for example 
one or more higher courts, lawmakers or by influential academic contributions does not exist. Courts 
and authors of academic contributions use various synonymous wordings for the notion of deliberate 
breach, describing in general similar phenomena, but they do certainly not draw a clear one-
dimensional picture. Lack of unanimity in the legal domain on the content of this term leads to the 
conclusion that the objective of this chapter cannot be to provide a single-sentence definition of 
deliberate breach of contract. Nevertheless, in order to create a point of reference, this chapter 
introduces a working definition, which is as follows: 
“Breach is considered to be deliberate when the party in breach commits breach of contract in order 
to obtain a financial advantage or to avoid a financial disadvantage, which he would have missed or 
which he would have incurred in the case of performance of the contract.” 
Every section starts with the reiteration of the working definition. The working definition of 
deliberate breach will subsequently be analyzed against and compared with the perspective in the 
specific section.  
First, the notion of deliberate breach of contract is briefly introduced. Only US law developed a – 
relatively recent – history in analysis of this phenomenon in academic debate. Second, the relation 
between deliberate breach and the distinction between excusable and non-excusable breaches will 
be explored. Third, a comparison between deliberate breach and the law and economics theory of 
efficient breach is inevitable, because the notions of deliberate and efficient breach may seem 
comparable, they are not equal. Fourth, the relation between deliberate breach and tort is explored. 
The core question in this section is whether deliberate breach may also be a tort. Fifth, the 
perception of deliberate breach in empirical legal studies will be briefly analyzed. How do parties 
perceive breach of contract and do they distinguish between types of breach of contract with respect 
to the level of fault?  Sixth, criminal law often deals with the notion of deliberateness. Insights from 
this area of law are especially relevant in order to tackle the problem of proving deliberateness, one 
of the most poignant problems in criminal law as well. Seventh, the relation between deliberateness 
and procedural evidence is explored. After the lessons provided by the previous section on evidence, 
the notion of deliberateness is briefly explored from civil procedure perspective.   
This chapter approaches the notion of deliberate breach of contract from a primarily theoretical 
perspective. The next chapter attempts to find traces of acknowledgement of deliberate breach of 
contract by courts in concrete case law. Inevitably, the various interpretations on the meaning of 
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deliberate breach will also be part of the analysis in Chapter 4. Therefore, the question what 
deliberate breach is will be partly answered in this chapter and partly in Chapter 4. 
3.2 Introducing the concept of deliberate breach 
In the past decades, deliberate breach has proved to be a legal phenomenon which is subject to 
discussion in academic contributions in US law. 118  Nevertheless, it is not a well-established 
unambiguous legal notion.119  This section starts with the working definition provided in the 
introduction:  
“Breach is considered to be deliberate when the party in breach commits breach of contract in order 
to obtain a financial advantage or to avoid a financial disadvantage, which he would have missed or 
which he would have incurred in the case of performance of the contract.” 
A crucial element of the provisional definition is the economic motive of the party committing 
breach. He commits breach of contract to achieve a financial gain or to avoid an economic loss. This 
section shows that the economic element in the decision to commit breach is a returning feature in 
many manifestations of deliberate breach in the various contributions. This section eclectically 
analyzes several of these contributions in order to get a first general idea what the concept of 
deliberate breach ought to imply. 
While studying a number of US contributions to the topic of deliberate breach, a first conclusion 
must be that the notion of deliberate breach cannot be positioned in an existing framework of US 
contract law as one term with one common meaning. It takes some time to discover this feature, 
because many US legal scholars design their own definition of deliberate breach. Within a specific 
contribution, such a self-designed definition gives the impression that the term cannot be defined 
otherwise, but a broader overview reveals that this conclusion would be premature. Furthermore, 
although the boundary between law and law and economics as two distinctive scientific disciplines is 
not sharp in the US, the difference in approaching the notion of deliberateness is visible. Several law 
and economics scholars, such as Posner and Shavell, have difficulty to discuss the sole notion of 
deliberate breach next to inadvertent breach or excusable breach. They do not consider this 
distinction very relevant for the construction of contract law, because they focus on the dichotomy 
of efficient versus inefficient breaches.120 Others, such as Shiffrin and Dodge opt for an approach 
which emphasizes the importance of the contractual bond. Both ‘camps’ – and there are many 
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authors who take an own position somewhere in this debate – have difficulties in coping with the 
notion of deliberate breach.121  
The definition of deliberate breach entails many difficulties. A first question is whether deliberate 
breach can be defined as a separate phenomenon. According to Johnson in his contribution about 
extracompensatory relief in cases of deliberate breach, all breaches are possibly deliberate breaches:  
“The entire universe of contract breaches is exposed to that (i.e. ‘willful’, MvK) designation.”122  
The attentive reader may have noticed that this thesis attempts to use the term ‘deliberate’ 
consistently, whereas the commonly used equivalent in US legal systems is ‘willful’. The connotation 
of willful breach is definitively negative. Willful breach in US is not an applauded phenomenon. 
‘Deliberate breach’ on the other hand at this moment seems to be a slightly more objective term. As 
a starting point, this thesis uses the term ‘deliberate’. 
According to Johnson the risk for parties who plan to conclude contracts is too large, when they 
cannot estimate properly whether they will be confronted with punitive damages or another remedy 
with a large impact, because they do not know what deliberate breach exactly is. The objective of 
contract law is to stimulate economic transactions. This objective is frustrated by incorporating in the 
law several harsh remedies for types of breach which are not clearly defined. Following this line of 
reasoning, it is only useful to introduce new remedies for specific types of contract and specific types 
of deliberate breach.  
Craswell analyzes deliberate breach as a sequence of facts, whereby it is relatively arbitrary to label 
such a sequence as deliberate or not. He also concludes that specific remedies for deliberate breach 
should be used in specific situations.123  
Farnsworth generalizes his statements about deliberate breach, whereas his contribution is about a 
specific type of contract, namely building and construction contracts and a specific type of deliberate 
breach, i.e. using deliberately wrong materials. Farnsworth deviates from the term willful breach and 
he uses the adjective ‘abusive’.124  
Bar-Gill en Ben Shahar are also conscious of the lack of clarity of the term ‘willful breach’. They 
oppose willful breach against inadvertent breach, but they conclude that this dichotomy should not 
be defined in terms of internal state of mind, because this state of mind cannot be determined by 
outsiders. The notion of deliberateness tells something about the will of the party to abuse a certain 
information advantage at the cost of the other party.125  
Other writers are less scrupulous and attempt to define deliberate breach as well as providing legal 
responses on it. For example, Dodge elaborately argues that from an economic perspective punitive 
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damages should be available for every type of deliberate breach, be it efficient breach or 
‘opportunistic’ breach without being too scrupulous about the concept of deliberate breach.126  
Marschall also defines willful breach in a more general way, because she does not connect deliberate 
breach with specific types of contracts or specific types of deliberate breach. Every type of conscious 
breach for which the party in breach can be held accountable and which does not confer benefit on 
the other party, can be classified as deliberate breach.127  
In a recent contribution Thel and Siegelman recognize that Craswell thoroughly analyzes the 
difference which may be logical at first sight, between deliberate and inadvertent breach. They may 
have overlooked this difference too quickly.128 Nevertheless, they conclude that not all “intentional” 
breaches are also willful breaches and not all willful breaches are “especially injurious to 
promisees”.129 
On the contrary, Posner links willful breach with wrongful breach, although he does not attach legal 
consequences to willful breach, even though it may be immoral.130 According to Posner, the most 
important interest is always that breach of contract is efficient. He even argues that in a consistent 
system of fault liability more severe remedies should be available in cases of inadvertent breach 
when they are not efficient. 
Another example in case law illustrates that the term willful breach in US law may indicate a strong 
attachment to tort law. In the case of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes International Inc.  
the court found that, as a matter of law, willful means a level of intent that rises to the level of an 
independent tort. This definition attaches to the willfulness a certain malicious component.131  
This account of opinions on the term deliberate breach is not limitative. It only illustrates that 
deliberate breach is in fact a term without a conclusive meaning, whereas some contributions at 
least let the reader believe that is a settled term. A particular definition can make sure that within a 
specific contribution terminology and content may be coherent, but comparing articles becomes 
more difficult if everyone uses his or her own definition. It is even arguable that any categorization in 
types of contract breaches is impossible due to the wide variety of definitions and use of synonyms. 
Nevertheless a provisional conclusion on this point should be that such a categorization is inevitable 
to be able to answer the research questions of this thesis. The alternative would be that every breach 
of contract, perhaps except for the excusable breach, is deliberate. From the perspective of revising 
remedies in contract, such a conclusion would not be useful. Any additional sanction to the existing 
body of remedies would mean, that the entire body of remedies should be increased. The relevance 
of such a proposal and the effectiveness are doubtful, because contract law as an instrument in order 
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to enhance smooth economic transactions would be in danger. More importantly, this approach at 
least denies a certain reality, because it is not the approach followed by many authors and because 
there is some empirical evidence that not every type of breach is considered similarly.  
3.3 Deliberate breach and the distinction between excusable and non-excusable breach 
This section compares the notion of deliberate breach with the notion of excusable breach.  Again, 
the starting point is the working definition: 
“Breach is considered to be deliberate when the party in breach commits breach of contract in order 
to obtain a financial advantage or to avoid a financial disadvantage, which he would have missed or 
which he would have incurred in the case of performance of the contract.” 
The definition does not say anything on the question whether the party committing deliberate 
breach of contract is liable. At first sight, it seems safe to argue that the liability of the party 
committing breach is assumed. The distinction between excusable breach and inexcusable breach 
marks the difference between the breaching party being liable for its breach or not. If the breach can 
be excused – or in other words – if the breaching party has a lawful excuse at his disposal, he is not 
only excused from performing the contractual obligation, he is neither liable in damages. In other 
words, if the assumption is true, a deliberate breach cannot coincide with an excusable breach. A 
deliberate breach in that situation would be a special manifestation of the inexcusable breach and 
excusable breach is not relevant for the definition of ‘deliberateness’. A closer look at the 
construction of the borderline between excusable and inexcusable breach reveals that this line of 
reasoning is not without difficulty. 
A lawful excuse is an umbrella term for all possible situations where non-performance of the debtor 
is justified. As the previous chapter mentioned, UK law defines breach of contract as breach which is 
committed when a party without lawful excuse fails or refuses to perform what is due from him 
under the contract or performs defectively or incapacitates himself from performing.132 The debtor is 
always liable for damage caused by breach of contract.  In other words, under UK law liability for 
breach of contract is considered to be strict, which means that only in exceptional circumstances the 
debtor is released from performance of his obligations. By contrast, at least in theory in continental 
legal systems the debtor’s fault is generally assumed, although he may evade liability for damages for 
breach of contract if he proves he is not at fault.133  
The party who is obliged to perform may somehow be legally relieved from his obligation to perform. 
Numerous examples can be provided. One example is the buyer who refuses to pay the price, 
because the goods delivered to him are defective. The buyer fails to perform his contractual 
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obligation, but he has a lawful excuse for doing so. A second example is the employee who falls ill. He 
cannot perform his obligation to go to work, but he is nevertheless excused.  
Parties are also relieved from performing their obligations when the purpose of the contract is 
frustrated. Frustration is a typical English law term. Frustration of (the purpose of) the contract 
means that it does not make sense any longer to perform the contract, if performance is possible at 
all. However, only in very exceptional circumstances the doctrine of frustration can be 
invoked.134Although the doctrine of frustration is a typically English law term, continental systems do 
have more or less comparable legal structures in order to fill in this part of the domain of the lawful 
excuse, often indicated with terms as ‘force majeure or the most neutral term ‘impossibility’.135 
Excuses for non-performances may be party-related, such as the first example. Excuses may also be 
derived from an external source, such as the third example. The second example, with the ill 
employee is somewhere in between. This thesis does not elaborate extensively on these notions or 
on the differences per legal system. The purpose of this section is to establish a link between thinking 
in terms of excusable breach and inexcusable breach and the idea of deliberateness.  
Therefore, another matter has to be discussed in the sphere of lawful excuses.  An excuse for 
performance may mean that a debtor is justified not to perform. He cannot be forced to perform the 
contractual obligation. In other words, the creditor may not invoke his right to enforced performance 
or – for that matter – the court may not order specific performance in a common law jurisdiction. 
However, a debtor may still be liable in damages. In such a case, the excuse is lawful in the sense that 
the debtor is allowed not to perform, but it is not lawful in the sense that he should not compensate 
the creditor.  
The debtor may be incapacitated from performing, but the cause of the incapacitation may lie in his 
own sphere of risk. Consider the example of the ill employee, who is the only one to produce the 
ordered goods by the creditor. Dependent on the circumstances of the case and the applicable legal 
system, all situations may occur. The debtor may be forced to perform anyway, because the illness of 
his employee falls within his own sphere of risk. Maybe he is forced to rely on the services of an 
external party in order to fulfill his contractual obligations, but he may nevertheless be compelled to 
do so. It may also be that the debtor is excused in the sense that he cannot be forced to perform the 
contractual obligation. Performance depends on the ill employee, there is no reasonable alternative 
and in the circumstances of the case, the debtor would be unreasonably burdened if he is faced with 
a claim for enforced performance. In continental legal systems, where enforced performance is 
generally qualified as a right, it is at least in theory not easy to block a claim for performance.  A 
relative impossibility – i.e. a situation where the debtor may be able to perform but against increased 
costs – is in principle not sufficient to defend against a claim for performance.136 If the costs 
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outweigh the foreseen costs to a large extent, this problem may be overcome. In general, in common 
law jurisdictions this theoretical problem is less urgent, because actual performance is in theory 
generally not available as of right.   
Nevertheless, the illness of the employee may still fall within his sphere of risk, so he may be liable in 
damages. It may also be that the illness of the employee provides the debtor with a lawful excuse in 
the sense that he is released from his contractual obligations and not liable in damages either. In 
general, in this case, the debtor is not at fault if he does not perform. Only in the case he caused the 
illness of his employee, this may be the case. As we have seen, for the matter of liability, the role of 
personal fault in rendering the debtor liable for breach of contract is not that relevant.137 It is often a 
matter of risk distribution. The relation between lawful excuse and deliberateness in the example of 
the ill employee is interesting. If the debtor is completely dependent on the efforts of the ill 
employee he is simply not able to perform. He has not a deliberate choice not to perform. The 
moment he may acquire help from another source, although this is obviously more expensive, the 
clear distinction between excuse and deliberateness starts to blur. Even though the debtor may be 
excused for performance and for liability in damages in the case of the ill employee, he may have a 
choice to perform or not. If performance is very expensive – because he has to hire another 
employee who claims a large sum of money for example – he may have justified reasons to do so, 
but non-performance is in such cases deliberate. The second example is quite a difficult one, because 
it is not clear beforehand who is primarily responsible for the illness of the employee. It is not clear 
either what the exact consequences of the illness are. These circumstances may all exercise influence 
on liability and on the level of deliberateness in choices to perform the contractual obligation. 
However, it is generally clear that even if the debtor has a choice to perform, the event of choosing 
to perform is not deliberate and indeed involuntary. He is forced to choose, because initially he 
wanted to perform according to the contract and in principle he still wants to do so.  
Consider the first example of the defective goods delivered to the debtor. The debtor is in this case 
not the seller, but the buyer. The relation between liability, excuse, fault, risk and deliberateness is 
completely different. The similarity between the second and the first example is that both cases may 
give rise to a lawful excuse under circumstances. However, the situation is completely different. The 
justification for non-performance lies within the reciprocity of the contractual relationship. Non-
performance of the buyer is justified, because he does not receive what he is entitled to according to 
the contract. It is fair to say that non-performance in this case is neither the debtor’s fault nor an 
event which falls within the sphere of risk of the debtor. The non-performance or breach of the 
obligation is therefore entirely justified and the debtor is excused for performance and for liability in 
damages. However, the decision not to perform is a deliberate one. The debtor is perfectly able to 
pay the agreed price. He does not want to and that is justifiable, but the refusal to pay remains 
deliberate. Again, as in the first case, initially the debtor does not want to non-perform, but the 
voluntariness of the choice is somewhat larger, because he is able and at liberty to pay if he wants to. 
A slight adaptation of the case may change the whole picture. If for example the defects are very 
small, or the non-performance of the seller is in general minor (he delivers an hour after the agreed 
performance), it is questionable if the debtor is justified not to pay the price. The basis for 
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establishing a lawful excuse may fall away and then the deliberate decision not to perform turns into 
a breach of contract for which the buyer is liable. The distinction between presence of lawful excuse 
and deliberateness of the decision not to perform is quite sharp. That may be one of the reasons why 
the decision not to pay is not without risks. 
The third example is the common example to illustrate the idea of a lawful excuse. If the debtor 
agrees to deliver goods by contract and after conclusion a war in the country concerned breaks out 
or the goods are destroyed due to the consequences of an earthquake, the debtor may be released 
from his contractual obligations. He has a lawful excuse and he is not liable in damages either. Again, 
it depends on the exact facts of the case whether the decision not to perform is deliberate or not. If 
the goods are destroyed, the non-performance is not deliberate. However, if the area from which the 
goods are transported is dangerous because of war, the decision not to perform is deliberate, not to 
mention that the decision is justified. The deliberate non-performance is also involuntary as the 
debtor would have performed if the supervening event had not taken place. However, there is 
another difficulty with this type of cases. Because the cause of the non-performance lies outside the 
sphere of the parties and has a large influence on the content of the contract, it may well be that the 
contract would never have been concluded the same way, had parties known about the supervening 
event. Due to unforeseen circumstances, the contract and the according intent and interests of both 
parties have changed. Whereas the contract itself is partially concluded as a mechanism in order to 
legally fix parties’ intentions at the moment they concluded the contract, this function finds its limits 
in the doctrine of unforeseen circumstances. It may be questionable whether a supervening event as 
mentioned before such as war or an earthquake may be qualified as lawful excuses at all, because 
excuses are only necessary in the case of the breach of an obligation and if the contractual 
obligations are not enforceable anyway due to the supervening event, we may find ourselves in 
another doctrinal box. It goes without saying that the doctrines of unforeseen circumstances and 
lawful excuses go hand in hand. A fundamental difference is often that the party confronted with the 
supervening event not rarely invokes the doctrine of unforeseen circumstances not as a defense, but 
in order to be able to change the contract or to be released from the contract altogether. 
The notion of deliberate non-performance is not easily compatible with the distinction between 
excusable and non-excusable breach. Deliberateness suggests a form of free choice of the debtor. In 
some cases, the choice is indeed free, but not very attractive, such as in the case of the buyer not 
willing to pay for defective goods. In other cases, the choice seems free in the sense that a party 
makes a conscious decision, but the choice is hardly voluntary as the costs may be unbearable. The 
case of the supervening event blocking delivery is the most evident example, but in this case the 
basis of the contract may be at stake as well. The case of the ill employee is tricky in this sense. It 
depends on the circumstances of the case and on the specific rules of the legal system involved 
whether the decision not to perform is deliberate, but also whether this case qualifies as a case for a 
lawful excuse. Lawful excuses depend not only on absence of fault, but also on circumstances which 
fall or do not fall within the sphere of risk of the debtor. Furthermore, it is wise not to forget that 
lawful excuses not to perform are not always similar to lawful excuses which release the debtor from 
being liable in damages.  
In conclusion, the borderline between excusable and non-excusable breach of contract shows that 
the existence of a lawful excuse does not always mean that the excused party did not realize he was 
committing breach of contract. In other words, even excusable breach may be deliberate in the sense 
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that a party knew what he was doing, but also in the sense of the definition. He may have had a 
lawful excuse to commit breach in order to prevent a substantial loss. A deliberate breach need not 
always be a non-excusable breach, but this thesis elaborates on the non-excusable breaches, 
because the essence of this thesis is to determine the potential effect of deliberateness of the breach 
on the availability and extent of remedies of the aggrieved party. This step is not possible any longer 
once the party committing breach has a lawful excuse for committing breach of contract. The 
borderline between deliberate and non-deliberate breach gets a new dimension especially if the last 
part of the provisional definition is focused upon. When a breach is deliberate in order to avoid a 
financial loss which would be large but bearable or so large that financial breakdown is inevitable is 
not so easy to determine. A first shade of grey in defining deliberateness is established. 
 
3.4 The theory of efficient breach: a belief with supporters and opponents  
This section elaborates on the theory of efficient breach of contract. The next section compares the 
notions of deliberate breach and efficient breach, but it is relevant to start with the working 
definition of deliberate breach anyway, because it is inevitable to make some references to the 
notion of deliberate breach in this section: 
“Breach is considered to be deliberate when the party in breach commits breach of contract in order 
to obtain a financial advantage or to avoid a financial disadvantage, which he would have missed or 
incurred in the case of performance of the contract.” 
The comparison between deliberate breach and efficient breach is relevant for finding an answer to 
the question what deliberate breach is, but also for the objective this thesis aims to achieve. Efficient 
breach theories influence the debate on the potential ‘bad’ nature of deliberate breach. The 
potential ‘bad’ nature of deliberate breach may also have consequences for the remedies available to 
the aggrieved party. Before anything useful can be said on the comparison between the two 
concepts, the notion of efficient breach needs to be explained. A few preliminary remarks are 
necessary in order to explain the relatively modest analysis of the notion of efficient breach. 
First, this thesis does not elaborate on the theory of efficient breach in all its aspects. Many authors 
have mentioned the theory of efficient breach before and discussed it thoroughly.138 Adding another 
extensive overview of the literature is in itself not a valuable academic contribution. The added value 
of discussing the theory of efficient breach is the analysis in perspective of deliberate breach which 
follows in the subsequent sections. Again, terminology turns out to be a major factor while discussing 
efficient breach of contract.  
Second, the notion of efficient breach of contract is more than a familiar notion in the area of law 
and economics. As far as law and economics of contracts is concerned, it is safe to assert that 
efficient breach is a key notion which defines law and economic thinking in the area of contract.139 
However, in legal doctrine and in case law in general, the concept of efficient breach is neither 
common nor accepted. The exception is US law. Efficient breach is on the one hand a well-
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established notion in academic literature and it is on the other hand as a tool accepted in court 
decisions. As well-established as the notion of efficient breach in the area of law and economics is, 
the exact features and implementation of efficient breach have caused many academic 
contributions, because there are many authors who define efficient breach in their own way.140 
Efficient breach of contract, though as a concept definable in a few lines, is a term with many specific 
elaborations depending on the aspect subject to research in a specific project.  
Although there is no single concept of efficient breach, because it can be presented and elaborated 
in many ways, the core idea nevertheless remains more or less the same throughout the years. In US 
law and economics, but also in judicial decisions, the efficient breach theory is a widely 
acknowledged theory with supporters and opponents.141 This section will not deal with the exact 
meaning of efficient breach theory and certainly not with all theoretical differences within the theory 
of efficient breach. It is sufficient to know that according to Posner, one of the founders of the 
efficient breach theory, efficient breach occurs in a situation where the debtor commits breach, 
because he can make a larger profit when he contracts with a third party. However, the breach can 
only be considered efficient, if the debtor supplies the original debtor with full compensatory 
damages.142  Posner does not make a principled difference between the performance of the 
obligation itself and the economic value of the performance. Friedmann has elaborated on this so-
called indifference principle. According to this principle the aggrieved party will become indifferent 
between performance and damages. He notices that – apart from the intrinsic truth of the principle – 
a problem may be that additional costs of claiming damages should be included in the calculation.143 
If breach is efficient, the law should not impose sanctions on the debtor, because every party 
involved benefits from the efficient breach. The core of the efficient breach is an economic and 
calculated decision not to abide by contractual obligations, under the condition that the debtor fully 
compensates the creditor. 
Two questions represent the core of the efficient breach debate. The first question is why a party to 
a binding contract should be allowed to choose to commit breach at all, be it an ‘efficient’ breach or 
not? From a legal perspective, this question is highly relevant, because any potential answer to this 
question requires formulating a notion of contract and the purpose of contract law and the law of 
remedies. From a law and economics point of view, this question is not being considered as an 
interesting one, because the question does not attack the notion of efficiency itself. This question is 
the core of the clash between legal scholars and law and economists. Furthermore, in the United 
States it is not common or logical to draw a sharp distinction between these two branches of 
academic debate, whereas in Europe the legal academic debate in general is not intertwined with 
other areas of academic research. The theory of efficient breach can only be implemented in legal 
practice in a system where contracts are considered to be a bargain and nothing more, because the 
efficient breach theory applies the indifference principle. Otherwise, it would be impossible to buy 
out the creditor if something which cannot be valued in money is part of the contract – or, more 
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precisely, the decision to commit breach would not be in the hands of the debtor considering breach, 
because he would be dependent on the will of the creditor who has the initiative to negotiate. 
Consequently, the question of whether efficient breach is a viable theory or not is also an object of 
debate in the common law versus civil law debate. Again, caution is necessary. Whereas one would 
think that every major common law system should support the efficient breach theory, because in 
general common law tends to approach contract law as a system to enhance economic transactions, 
this is certainly not the case. UK common law, generally, tends to take a hostile attitude towards the 
efficient breach theory for reasons to be explained. Furthermore, whereas the notion of efficient 
breach is most developed in the US legal debate, several authors question the role of contract law as 
a sole catalyzing tool for commercial enterprise and therefore also the notion of efficient breach.  
Lastly, the commercial notion is naturally not absent in continental systems. There may be some 
space for efficient breach as a serious option within contractual relations in continental systems as 
well.   
The second question is according to law and economic scholars the more interesting one: when is a 
breach efficient? The core debate on this matter is to define and distinguish between efficient and 
inefficient breaches. The first type of breach should be allowed and even encouraged, whereas the 
second type should not be allowed and even deterred. The body of literature covering this topic is 
largely the territory of law and economics scholars. The discussion presupposes a recognition of a 
certain viability of efficient breach theory, which may partly explain why in Europe – and in the 
doctrine of continental legal systems – this topic is not much discussed in European legal doctrine. 
The efficiency question triggers a debate on an economic level. Superficially, a transaction is efficient 
when the benefits outweigh the costs of the transaction, but this statement does not solve the 
matter whether breach is efficient or not, because this principle does not reveal who bears the costs 
and who takes the benefits. A yardstick which does not take into account the localization of the 
efficient distribution of wealth after the transaction may not be adequate, as for example Ogus 
notices: 
“The key question is whether the apparatus of law enforcement is sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate “wrongdoing” when, in this sense, it turns out to be beneficial. The economic 
approach, although it does not provide definitive answers, generates valuable insights for the very 
reason it abstracts the moral dimension from the analysis.”144 
Every yardstick has its own advantages and drawbacks.  The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterium implies 
that an outcome is more efficient if those that are made better off could in theory compensate those 
that are made worse off without the requirement that compensation is actually paid out to the 
‘victims’. A problem of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency test is that it is too rude. By applying the Kaldor-
Hicks test to the efficient breach theory, the party committing breach in general accrues the benefits. 
In the case of Pareto efficiency, an outcome is more efficient if at least one person is made better off 
and nobody is made worse off. This efficiency yardstick seems to be more adequate in covering the 
ground for efficient breach theory, but even in this case a few drawbacks may be pointed out. Apart 
from the problem of transaction costs – how much additional costs are involved to transfer the 
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losses from the party committing breach to the party bearing the losses? - the problem of subjective 
loss is not solved directly by using a Pareto efficiency yardstick.145  
The idea of subjective loss together with the aforementioned indifference principle is the core 
element of the statement that efficient breach is not a factual construction, but a matter of belief.  
First, supporters of the efficient breach theory believe that breach can be efficient in the sense that 
every party participating in a contractual relationship values performance and damages as equal 
remedies without preferring one above the other as long as damages fully compensate the loss. The 
indifference principle is an assumption underlying efficient breach theory. This assumption needs 
elaboration as far as the mentioned remedies are concerned. Authors on efficient breach, supporters 
and opponents, differ on the position of enforced performance as a remedy in a legal world where 
efficient breach is a serious option. Many academic contributions on efficient breach assess the 
relation between enforced performance – or specific performance in a common law context – and 
damages.146 The indifference principle distinguishes the moralists from the economists. The moralists 
believe that parties only conclude contracts because they want performance of the contractual 
obligations and that parties acquire a strong right to performance once the contract is concluded. 
The decision to commit breach for economic reasons in itself is a fact which can be established, but 
the idea that the efficient breach is justified is a belief. 
Second, the idea that a breach can be efficient may be a fact as well depending on the yardstick 
applied. Efficiency may be achieved in Kaldor-Hicks or Pareto terms, but the core idea that full 
compensation to the victim of the breach must be provided may be in serious danger.147 On an 
individual level, the level of the parties concerned, efficiency is hard to achieve because of the notion 
of subjective loss. A party may attach an incalculable value to a specific obligation. The trigger to 
increase the amount of subjective loss is even more interesting after the breach occurred and the 
party in breach vows to provide full compensation – forced by the law or not. To a certain extent, 
damages may be objectively assessed. Tools such as the market price, remoteness tests and other 
generally justified limitation concepts such as the requirement of foreseeability may provide an 
estimate of the losses concerned. However, in many contractual relationships, parties have a 
subjective interest in performance which cannot be calculated. The father who misses his plane by 
deliberate overbooking may be compensated for a delay and he may be offered a certain amount to 
cover inconvenience. However, if he misses the graduation ceremony of his daughter due to the 
delay, this damage cannot be calculated.148 Even within law and economic thinking, this problem of 
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subjective loss is a serious one. The problem is that the aggrieved party may be tempted to 
exaggerate the extent of the subjective loss, asserting that he will never be fully compensated as long 
as the subjective loss is not covered. Within this scenario, efficient breach is not an effective tool, 
because it cannot be seriously applied. On the one hand, subjective loss must be acknowledged as a 
serious type of loss, on the other hand, the assessment of the amount may not be an ex post decision 
in the hands of the aggrieved party in order to prevent exaggeration. A solution may be a 
hypothetical construction before breach has occurred at the time of the conclusion of the contract. If 
parties in advance decide on the amount of damages they want to receive in the case a specific loss 
occurs (or for any unforeseen, subjective loss), they may anticipate an efficient breach situation 
involving subjective loss. The analysis of Calabresi and Melamed in their influential article on 
property and liability rules may be helpful for this solution. Property rules improve the position of the  
right-holde in the negotiation process in order to release the wrongdoer for the amount he needs to 
be fully compensated.149 If the negotiation process may be streamlined along these lines, Pareto 
efficiency, or the closest point to that, can be achieved. 150This solution may solve part of the 
problem, but not the whole problem, because the circumstances of the case may influence the way 
such a hypothetical construction arises. The instability of the idea is illustrated by the overbooked 
airline case, mentioned by Ogus. Clients or passengers are not in the position to negotiate a good 
overbooking fee which may cover potential subjective losses. If efficient breach is allowed, they 
practically must rely on the good intentions of the airline operator in order to provide for a 
reasonable ‘full’ compensation. 
This section introduced the concept of efficient breach. A party decides to commit breach because it 
is economically advantageous and he compensates the aggrieved party in full. This section argued 
that efficient breach as such is not a construction of fact, but a matter of belief. This argument proves 
to be relevant in the next section, once the notions of deliberate breach and efficient breach are 
compared, but it is already clear that the two notions have similar features based on the provisional 
definition of deliberate breach of contract. 
3.5 Deliberate breach and efficient breach compared: similar but not equal  
This section compares efficient breach and deliberate breach.  Studying the similarities and 
differences between the two concepts contributes to a better understanding of the notion of 
deliberate breach, whereas the comparison also illustrates the variety of ways the notion of 
deliberate breach is appreciated. 
Again, the provisional working definition provides the starting point for the comparison: 
“Breach is considered to be deliberate when the party in breach commits breach of contract in order 
to obtain a financial advantage or to avoid a financial disadvantage, which he would have missed or 
which he would have incurred in the case of performance of the contract.” 
According to the provisional working definition, every efficient breach is deliberate, because the 
essence of efficient breach is the deliberate foregoing of the performance of the contract in 
exchange for a Pareto improvement. However, not every deliberate breach is efficient. The incentive 
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for a party to commit deliberate breach is the prospective of a financial advantage for him 
exclusively, a larger advantage than he would obtain by performing the contract. 
So far, the main characteristic of deliberate breach is an element of calculation on the debtor’s side. 
Therefore, it is inevitable to discuss the borders between deliberate breach and the law and 
economics notion of ‘efficient breach’. If breach is efficient, the law should not impose sanctions on 
the debtor, because every party involved benefits from the efficient breach. According to this 
definition, it goes without saying that an efficient breach is also a deliberate breach. The core of the 
efficient breach is an economic and calculated decision not to abide by contractual obligations, under 
the condition that the debtor fully compensates the creditor.  
A first remarkable dichotomy to analyze is the generally negative connotation attached to the term 
‘willful’ or ‘deliberate’ breach. These terms are associated with bad faith and bad intentions, whereas 
in the United States efficient breach is in theory not approached in a hostile way.151 In a US case a 
court defines ‘opportunistic breach’ – note that the court in this instance does not use the term 
‘willful –  and contrasts it with notions of efficiency, because in the case of opportunistic breach the 
debtor exploits the inadequacies of the remedy of “ordinary” damages.152 However, as Craswell 
rightly points out, no one knows what ‘exploiting’ means, so the line between opportunistic and 
efficient may be quite thin.153 In addition, if damages are always considered as a second best solution 
compared to actual performance of the contract – which is the case in European continental law 
systems, but of course not in the common law –, every efficient breach is opportunistic or willful or 
deliberate. 
The difference in attitude towards the concept of ‘efficient breach’ and ‘deliberate breach’ can be 
redirected to the indifference principle and it is necessary to analyze this principle again against the 
concept of contract in general. Is a contract ‘only’ a bargain – i.e. a guarantee to the financial value of 
the contract and nothing more – or does a contract also imply an ethical duty to perform, which can 
be legally enforced? The Anglo-American lawyer would be inclined to support the first version, 
however the recent literature on deliberate breach does not unisono support this approach.154 The 
(continental) European lawyer is likely to support the second option. The law and economics 
theorists do not consider this first question as an interesting one, because it is assumed to be a 
‘theoretical’ one and not an intrinsic argument against efficient breach theory itself. They assume 
that efficient breach is economically justified, just because it is efficient. Commercial private law is 
not primarily about ethics or good faith, it is about achieving efficient results with Pareto 
improvements. Nevertheless, for the Anglo-American lawyer, the continental lawyer and the law and 
economics scholar, this issue is certainly not without problems.  
Core questions are whether deliberate breach is a distinguishing factor on the level of remedies in 
concrete court decisions at this moment and why. Even Posner, one of the most ardent supporters of 
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the efficient breach theory, has some difficulty in discussing the theory of efficient breach next to the 
notion of deliberate (or willful) breach.  
In his standard textbook An Economic Analysis of Law Posner elaborates on his theory of contract law 
and on the efficient breach theory. It is remarkable that one of his first remarks on breach of contract 
in general is about ‘opportunistic breach’.155 The terminology issue is one of the indicators that 
deliberate breach of contract is a highly debated issue. According to Posner, willful breach seems to 
cover all intentional breaches including the efficient breach, whereas opportunistic breach is 
reserved for the inefficient intentional breach. Other authors seem to use willful breach and 
opportunistic breach as synonyms. Legal scholars who are not familiar with efficient breach theory or 
who do not recognize efficient breach theories as a viable legal theory use the term willful or 
intentional breach for every deliberate breach including the efficient breach. 
However, it is quite difficult to distinguish between the different variants in this respect. Posner 
provides a good example. His first comments regard opportunistic breaches, which he defines as 
actions whereby  
“the promisor breaks his promise merely to take advantage of the vulnerability of the promisee in a 
setting (the normal contract setting) where performance is sequential rather than simultaneous 
(…).”156  
According to his analysis such conduct has no economic justification and should simply be deterred. 
In these cases restitution is an attractive remedy, because breaking the contractual promise would 
then be worthless for the promisor. The next section starts with a sentence which summarizes the 
line of reasoning of Posner: 
“Most breaches of contract, however, are not opportunistic. Many are involuntary; performance is 
impossible at reasonable cost. Others are voluntary but (as we are about to see) efficient – which 
from an economic standpoint is the same case as that of an involuntary breach.”157 
Efficient breaches are ‘voluntary’, but should be treated as ‘involuntary’ breaches, because they are 
efficient. Is Posner suggesting that the choice to break a contractual obligation is unavoidable if it is 
efficient? One could argue he does not, because he adds the words “from an economic standpoint”. 
However, in his latest contribution he seems to deviate slightly from his approach in the text book, 
where he says that efficient breach is deliberate rather than compelled.158 Although he argues in his 
contribution that contract law is not about morals, the following quotation seems to suggest 
otherwise: 
“There is an element of perversity, moreover, in arguing that efficient breaches, being deliberate 
rather than compelled, should be discouraged. Efficient breaches are efficient. Involuntary breaches 
are often inefficient: the promisor miscalculated his ability to comply with the contractual terms to 
which he had agreed. I am not suggesting he should be “punished”; but if fault were taken seriously 
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in contract law, he, like a negligent injurer sued in tort, would be thought at fault, whereas a party 
that committed an efficient breach and thus increases the social product would not be.”159  
The core conclusions from this analysis are that efficient breach is regarded as a positive notion in US 
law and economics scholarship, whereas deliberate breach is generally not. Efficient breach can 
generally be circumscribed as deliberate breach plus the efficiency aspect which means that the 
aggrieved party should be paid full compensation after deliberate breach. Once the efficiency 
component is stripped from the definition, willful breach generally remains according to many 
academic contributions. The problem of determining the exact meaning of ‘efficiency’ and the 
problem of undercompensation are well-known arguments to question the efficient breach theory. 
However, the law and economics theory tends to neglect the intentional aspect of the act of breach. 
Only recently in several contributions the aspect of deliberately neglecting the contractual bond 
between the parties triggered authors to discuss this particular aspect, resulting in a fierce discussion 
between legal scholars such as Posner, Shavell and Shiffrin.160 The implications of efficient breach 
and deliberate breach on remedial relief and its extent in concrete cases will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
3.6 Deliberate breach of contract from a tort law perspective 
In the previous sections, the notion of deliberateness has been viewed from a primarily US doctrinal 
perspective. The interconnection between deliberate and efficient breach attributes a strong 
economic aspect to the notion of deliberateness. In essence, the working definition also reflects this 
economic notion. The costs of performing the contractual obligation do not outweigh the benefits for 
the debtor: that is the core of ‘deliberateness’ so far, as the provisional definition shows: 
“Breach is considered to be deliberate when the party in breach commits breach of contract in order 
to obtain a financial advantage or to avoid a financial disadvantage, which he would have missed or 
which he would have incurred in the case of performance of the contract.” 
The economic perspective of cost and benefit thinking may be a logical first step, it remains a matter 
of construction. In order to get a better grip on the meaning of deliberateness it is also useful to look 
into situations in which deliberate breach constitutes a tort or an unlawful act. This perspective 
offers a better insight on the variety of interpretations of the term ‘deliberateness’. A deliberate 
breach which is also a tort may cause a more extensive possibility for the aggrieved party to invoke 
remedies, in particular the remedy of damages, because the basis of an eventual claim shifts from 
contract to tort or the two claims may be accumulated. Especially interesting is the possibility for the 
aggrieved party to claim punitive damages. Punitive damages are more or less out of the question in 
civil law jurisdictions in contract and in tort, but in US law especially, tort law offers the claimant the 
possibility to claim punitive damages, whereas punitive damages are in general available in 
contract.161  
Within the framework of this thesis, the tort law perspective on breach of contract should be 
approached with a certain ‘boldness’. Several fundamental issues need to be mentioned, but they 
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are not elaborately addressed in order to stay focused on answering the core research questions. As 
mentioned above, it is only relevant to know whether deliberate breach of contract constitutes a 
tort, when such a conclusion has remedial consequences. If a claimant can invoke exactly the same 
remedies – in type or in extent – the qualification of a deliberate breach as a tort is not a useful 
exercise. A preliminary issue in this perspective is whether every breach of contract – without the 
connotation of deliberateness – constitutes a tort. As a matter of principle, a tort or unlawful act is 
the most basic ground for remedial relief. Breach of contract could therefore be construed as a 
specific manifestation of a tort. However, systematically, this standard accumulation would not be 
useful, because it would be unclear why the distinction between liability in contract and tort exists at 
all. Breach of contract is generally considered as a different ground for liability than tort. That does 
not mean that liability in contract cannot concur with liability in tort. In case of breach of contract, 
liability in tort must generally be established independent from liability in contract.162 The first 
important question is whether the element of deliberateness in the breach of contract can constitute 
such a separate liability in tort. In order to answer the question, what deliberateness exactly is, this 
question should be ideally reversed: which breach of contract situations lead to liability in tort and 
can some of these situations be qualified as deliberate breach?  The second question is then, 
whether such ‘tortious’ deliberate breach is  a whole new category of deliberate breach.  In other 
words, are there similarities between the ‘tortious deliberate breach’ and the ‘economic deliberate 
breach’? The third question of relevance is the one with which this paragraph started: does the 
qualification as a tort open new or extra ways for the aggrieved party to invoke remedies, and if so, 
which ones? The last question will be answered in more detail in subsequent chapters. 
So far, deliberateness has mainly been discussed as an act of economic egoism of a debtor who 
balances the odds of non-performance against performance. From the perspective of tort law, this 
type of breach of contract will generally not constitute liability in tort. The unlawfulness cannot be 
separated from the breach of the contractual obligation. Something more should be added in order 
to ‘upgrade’ a breach of contract to a tort. The situation of a complete separate tort next to breach 
of contract is not of interest for this section. The seller who punches the debtor after he told him he 
would not deliver the goods as promised, naturally commits a tort next to breach of contract. In 
order to upgrade the breach itself to a tort, something extra should be added. This may be the case 
when committing breach of contract is not a means to achieve the end of economic welfare, but an 
end in itself in the sense that breach hurts the creditor without taking into account the economic 
consequences.   
If a plumber agrees to fix a broken sink and he destroys the kitchen, because he wants to upset his 
contracting partner, breach is not only deliberate, but it is also ‘malicious’ and this type of behavior 
constitutes a separate unlawful act. A debtor commits a malicious breach if he deliberately or very 
recklessly aims at causing damage to creditor with the primary intention to cause damage to the 
creditor. This type of breach also qualifies as an independent tort (unlawful or wrongful act).163 The 
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difference between malicious breach and deliberate breach in the sense of the working definition is 
fundamental, because the debtor in committing a malicious breach is not primarily interested in 
gaining any economic advantage or avoiding economic loss. He just wants to inflict harm to the other 
party. The element of calculation seems absent in these cases of breach. In the area of plumbing 
contracts, the plumber deliberately or recklessly destroys the sink without considering any economic 
advantage resulting from his behavior. In the area of sales contracts, one could think of selling a rare 
painting to a third party, not because the third party offers a higher amount of money, but because 
the debtor does not want the original creditor to acquire the painting, although he had concluded a 
contract with him. In principle, this category of breach seems to be an exceptional category of 
deliberate breaches. One could hardly imagine that committing a malicious breach would be a 
tempting business decision for a debtor who makes choices based upon economic calculation. 
Moreover, the breach of contract is in this type of cases not that relevant any longer, because it is 
completely  ‘overtaken’ by the unlawful act, so it is even questionable whether it is useful to qualify 
such breaches as deliberate breaches of contract. Therefore, from the perspective of answering the 
core research questions  of this section and of the thesis as a whole, in particular the connection 
between deliberate breach and remedial relief, the objective of any possible adjustment of the 
debtor’s behavior as a consequence of the availability of more severe remedies in contract for the 
creditor is not feasible. 
The exploration so far shows a clear difference between economic and malicious or tortious 
deliberateness.  The second question of this section needs a more serious look into potential 
similarities between economic and malicious deliberate breach. A slight change in approach may 
already blur the border between deliberate and malicious breach. An example is the situation where 
the debtor enters into a contract in bad faith in order to exploit the other party.   
Sometimes one of the parties ‘only’ negotiates in bad faith and withdraws from negotiations at a 
very late stage. In this specific situation, negotiating in bad faith implies that the party concerned 
never had the intention to conclude a serious contract with the other party in the sense that he 
expected to perform his own obligations. This particular situation falls outside the scope of this 
section, because a contract is not concluded and breach of contract does not come into play.  
However, sometimes parties conclude contracts without the intention to perform obligation at all. 
The previous examples analyzed situations where the debtor faced a situation where he has a choice 
between performance and non-performance after the conclusion of the contract. The conclusion of 
the contract itself is considered to be done within the limits of fair behavior in the sense that both 
parties originally created the contract in order to perform the obligations resulting from the contract. 
However, there may be situations where one of the parties concluded the contract, but never 
considered performing the obligation at all or at least considered the possibility he would not 
perform as a serious probability in the future. Because generally all contracts are about distribution 
of monetary interests, the drive behind this behavior is financial. Therefore one could imagine breach 
being considered as a financially attractive option not only after conclusion of the contract – e.g. 
because a third party shows up offering a higher amount of money for the sold object to the buyer - , 
but also before the conclusion of the contract.  
An example of this type of breach is the so-called bad faith breach in insurance cases. In the 1970’s 
some States in the US started to recognize in law a new concept with contract and tort elements: 
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‘bad faith breach’ or, as Slawson puts it, “the tort of bad faith breach”.164 A general concept of tort is 
not recognized in common law jurisdictions. The common law ‘only’ recognizes  a range of various, 
specifically circumscribed torts, such as the torts of libel, slander, trespassing and tortious 
interference. The approach of several civil law jurisdictions – i.e. to test whether a certain act is 
unlawful – is a completely different one.  
It is vital to attempt to understand the notion of bad faith breach. The essential element in the bad 
faith breach is the absence of belief in the mind of the breacher that he has a viable defense against 
a claim based upon a contract. The party in breach knows he is liable in contract, but he willfully 
attempts to escape liability. The tort of bad faith breach had initially been developed for insurance 
law cases. The insurer who knows he has to pay a sum of money according to the insurance contract, 
but who instead does not and forces the insured to start legal proceedings to obtain the right – and 
the financial translation of this right – he indisputably has.  
The key element of the US concept of bad faith breach is that it is a specific tort. US law primarily 
recognizes the contractual character of a first party insurance. The refusal to perform any obligation 
according to the contract should primarily be considered as breach of contract. The available tools 
for the aggrieved party are the remedies for breach of contract, primarily expectation damages. 
Expectation damages are only available to the extent of compensation of the losses. These losses 
must be foreseeable and not too remote. In addition, any costs made with respect to legal 
representation are generally not recoverable under expectation damages. However, parties to an 
insurance contract are not only bound by the wording of the contract, they are also bound by an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which sounds in contract as well as in tort.165 The 
gateway to the tort qualification is essential, because remedies in tort also include punitive damages, 
whereas remedies in contract generally do not. The question is whether breach of the insurance 
contract in this case could also be classified as a tort. If that result is achieved, remedies in tort are 
also available, under which punitive damages. The route from contract damages to tort damages – in 
other words the equation of breach of contract with a tort – has generally, historically and 
traditionally been cut off firmly.  In the words of Gilmore, classical contract theory on this issue is  
“dedicated to the proposition, that ideally, no one should be liable to anyone for anything.”166 
Gilmore used this exaggeration to emphasize that damages in contract have a history of constant 
limitation and restriction. The whole idea of contract and its narrow conception of damages would be 
in danger if damages in tort could be easily obtained by qualifying every breach of contract as a tort. 
A breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may sound in contract and in tort, but the 
difficult question arises whether a breach of contract as such should be qualified as against good 
faith. That is apparently not the case. Breach of contract as such is in principle part of the freedom of 
contract. A party may commit breach of contract, even consciously. For a breach against good faith, a 
bad faith breach, something more is required. According to the Fletcher case and later cases, the 
essential element in order to label a breach as a bad faith breach is a special relationship between 
the contracting parties. The position of the insured is vulnerable. In a leading US case the court 
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decided that the insurer commits bad faith breach of contract, which can be qualified as a tort, if the 
insurer consciously abuses the vulnerable position of the insured by denying liability, even though he 
knows he does not have a viable defense against a claim speculating on the ignorance of the insured 
or his inability to fight for his rights.167 In this situation, tort remedies are also available, because this 
type of behavior of the insurer should be subject to retribution on the one hand and be deterred on 
the other hand. This particular behavior makes breach of contract tortious. The tort addition is 
necessary to trigger a new box of damages, such as punitive damages.  
In conclusion, the borderline between deliberate breach and tort adds another perspective to the 
meaning of the notion of deliberate breach of contract. The notion of deliberateness in this respect 
may have a sharp edge. An element of maliciousness may be added to the deliberate economic 
consideration to commit breach of contract. Although maliciousness and economic reasoning at a 
first glance may be two separate manifestations of deliberateness, they may also coincide and 
catalyze each other as the example of bad faith breach of contract in insurance cases shows. The 
remedial aspects of categorizing deliberate breach as a tort are also briefly discussed, but these 
aspects deserve more structural attention in the next chapter. An interesting aspect of the bad faith 
breach is that it is a phenomenon which is subject to actual debate in American jurisdictions as well 
as in European jurisdictions. The example of bad faith breach shows in its own way that the dynamics 
of defending against a claim by an insured cannot be completely shut down by awarding high 
punitive amounts for delay in payment. The freedom for parties to litigate and build their own 
defenses according to the applicable procedural rules may not too easily be set aside. On the other 
hand, the example of bad faith breach already shows that proving deliberate misconduct is extremely 
difficult.  
3.7 Deliberate breach in empirical legal studies 
In order to explore the features of deliberate breach, another approach which should be taken into 
account, is an empirical one. In other words, do parties themselves make a distinction in the way 
they are being treated by their contractual opponent in case of breach of contract? Are they 
offended more severely when they feel that the breach is not a simple breach, but a deliberate act of 
the debtor in order to avoid performance? If parties make such a distinction, it is relevant to find out 
which features are essential according to the parties – who are obviously not lawyers themselves – to 
qualify as a deliberate breach. A subsequent question may be whether the aggrieved party in case of 
deliberate breach of contract would like to have more severe remedies at his disposal than the 
standard remedies in case of breach of contract.  
Again, the working definition of deliberate breach serves as a point of reference: 
“Breach is considered to be deliberate when the party in breach commits breach of contract in order 
to obtain a financial advantage or to avoid a financial disadvantage, which he would have missed or 
which he would have incurred in the case of performance of the contract.” 
The empirical approach is relevant, because if parties – the users of the law of contract – feel 
deceived or betrayed as a result of breach of contract, they may also want to express this feeling in 
the reaction towards the party in breach. If parties distinguish between types of breach in terms of 
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degree of fault, this is a serious indication for the law to adequately respond to the needs of 
contractual parties. 
Empirical research is in legal scholarship not widespread in civil law in general, and certainly not in 
the law of contract. The empirical research projects and their results which are relevant for the 
answer to the question how breach is perceived are mainly done in the US. A core element of these 
studies is often that the parties’ approach towards a contractual relationship is not a ‘friendly’ one. 
Parties know that a contract is necessary, but the process of legal negotiation is perceived as the 
domain of the lawyer, who is not part of the real deal between the parties. The conclusion of a 
contract allowing parties to have access to remedies in the case of various kinds of behavior of the 
other party is generally viewed as a necessary evil, a formality which allows the lawyers concerned to 
obtain substantial gains from creating massive contracts with legal content the parties themselves 
cannot understand. The core of the contract, the agreement on the content of the obligations in legal 
terminology, is not perceived as a primarily legal affair by parties. The key word in lay perspective in 
this sense is ‘trust’.168 When parties negotiate about contracts and decide whether they want to 
conclude a contract with each other, it boils down to the question whether they trust each other 
enough to proceed.  In general, this approach is sound for practically any voluntary contractual 
relationship169, for consumers and professionals. Naturally, this approach is most accurate when 
professional parties conclude a large and complicated transaction, such as a transfer of shares of a 
large company. Negotiations between the parties on the specific terms have to fill the gaps which 
trust cannot fill in the specific situation. However, even if a consumer buys a loaf of bread, he trusts 
the baker in the sense that he delivers fresh-baked bread.  
In his influential article in 1963, Macaulay states that contract law might promote rational planning 
of transactions, but only when the value of the exchange is great. The most important reason for this 
empirical finding is the lack of necessity.170 In business, the decision-makers do generally not care 
about small print contracts, but about trust. They value trust more than any concrete contract 
related issue, only until the moment trust is violated. In such a situation, a contract may become 
important. This empirical study, albeit limited in extent, has been very influential for future 
research.171 The empirical study in North Carolina from 1992 seems to confirm some of Macaulays 
findings. Businessmen are not charmed with the idea of willful breach. They rather expect their 
counterparties to perform their contractual obligations. The availability of damages does not take 
away parties’ preference for performance of the obligations. For parties, although they may not 
always be aware of it, the law of damages fills gaps in the contract, because it is inefficient to draft 
‘complete’ contracts.172  
The construction and mechanism of trust and its psychological and sociological consequences not 
only between parties in contractual situations, but also outside contractual situations has not been a 
topic which has been studied in-depth in legal research, at least not in relation to breach of contract. 
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How trust works has been subject to in-depth research in the area of social sciences.173 This thesis is 
not the place to discuss these works thoroughly. Some scholars who operate on the verge between 
legal and social sciences executed empirical research in order to establish that trust is essential in 
concluding contracts.174  
One of the most recently published studies is relatively sharp in its conclusions. It revealed empirical 
evidence that individuals may view breach as moral harm. Even compared to standard tort situations, 
individuals under circumstances perceive breach as a more serious infliction on a moral level. 
Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman assert: 
“Breach creates an injury distinct from the economic loss created in tort. Breaches for gain are 
perceived as worse than breaches to avoid loss”.175 
In these cases, the individuals who took part in the experiments could not deny a sense of being 
exploited. The idea that subjects may experience breach in various ways even though the economic 
losses are similar, is therefore not only an assumption, but at least on a basic level a tested empirical 
fact. Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman also indicate the limitations of their research. They do not say 
anything on the potential answers of the law in the sphere of remedies. In other words, they do not 
propose a larger award of expectation damages or an easier access to specific performance as a 
remedy. A further limitation of their research is that their experiments only included individuals. The 
perception of (large) companies may be different, because the economic considerations to conclude 
and to forfeit contractual obligations may be stronger than in the case of an individual initiating a 
contractual relationship. Nevertheless, a less recent and modest empirical review also shows that 
companies may experience feelings of deceit once they are confronted with deliberate breach of 
contract.176 Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman explicitly deny the Holmesian premise that a contractual 
party is indifferent towards the remedy of specific performance, because expectation damages suit 
the aggrieved party as well, as long as damages are adequate. They contend that parties tend to 
incorporate more than only economic considerations in their assessment of the question which 
remedy suits them as most appropriate in a case of breach of contract.177  
In conclusion, contracting parties experience a serious feeling of deceit once they discover the other 
party deliberately committed breach of contract in order to achieve a larger financial gain. It is not to 
be said that an immediate increase of legal remedies would be a good solution in all cases – it is too 
early for such a conclusion – because parties would like to postpone the moment they have to invoke 
legal assistance almost at any cost, especially when more forceful extra-legal remedies are available, 
such as causing reputation damage. On the other hand, parties may experience a feeling of 
understanding once they discover the other party had to breach in order to avoid a destructive 
financial loss. The empirical legal studies mentioned in this section seem to cover the ground for the 
assumption that deliberateness of the breach in the sense of a more severe loss of mutual trust is a 
factor which should be taken into account in the assessment of legal remedies after the breach 
occurred. 
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3.8 Proving deliberateness? A comparison between deliberate breach and criminal intent 
A brief comparison between the notion of criminal intent and the specific manifestation of 
deliberateness in civil law is relevant in two ways. First, the notion of criminal intent and the way this 
notion is approached by criminal law provides private law a new perspective on the notion of 
deliberateness.  Second, the notion of criminal intent is especially relevant to highlight a problem 
occurring in both areas of law, a problem of evidence. The question in both areas of law is how the 
aggrieved party is able to prove that the criminal behavior of the perpetrator was intentional or that 
the breach committed  was deliberate. Criminal law has more experience in dealing with this 
problem than civil law. The way the notion of ‘criminal intent’ is approached by criminal law helps to 
acknowledge and solve this problem in the area of civil law.  
For purposes of consistency, the working definition of deliberate breach of contract is again 
repeated: 
 “Breach is considered to be deliberate when the party in breach commits breach of contract in order 
to obtain a financial advantage or to avoid a financial disadvantage, which he would have missed or 
incurred in the case of performance of the contract.” 
In criminal law, thinking about degrees of blameworthiness is one of the essential elements  of 
academic research. Several dissertations and other substantive contributions have been written on 
the topic of criminal intent.178The problems of adequately describing the notion of deliberateness is 
also recognized in criminal law. In criminal law the notion of intent, intention or intentionality is not 
easy to define either. Criminal law generally uses the term ‘intent’ when the suspect acts ‘willingly 
and knowingly’. He must want to act and he must know that he acts criminally.179 The idea of intent 
as a pure subjective state of mind as a requirement for criminal liability is difficult, because it is 
impossible to detect and, therefore, impossible to prove that the suspect is criminally responsible for 
an act for which criminal intent is necessary. 
De Jong does not define the term criminal intent, but he describes some well-known lines of thinking 
in criminal law on criminal intent: 
“In relation to the meaning attributed to intention in colloquial language, the concept of intent in 
criminal law is characterized by a rather wide scope of applicability, mainly because of the 
development of the notion of conditional intent. The furnishing of proof of intent by strongly 
objectivizing and normativizing tendencies.”180 
De Jong argues that intent is not a static state of affairs and cannot be localized somewhere. It must 
be established while studying subjective and intersubjective moments. This highly theoretical 
approach should be contrasted with the view of Van Dijk, who – more down to earth – asserts that 
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criminal intent is a state of mind of the defendant.181 Safferling comparatively studies the various 
degrees of criminal blameworthiness from German as well as English perspective. On intent 
Safferling concludes that the elements of malicious intent on the result of the act (‘Absicht’) are not 
necessary to qualify as criminal intent. It is sufficient when it can be established that the suspect 
could have foreseen the result of his act. In general, German and English law both recognize a more 
generous interpretation of ‘intent’ than the pure ‘willingly and knowingly’ manifestation of intent, 
because – as in Dutch law – conditional intent is also a manifestation of criminal intent.182  
The category of conditional intent is an important one in criminal law. The man who drank too much 
alcohol and caused a collision with a pedestrian, did most likely not have the intent to cause a 
collision. Nevertheless, the risk at a collision vastly increased by deliberate acts of the man. Causing 
the collision could not only be qualified as ‘culpable’, but also as ‘conditionally intentional’, which 
increases the severity of the criminal act. 
It seems that criminal law needed to develop a tiered structure of the notion of intent in order to 
overcome problems of evidence. The strongest manifestation of intent, the ‘willingly and knowingly’ 
committed criminal act without restrictions is the one most difficult to prove, because intent is a 
subjective state of mind which in itself is very difficult to detect. The development of the notion of 
conditional intent helps to avoid the situation in which criminal intent becomes a dead letter due to 
problems of being able to prove intent. On the one hand, criminal law solves the problem of 
evidence by distinguishing different categories of intent. On the other hand, criminal law also has to 
deal with external manifestations, external events, which thereafter have to be qualified as intent or 
not.183  
Returning to the provisional definition of deliberate breach of contract, the cost and benefit idea 
resulting from the definition is a matter of construction. The idea that deliberateness can be 
construed – an idea developed by criminal law – by the way facts are presented and described is 
helpful to understand what deliberateness in civil law may imply, but it is also helpful to overcome 
problems of evidence. The definition indicates that deliberateness is assumed once the debtor 
commits breach with the idea of achieving financial advantage as a result of the breach.  Various 
questions arise once deliberateness is derived from a construction. Is breach according to the 
definition also deliberate if financial advantage is not achieved although the party committing breach 
intended to achieve financial advantage? The answer will depend on the circumstances of the case, 
although the latter situation is exactly an example of a situation which is difficult to prove, because 
the internal state of mind of the party committing breach should be examined. In order to make the 
notion of deliberateness a notion with which the aggrieved party can achieve something, the 
necessity to prove the internal state of mind should be avoided. In that sense, deliberateness should 
always be a matter of construction in the legal sense of the word, because deliberateness as a 
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subjective state of mind is not recognizable for anyone except for the debtor who commits breach of 
contract. If he denies having the intent to commit breach, and proof of the subjective intent would 
be the only allowable evidence, the practical significance of this research project would be minimal.  
The connection between criminal and civil law can be made by looking carefully at the facts of the 
case, when deciding if breach can be considered as deliberate. A deliberate act of the debtor which 
does not directly precede the moment of breach or can be qualified as the breach itself does not a 
priori mean that the breach cannot be qualified as deliberate.184  
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar developed a theory according to which deliberate – in their terms ‘willful’ – 
breach is a tag attached to behaviors that reveal information about some underlying bad trait, 
distinct from the breach itself. What makes a trait bad is that it is associated with a pattern of 
undetected value-skimming conduct.185Essentially, it comes down to labeling specific situations as 
deliberate or not. This is a mechanism to avoid examining the state of mind of the debtor committing 
breach.  
According to Craswell, who also sought inspiration in criminal law, breach of contract is not an action, 
but a state of affairs. He argues that a state of affairs is the result not of one action, but of a whole 
sequence of actions.186 Therefore, it matters how the sequence of these actions is presented on the 
assessment of the type of breach. Craswell rightly points out, that in practically every breach a 
voluntary element can be detected – this is an aspect which has also been mentioned in section 3.3 
on excusable breach – , whereas at the same time parties at the time of signing the contract do not 
intend to breach the contract. The emphasis on different events leading to the breach can influence 
the assessment of the type of breach.  He discusses the cases of Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & 
Mining Co. and Jacob & Youngs, Inc v. Kent to illustrate his point.187 The first case was about a mining 
company who promised to repair the land he used for mining purposes. Once he discovered that the 
costs of repair were much higher than he expected, because the coal lay deeper than foreseen, he 
did not abide by his contractual obligations. Whereas the decision not to repair the land may be 
considered as deliberate, the involuntary or unexpected element is the position of the coal, which 
influences the cost of repair. In the second case a builder uses a wrong brand of pipe, apparently by 
accident as the court assumes. The building of the house is finished – it is not unsafe nor useless as a 
result of the use of the wrong pipes–  and replacing the pipes would only be possible if the house is 
demolished. However, elements of deliberateness can be discovered as well: the builder could have 
taken more (and more costly) measures to prevent the accident in the first place and furthermore, 
he could have demolished the house to correct his mistake (even more costly).  The presentation of 
the sequence of facts is relevant, because – as section 3.7 showed – some empirical research has 
been done on the assessment of parties themselves of specific breaches as deliberate. Breach to 
obtain greater profit is generally considered as deliberate, whereas breach to avoid losses is not.188 In 
order to correctly label these situations, it may be helpful to refer to empirical studies which reveal 
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attitudes towards certain breaches and differences between types of breach. Even within these 
parameters, the presentation of the facts may lead to the situation that the same breach may be 
presented as a ‘profit’ or an ‘avoid loss’ case, depending on the way of presentation. For example, 
the two cases just mentioned may factually be presented as avoidance of loss – by emphasizing the 
costly repair of land respectively the demolishing of a new building – , but the same events can also 
be presented as attempts to maximize the profit – avoiding a loss in business may also create a profit 
for the party committing breach respectively emphasizing the lack of preliminary research to the 
depth of the coal or the lack of preventive measures.  
Summarizing, this section introduced a criminal law approach to the notion of deliberateness. The 
criminal law approach is relevant because of its thorough and in-depth research on the notion of 
criminal intent. The relevance of criminal intent and intentional behavior from a criminal law 
perspective is obvious, because it may be relevant to establish whether a suspect is for example 
criminally liable for intentional manslaughter or death by negligent behavior. Criminal law tends to 
focus on the problem of deliberateness that it is generally perceived as a state of mind of the acting 
person. He acts deliberately, because he internally decides to act. However, the internal state of 
mind in itself is not externally visible. Therefore, from this perspective deliberateness would be 
impossible to prove. However, authors from several jurisdictions have shown that there are 
numerous ways to circumvent this problem in order to make the notion of deliberateness legally 
relevant. By normativizing and externalizing the features of specific behavior, it may be possible to 
label a specific, factual sequence of acts as deliberate. In fact, the provisional definition of deliberate 
breach of contract proves to be an example of this strategy. In this provisional definition, the act of 
deliberateness is connected with economic outcomes of certain behavior, which are externally 
visible. The notion of criminal intent is useful in helping the civil law solving the puzzle of evidence in 
this respect. Moreover, the notion of criminal intent may also prove to be useful when establishing 
borderlines of deliberateness in another way. Criminal law also recognizes the notion of conditional 
intent. Even if the suspect did not foresee the negative consequences of his act, but acted in such a 
way that he reasonably could have foreseen these consequences, but apparently did not care too 
much, his act may be qualified as conditionally intentional. In the context of deliberate breach of 
contract, this perspective may for example open doors to take into account examples of defective 
performance due to cost cutting in servicing machines for example, which may cause a large amount 
of damage to the aggrieved party. As we shall see in the next chapter, the notion of remoteness of 
damages may also be affected by the inclusion of conditional intent. 
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to answer the following research question: 
What is deliberate breach of contract?  
This chapter shows that the question is slightly misleading, because it suggests that after thorough 
research an unequivocal answer will be provided. Although a single definition could be provided as a 
definitive answer, it is not a satisfactory answer. The notion of deliberate breach can be approached 
from various perspectives and the variety in perspectives shows that it is not useful to catch the 
notion in a one-sentence definition. Nevertheless, as a starting point this chapter in every section 
uses a provisional working definition. 
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“Breach is considered to be deliberate when the party in breach commits breach of contract in order 
to obtain a financial advantage or to avoid a financial disadvantage, which he would have missed or 
which he would have incurred in the case of performance of the contract.” 
This definition may have seemed to be adequate at the beginning of this chapter; it has lost its clarity 
at the end of it. Various perspectives on deliberate breach differently emphasize and contextualize 
specific aspects of the definition. 
First, section 3.3 shows that the classic borderline between excusable and non-excusable breach of 
contract does not represent the same borderline between deliberate and inadvertent breach. In 
other words, an excusable breach may be deliberate in the sense that a party knew what he was 
doing, but he may have had a lawful excuse to commit breach in order to prevent a substantial loss. 
On the other hand, a deliberate breach need not always be a non-excusable breach. At the same 
time, an inadvertent breach needs not be an inexcusable breach. The baker who delivers the 
wedding cake, but ruins it by accidentally stepping into a hole in the pavement, is liable in contract, 
although the breach was inadvertent. The borderline between deliberate and non-deliberate breach 
gets a new dimension especially if the last part of the provisional definition is focused upon. When a 
breach is deliberate in order to avoid a financial loss which would be large but bearable or so large 
that financial breakdown is inevitable is not so easy to determine. A first shade of grey in defining 
deliberateness is established. 
Second, the definition consistently uses the term ‘deliberate’ in order to describe a breach which is 
somehow premeditated. This chapter shows that courts as well as academic contributions use a 
variety of terms which all describe phenomena similar to the type of breach suggested in the 
definition, but not without differences. Terminological chaos regarding deliberate breach is 
paramount, although two notions represent two manifestations of deliberate breach: willful breach 
and efficient breach. The core conclusions from this analysis must be that efficient breach is regarded 
as a positive notion in US law and economics scholarship, whereas willful breach is generally not. 
Efficient breach can generally be circumscribed as willful breach plus the efficiency aspect which 
means that the aggrieved party should be paid full compensatory damages in case of (willful) breach. 
Once the efficiency component is absent, the breach only remains ‘willful’, a type of breach which is 
associated with opportunistic behavior which should not be encouraged.  
Third, an important conclusion is that efficient breach theory leads to serious economic debate on 
the notion of willful breach itself. Classic law and economics theory tends to neglect the intentional 
aspect of the act of breach, focusing on the efficiency of the breach. Especially Posner and Shavell 
advocate the development and application of deliberate breach, as long as it is efficient. Opponents 
of this development, such as Shiffrin, emphasize that efficiency is hard to achieve and that even if 
efficiency is achieved – the question still remains whether the aggrieved party would not rather have 
been more satisfied when the original obligation had been correctly performed.  
Fourth, the borderline between deliberate breach and tort needs to be examined. The notion of 
deliberateness in this respect may also have a sharp edge which goes beyond a financial motive of 
the party committing breach. An element of maliciousness may be added to the deliberate economic 
consideration to commit breach of contract. Although maliciousness and economic reasoning at a 
first glance may be two separate manifestations of deliberateness, they may also coincide and 
catalyze each other, as the example of bad faith breach of contract in insurance cases shows.  
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Fifth, the perceptions of the parties concerned are also relevant in determining the meaning of 
deliberateness and, moreover, its potential legal relevance. Empirical research on contracts, in the 
socio-legal experiments in the US, but also in sociological experiments in Europe, shows that the 
element of trust in the contractual relationship is very important. Contracts and trust are not 
synonyms. Contracts are partly used to fill in the gaps trust cannot fill between the parties. However, 
a contract between parties may only be concluded once there is an element of trust between the 
contracting parties. Contracting parties experience a serious feeling of deceit once they discover the 
other party deliberately committed breach of contract in order to achieve a larger financial gain. The 
empirical legal studies mentioned in this section seem to cover the ground for the assumption that 
deliberateness of the breach in the sense of a more severe loss of mutual trust is a factor which 
should be taken into account in the assessment of legal remedies after the breach occurred. 
Sixth, attention should be paid to the problem of proving deliberateness, a problem which is 
implicitly present in the provisional definition. Deliberateness suggests that a party knows what he is 
doing, it is generally perceived as a state of mind of the acting person. He acts deliberately, because 
he internally decides to act. The internal state of mind in itself is not externally visible. Therefore, 
from this perspective deliberateness would be impossible to prove. Nevertheless, criminal law may 
help to overcome this difficult issue, because criminal law has to deal with the notion of criminal 
intent. By normativizing and externalizing the features of specific behavior, it may be possible to 
label a specific, factual sequence of acts as deliberate. In fact, the provisional definition of deliberate 
breach of contract proves to be an example of this strategy. In this provisional definition, the act of 
deliberateness is connected with economic outcomes of certain behavior, which are externally 
visible.  
Finally, this chapter has shown that the provisional working definition may be used in order to 
communicate in one sentence what a general interpretation of deliberate breach may imply, but it 
definitely falls short in providing a complete account of the range of aspects deliberateness as a 
notion may imply. En passant, this chapter already makes clear that the notion of deliberateness 
seems to be relevant, at least where deliberate breach implies efficient breach or a tort. The main 
shortcoming of this chapter may be that it is still slightly too general. Examples are mentioned, but 
not elaborated in detail. The notion of deliberateness starts to live in practice, once remedial 
consequences are attached to deliberate behavior in concrete cases. A start of a more detailed 
analysis of the concrete features of deliberate breach of contract is only possible after discussing the 
remedial consequences. The next chapter reveals on a concrete level the diversity in solutions in 









4  Deliberate breach of contract and its influence in (legal) 
practice on core remedies in contract: an exploration 
4.1  Introduction 
The research question this chapter attempts to answer is the following: 
Does deliberateness of the breach of contract play a role in existing contract law, more specifically in 
contract law related legal provisions – ‘law in the books’ –  or in case law –‘ law in action’ – , in the 
sense that deliberateness as a relevant factor influences the choice or application of remedies in 
contract and if so, how? 
This chapter continues to build a picture of the notion of deliberate breach by searching concrete 
examples in case law. Is the notion of deliberate breach recognized by courts and lawmakers, and if 
so, how? In this sense, this chapter continues the quest started in Chapter 3. Furthermore, this 
chapter investigates the role of deliberate breach in the application of contract remedies. The 
answer to the descriptive research question in this chapter is a relevant and necessary step in order 
to start building a credible and reliable analytical framework which is necessary to answer the 
normative research questions. It is relevant and necessary, because it is pointless to criticize court 
decision making on sanctioning deliberate breach of contract, when the current status of 
deliberateness as a possible relevant influential factor on remedies in contract in existing case law is 
not addressed.   
The research question of this chapter has a strong exploratory character. The term exploration 
suggests that the reader will be faced with choices made by the author. Not every possible case of 
deliberate breach will be mentioned – that would be neither useful nor desirable -, but the choices 
made should be justified as well as the structure of this chapter.  
First, this chapter opts for a structure in types of core remedies in contract – i.e. focusing on enforced 
performance and several manifestations of damages. With regard to all the chosen remedies, case 
law illustrations from various jurisdictions will be presented in order to detect whether 
deliberateness is a relevant factor in applying the analyzed remedy.   
Second, it is important to emphasize that this chapter opts for an illustrative approach and does not 
strive for completeness. After this chapter, the reader should have a more concrete idea of the 
current relevance of deliberateness on application of remedies in contract in several major 
jurisdictions. A complete picture of cases in all analyzed jurisdictions where deliberateness plays a 
role is not an objective of this chapter, because it is impossible in practice and not relevant either, 
taking into account the research objective of this thesis as a whole. Furthermore, it is impossible, 
because the notion of deliberateness is not an established legal concept, which may differ between 
jurisdictions, but also within jurisdictions – i.e. courts of the same jurisdictions may differ on the idea 
of what deliberate breach is. Therefore, the possible influence of deliberateness on applying 
remedies in contract may vary accordingly and a clear complete picture is therefore not possible to 
provide. The aim of this thesis is to create an analytical framework on which basis deliberateness of 
the breach may be implemented as a factor of relevance in applying remedies in concrete cases in a 
more coherent way than it is currently done. In order to create such a framework, a basic idea of the 
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current influence of deliberateness on remedies in concrete breach of contract case law is relevant 
and necessary, but a complete overview is not essential to create this framework.  
Third, this chapter deals with three core variables, i.e. the notion of deliberateness (1), the type of 
remedy on which deliberateness may have a certain influence (2) and the specific jurisdiction where 
this connection is found (3). One of the main difficulties is that the first two variables do not only 
predictably vary – i.e. every section of this chapter discusses deliberateness as a possible relevant 
factor for another remedy and every subsection deals with an example from another jurisdiction – 
but they are also intrinsically vague. Deliberate breach of contract, as explained previously, is not a 
term always used in the same way in legal provisions, by courts or in academic contributions. The 
analyzed remedies have their own specific, jurisdiction-related meaning. Even without taking into 
account the comparative difference, the remedies lack intrinsic clarity. The specific meaning of 
‘expectation damages’ for example is not always clear in advance, because it can be questionable 
which types of damages are part of this definition and which are not. The uncertainty embedded in 
this chapter emphasizes the need for a clear structure on the one hand and a modest objective of 
this chapter on the other hand. This chapter analyzes examples of deliberate breach and court 
remedial solutions on situations of deliberate breach and it does so by a cherry-picking approach. 
This approach is justified as explained previously, but it is necessary to mention that any answer to 
the research question will provide only a raw sketch of the way deliberateness is embedded in the 
current law of remedies in contract. 
Fourth, the concrete structure of this relatively extensive chapter is presented as a roadmap in order 
to help the reader to find his way. Section 4.2 explores the relation between deliberate breach and 
the remedy of enforced performance. The most relevant specific question is whether the element of 
deliberateness influences the lawmaker or the court in deciding on the availability of enforced 
performance for the creditor. Section 4.3 explores the effect of deliberateness on contractual 
arrangements regarding breach of contract. This section focuses on the connection between 
deliberateness of the breach and the validity of penalty clauses and on the validity of exclusion or 
limitation clauses. Deliberateness of the breach may also influence the court to mitigate the 
consequence of invoking the specific clause. A specific common law versus continental law issue is 
that deliberateness may influence the choice of the court of labeling a clause as liquidated damages 
clause or as a penalty clause. The effect of being able to invoke the clause is enforcement of the 
clause; therefore this section is situated near the section on the remedy of enforced performance. 
Section 4.4 explores the influence of deliberateness on the ‘classic’ remedy of expectation damages. 
Section 4.5 and 4.6 respectively explore the influence of deliberateness on the availability and extent 
of damages for non-pecuniary losses or punitive damages. Section 4.7 explores the relation between 
deliberateness and the remedy of account of profits. Section 4.8 explores some examples where 
deliberateness may influence the attitude of the lawmaker or the court towards the remedy of 
termination. Deliberateness may also play a role in the decision whether partial termination or price 
reduction may be available. Section 4.9 explores the relation between deliberateness of the breach 
and the possibility to recover costs for legal representation. Section 4.10, as a second step outside 
the area of standard remedies next to the section on penalty clauses, briefly explores the 
relationship between deliberateness and the application of exclusion clauses. Finally, section 4.11 
ends with a conclusion, which summarily recollects the main findings of this chapter and answers the 
core question of this chapter. 
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4.2  Deliberateness and enforced performance 
4.2.1  Introductory remarks 
This section presents examples in case law where deliberateness of the committed breach influences 
court decisions to award the claim of performance.  In common law jurisdictions, the courts will 
generally have to decide whether deliberateness of the breach influences the decision to deem an 
award of expectation damages as ‘not adequate’, because ‘adequacy of damages’ is the general 
requirement for allowing the aggrieved party to the remedy of specific performance. In civil law 
jurisdictions, it is generally more difficult to deny the aggrieved party a claim to performance. 
However, considerations of practice may persuade parties not to claim performance at all, because 
damages are easier to claim. Nevertheless, in case of a deliberate breach, in civil law jurisdictions the 
court may under circumstances lower its thresholds to honor the claim of enforced performance.  
Surprisingly, deliberateness may influence a decision on awarding specific performance in a 
completely other way as well, namely in the situation where the party committing deliberate breach 
himself claims specific performance. This situation occurs when the other party also commits breach 
of contract. The specific question arises, whether the deliberateness of the breach influences the 
availability of claiming specific performance as a reaction to breach of contract of the other party. 
Especially in US law and in English law, some interesting examples with direct references to 
deliberateness are analyzed. Again, in civil law jurisdictions it is more difficult to find some concrete 
examples in this area. 
4.2.2  English law Ia: Raphael v Thames Valley Railway Company 
English law does not offer many direct clues which link deliberateness of the breach to an eventual 
easier access to the remedy of specific performance. Nevertheless, some clues for the existence of 
such a connection may be found, at least implicitly. Two examples, an old one and a new one, reveal 
that deliberateness of the breach may influence the decision to award specific performance or not. 
In the 19th century case Raphael v Thames Valley Railway Company189 a railway company negotiated 
with a landowner to build a railway on his estate. The railway company promised to build the railway 
in a particular manner and the landowner in turn promised not to vote against the bill which allowed 
the construction of the railway company. The bill was filed pending the works and the railway 
company altered the course of the line during building. At the time of proceedings, the railway was 
already open for the public, but the landowner claimed specific performance of his agreement with 
the railway company and asked the court to order the company to rebuild the railway according to 
the agreement. The railway company argued that the public would be unnecessarily disadvantaged if 
the railway had to be rebuilt. The court in first instance allowed this defense and denied the order for 
specific performance with a reference to possible danger and inconvenience to the public. In appeal, 
the court repeats the argument of the court of first instance, where it says that there is another class 
of persons whose interests should be taken into account – i.e. the public – and it argued that the 
public could not be subject to such a disadvantage because of an eventual order for specific 
performance in a private contract between an landowner and a railway company. The Court of 
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Appeal, represented by Lord Chelmsford, denied this argument and started its argument with the 
following quote: 
“Whether in a case where there has been a determined and willful breach of an agreement by a 
railway company, the element of public convenience ought to be introduced to prevent a decree for 
specific performance, is at least questionable; but I can hardly think it ought to have been permitted 
to influence the judgment of the Master of the Rolls in the present case.” 
Apparently, Lord Chelmsford considers the factor of inconvenience for the public as a relevant 
element in deciding on the award for specific performance as exceptional, but in a case of deliberate 
– willful – breach he definitely denies the possible relevance of public inconvenience. Lord 
Chelmsford subsequently shows that damages would not be an adequate remedy under these 
circumstances. Without directly referring to the willfulness of the breach, but indirectly hinting on its 
presence, he again summarizes what leads him to award the claim of specific performance: 
“The company, however, persevered in deviating from the agreed line, so as, in the opinion of the 
Plaintiffs’ witnesses, materially to damage the estate, and to interfere with the safety of the access to 
it, and then, having obtained permission to continue and complete their works, which have not been 
disputed to be a departure for the agreement, they bring forward the public convenience as a ground 
why their undertaking should not be enforced, nor a specific performance of their agreement 
decreed.” 
For a second time, Lord Chelmsford, uses the willfulness of the breach – or at least the calculating 
decision of the railway company to deviate from the agreement – to support the decision of the 
Court of Appeal and to award the decree of specific performance. 
The secondary position of specific performance in English is illustrated by this case. The court needs 
all arguments to award specific performance, especially if it needs to turn down an earlier decision 
on the same case. Although this case is not a recent one – even old-fashioned with an eye on the 
facts – the same struggle with awarding specific performance is visible in more recent cases.  
4.2.3  English law Ib: Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd.  
The element of deliberateness is also visible in the landmark case on specific performance Co-
operative Insurance Society Ltd. v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd. 190 
The case is on the question whether a company can be forced to run a loss making business, in this 
case a supermarket, because it commits breach of a contractual obligation as a tenant of a building 
which he agreed with the owner to a rent for a long period of time. The facts of this case are based 
on the statement of facts of Leggatt LJ in the Court of Appeal decision. The property in question 
comprises 30% of the total letting area of the Hillsborough Shopping Centre. It is let to Argyll for use 
as one of their Safeway supermarkets. It is the anchor unit in the shopping centre and it plays a key 
role. The lease is for a term of 35 years from 4 August 1979 with periodic rent reviews. The contract 
contains the following obligation: 
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 “To keep the demised premises open for retail trade during the usual hours of business in the 
locality and the display windows properly dressed in a suitable manner, in keeping with a good class 
parade of shops ...” 
Until May 1995 the store was open for trading. But in its last trading year it made a loss of £70,300, 
so Argyll decided to close the supermarket. That decision was made well knowing of the 'keep open' 
covenant. When the landlords learned of the intention to close, their regional surveyor wrote Argyll a 
letter dated 8 May 1995, in which he said that he did not wish to pursue legal remedies, but asked 
Argyll to keep the supermarket open for trading until an assignee had been found. He offered the 
prospect of a temporary rent concession and asked for an immediate response, but the response 
never came. Instead, on 19 May 1995, the shop was stripped out. It would cost £1m to reinstate. The 
landlords referred to their insurance company and legal proceedings followed. 
In the Court of Appeal decision, the Lord Justices Leggatt and Roch both recognize that in the past an 
order for specific performance in cases like these had been seldomly awarded. The problem is, as 
being recognized by both justices, that calculating defendants can breach their contractual 
obligations, because they know they will not be ordered to actually perform their obligations. A claim 
for damages is the only thing the victim of the deliberate breach has. However, both justices qualify 
the conduct of the supermarket chain as a deliberate and knowing breach. Leggatt LJ qualifies the 
facts as follows: 
“Until May 1995 the store was open for trading. But in its last trading year it made a loss of £70,300. 
So Argyll decided to sell it together with 26 of their other supermarkets. That decision was made well 
knowing of the "keep open" covenant.”191 
Leggatt LJ identifies the problems of a claim for damages and he gives full credit to the motive of the 
breaching party as a factor to be taken into account when deciding an order for specific performance 
should be available: 
“The plaintiffs (the insurance company as the owner of the premises, MvK) would have very 
considerable difficulty in trying to prove their loss. An award of damages would be unlikely to 
compensate them fully; and the losses of the other tenants of the shopping centre would be 
irrecoverable, except in so far as they might be mitigated by reduced rents. Argyll have acted with 
gross commercial cynicism, preferring to resist a claim for damages rather than keep an 
unambiguous promise. This is not a court of morals, but there is no reason why its willingness to 
grant specific performance should not be affected by a sense of fair dealing.”192 
Roch LJ concurs with his colleague.  He is even less amused about the conduct of the supermarket 
chain: 
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“One matter that has been quite apparent in this appeal is that the defendants have behaved very 
badly.” 
The question is whether the way Argyll handled his contract affects the judgment. Is motive relevant 
for ordering specific performance or not, as Leggatt LJ affirmed in his opinion? 
In first instance, Roch LJ seems to cover the same ground as his colleague, but he deviates and 
reaches the same conclusion – specific performance should be ordered – but he does not attribute 
much value to the element of deliberateness of the breach. He rather chooses a more classic 
approach: 
“The purpose of the civil law is not to punish, save in certain limited and narrowly defined 
circumstances, but to compensate. The basic issue in this case, in my opinion, is whether damages 
are an adequate remedy. If they are, then no order for specific performance could be made. (…)”193 
In addition, he concludes that damages are not an adequate remedy in this case and he furthermore 
denies the idea that specific performance would not be possible and desirable because performance 
of the order could not be supervised or would be too costly. In his decision he refers to the conduct 
of the supermarket chain, albeit not the act of breaching itself, but to the rather clumsy way the 
supermarket chain behaved after the breach by not replying to letters sent by the owner of the 
building. 
The reason to pay attention to the opinion of Millett LJ is that his minority opinion seems to be the 
basis of a House of Lords decision which quashes the decisions of Leggatt and Roch LLJ. It is also clear 
he relies on the judgment of the judge who decided the case in first instance, leaving the owner of 
the building with a damages claim and not awarding the specific performance claim: 
“The judge carefully reviewed the facts and concluded that there was nothing which required him to 
treat the case as exceptional. He thought that it was one in which the ordinary practice should be 
followed. He acknowledged that the defendants had closed the store in deliberate and conscious 
breach of its obligation, but it did so openly and in the light of the practice of the court not to restrain 
breach of a covenant of the kind in question but to award damages instead. That, he considered, was 
a further reason for him not to depart from ordinary practice.”194 
The fact that Argyll is openly taking advantage of the legal situation at the cost of fulfilling his 
contractual obligation and at the expense of his contractual counterparty is considered as positive by 
Millett LJ. Millett LJ builds the foundation for Lord Hoffmann to downplay the role of the 
deliberateness of the breach in assessing the claim for specific performance: 
“In my opinion there is a fundamental objection to such an order (to compel Argyll to run a business, 
MvK). If granted for any length of time or for an indefinite period it is oppressive. To compel a 
defendant for an indefinite period to carry on a business which he considers is not viable, or which 
for his own commercial reasons he has decided to close down, is to expose him to potentially large 
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unquantifiable and unlimited losses which may be out of all proportion to the loss which his breach 
of contract has caused to the plaintiff.”195 
The interesting element of this part of the opinion of Millett LJ is that the assessment of the 
breaching party of fulfilling his part of the contract as ‘not viable’ seems to be leading for his own 
decision that compelling him to do so is ‘oppressive’ and might expose him to ‘large unquantifiable 
and unlimited losses’. However, the court does not know what happens if the order is granted. It is 
clear that the owner of the building is losing grip on the situation. He might be left with a claim for 
damages, although he cannot claim all damages he suffered, let alone that other parties concerned 
can recover any damages – such as the other stores in the shopping mall – because they do not have 
any contractual relationship with the supermarket chain.  
Lord Hoffmann, who wrote the opinion of the House of Lords, avoided all questions about the 
meaning of the binding force of the contract and a deliberate breach of the contract. The House of 
Lords unanimously refused to order Argyll specifically to run a loss- making supermarket in a 
shopping mall, although Argyll was obliged to run the supermarket according to the contract.196 All in 
all, the House of Lords overruled the decision of the Court of Appeal and denied the order for specific 
performance. Lord Hoffmann approached the case quite factually and focused completely on the 
general question under which circumstances specific performance might be awarded by the court 
instead of damages. Where all justices of the Court of Appeal at least mentioned the difficulty of 
claiming full compensatory damages if the order of specific performance had not been granted, Lord 
Hoffmann largely ignores this point by saying there is a ‘plausible alternative’ available in the form of 
damages. 
The House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and eventually denied the order for 
specific performance. For the purposes of this chapter, the decision of the Court of Appeal deserved 
special attention, because in this decision several Lords Justices mentioned the link between 
deliberateness and the order for specific performance. The House of Lords in turn – and somewhat 
unfortunately – approached the case on a more practical level without paying too much attention to 
the factor of deliberateness.197 More specifically, Lord Hoffmann explicitly toned down the element 
of the (mis)conduct of Argyll by calling the label attached by the Court of Appeal an ‘exaggeration’. 
The analysis of the reversed decision of the Court of Appeal is therefore not an indication of the state 
of the law, but it nevertheless indicates that the English judiciary sometimes realizes that 
deliberateness plays a certain role in the application of remedies in contract. 
The Railway case is a good example of a case where deliberateness indeed seems to have pushed the 
Court of Appeal to award specific performance. In the Argyll case, the Court of Appeal decision 
definitely incorporates the element of deliberateness, but the overruling House of Lords decision 
tones down the relevance of deliberateness, which makes the real influence of deliberateness on 
decisions of specific performance in English law in this respect not all too convincing. 
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4.2.4  English law IIa: Rankin v Lay, deliberate breach and relief against forfeiture? 
The factor of deliberateness may also be connected to the remedy of specific performance in a 
completely different way. In English law, cases can be found where the party claiming specific 
performance is confronted with a defense that specific performance should not be granted, because 
the party claiming specific performance committed deliberate breach. In other words, the party 
claiming specific performance forfeited on the contract and the other party seeks relief against 
forfeiture.  Two examples clarify the exact position of deliberateness in this situation, one older 
example and one recent case. 
Rankin as a lessee issued a claim for specific performance of a farming lease. Lay, the lessor, had 
started proceedings to eject Rankin from the farm as he had allegedly not performed his obligations 
according to the conditions of the lease. Rankin had promised to farm the land properly and 
according to Lay he failed to do so. That is why Lay attempted to forfeit her obligations on the 
covenant and subsequently terminate the lease and eject Rankin from the farm. Rankin argued he 
had performed his obligations correctly. The Lord Chancellor had to decide whether the decree for 
specific performance should be granted and why Rankin should be relieved from forfeiture. His main 
argument is worth quoting, because it indicates the relation between deliberateness and specific 
performance: 
“I am not satisfied that there has been a breach of the covenants which would have worked a 
forfeiture of the lease, and would have entitled the landlord to maintain an action for a breach of the 
covenants, and so, as upon the forfeiture to recover possession of the premises. The inclination of 
my mind at present is on the other side. It is not every breach that will be sufficient; it must be a 
serious, willful, deliberate breach, which would work a forfeiture, and would render the lease 
void.”198 
He awards the decree for specific performance, because he concludes that in this case Rankin had 
not committed a deliberate and willful breach, partly because there is contradictory evidence on the 
actions of Rankin. The claim for specific performance could only have been denied in the case Rankin 
himself committed a deliberate breach of contract. 
The clear connection between deliberateness and specific performance in this case is visible, but it 
remains to be seen if such a connection can be found in a more recent case. At least the connection 
between relief from forfeiture and deliberateness can be found in the following recent case Celestial 
Aviation v Paramount Airways.199 
4.2.5  English law IIb: Celestial Aviation v Paramount Airways 
The case is about Paramount Airways who leases three airplanes from Celestial Aviation. Once the 
airplanes are delivered, Paramount repeatedly fails to pay the rent according to the lease contract. 
Celestial sends several default notices and urges Paramount to pay according to the contract, but 
Paramount fails to do so. As a consequence, Celestial wants to terminate the contract – i.e. forfeits 
on the contract – Paramount claims relief from forfeiture. 
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First, the court of first instance decides on the matter of jurisdiction – i.e. whether this contract is a 
type of contract where relief from forfeiture may be asked. In this case it becomes evident, that this 
particular equitable defense is only allowed in a limited type of cases, the most important of which is 
whether the contract involves the transfer of proprietary or possessory rights.200 The court in this 
case finds that there is no jurisdiction to grant relief anyway, but fortunately the court also provides 
a decision in the case it had made a wrong decision on this point. 
More importantly, the court elaborates in a detailed way on the substantive requirements to allow 
the relief from forfeiture and soon comments on the requirement of the breach being deliberate. 
The court, personified in Hamblen J, starts with a quote from the House of Lords case Shiloh Spinners  
Ltd v Harding201, specifically the from the speech from Lord Wilberforce. Lord Wilberforce stated that 
on the question whether relief against forfeiture should be granted involves: 
“a consideration of the conduct of the applicant for relief, in particular whether his default was 
willful, of the gravity of the breaches and of the disparity  between the value of the property of which 
forfeiture is claimed as compared with the damage caused by the breach.”202 
Hamblen J heavily relies on this case, but the choice for this simple High Court case is justified by the 
fact that it is recent and a very good example of an elaborate motivation on the aspect of 
deliberateness. He uses this criterion and applies it to the current case. He analyzes whether the 
conduct of Paramount could be labeled as willful. It is also interesting to notice that willfulness and 
seriousness or gravity of the breach are mentioned in the same sentence, as in the Rankin v Lay case. 
Although seriousness of the breach is not the same as willfulness of the conduct leading to breach, 
they both seem to stay close in this line of cases. 
Hamblen J motivates the way he applies the facts of the case on the  requirement of willfulness as 
formulated in the Shiloh Spinners case by summing up the amounts Paramount had to pay for the 
aircraft, followed by the defaults in payment – Hamblen J labels the defaults as “persistent” – and he 
also mentions all the notices sent by Celestial to remind Paramount being in default. He states: 
“This is not therefore a case where the default in question arose by surprise, accident or ignorance. 
Paramount knew what its obligations were and knew that it was going to default on those 
obligations. (…) It is clear that willful breaches will only exceptionally be relieved against.”203 
The last sentence is also based on the opinion of Lord Wilberforce, who is quoted again and this 
quote is also worth mentioning here: 
“Established and, in my opinion, sound principle requires that willful breaches should not, or at least 
should only in exceptional cases, be relieved against, if only for the reason that the assignor should 
not be compelled to remain in a relation of neighborhood with a person in deliberate breach of his 
obligations.”204 
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Hamblen J concludes that relief against forfeiture should not be granted in this case. Effectively, in 
my opinion, this means that Celestial may lawfully terminate the contract and that due to the 
deliberateness of the breach on the side of Paramount, the latter is not able to claim specific 
performance from Celestial in the sense that Celestial still needs to keep the airplanes at the disposal 
of Paramount. 
This case is another explicit illustration of the role of deliberateness. Contrary to the previous case, 
this time the court concludes that there is a deliberate breach of contract which in turn blocks the 
possibility of relief from forfeiture. Deliberateness and specific performance in English law are 
explicitly connected in two different, specific ways. Deliberateness plays a role in English law in the 
sphere of the remedy of specific performance. The extent of the influence varies. Deliberateness 
does not seem to influence the court in the sense that the court grants specific performance because 
of the deliberateness, although the factor of deliberateness is sometimes mentioned. In the sphere 
of defenses against invoking relief against forfeiture, deliberateness has a clear and explicit role in 
awarding or denying relief. 
4.2.6  US law: two case law examples indicating an implicit influence of deliberateness 
A direct reference to the relevance of deliberateness in combination with the award of the remedy of 
specific performance is not easy to find in US law. In a more indirect way, a connection can be 
established. US law seems to have developed two instruments in order to anticipate on a possible 
deliberate breach situation. These instruments show the way US law values performance of the 
contractual obligations. These instruments are ‘substantial performance’ on the one hand and 
‘material breach of contract’ on the other hand. In applying both legal notions the element of 
deliberateness may play a relevant role. Both notions also play a role if the court has to decide 
whether a party may terminate the contract, so it is inevitable to mention the remedy of termination 
in this section as well. Section 4.9 provides a further elaboration on the connection between 
deliberateness and termination.  
According to the case of Hardin, Rodrigueze & Boivin Anesthesiologists Ltd v Paradigm Insurance 
Company, the doctrine of substantial performance provides that when a party performs the 
essential, material parts of a contract in good faith, the other party will be required to pay or perform 
even though there has not been strict compliance with the terms of the contract.205 The doctrine of 
substantial performance usually applies to building contracts, where it is regular that the contractor 
may not be able to comply with all the specific terms of the contract. It is possible to amend this 
doctrine of substantial performance by upgrading specific terms to a condition. In such cases, 
performance can only be substantial if the specific condition is also fulfilled. A way to exclude the 
working of this doctrine is to incorporate a full performance clause as a condition into the contract. 
In that situation, only full performance is substantial. 
In the aforementioned case, a group of anesthesiologists attempted to buy medical insurance in a 
time (the late 1980’s) when this was not an easy task. Hardin & Co negotiated with Paradigm, but 
insisted that they would only conclude a contract – buy the policy – when Paradigm provided them 
with the policy and a financial statement which confirmed the financial stability of the company. 
Paradigm failed to do so, because it did not effectively run an insurance company. They sent Hardin a 
                                                          
205
 Hardin, Rodrigueze & Boivin Anesthesiologists Ltd v. Paradigm Insurance Company 962 F. 2d 628. 
79 
 
provisional policy (a ‘binder’), but never sent a policy. Hardin paid one installment and then stopped 
paying demanding termination of the contract. The court concluded that Paradigm may have said 
that it would provide coverage, but actually never did.  
Against this background, it comes as no surprise that the court denied the validity of the argument of 
substantial performance on the side of Paradigm which would block termination of the contract, 
because the court found that that there was no contract. The court explicitly states, citing the case of 
Jacob & Youngs’s Inc v. Kent that the doctrine of substantial performance does not extend to cases 
where one of the parties has always insisted upon strict compliance with its conditions and has never 
waived them.206 The counterparty is not free to adapt the contract in order to create space for 
application of the doctrine of substantial performance in such a case.  
The relevance of this case and its elaboration on the doctrine of substantial performance for the 
position of deliberate breach is that deviation from specifications of the contract may be allowed, 
even if they are willful. However, the doctrine cannot be used in order to avoid liability for deliberate 
non-performance of primary contractual obligations. In this case, Paradigm did not perform at all, so 
substantial performance cannot be claimed by Paradigm. 
The doctrine of material breach partly represents the mirror of the doctrine of substantial 
performance. According to this doctrine, a party is only able to terminate the contract, if the breach 
is “material”. Material breach may also be a relevant legal nuance in a more complicated matter 
relating to the remedy of specific performance, namely where both parties did at a certain moment 
not abide by their contractual obligations. The party who claims specific performance – or requesting 
an order for specific performance from the court, which is more adequate – of a restrictive covenant 
which is part of the contract, may only successfully do so, if this party did not commit a material 
breach of this covenant himself. In the case Polk Bros. Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., parties 
concluded a lease contract including a restrictive covenant which constituted a horizontal restraint 
on the sale of major products. The lessor sought an injunction which should compel the lessee to 
abide by the covenant by not selling specific goods listed in the covenant. The court logically denied 
the claim of the lessor, because the restrictive covenant itself constituted a violation of a specific 
antitrust act in Illinois. Moreover, the court denied the claim of the lessor, because the lessor himself 
had violated the covenant by deliberately selling products on the (prohibited) covenant for several 
years. Had the covenant be valid, the lessor would have had no case against the lessee, because his 
own material and deliberate breach blocks the possibility to claim specific performance.207 
4.2.7  French law: the Pool case 
French law, as a representative of civil law jurisdictions, in general recognizes a right to enforced 
performance. The connection between deliberate breach and the exercise of the right to 
performance is in advance more difficult to establish, because a party may have a right to 
performance as a result of the contract and at least in case of practically any form of breach of 
contract. Nevertheless, the following example illustrates potential relevance of deliberateness for 
exercising the right to performance. 
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This example shows remarkable similarities with an English case, dealt with in one of the subsequent 
sections. The constructor in this case builds a swimming pool with three steps. In the specifications, 
the assignor specifically indicated an entrance consisting of four steps.  The assignor claims rebuilding 
the pool according to the specifications – i.e. he claims performance of the contract. The constructor 
refuses to adapt the pool and argues that the assignor cannot prove that the entrance with three 
steps is less convenient or unsafer than an entrance with four steps. Whereas the Court of Appeal 
follows the constructor in his defense and denies the claim of enforced performance, the Cour de 
Cassation rejects the decision of the Court of Appeal. The Cour de Cassation argues that the assignor 
simply does not have to prove any disadvantage as a consequence of the breach of contract. Based 
on art. 1134 Cc the assignor has a right to enforce the contractual obligation independent of the 
consequences of the breach of contract.208 This decision is confirmed by a more recent decision by 
the Cour de Cassation in 2005.209 In that specific case, a building was constructed several centimeters 
too low. This deviation from contractual specifications did not cause any noticeably disadvantageous 
consequences for the assignor, but he nevertheless could enforce the contract. This decision has 
been subject to criticism, because it is argued that this decision may be somewhat too harsh on the 
debtor and that a cost-benefit analysis is useful.210 
It should be noted that motive in these cases is not mentioned as a relevant circumstance, so it is 
very difficult to draw any conclusion on the relevance of motive for remedies. Nevertheless, French 
law without doubt offers the creditor in this type of cases a strong position. In general, if the right to 
performance is strong, motive of the breaching party is less relevant. In the end, the creditor has 
always means to have the original contractual obligation performed. If he has a strong right to 
performance, which French law apparently provides, he will be less concerned that breach of 
contract may occur deliberately, whereas the debtor may think twice before considering breach of 
contract as a lucrative option. 
4.2.8  German law: the Window case 
In a German case, the creditor concluded a contract for the construction of very specific windows, 
which provided maximal insulation.211 The loss of heat was contractually specified. When the 
windows were installed, the loss of heat proved to be larger than contractually agreed. In other 
words, the debtor performed defectively. The creditor claimed correct performance which meant 
complete replacement of all windows. The debtor refused to do so, because complete replacement 
meant doing the same job again without additional payment. The court paid much attention to the 
difference between ‘Nachbesserung’  - reparation – and ‘Neuherstellung’ – replacement. In the end, 
the court decided that replacement is the ultimate manifestation of reparation, because both actions 
should lead to correct performance of the contractual obligation. In cases like these, where 
contractual specifications in detail provide the core of the contract, the creditor has every right to 
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demand what he is entitled to. He may claim full replacement, because this is the only way the 
obligation can be correctly performed. Partial reparation does not suffice.212    
Again, the strong right to performance in German law relieves the court from mentioning potential 
motive of the party committing breach as an immediate reason to award the right, because the 
aggrieved party may easily have access to this right. 
4.2.9  Dutch law I: limited relevance of deliberateness for a claim for enforced performance 
The right to performance is a strong right in Dutch law. It is, as explained in Chapter 2, the primary 
right of the contracting parties resulting from the contract. In other words, the right is not ‘just’ a 
remedy as a reaction on a breach of contract, it is a contractual right. The initial strength of the right 
to enforced performance is an important element to take into account, once the question is asked 
whether deliberateness of a breach of contract may influence the decision of the court to decide 
whether enforced performance may be awarded. Because parties in general always have a right to 
performance, because they concluded a contract, deliberateness of a breach of contract does not 
seem to be a too relevant element to influence the availability of this remedy. Taking into account 
the starting point, two considerations may make a certain influence possible. First, a court will only 
enforce performance of the contract, once parties claim performance of the contract. The amount of 
case law on exercising the right to performance is not overwhelming, because parties rather claim 
damages instead of performance, once their dispute has reached the stage of legal proceedings. 
Furthermore, the right to enforced performance, though strong, is not absolute.  Exceptions exist, as 
Chapter 2 has shown. In general, the court only confirms the right of a party to enforce a contract, 
but in practice the Hoge Raad created a possibility for the court to decide whether a party may 
exercise his right to performance. In the landmark case Multi Vastgoed/Nethou the Hoge Raad 
confirms the strong right to performance of the creditor after breach of contract, but also states that 
the creditor is not always free to choose between performance and damages after breach of 
contract. The following examples show that court may take deliberateness of the breach into 
account while assessing a claim for performance. 
4.2.10  Dutch law II: NSI Kantoren BV / Ernst & Young Accountants 
Many cases which incorporate questions about the breach of duty to run a business in a rented 
premises are somewhat ‘hidden’, because the law concerning lease and rent is a specialization of the 
general contract law213. Althugh the core problem is exactly the same as in the Argyll case, the 
dynamics in this type of contract are different. At least in general, the owner of the building can in 
most cases rely on the contract and he has the right to claim performance, even though this is 
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disadvantageous for the lessee. The case NSI Kantoren BV / Ernst & Young Accountants provides a 
good illustration.214 
Since 2002, Ernst & Young has leased part of premises owned by NSI. In the lease contract Ernst & 
Young promised to stay in the building for a period of 10 years. In 2007 Ernst & Young announces to 
NSI that they are going to leave the building. They also promise to seek a new tenant. According to 
the contract, they have the right to sublet the premises. NSI is not impressed by this announcement 
and reminds Ernst & Young of their contractual duty. Furthermore, NSI is not impressed by the 
proposed subletting party, because the sublessee apparently did not have any employees. NSI fears 
to be left with a premises decreasing in value. NSI claims performance in advance, because Ernst & 
Young would not be leaving until 2009 and NSI also attempts to obtain an assurance from the court 
that it does not have to accept the proposed new tenants. 
In a summary judgment, the court partially allows the claim of NSI. The court states that NSI has a 
justified interest in being assured that the premises continue to be used. Even the likelihood that the 
premises will be left in the near future without the prospect of a future tenant may decrease the 
value of the premises. Because Ernst & Young at the moment of the decision of the court is still 
present in the premises, the possibility of future losses is the trigger to make this case relevant. 
However, according to the contract NSI cannot make any specific demands as far as the capacities of 
the future, subletting tenant are concerned. Ernst & Young may decide to whom they sublet the 
premises, but they are responsible for the way their ‘candidate’ for subletting will use the premises. 
Therefore, the court already decides that Ernst & Young has to perform the obligations according to 
the contract and awards a provisional penalty payment if Ernst & Young does not fulfill its 
contractual obligations. 
It is clear that the term ‘deliberateness’ is not mentioned in this decision. The question is why this 
case is in any sense relevant for an answer to the question in this section. The assumption in this case 
is that the decision of Ernst & Young to leave the premises is a conscious and deliberate one. 
Whether this decision amounts to a breach of contract is somewhat uncertain, because Ernst & 
Young is allowed to replace the vacancy with a sublessee. If the breach of contract occurs, it is 
certainly deliberate. For the purpose of illustration, this example suffices. The court anticipates on a 
possible breach of contract by reaffirming the right of NSI to performance and secures the right with 
a penalty payment.  This example shows that Dutch law enforces the contract at least as a starting 
point. Deliberateness of the breach is indirectly relevant, because of two reasons. First, within this 
type of contracts and cases in Dutch law, the decision of the court to award the claim for 
performance depends on the circumstances. If economic circumstances force one of the parties to 
move out of a building and the same party sincerely attempts to perform its obligations according to 
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the contract, it is questionable whether the court will award the claim for performance.215 The 
decision of one of the parties to leave the rented premises deliberately without a compelling 
financial reason is certainly a circumstance to take into account. In that sense, deliberateness may 
influence the decision of the court to honor the claim to enforced performance.  
4.2.11  Concluding remarks 
In general, the influence of deliberateness of the breach on the availability or award of the right or 
remedy to enforced performance is not crystal clear. The explicit recognition of a breach being 
deliberate is in some legal systems not even present. English courts at least explicitly mentions 
deliberateness of the breach as a potential factor of relevance, but the attitude of the courts towards 
the influence of deliberateness on the availability of specific performance remains somewhat 
unclear. In the leading Argyll case, deliberateness is not considered a relevant factor by the House of 
Lords.  A look into English law revealed that specific performance may not only be claimed by the 
victim of deliberate breach, but also by the party who commits deliberate breach – for example in 
the Celestial Aviation case. Deliberateness of the breach may block the claim for performance and in 
this sense the connection between deliberateness and specific performance is visibly present. In US 
law, the connection between deliberateness and specific performance is not clear either. In civil law 
jurisdictions, the relation between deliberateness and enforced performance is more difficult to 
establish, because enforced performance is generally available as of right, resulting from the contract 
itself. Direct references to the relevance of deliberateness in combination with the right to enforced 
performance on the continent are hard to establish. 
4.3  Deliberateness and its influence on the validity of penalty clauses and the court’s 
discretion to mitigate or to increase the penalty 
4.3.1  Introductory remarks 
Deliberateness of breach may also influence the approach to the use of penalty clauses. The debate 
in civil law jurisdictions differs from the debate in common law jurisdictions. In civil law jurisdictions, 
the most relevant question is whether deliberateness of the breach should influence the decision of 
the court to mitigate the amount mentioned in the penalty clause. In common law jurisdictions, the 
distinction between liquidated damages clauses and penalty clauses may influence a party’s decision 
to commit breach or not. Moreover, especially in US law, the question arises whether the attitude 
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towards efficient breach of contract – which is considered to be a specific type of deliberate breach 
as Chapter 3 established – should have consequences for the distinction between penalty clauses 
and liquidated damages clauses.  
4.3.2  English law:  Bridge v Campbell Discount Co. Ltd  
The distinction between liquidated damages clauses and penalty clauses reveals an interesting 
incentive for parties to consider breach of contract as a profitable option. It is not the alleged 
deliberateness of the breach which may trigger the courts or the law to adapt its remedial approach, 
but it is the other way round. The system sometimes seems to stimulate parties to consider 
deliberate non-performance. 
In the Bridge case parties concluded a contract to hire-purchase a car.216 The buyer paid the first 
installment, but terminated the contract afterwards. The contract foresaw the possibility to 
terminate in a certain way in exchange for payment of a certain amount of money. This clause in the 
contract ordered the buyer to pay a variable amount of money to the seller, depending on the 
decrease in value of the car: the lower the value decrease, the higher the payable amount. The point 
in this case is that the House of Lords decided that the hirer did not rely on the termination clause, 
but terminated on his own conditions. The non-contractual termination qualified as breach of 
contract. Against this background, the House of Lords had to decide whether the payment clause was 
an allowed liquidated damages clause or a forbidden penalty clause. The House of Lords decided that 
the clause did not contain a correct pre-estimate of the damages, because the payable amount 
increased further when the value of the car decreased less. The House of Lords declared the clause 
to be penal and denied the validity of the clause. 
As Lord Denning justifiably remarks, this case contains an interesting paradox. If a party correctly 
cancels the contract against a certain payment, he seems to be in a worse position than if he 
commits breach of contract. In the latter situation, the court will assess the validity of the clause. If 
the clause is declared invalid, the party committing breach walks away without having to pay the 
amount according to the contract.217  
Although at first sight it seems that the system of structuring penalty clauses In English law 
stimulates calculating behavior of the debtor, Lord Denning immediately shows that this conclusion 
would be too simple. In the first place, the validity of the clause would most probably also be subject 
to judicial review if the hirer would follow the route of contractual termination. Moreover, the hire—
purchase company still has the possibility to claim damages after the decision to declare the clause 
invalid, because the case if referred to a lower court in order to assess an eventual claim for 
damages. Whether a decision of the hirer to commit deliberate breach in such a case is really 
profitable for him remains therefore unclear. However, it is evident, that the emphasis of the law to 
distinguish between liquidated damages clauses and penalty clauses may lead to unexpected results 
in case of deliberate breach. 
The influence of the distinction between liquidated damages and penalty clauses on concrete 
remedies in case of deliberate breach of contract is most aptly demonstrated by exploring US law 
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4.3.3  US law: a call for a different approach towards the penalty clause, but on which grounds? 
The debate on the penalty clause and its (in)validity is an intense discussion, in which the notions of 
deliberate and efficient breach of contract play a significant role.218 Nevertheless, the core of the 
debate is not always clear for the reader. The relevant discussion takes place in academic debate, not 
so much in concrete court decisions 
The current rule which renders penalty clauses invalid, because they are incorporated in terrorem of 
the offending party, is generally justified by three arguments. First, allowing penalty clauses would 
increase the risk of overcompensation of the aggrieved party, because a penalty could be 
considerably larger than the value of the breached obligation. Second, the current role allows the 
parties to commit efficient breach of contract, which serves the economic purpose of the law of 
contract. A rule which validates penalty clauses would interfere with the possibility to commit 
efficient breach, because the party who considers committing breach faces a penalty which could be 
well above the amount of expectation damages he would have to pay under the current rule.219 
Third, the more classic justification for the rule is the historical role of the law of contract and, more 
specifically, the role of damages in contract. The law of contract primarily serves commercial 
interests and the law of contractual damages aims to compensate the victim of breach of contract. 
From this perspective, there is no room for a type of clause which contains an element of 
punishment or vindication beyond compensation. This argument seems to block a connection 
between deliberateness of the breach and allowing penalty clauses, especially when the amount 
mentioned in the clause is much larger than the suffered losses. 
Over the last few decades, it is the law and economics approach towards the law of contract which 
has become paramount in US legal doctrine. Law and economic scholars have a critical attitude 
towards the current rule of penalty clauses, but on different grounds. One of the problems law and 
economists signal is a time and cost increasing discussion on the question which clauses may be 
defined as penalty clauses. Successful evasive maneuvers have been invented over the past years in 
order to incorporate a monetary sanction on non-performance into the contract without the label 
‘penalty clause’, e.g.  bonus clauses. These clauses confer a bonus on the debtor who performs 
correctly and on time. The current rule stimulates deviation tactics without looking at the reality and 
wishes of the parties.220 Moreover, allowing the penalty clause could be reformulated as an 
insurance on performance which is an economically viable construction, because parties also pay a 
price to incorporate the penalty clause into the contract.221 
The reasons mentioned so far against the current penalty rule are all quite ‘practical’. The most 
principled reason for being against the invalidity of penalty clauses is that this rule directly interferes 
with the principle of freedom of contract.222  Parties should be able to incorporate a clause into their 
contract which secures performance of the obligation.  
The problem with this approach is that an incongruence within law and economic thinking reveals 
itself if this line of reasoning is introduced. It is the reluctant attitude of common law towards the 
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penalty clause – next to the secondary nature of the remedy of specific performance – which allows 
parties to break the contract without running the risk of paying a penalty if a third party offers a 
higher price. A more lenient approach towards the acceptability of the penalty clause could make 
access towards efficient breach more difficult. Freedom of contract is also a primary reason for law 
and economists to justify the possibility to commit efficient breach. According to DiMatteo, 
reconciliation of the two lines can be acquired by arguing that penalty clauses should only be allowed 
if they are incorporated into the contract on the basis of full and fair negotiation of the specific 
clause. Parties should be able to avoid the penalty clause on the grounds of ‘unconscionability’.223 
DiMatteo emphasizes the role of negotiations. If negotiations are not fair – e.g. because one of the 
parties does not have the possibility to negotiate on a standard contract with a penalty clause – the 
penalty clause should not be enforced. If parties nevertheless wish to enforce the clause, the court 
should be able to modify the clause.224 
In English law the efficient breach component is virtually absent in the discussion, but the 
interference of the current rule with the principle of freedom of contract is also a reason to follow 
the development of the rule critically.  
4.3.4  French law: the notion of ‘dol’ and penalty clauses 
For the relationship between deliberateness – ‘dol’ – and penalty clauses in French law, the following 
case is relevant. The decision of the Cour de Cassation in 1969 is also important for the development 
of the meaning of the notion of ‘dol’ in French law specifically.225 In this case, an actor who was 
employed exclusively at the Société des Comediens francais, accepted a role in a movie produced by 
another company. The actor knew he was not allowed to do so according to the contract with the 
Société, because this contract incorporated a penalty clause, which imposed a penalty on him if he 
worked for other employers than the Société.  The actor admitted he committed breach of contract, 
but he argued that the breach was not deliberate, because he did not intend to inflict harm on the 
Société. However, the Cour de Cassation assessed the breach of contract as deliberate, because the 
actor knowingly committed breach because of opportunistic reasons. According to the Cour de 
Cassation, the breach being committed knowingly was sufficient to qualify as deliberate. This 
assessment proved to be relevant, because the case was decided against the background of art. 1150 
Cc.226 This case shows that not only clauses excluding or limiting liability may be influenced by the 
rule of art. 1150, but also penalty clauses. In this particular case, the Cour de Cassation by holding 
that the breach is deliberate, also decides that the Société is entitled to damages above the amount 
mentioned in the penalty clause. Apparently, the Cour de Cassation considers the penalty clause as a 
limitation of damages to foreseeable damages. Because the limit of foreseeability of damages does 
not apply when the breach is deliberate, the amount of the penalty is not the upper limit of 
damages. 
                                                          
223
 DiMatteo 2001, p. 733. Note that DiMatteo emphasizes the question of enforceability of the specific clause 
without being too principled on the terminology: liquidated damages or penalty clause. 
224
 DiMatteo 2001, p. 733. 
225
 Cour de Cassation (1e Ch. Civ.) , 4 févr 1969, Dalloz 601-602 with note J. Mazeaud. 
226
 “Le débiteur n'est tenu que des dommages et intérêts qui ont été prévus ou qu'on a pu prévoir lors du 
contrat, lorsque ce n'est point par son dol que l'obligation n'est point exécutée.” See section 4.4.5 for a more 
elaborate analysis of this provision. 
87 
 
4.3.5  German law: mitigation and motive connected 
As Dutch law, French and German law as major representatives of continental law systems recognize 
the relevance of the degree of fault as a factor which influences the decision of the court to mitigate 
a penalty. In all these systems, comparable ideas on the existence of penalty clauses exist. Penalty 
clauses are acceptable, but courts in general have a discretionary power to mitigate the penalty in 
concrete circumstances.  
German law recognizes that a debtor who deliberately commits breach of contract cannot expect the 
court to mitigate the penalty. Two comparable cases in the area of employment contracts illustrate 
the connection between deliberateness of the breach and the refusal to mitigate the penalty. 227 In 
both cases an employee deliberately concluded a contract with a new employer contrary to the non-
competition clause in the settlement agreement with his former employer. The non-competition 
clause provided for limits in time and place where the employee could have a comparable, job. In 
both cases, the former employees clearly violated the clause. In one of the cases, the employee even 
used information and client lists from his former employer. The penalty clause accompanying the 
non-competition clause contained a penalty which was not subject to mitigation after the established 
deliberate breach of contract. 
4.3.6  Dutch law: deliberateness and mitigation; NVB/Helder and the Buck case228 
Recalling from Chapter 2, Dutch law as a civil law jurisdiction recognizes the existence of clauses with 
a specific penalty character, although the court has a discretionary power to mitigate the penalty. 
The power of the court to mitigate is not without limits.229 The deliberateness of the breach is one of 
the factors which should be taken into account. 
In the NVB case a bank – NVB – does not pay commission to an agent he has a contract with – 
Helder. The delay in payment is a breach of contract. In the contract between NVB and Helder a 
penalty clause is incorporated. NVB argued that because Helder received at least a large part of the 
provision, the penalty should be mitigated. The Dutch Court of Appeal does not follow this line of 
reasoning and the Hoge Raad concurs. Although deliberateness of the breach is not explicitly 
mentioned as the reason not to mitigate the penalty, the Court of Appeal reasons that the breach of 
contract is neither sufficiently partial nor small to mitigate the penalty. Schelhaas interprets this 
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decision as an indication that this “deliberate” action of the bank could have been the reason for the 
refusal of mitigation.230  
A more explicit example is the Buck case.231 Buck was professor at the Technical University of 
Eindhoven. After a conflict on alleged carelessness regarding certain research projects Buck was 
forced to resign. Part of the resignation was a contract with the university with – inter alia – a 
financial settlement. Parties agreed not to make any public statement on the contents of the 
contract. However, Buck appeared on TV and spoke about the settlement. The obligation to remain 
silent was secured by a penalty clause. The Court of Appeal in this case not only mentions the 
seriousness of the breach, but also the motive of the party, because the Court argues that Buck 
deliberately and consciously violated the obligation of secrecy. This way of violation justifies the 
refusal of the court to mitigate the penalty. 
It is not easy to distinguish the correct questions with regard to this topic. Absence of mitigation 
means that the party relying on the clause may demand complete specific performance of the 
obligation to pay the penalty. The relevance of the penalty clause only becomes clear when the 
debtor committed breach of the primary obligation. In general, it is not possible to claim 
performance of the primary obligation and of the penalty clause. The penalty clause is incorporated 
in order to stimulate performance of the primary obligation. This objective is a preventive objective. 
After the breach has occurred, this objective cannot be achieved for that specific case. However, for 
future cases it remains relevant that the amount mentioned in the penalty clause should not be 
mitigated to an extent that it does not provide any incentive for parties to perform the original 
contractual obligation. The influence of deliberateness of the breach on mitigation is therefore 
especially relevant. 
4.3.7  Concluding remarks 
Does deliberateness of the breach influence the way the court deals with application of penalty 
clauses? In common law jurisdiction, the answer to this question is seriously difficult to provide, 
because the discussion on the validity of the penalty clauses opposed to liquidated damages clauses 
blurs a good analysis of the question, as the academic debate in US law shows. In civil law 
jurisdictions, deliberateness may influence courts to deal with penalty clauses in two ways. First, the 
court does not mitigate the penalty in case of deliberate breach of contract. Examples in Dutch and 
German law show this explicit connection between deliberateness and the absence of mitigation. A 
critical approach of this manifestation may be that the influence of deliberateness is only limited, 
because the most a party can achieve is enforcement of the penalty clause. A second manifestation is 
that the court allows a claim for additional damages next to enforcement of the clause. This would 
be a serious enlargement of the remedial possibilities in case of deliberate breach of contract. French 
law recognizes a possibility for the court to deviate from the contract in favor of the aggrieved party, 
but for example Dutch and German law may allow such a theoretical possibility in the law in the 
books, but no concrete indication that such a connection is made by the courts can be found. 
                                                          
230
 Schelhaas 2004, p. 93, 94.                                                                                                     
231
 Hof ‘s-Hertogenbosch 3 juni 1997, NJ 1998, 162. 
89 
 
4.4  Deliberateness and expectation damages 
4.4.1  Introductory remarks 
The core question of this chapter is whether the factor of deliberateness influences the law or the 
court in applying a certain remedy in contract, in this case the remedy of damages. As far as the 
remedy of damages is concerned, three options are possible. Either the factor of deliberateness  is 
not relevant, or the factor of deliberateness influences the level of damages in the sense that a 
deliberate breach would give the creditor a claim for a higher level of damages, or the factor of 
damages gives access to another, extra type of damages. An example of the last option is an eventual 
availability of punitive damages or account of profits. Level of damages and type of damages seem to 
be two different things, but they can overlap as well.  Last but not least, a question of evidence may 
also come into play. It may be difficult to establish that a certain type of damage was caused by the 
deliberateness of the breach.  
This section provides legal rules or case law examples where deliberateness influences the remedy of 
‘normal’ contract damages. In most legal systems, the creditor who claims damages after breach of 
contract is entitled to a level of damages which virtually brings him in the position as if the 
contractual obligation had been correctly performed. In common law jurisdictions, as mentioned in 
the first chapter, this type of damages is labeled as ‘expectation’ damages. Naturally, differences 
between continental and common law jurisdictions may exist, but this concept is also generally 
accepted as ‘normal’ contract damages in continental jurisdictions. However, this simple statement is 
only the beginning of the exploration of what exactly is part of this definition. In many systems, 
expectation damages comprise incurred losses as well as missed profits as a result of the breach of 
contract. For example, as far as the incurred losses are concerned, the party in breach is generally 
only liable for foreseeable losses. Unforeseeable losses are not automatically covered under general 
rules of contract liability. Deliberateness of the breach may for example result in incorporating 
unforeseeable losses into the claim of the creditor. In terms of finding an answer to the core 
question of this chapter, such a finding would deliver an affirmative answer. Nevertheless, it is not 
easy to qualify such a finding. It is not easy to say whether unforeseeable damages are another, extra 
type of damages or whether they may be incorporated into the definition of expectation damages 
after all and, when awarded, mean a higher level of damages. Even more important, the definition of 
foreseeability is not a solid one. Every legal system has its own rules on this point and even within 
legal systems it is not always easy to assess which type of damages is foreseeable and which is not.  
‘Damages’ is a legal term with many manifestations and in this section, it is only possible to detect a 
superficial link between the notion of deliberateness and the award of expectation damages. In 
sections 4.6 and 4.7, the possible award of punitive damages and account of profits is dealt with 
separately. 
4.4.2  English law I: Golden Strait Corporation v Nippon Yusen Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden 
Victory) 
Although the leading case on the relationship between specific performance and damages – 
mentioned in the previous section, the Argyll case – discusses the role of deliberateness to some 
extent, it does not forecast a major role for this element in future decisions about awarding specific 
performance. The explicit role of the motive seems to be downplayed in the eventual decision. 
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to think that parties may attempt to break their contractual 
obligations if they consider it economically viable to do so. An extra reason for the possibility of this 
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behavior is the reluctance of English courts to connect the level of damages to the motive of the 
party committing breach.  A recent case illustrating this reluctance is a case on a long-term lease of 
another type, namely the seven-year charter of a ship, i.e. Golden Strait Corporation v Nippon Yusen 
Kubishika Kaisha (The Golden Victory).232 Although both the Argyll case and the Golden Victory case 
deny an explicit role of deliberateness in the area of breach of contract, analysis of both cases may 
nevertheless show an implicit connection between deliberateness  and the remedy concerned. 
In this case Nippon Yusen chartered a ship – the Golden Victory – owned by Golden Strait in 1998 for 
a period of approximately 7 years. Both shipowners and charterers agreed to a certain price scheme. 
They also included into the contract a provision that both parties had the right to cancel the charter – 
without any obligation to pay damages to the other party – if war or hostilities were to break out 
between any two or more of a number of countries including the United States of America, the 
United Kingdom and Iraq. English law was applicable under the contract and an arbitration clause 
was included. 
On 14 September 2001 – a few days after the events on ‘nine-eleven’ – the charterers repudiated the 
charter and redelivered the vessel to the owners. Repudiation under English law is a form of 
termination, which has to be accepted by the other party. In this case, the owners accepted, but they 
claimed damages to the extent of the contract price for the charter time. The ending date of the 
charter was established at 6 december 2005, which means that the charterers had to pay for 
approximately 4 years. The charterers objected and went to the arbitrator. The arbitrator by an 
interim award decided in favor of the owners, but in the meantime the Second Gulf War broke out 
(In March 2003). Thereupon, the charterers held that the amount of damages could not exceed the 
limits of the contract price which should have been paid, had the contract not been cancelled. In that 
case both parties would have had the opportunity to cancel the contract according to the 
aforementioned provision. The arbitrator in his final decision decided against the owners and in favor 
of the charterers, although he had some serious doubts about his decision. However, his decision 
was upheld by the court in first instance and by the Court of Appeal.  
In a rather controversial 3-2 majority the House of Lords rejected the appeal of the owners and again 
decided in favor of the charterers. According to Lord Scott of Foscote, who gives the leading majority 
opinion, the fundamental principle governing the quantum of damages for breach of contract – 
damages should compensate the victim for the loss of his bargain – had been long established and 
not in dispute.233 This principle is not different for a contract for performance over a period.  
Therefore, the victim of the breach should get no less, but also no more than he would have had, if 
the contract had been correctly performed. This principle entails that there is no hard and fast rule 
that damages should be assessed at the date of breach. Lord Scott does not deny the existence of 
this rule in a wide range of cases, especially where contracts for sale of goods are concerned.234 For a 
long(er)-term contract, this rule might not be apt. In essence, he simply says that the charterers 
could have cancelled the contract in 2003 according to the contract. Consequently, the arguments of 
the owner to receive full compensation for the period until 2005 would offend the compensatory 
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principle. According to Lord Scott the compensation principle cannot be overruled by a principle of 
certainty, because the latter cannot be considered as a principle.235 
Furthermore, the concurring opinion by Lord Carswell emphasizes that the arbitrator, according to 
the general rule on calculation of damages on the day of breach, should alternatively have been 
obliged to estimate the likelihood of a breaking-out of war and calculate the damages accordingly. 
The chosen solution does justice to the contract and is much easier. Lord Carswell explicitly states 
that a risk exists that repudiating parties in future cases may attempt to delay the assessment of 
damages in order to see if a suspensive condition might come into operation.236 He does not consider 
this risk as a problem, because courts and arbitrators can properly react on eventual abuse.  
Lord Bingham delivered the leading minority opinion. He argued that damages should be calculated 
and established at the moment of breach and that this case should not be an exception to this rule. 
His line of reasoning is straightforward, especially when it comes to the justification of the point of 
view of the charterers that the owners would be overcompensated if the later event –  the Second 
Gulf War –  would not be taken into account. Firstly, according to Lord Bingham, contracts are made 
to be performed, not broken.  
“It may prove disadvantageous to break a contract instead of performing it.”237 
With this statement Lord Bingham emphasizes that contracts are concluded to be performed. 
Damages could serve as an instrument to prevent debtors from breaching instead of performing. His 
second argument is that the charterers could have paid when the repudiation was accepted by the 
owners, because they now seem to have had a ‘free ride in awaiting legal proceedings, because 
events after the breach such as the outbreak of a war in the reasoning of Lord Scott and Lord 
Carswell still count in the assessment of damages. His third argument is that there can be no 
misunderstanding about what the owners had lost on the date of breach: a charterparty with slightly 
less than four years to run.  These arguments illustrate that the interpretation of the facts are crucial 
to this case. Lord Bingham emphasizes that at the time of the repudiation the likelihood of war was 
an outside chance, not affecting the market value of the charter. This approach is different from the 
one of Lord Carswell, where he offers the possibility that the arbitrator or the court should estimate 
the likelihood of war and accordingly decrease the level of damages.  
All in all, the Golden Victory case does not reveal a court approved influence of deliberateness on the 
remedy of expectation damages. Nevertheless, especially the opinion of Lord Bingham seems to 
suggest that deliberateness of this particular breach is a serious problem for justifying the discount in 
damages, even though parties did themselves draft the contractual obligation on which this case is 
based. 
4.4.3  English law II: Patrick v Russo-British Grain Export Company, Limited 
The Patrick case seems to approach the attitude of English towards deliberate breach in a classic 
situation of breach of contract.238 The case is simple. Russo-British sold Russian wheat to Patrick. At 
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the time of the sale, the sellers knew that the buyers were merchants and resold the wheat 
immediately, presumably at a profit. Russo-British could not deliver at the due date and Patrick 
suffered a loss from the resale, more specifically an amount of lost profit. The particular element 
which makes this case interesting is that at the time of the contract, there was no serious market for 
Russian wheat, so a market price could not be determined. Moreover, the buyers could not obtain 
Russian wheat from another source. The question for the court was whether Patrick could claim the 
difference between the contract price (with Russo-British) and the resale contract price, i.e. the lost 
profit.  
Under normal circumstances, such a claim would be denied under English law, because the recovery 
of lost profits would stimulate overreliance. The buyer would be able to claim the market price at the 
time of the breach, maybe he would get compensation for buying new wheat on the market on 
short-term in order to be able to fulfill his own obligation of the resale contract, but he would not 
receive the profits of that resale contract. Because there is no market and no available substitute, the 
court awards the loss of profit as part of the claim of damages in this particular case.  
The problem of this case is that the breach of the seller is not particularly considered. The buyer 
and/or the court are not aware of the circumstances of the breach or at least no attention is paid to 
these circumstances. It is not clear whether Russo-British sold the wheat to another party for a larger 
amount of money – that would be a classic double-sale situation. One could say that a last-minute 
failure to perform a relatively straightforward sales contract must be a deliberate failure. Even if this 
is the case – and the court does not provide any indication to objectively justify this conclusion – the 
considerations of the court to award lost profits of the resale contract as expectation damages do 
not depend on the nature of the breach. The court traditionally focuses on the position of the buyer 
and his financial situation and the court at all costs wants to avoid the idea that a buyer is stimulated 
to act passively, because he can easily claim all his losses from the non-performing seller.  
In conclusion, English law in sales situations does not seem to pay much attention to the 
deliberateness of the breach as a factor to increase the level of expectation damages by including an 
award of lost profits as a result of a resale contract. English law may award such a claim, but on 
completely different grounds. 
4.4.4  US law: a principled “no” on an explicit link between deliberateness and expectation 
damages 
It is worth repeating from Chapter 3 that US law has expressed the most opinions on the status of 
deliberate breach.  US law distinguishes between certain levels of deliberateness. According to the 
comments on the First Restatement of Contract on §357239, the authors state that, on a first level, a 
breach may be committed knowingly and yet not be willful and deliberate. The Restatement of 
Contracts formulates the general rule that a person who defaults of lack of sufficient financing is held 
not to commit a willful breach. This case can be readily distinguished from situations in which a party 
makes a “bad bargain” and simply abandons the contract, which is the second level. This formulation 
reveals that deliberate and willful are more or less synonymous. A willful breach is, as stated in the 
previous chapter, a term with a negative connotation. In any case, the effect of the breach being 
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deliberate and willful in the most negative sense on the remedy of expectation damages as 
compensation does not differ from the impact of a ‘normal’ breach of contract. According to the 
court in a New York case, 
“Whether the breaching party deliberately rather than inadvertently failed to perform contractual 
obligations should not affect the measure of damages.”240 
And, somewhat further: 
“Plaintiff has proved no more than a breach of contract, albeit deliberate. It is well settled that a 
breach of contract is compensable by contract damages alone.”241 
This last sentence is a tricky one. Apparently, US law recognizes contract damages, but also other 
damages. This distinction between contract damages and, for example, tort damages, is essential for 
understanding the US approach to willfulness. The third layer of deliberateness comes into play when 
the willful breach of contract may also constitute an independent tort. In such a case, not only 
contract damages are available, but tort damages may also be available, such as punitive damages. In 
a ‘normal’ contract case, even if willful breach is proven, punitive damages are not available for the 
aggrieved party. In an Illinois case, this point of view is illustrated. 
“As a general rule punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract, even for a “willful” 
breach since the sole purpose of contract damages is to compensate the non-breaching  party”. 242 
Although at first sight this conclusion is as simple as it is disappointing for purposes of concluding 
anything interesting on deliberateness as far as US law is concerned, the structure of US damages 
leads to a more scattered picture once punitive damages and certainly account of profits are 
positioned next to the notion of deliberateness. Both types of remedies as manifestations of 
damages are certainly under some influence of the notion of deliberateness as the next sections will 
show. 
4.4.5  French law I: deliberateness and the requirement of foreseeability  
In France, with regard to the aspect of foreseeability of damage, the factor of deliberateness may 
come into play. French law also recognizes the notion of foreseeability as far as damages are 
concerned. The type as well as the extent of the compensable loss is limited to those which are 
foreseeable.243 The practical question is whether damages are also limited to foreseeable losses if the 
breach is deliberate. French law is one of the systems which seems to recognize an exceptional 
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position for deliberate breach in this regard. French law has even a specific provision in the Civil 
Code, art 1150244: 
“Le débiteur n'est tenu que des dommages et intérêts qui ont été prévus ou qu'on a pu prévoir lors 
du contrat, lorsque ce n'est point par son dol que l'obligation n'est point exécutée.”245 
The relevance of deliberateness in the sphere of remedies in contract seems to be very concrete 
when this provision is read in isolation. It goes without saying that French law recognizes 
foreseeability as a relevant criterion to limit the extent of damages. However, this provision also 
recognizes that the ordinary limitation to foreseeable damages may be set aside once the breach is 
committed intentionally. The French term ‘dol’ in this provision also encompasses ‘gross negligence’ 
or ‘faute lourde’.246 
Whereas ‘dol’ also incorporates gross negligence in this provision, it does not mean that the French 
notion of deliberateness conceptually incorporates gross negligence. According to the comments on 
the Civil Code, the term ‘faute lourde’ could be added to the provision. The definition of ‘dol’ in the 
sphere of non-performance has subtly developed. Historically, a debtor could only commit an 
intentional breach, when his intention was to inflict damage on the creditor.247 However, in case law 
this strict interpretation of intention had been nuanced.  Breach is considered to be intentional if the 
debtor knowingly decided not to perform his contractual obligations.248 
Art. 1150 is an explicit example of a situation where deliberateness is relevant in establishing a 
contract remedy. This example is also illustrative, because it shows that deliberateness may be a 
relevant factor in determining damages without directly turning over the whole system of contract 
damages by incorporating categories of damages which were never part of contract damages, such 
as punitive damages. 
Furthermore, the debtor who has restricted his liability to foreseeable damages cannot rely on this 
limitation once the established breach is deliberate because of this provision.249  
The French Civil Code itself seems slightly worried about the potential consequences of the provision 
allowing unforeseeable damages entering into the arena of damages once deliberateness is 
established. The extent of the influence of deliberateness which is given by one hand, is partly taken 
away by the other hand according to art. 1151: 
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“Dans le cas même où l'inexécution de la convention résulte du dol du débiteur, les dommages et 
intérêts ne doivent comprendre à l'égard de la perte éprouvée par le créancier et du gain dont il a 
été privé, que ce qui est une suite immédiate et directe de l'inexécution de la convention.”250 
On the basis of art. 1150 and 1151 Cc, in the case of a deliberate breach of contract a creditor has a 
right to expectation damages which may incorporate incurred losses and missed profits. These 
damages need not be foreseeable, but they have to be an immediate and direct consequence of the 
breach. 
The relation between art. 1150 and 1151 is not clear in advance. The difference between foreseeable 
damages and immediate and direct consequences is a subtle one. The directness test should be 
applied on a case by case basis. The message should be that even in a case of deliberate breach the 
creditor may not claim damages for any possible negative consequence of the breach even though it 
is very remote. 
According to Le Tourneau, the widening of the scope of the term ‘dol’ to other situations than the 
intentionally inflicting harm-situation has been appreciated by the courts, because the first, very 
limited definition, would practically rule out the application of art. 1150. The comments mention that 
fortunately (sic) parties rarely decide not to perform because they directly aim to cause damages to 
the other party, let alone that this situation is very difficult to prove. Indeed, the reason not to 
perform is often egocentric, because the party committing intentional breach foresees an advantage 
taking into account the possible payment of damages. For these situations, a provision such as art. 
1150 Cc should be reasonably accessible in order to achieve the possibility to claim unforeseen 
damages.251 According to this definition the term ‘dol’ is more or less considered as the opposite of 
the performance in good faith. The intention to inflict damage may be absent, there is a calculated 
decision to perform incorrectly. According to art. 1150 Cc, the existence of dol overcomes the limit of 
foreseeability on the remedy of damages after breach of contract. The existence of this provision and 
the explicit reference to dol in connection with performance of the contractual obligation are further 
nuanced in several concrete case law examples. Before analyzing some of these examples it is 
necessary to remark that many of these cases are decided against the background of a clause limiting 
liability to foreseeable damages. If the victim of the breach proves the breach to be intentional, the 
exoneration clause cannot be invoked as a result of art. 1150 Cc.  
A concrete example is the builder who installs a floor of inferior quality. The builder simply takes 
advantage of the ignorance of use by the assignor.252 He substitutes the type of floor for another one 
with inferior quality without informing the assignor. This deliberate change has impact on the 
stability of the construction. Two questions were important in this case. The first one was whether 
this type of breach would qualify as a deliberate breach in the sense of art. 1150 Cc and the second 
question was which consequences the qualification of deliberateness would have in terms of 
sanctions. 
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According to Cornu who analyzed this case, the intention to inflict harm is not necessary to label this 
breach as intentional or deliberate. The same term in the area of tort law has the sharper meaning of 
malevolent, harm-inducing behavior.   A professional and deliberate deviation from the contract 
without the aim to hurt the other party, but with the most probable aim to achieve a larger financial 
gain – the constructed floor was no doubt cheaper - , qualifies therefore as a ‘faute dolosive’, an 
intentional breach.  He also emphasizes the idea of this case that labeling the breach as deliberate 
does not introduce the regime of tort law into contract law. The breach being deliberate does not 
make the breach ‘delictual’.253 
The most important consequences of the breach being committed deliberately is that, as a logical 
consequence of art. 1150 Cc, the exoneration clauses containing limits for foreseeable damages are 
not valid. It is remarkable that Cornu explicitly distinguishes the consequences of dol from faute 
lourde  with regard to the absence of a foreseeability limit, especially because he says that in other 
cases the consequences of dol and faute lourde are generally similar.254 
4.4.6  French law II: the airline case  
The following case needs some introduction, because it centralizes the problem of damages suffered 
by passengers in case of delay or cancellation of flights. This problem is also object of legal 
instruments beyond national law, such as the Montreal Convention and within Europe, a Regulation 
establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied 
boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights.255 These international rules are not taken into 
account, because the focus in this – slightly older –  is not to provide a complete and up-to-date 
picture of the rules around compensation of passengers in case of overbookings or, somewhat 
broader, delay or cancellation 
A compelling example of deliberate breach of contract is the case of an overbooked flight.256 The 
case concerned three members of an organization specialized in medical assistance. They planned to 
fly to the African country Gabon via Brussels on 10 July 1988 in the hope of entering into a contract 
with the Gabonese authorities. They had received confirmation of the travel agency to board their 
flight at the airport, but when they arrived they were refused to enter the plane because the flight 
concerned was overbooked. The three were sent to the Roissy airport – near Paris, where they 
departed from that morning – and they arrived a day later in Gabon. However, the hosts were not 
amused by this delay and they cancelled the meeting. The three issued a claim against Sabena, the 
airline company, and they claimed damages for incurred costs for the delay and the useless trip to 
Gabon including expenses for hotel and food and for the loss of opportunity to enter into a contract 
with Gabon for an amount of FF 30.000 – approximately E 4500 – . The airline company did not deny 
that the flight was overbooked. As a defense, it invoked a clause in the conditions added to the 
contract with the passengers. In this clause the airline company limits the obligation to pay damages 
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after breach of contract effectively to the price of the ticket plus E 50 per day the airline company is 
not able to provide an alternative for the overbooking. 
The court decided that the airline company, by not being able to assure the passengers that they 
have a seat on the planes, committed an intentional or deliberate breach.  According to the court, 
the airline company made a political choice being fully aware of the risk that it could not assure that 
every passenger would be able to board the flight.257 The choice is internally justified on the basis of 
financial considerations, but it is also a choice at the detriment of the legitimate interests and 
expectations of the passengers. Therefore, this behavior qualifies as an intentional breach of contract 
as a result of which the airline company cannot rely on the exclusion clause. The court awards the 
claim of damages in full. 
This is an explicit example of a situation where deliberateness is relevant in assessing the availability 
and the extent of a remedy in contract. This example is also illustrative, because it shows that 
deliberateness may be a relevant factor in determining damages without directly turning over the 
whole system of contract damages by incorporating categories of damages which are systematically 
not embedded such as punitive damages. 
The case of the overbooking of flights triggers a debate on the influence of the degree of fault on the 
availability and extent of damages in French law. Délébecque feels some remarks are necessary, 
because the airline case is a case in the area of transport law. In the area of transport law in French 
law, the idea of ‘faute inexcusable’ plays a role. Délébecque attempts to position the faute 
inexcusable between the faute dolosive and the faute lourde.258 Furthermore, he also mentions the 
‘faute lucrative’, which can also be positioned between the faute dolosive and the faute lourde. The 
classic distinction between dol and faute lourde is easy to formulate. A faute dolosive only applies 
when the intention to inflict harm can be established. A faute lourde is established without reference 
to the intention of the party committing the  faute lourde, because only the seriousness of the 
breach is relevant for establishing a breach as a faute lourde. Although in most cases the legal 
consequences of dol and faute lourde are similar, it is not clear whether this is also true in the case of 
art. 1150 Cc. Within this framework, the notion of faute inexcusable may have an added value, 
because the intention to inflict damage as a requirement of dol limits the applicability of this term. 
The faute inexcusable does not require this element. It is sufficient to make a ‘faute’ inexcusable 
when the party committing the faute takes a substantial risk that the aggrieved party suffers 
damages. The faute lucrative is more or less a synonym of the faute inexcusable making explicit the 
idea that the party committing the faute lucrative aims to get a financial advantage at the detriment 
of the aggrieved party.  The intention to inflict harm is not required, whereas the seriousness of the 
breach by itself is not sufficient to qualify as a faute inexcusable. The party committing a faute 
inexcusable consciously takes into account the risk of inflicting harm on the aggrieved party, but that 
is all. On the other hand, he deliberately commits breach for other, often egocentric reasons. 
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Whereas transport law – specifically maritime and air transport law -  may use the intermediate 
variant of faute inexcusable, because it attaches specific remedial consequences to such ‘fautes’, in 
civil law within the framework of art. 1150 Cc the use of the intermediate variant does not seem to 
be necessary after the decision of the Cour de Cassation in 1969.259 According to this decision, the 
scope of dol is widened as explained and dol actually incorporates the faute inexcusable and the 
faute lucrative. The problem is that the courts also use a stricter variant of dol where the intention to 
inflict harm is still a standing requirement, especially in tort cases. Systematically, French authors are 
reluctant to admit that they created two types of dol, a strict version and a more lenient version.260 
The latter is at least used in the art. 1150 Cc, which is a ‘contractual’ provision. It is the only way to 
explain satisfactorily the two way solution chosen by the courts.261 
4.4.7  German law 
In German law, the element of deliberateness as a potential factor influencing the remedy of 
damages can be found in several provisions in the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code), including 
§276 BGB. The provision states that the debtor has to be at fault or has to act deliberately (i.e. 
‘vorsätzlich’) in order to be liable for damages. The comments on this provision define the element of 
deliberateness as willingly and knowingly breaking an obligation.262 Theoretically, the element of 
deliberateness is compared with criminal intent, for example in distinguishing between direct intent 
and conditional intent. Nevertheless, the comments recognize that the notion of deliberateness is 
not so relevant to establish liability, because the element of fault essentially provides the more 
relevant hurdle. No further distinction between (profound) negligence ((grosse) Fahrlässigkeit) and 
deliberateness (Vorsatz) is necessary in that case.263 Several comments on this provision elaborate on 
the meaning of Vorsatz, but references to contract law situations are not made in the sense that 
intent as a factor may increases liability for damages, except for the fact that liability for intent 
cannot be excluded. The law does not seem to pay much attention to deliberateness as an important 
element. The reason for this lack of interest is that German law has a clear remedial hierarchy in 
contract law, where actual performance of the contract plays a large role on the one hand and the 
remedy of damages is strictly limited to compensatory damages, at least in the sense that German 
law is generally hostile towards punitive damages.264 If the objective of paying extra attention to the 
motive of the contract breaker would be protection of the interest of the creditor, the remedy of 
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actual performance is the most adequate way to do so. However, if the breach is a fact and 
performance is not possible any longer, the level of damages might become relevant again, but 
whether motive plays any role in the award of damages is unclear. 
4.4.8  Dutch law I: deliberateness in the Civil Code or not?  
In Dutch law references in the civil code to potential significance of deliberateness of acting of the 
debtor are scarce. Under the old Civil Code, which entered into force in 1838, art. 1283 and 1284 
explicitly referred to deliberate breach of contract. According to art. 1283 Cc (old) a party in breach 
has to pay for foreseeable losses. Losses are considered to be foreseeable, if the party in breach 
foresaw or could have foreseen the losses, as if the breach had been committed deliberately. In 
other words, this provision suggests that every breach should be treated as a deliberate breach. In 
addition, art. 1284 Cc (old) adds that in any case – i.e. whether a breach is deliberate or not –  the 
aggrieved party can claim only ‘direct’ losses. Motive is fixated under the old civil code at ‘deliberate’, 
but with some side-notes. Case law illustrates that deliberate breach in the sense of these provisions 
does not require intention to inflict damage to the creditor. 265 Even more interesting is the fact, that 
the Hoge Raad does not require the debtor to foresee all damaging consequences of the breach to 
qualify as deliberate breach. The threshold to qualify as deliberate is therefore perhaps somewhat 
lower than expected, because any calculated breach can amount to a deliberate breach. It is also 
clear that the Hoge Raad distinguishes deliberate breach from wrongful breach, which yields an 
independent unlawful act. Nevertheless, the debtor can only act deliberately, if he is clearly aware of 
the fact that he commits breach of contract.266 
The new and current civil code does not contain these provisions any longer, because they were 
considered to be outdated.  Nevertheless, it is questionable whether these provisions do not return 
in the new code, because the creators of the new code thought that the element of deliberateness 
was not relevant any longer in determining remedial consequences of breach of contract.267 On the 
contrary, as Krans in his dissertation noticed, a peculiar situation has been created, because he 
argues that intent or deliberateness as an element is certainly relevant in the area of assessment of 
damages. He explicitly mentions the bad intention of the debtor as well as the greater probability of 
foreseeing damage as reasons for increasing the level of damages.268  This statement is not 
compatible with the abandonment of deliberateness in the law. However, the statement is not 
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supported by any case law.269 The next section shows an example of a case in Dutch law which does 
not explicitly mention deliberateness as a relevant factor for assessing damages. Nevertheless, the 
case contains aspects which hint at deliberateness as an implicit factor having influenced the decision 
of the Hoge Raad. 
4.4.9  Dutch law II: Vos/TSN Logistics  
In the case Vos /TSN Logistics, the latter party could rely on a long-term contract consisting of the 
obligation to service a fleet of trucks for a period of 5 years.270 Vos told TSN well before the end of 
the contract that TSN was released from its duties. TSN claimed the profits based on the agreed 
contract price for the whole 5 year term. During legal proceedings TSN had managed to obtain other 
assignments, so it could continue its business. Vos recognized liability for breach of contract, but 
refused to pay the expected profits based on the whole term, because he argued that he created an 
opportunity for TSN to obtain profits from new contracts with other parties, which it effectively did. 
Therefore, according to Vos, TSN could not claim full profits, because it would receive a double profit 
in that case. The profit made in contracts with other parties should be deducted as a financial 
windfall (advantage) from the damages claim of TSN, on the one hand because Vos should only be 
able to claim concrete losses – loss of profit minus the profit made in other contracts – and not the 
‘abstract’ loss of profit and on the other hand because of the doctrine of ‘voordeelstoerekening’  
according to art. 6:100 BW, which allows for deduction under certain circumstances.  Furthermore, 
TSN was obliged to limit its losses according to the law. The Hoge Raad did not agree with this line of 
reasoning and decided that in cases like these, the principle that the aggrieved party should be 
brought in the situation as if the contractual obligation had been performed correctly prevails. Under 
these circumstances, the court is allowed not to take into account the fact that Vos concluded 
contracts with other parties. Furthermore, the Hoge Raad did not agree, because the damage and 
the advantage did not arise from the same source. The damage was caused by Vos due to breach of 
contract, whereas the advantage of TSN only occurred due to the efforts of TSN, which effectively 
ruled out application of art. 6:100 BW. 
The Vos /TSN Logistics decision received critical comments from several authors, because one could 
say in brief that TSN indeed got an opportunity to make an extra profit due to the breach, so as 
damage should only be counted search costs for finding new assignments and costs for bridging the 
gap between the breach of contract and the start of the new assignment.271 Lindenbergh argues that 
art. 6:98 BW provides a good reason to take into account the nature of the foundation of the claim – 
i.e. the contract.272 Furthermore, he argues that art. 6:98 BW also mentions the degree of the fault 
leading to liability should play a role in deciding the availability and the amount of damages.273 
Beversluis on the other hand argues why later profits should or should not be deducted from the 
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amount of profits which is a technical matter of labeling according to his line of reasoning. The end of 
his contribution is ominous for the approach to deliberateness as a relevant element. He concludes 
his analysis by saying that Vos/TSN is not a precedent case which stimulates aggrieved parties to do 
nothing or to claim a ‘double’ profit after every breach of contract. Specific technical circumstances 
in this case justify the calculation of damages which lead to granted claim for ‘double’ profits.  
However in the penultimate sentence of his contribution, Beversluis contends that the Hoge Raad did 
‘apparently’ not feel compelled to avoid this negative result for Vos, “probably with the idea that Vos 
did not deserve better”.274 The debate on this specific point is a sign that, although implicitly, the  
‘bad’ conduct of the party in breach may be relevant. 
 The Hoge Raad seems to deliver a firm statement on the way parties should deal with long-term 
contracts. The message is that these contracts should be performed. If actual performance is out of 
the question due to lapse of time or other reasons, the victim of the breach should get an easy access 
to full compensation at the expense of the party who commits breach.  
4.4.10  PECL, DCFR and CESL  
As illustrated, French law is a typical example of an existing legal system where deliberateness 
explicitly plays a role in assessing the type of loss as well as the level of damages. Although the 
practical value of the provision is not easy to assess, because case law is not abundant, the drafters 
of the PECL and DCFR found it necessary to incorporate a comparable provision. 
Art. 9:503 PECL says:  
“The non-performing party is liable only for loss which it foresaw or could reasonably have foreseen 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract as likely result of its nonperformance, unless the non-
performance was intentional or grossly negligent.” 
 And Art. III.3:703 DCFR says: 
“The debtor in an obligation which arises from a contract or other juridical act is liable only for loss 
which the debtor foresaw or could reasonably be expected to have foreseen at the time when the 
obligation was incurred as a likely result of the non-performance, unless the non-performance was 
intentional, reckless or grossly negligent.” 
In both provisions, foreseeability is presented as the generally applicable rule, which is set aside in 
case of deliberate non-performance. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the PECL and the 
DCFR do not contain provisions which limit the damages to immediate and direct consequences of 
the deliberate breach as French law does. 
Both provisions offer a direct answer to the key question of this paper of whether deliberate breach 
compared to ‘ordinary’ breach of contract may lead to a higher amount of compensatory damages or 
to additional damages. In this provision, the motive of the contract breaker is linked with the 
‘foreseeability’ notion. Foreseeable losses are always covered in case of breach of contract. In case of 
deliberate breach, unforeseeable losses are covered as well. Again, this provision mentions not only 
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intentional non-performance, but also reckless and grossly negligent non-performance. The 
distinction between these three terms is difficult to establish precisely. 
Within the DCFR framework, the creditor can only claim compensatory damages for breach of 
contract.275 Therefore, the unforeseeable losses, which cannot be claimed in a situation of ‘ordinary’ 
breach of contract must be claimed as part of compensatory damages. Deliberate breach gives access 
to a higher amount of compensatory damages than ‘ordinary’ breach. Moreover, this provision 
implicitly indicates that in case of ‘ordinary’ breach perfect compensation can often not be provided. 
The comments also provide an original example to illustrate the potential role of intent in awarding 
damages.276 A contracts with B to construct and erect stands for a major exhibition at which leading 
firms in electronics will display their equipment. A few days before the exhibition opens A demands a 
substantial increase in the contract sum and refuses to complete the stands. B does not only lose 
profits if the stands are not completed, but he also faces a serious liability claim from C, who 
contracted with B to expose a new device and would suffer large losses if he cannot display his 
device on the exhibition. A nevertheless withdraws his workforce. In such a case A is also liable for 
non-foreseeable losses on B’s side, such as for the financial consequences of the liability claim, even 
though A could not foresee these consequences, because A’s breach of contract was intentional. It 
does not matter in this case if B told A about his contract with C or not. The risk for such extra losses 
is always shifted to A because of the intentional breach. 
Where the applicable provision, art. III.3:703 DCFR, states that the aggrieved party can only claim 
damages in case of breach of contract for losses which were foreseeable at the time at the 
conclusion of the contract, except for the case when breach of contract is intentional, the CESL 
contains exact the same provision, but without the exception referring to the deliberateness of the 
breach. Art. 161 CESL states the following: 
“The debtor is liable only for loss which the debtor foresaw or could be expected to have foreseen at 
the time when the contract was concluded as a result of the non-performance.” 
Although the explanatory memorandum added to the CESL is quite elaborate, it does not comment 
in detail on specific provisions. It is clear that the CESL is based on the DCFR, but specific deviations 
are not explained.  This deviation regarding the disappearance of the direct references to 
deliberateness of the breach and its influence on the remedies of termination or damages and the 
lack of any explanation is remarkable. The development in Europe concerning detection and 
collection of a common frame of reference of European private law in my opinion rightfully included 
the explicit reference to the relevance of motive – specifically deliberateness of the breach – where 
the application of remedies is concerned.  
Again, in the absence of concrete case law examples, it is difficult to know what the relevance of the 
explicit link between deliberateness and foreseeable losses exactly means. The relevance of 
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deliberateness depends on the concrete meaning of foreseeable losses. Because foreseeability is a 
relevant element of assessing expectation damages, the PECL and DCFR are not specifically clear on 
the role of deliberateness in assessing expectation damages. Regarding the lack of references to 
deliberateness in the CESL, it is necessary to prelude on the argument made in Chapter 5. This thesis 
argues that deliberateness reluctantly plays and at least should play an explicit role in the process of 
seeking and awarding an adequate remedy. The systems where explicit reference to deliberateness 
lacks – such as Dutch or English law to a certain extent – visibly struggle with dealing with the notion 
of deliberateness. Consequently, the explicit reference to deliberateness in one or two instances in 
the DCFR could be considered as a good step forward to acknowledging the relevance of motive in 
the law of contract and breach of contract. In that sense, the CESL seems to do a step back in this 
process. Again, the exact reasons for omitting references to deliberateness are unclear yet, but they 
should be quite strong in order to convincingly counter the argument that deliberateness of the 
breach is a relevant element in the application of sanctions for breach of contract.277 
 
4.4.11  Concluding remarks 
This section presented several case law examples illustrating potential links between deliberateness 
of the breach and expectation damages. A first general remark must be that the explicit relevance of 
deliberateness on the court awarding expectation damages is not evident. One of the reasons may 
be that the concept of expectation damages is, though a common legal term, not a term with a 
universal and unambiguous meaning. The type of damage which is ‘expected’ and the relevance of 
the notion of deliberateness for awarding expectation damages depend on the interpretation of this 
legal term.  The influence of the notion of deliberateness on damages is for example visible in art. 
1150 Cc of the French Civil Code and in some provisions in the soft law bodies PECL and DCFR. 
Deliberateness of the breach as well as lesser degrees of fault open the gate for claiming 
unforeseeable losses as compensatory damage, whereas in any other breach of contract, only 
foreseeable losses could be recovered. The relevance of deliberateness depends on the concrete 
meaning of foreseeable losses. The Golden Victory case and the Vos/TSN case are both examples in 
respectively English and Dutch law representing the difficulty of establishing a good link between 
deliberateness and expectation damages, because no explicit reference is made. 
4.5  Deliberateness and damages for non-pecuniary losses 
4.5.1  Introductory remarks 
This section describes some examples of cases where deliberateness of the breach influences the law 
or the court to award damages for non-pecuniary losses, explicitly or implicitly. The reason to create 
a separate section for the relation between deliberateness and this type of damages is that non-
pecuniary losses do generally not fit easily in the area of contract law. Contracts are often concluded 
between parties with an economic objective. Failure to perform may cause economic, financial, 
pecuniary losses including loss of profits. In general, these losses should be compensated as the 
previous section and Chapter 1 showed. Non-pecuniary losses in the sense of loss of pleasure, loss of 
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amenity or mental distress are generally not recoverable.  Circumscribing non-pecuniary losses this 
way could lead to the conclusion that non-pecuniary losses can generally not be claimed as (a part of) 
expectation damages. Nevertheless, in some cases the objective of the contract is to provide 
pleasure or another non-material value. Failure to provide this type of pleasure may result in non-
pecuniary losses and in such cases, expectation damages at least may include non-pecuniary losses. 
The reluctant attitude of the law of contract towards the award of damages for non-pecuniary losses 
is tested in some cases where the breach concerned is deliberate. A few examples of cases are 
mentioned in which non-pecuniary losses can be recovered and where the deliberateness of the 
breach at least implicitly seems to be one of the causes to award such damages.  
4.5.2  English law: Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth 
In the case Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth  Forsyth orders Ruxley to build a 
swimming pool in his garden. Parties conclude a contract, which includes the duty of Ruxley to build 
a swimming pool with a depth of 7 feet 6 inches – approximately 230 centimeters for a price of £ 
38,564.77.278 The finished pool has only a depth of 6 feet 9 inches – 205 centimeters. In other words, 
Ruxley does not correctly perform his contractual obligation. For safety reasons the difference in 
depth is not relevant. Furthermore, the value of the shallower pool is held to be equal to the value of 
the pool with the intended depth. The correct depth cannot be achieved otherwise than by 
completely rebuilding the pool – approximately £ 21,500. Forsyth refuses to pay and refers to the 
breach of contract of Ruxley. Ruxley starts legal proceedings and claims performance i.e. payment of 
Forsyth on the contract. Forsyth claims damages on the level of ‘cost of reinstatement’ or ‘cost of 
cure’.  
The trial judge – the court in first instance –after having established that Ruxley committed breach of 
contract, decides that he is not convinced that Forsyth will indeed rebuild the pool when the cost of 
reinstatement is awarded. Furthermore, the relation between the level of damage and the amount 
of damage is too unbalanced in favor of Forsyth.  Finally, he decides to award a small amount of 
money – £ 2,500 – to Forsyth for ‘loss of amenity’ due to the shallower pool he received. 
The Court of Appeal reverses the decision of the trial judge and awards the claim of Forsyth in full. 
The Court awards the claim of cost of reinstatement and the award of damages for loss of amenity is 
set aside. Consequently, Ruxley brings the case to the House of Lords, but he only questions the 
affirmative decision of the Court of Appeal on the original claim of Forsyth. The decision of the trial 
judge does not play a role in the case before the House of Lords, especially not the award for the loss 
of amenity. Therefore, an eventual decision to quash the decision of the Court of Appeal  does not 
force the House of Lords to assess the decision of the trial judge. 
Four out of five Lords wrote an opinion on this case. They all come to the same conclusion, but they 
do not follow the same line of reasoning and they all struggle with the legal foundation of their 
decision. 
The most important argument Forsyth makes to support his claim is that the trial judge recognized 
the existence of a certain type of loss, because he awarded damages due to loss of amenity. 
According to Forsyth, at least in the area of building contracts English law does not recognize such a 
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remedy or such a type of damages as an alternative for the ‘classic’ remedies. The only applicable 
rule is the general rule of law that after a breach of contract the aggrieved party should be financially 
brought in the position as if the obligation had been correctly performed. Two options are normally 
available in this situation. A first possibility is the award of the difference in value. However, this 
option is not available, because there is no difference in value between the existing and the 
hypothetically deeper pool, whereas Forsyth has suffered damage at the same time. Therefore, only 
the second option is available in this case, which is awarding the cost of reinstatement, as the Court 
of Appeal correctly did. 
Lord Bridge of Harwich argues that the starting point of awarding damages in contract should be that 
the claimant receives what he is entitled to according the contract and the negotiated result. In any 
case, damages are not supposed to be a punishment for the party committing breach of contract. 
However, Lord Bridge admits that this principle is only easily applicable in a commercial setting 
where the loss of the aggrieved party resulting from the breach can be easily calculated.  If the object 
of the transaction is the creation or procurement of pleasure, such as in this particular case, the 
original assumption is not automatically applicable. Lord Bridge denies the argument of Forsyth by 
reasoning that in a relative non-commercial setting such as this one, it is not valid to calculate 
damages based on pure economic reasons. Furthermore, he disagrees with the reasoning that the 
impossibility of awarding the difference in value automatically leads to an award of the cost of 
reinstatement. Therefore, he quashes the decision of the Court of Appeal and reinstates the decision 
of the trial judge. 
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle recognizes the principle in the law of damages of complete expectation 
damages mentioned by Forsyth with a reference to relevant case law279, but he argues that a minor 
failure to achieve the contractual objective should not be equaled to a complete breach of contract. 
The core question is how to assess the loss of Forsyth. Lord Jauncey argues that the intended depth 
of the pool does not have an economic added value, but it is a personal preference of Forsyth. 
Therefore, awarding cost of reinstatement is a bridge too far.  
Lord Mustill and Lord Lloyd of Berwick reach comparable conclusions. Lord Lloyd is the only one who 
discusses the considerations of the Court of Appeal in full. He asks the relevant question whether 
English contract law offers the possibility to award damages for denied expectations without 
economic consequences. Because this question is not explicitly part of the questions submitted to 
the House of Lords, he does not formulate an answer to this question. 
In conclusion, although the facts rule out deliberateness of the breach in this specific case, it is clear 
that all courts struggle with the idea that the builder may walk away from the specifics of the 
contract, because the award for complete expectation damages or specific performance would be an 
economic anomaly. The absence of a sanction leads to the possibility of a free ride, a deliberate 
breach of contract, though within certain margins, because if the breach is too serious, the aggrieved 
party is able to claim expectation damages. Small deviations which are annoying, but not decisive for 
the value of the object leave English law in doubt. 
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4.5.3  US law: Lutz Farms et.al v. Asgrow Seed Company 
In US law, an explicit link between deliberateness and the award for non-pecuniary loss is rare. In the 
case of Lutz Farms et al. v. Asgrow Seed Company an explicit link is nevertheless visible.280 In this 
case, the Lutz brothers bought onion seed from Asgrow. The seed produced numerous double 
onions, which were not commercially salable. Lutz stated and proved that the onion seed they 
bought was not properly tested in breach of the internal regulations of Asgrow. Had Asgrow done the 
test, it would have been clear in advance that the seed was of a poor quality. Lutz sued Asgrow on a 
number of grounds, including breach of express and implied warranties and willful breach of 
contract, but the claim was also based on tort, more specifically negligence. The case states that Lutz 
claimed damages for emotional distress in connection with the willful breach of contract claim.281 In 
a jury trial in the district court of Colorado the jury honored the claim of willful breach of contract 
and awarded damages for emotional distress accordingly. The cited case is an appeal case, on which 
the Court of Appeal of the 10th Circuit decided. For this case, it is only relevant how the court 
decides on the willful breach claim and the connected claim of damages for emotional distress. The 
court states three important things in one passage and it should therefore be quoted in full: 
“The parties apparently agree that under Colorado law "damages for mental suffering are 
recoverable for willful or wanton breach [of contract] when they are a natural and proximate 
consequence of the breach.282 It is Asgrow's position that there was insufficient evidence that any 
breach of warranty on its part was willful and wanton or that any emotional distress suffered by the 
Lutzes was the natural and proximate consequence thereof, and that accordingly, the emotional 
distress claim should not have been submitted to the jury. The district court was of the view that the 
evidence was sufficient to warrant submission of this claim to the jury. We agree.”283  
First, the court states that according to Colorado law damages for emotional distress after willful 
breach are recoverable. The court puts the words “of contract” between brackets which suggests 
that the term “willful breach of contract” is not a generally used term, but rather the term “willful 
breach”. Warranties, next to a contract, can also be breached willfully and warranties need not be 
always contractual in the sense that parties expressly agreed on its wordings. Nevertheless, in this 
case the court apparently does not deem the possible difference relevant and it cites case law on 
which it founds the general link between willfulness and damages for emotional distress. 
Second, the court formulates the requirements which should be fulfilled in order to claim damages 
for emotional distress after willful breach of contract.  On the one hand, Lutz should prove the 
willfulness of the breach and on the other hand, Lutz should prove that the emotional distress is a 
natural and proximate consequence of the willfulness. This case is also instructive, because the court 
shows why Lutz succeeded in proving both steps.  
The court explains that Lutz showed that the failure to test was a consequence of the calculated and 
considerate business decision of Asgrow intended to speed up sales and marketing of the onion seed. 
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Because Lutz provided evidence to support this claim, the failure to test was willful and wanton and 
not inadvertent.284 
Then, the court explicitly mentions the detailed nature of evidence provided by Lutz in order to prove 
the proximity of their emotional distress as a consequence of the willful breach. The court states that 
in case of absence of evidence or even in the case of marginal evidence, the district court could not 
let the jury decide on this matter. The court decided that the district court did not err, because 
Asgrow was fully aware that they were dealing with commercial growers. Furthermore, Asgrow was 
also aware that the large value of the deal would lead to bankruptcy on the side of Lutz in the case of 
harvest failures. This scenario became reality – as Asgrow could have foreseen – and Lutz suffered 
emotional distress as a consequence thereof.285 
Consequently, the Federal Court of Appeal supported Lutz’s claim and denied the arguments of 
Asgrow. It is worth mentioning that the district jury awarded $ 425,000 in favour of the two brothers 
Lutz for damages for emotional distress alone. This substantial amount – the case was decided in 
1984 – could not have been awarded had the breach of contract not been willful.  
4.5.4  French law: recapturing the swimming pool case 
The other case which is comparable to the case study is the French swimming pool case. The Cour de 
Cassation seems to be more in favor of the creditor, because he seems to be able to enforce his right 
to performance, even though the disadvantage due to the defective performance need not be 
established. In this case too, motive as a relevant element has not been part of the arguments. A 
closer look reveals that the French swimming pool case is somewhat different from the English one, 
because in the latter one, the cost of reinstatement is deemed to be out of proportion against the 
loss or damage at the side of the creditor. In such situations, French law is not so creditor-friendly as 
it seems to be. In a specific French case, where a constructor used a different type of wood than 
specified in the contract for furniture for a shop, the Cour de Cassation decided that although there 
was a breach of contract, the creditor could not terminate the contract and claim damages, because 
there was no loss. The absence of loss was established, because the Cour de Cassation found that the 
different type of wood used did not affect the usefulness or the outward appearance of the finished 
work.286 Careful reading of the decision leads to the conclusion that the debtor offered a price 
reduction as a reparation measure because of the wrong type of used wood. Such a price reduction 
can be constituted as a partial termination. The quality of the performance has been decreased, 
albeit to a minimal extent, and the counterperformance – the payment – has been decreased as well. 
The creditor is compensated for his losses, but he is not entitled to a higher amount of damages, 
because he suffered no – additional and tangible – loss. It is interesting that the authors of the 
Casebook seem to assume that the factor of deliberateness could have been part of the decision in 
this French case, but the relevance in the end was limited, because the offered price reduction 
allegedly consisted of the profits the constructor made by using the wrong – and apparently cheaper 
– type of wood. However, it is not so easy to find a reference to a form of restitutionary measure in 
the French decision itself. 
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4.5.5  Dutch law: art. 6:106a BW; an exceptional provision in the Dutch Civil Code 
A straightforward example of the relevance of deliberateness on the award for non-pecuniary losses 
can be found in Dutch law. As previously explained, Dutch law of damages is a general law which 
encloses contract law as well as tort law, whereas in specific situations the concrete provisions offer 
sufficient possibilities to distinguish between tort and contract law situations. The starting point of 
the Dutch law of damages is the award of compensatory damages for material losses – including loss 
of profits. An aggrieved party confronted with breach of contract or with an unlawful act is 
automatically entitled to this type of damages according to art. 6:95 BW. According to this provision,  
the award for non-pecuniary losses is only possible when a specific foundation in law can be 
identified. Such a foundation is art. 6:106 BW.287  
Subsection 1 allows for an award of damages for non-pecuniary loss in the case the party inflicting 
the damage specifically aimed at causing non-pecuniary damage on the aggrieved party.288 This 
provision is applicable for contract as well as tort situations, but it is clear that this provision is only 
relevant in breach of contract situations if the breach also constitutes a tort. A ‘simple’ deliberate 
breach aimed at acquiring a financial advantage does not render this provision applicable, because 
the intention to inflict immaterial harm is absent.  
The question arises whether a connection between an award damages for non-pecuniary losses and 
deliberateness in the area of breach of contract is possible.  
4.5.6  Concluding remarks 
Section 4.5 describes the potential influence of deliberateness on the award of damages for non-
pecuniary losses. Because this type of damages is a rare type of damages to be awarded in contract 
law, the question is whether deliberateness of the breach may lower the threshold to award 
damages for non-pecuniary losses. Examples from English law and US law are not conclusive on this 
issue. At most, both systems give some indications that this question may be answered affirmatively, 
although both systems provide different examples. Where US law emphasizes the connection 
between the blameworthiness of the conduct and the award of this type of damages, English law 
seems to struggle with the question whether the risk of deliberate breach without a sanction would 
become problematic in cases where expectation damages are not easy to calculate, as the Ruxley 
case shows. 
4.6  Deliberateness and punitive damages 
4.6.1  Introductory remarks 
This section pays attention to the possible link between deliberateness of the breach of contract and 
the award of punitive damages. In other words, does the element of deliberateness push the court 
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towards awarding punitive damages or does it influence the level of punitive damages? The last 
question is difficult to answer and this section concentrates on the first one. 
A first relevant issue is  - as Chapter 1 already mentioned – whether punitive damages are a possible 
remedy in contract law at all. In European legal systems, it is fairly safe to argue that in a pure 
contract law case, punitive damages are not available. In continental systems, punitive damages are 
neither available in tort law except for a very limited group of defamation cases. In English law, 
exemplary damages may be awarded in tort cases, but the courts are also reluctant.289 In other 
words, in European legal systems, the question whether deliberateness influences the decision of the 
court to award punitive damages in case of breach of contract is not relevant.  
It is interesting to notice that whereas the language seems strong in denying the relevance of motive 
with regard to the potential award for punitive damages, at the same time some prudence is 
exercised. This prudence is justified, because there are exceptions. Punitive damages are possible in 
a situation of breach of contract, if the breach is accompanied by an independent tort. Punitive 
damages are in certain jurisdictions available in tort, but the question remains whether punitive 
damages are also available in the case of a deliberate breach which is not automatically an 
independent tort. 
The notion of punitive damages is certainly well developed in US law. However, the specific question 
asked in this chapter cannot be answered in an easy way. In the next subsections the step towards a 
possible award of punitive damages after a willful breach of contract proves to be a two stage rocket. 
Even then, it is questionable, whether a proper link between the two notions is possible to establish. 
4.6.2 French law: a new development on punitive damages in contract? 
This section starts does not start with a description of current French law, in which prunitive 
damages are not available, neither in contract nor in tort. However, the last reform project as a 
proposal introduced the availability of punitive damages in case of a ‘faute manifeste deliberée’ (art. 
1371 Proposal).  According to the structure of the Proposal which is not too clear on this point, art. 
1371 means also to cover contract cases in which a so-called ‘faute lucrative’ gives access to punitive 
damages. The exact wordings of the provision are: 
“L’auteure d’une faute manifestement délibérée, et notamment d’une faute lucrative, peut être 
condamné, outre les dommages-intérêts compensatoires, a des dommages-intérêts punitifs dont le 
juge a la faculté de faire bénéficier pour une part de Trésor public. La decision du juge d’octroyer de 
tels dommages-intérêts doit être spécialement motivée et leur montant distingué de celui des autres 
dommages-intérêts accordés á la victime. Les dommages-intérêts ne sont pas assurables.”290  
It is worth mentioning this tentative provision in French law, because it reflects a tendency in legal 
thinking which completely opposes the more popular law and economics theory of efficient breach. 
The award of punitive damages does not only aim to redress the type of cases which will be 
elaborated on in the subsequent subsections on bad faith breaches in insurance cases, but also 
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explicitly the classic type of deliberate breach, the double sale.291 Rowan acknowledges that the 
proposed provision would mean the introduction of unknown territory to French law. It is therefore 
regrettable that the provision and the official additional comments on the provision do not make 
clear how the court should exactly make use of this new possibility. Does it really apply to contract 
case or only – for example –  to the more traditional defamation cases – as in English law? 
Nevertheless, the development shows that the first attempts to acknowledge the phenomenon of 
the deliberate breach of contract in connection with remedies on the continent are present.  
4.6.3  US law I: deliberateness, punitive damages and the issue of contract and tort 
In case of any breach of contract, the primary available remedy for the aggrieved party is expectation 
damages. Expectation damages are only available to the extent of compensation of the losses. 
Deliberateness is  in general not relevant for the award of expectation damages. Furthermore, in a 
pure breach of contract case, the breach being deliberate or not, the aggrieved party does not have 
access to punitive damages.  
In the case Christopher Keith Salvino and Suzanne Mary Salvino and Wish Acquisition LLC v. 
Christopher Salvino the court again states the current position of US law towards punitive damages 
and contract law, especially in a case of willful breach:292 
“It is well settled in this state that punitive damages are not recoverable in an action for breach of 
contract, even though it is alleged that the breach was unlawful, willful, wanton and malicious.”293 
Nevertheless, although US law considers a conscious breach of contract no different than any other 
breach in terms of remedies, the question may be asked whether a deliberate – willful – breach at 
least sometimes may also qualify as a tort. In the area of tort damages, punitive damages are 
available in the appropriate cases. Labeling ‘willful breach of contract’ as a specific tort in order to 
gain access to punitive damages without any further legal requirement could be a trick to avoid the 
doctrinal limits of contract damages. Courts also acknowledge this potential manoeuver. The Second 
Restatement of Contract is an academic document with no legal force, but nevertheless attempts to 
provide a structured picture of the general rules of contract based on case decisions. A commentary 
on § 355 of this Restatement says that punitive damages may be awarded for breach of contract only  
“if the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable”294 
The route from contract damages to tort damages – in other words the equation of breach of 
contract with a tort – has generally, historically and traditionally been cut off firmly.  In the words of 
Gilmore, classical contract theory on this issue is  
“dedicated to the proposition, that ideally, no one should be liable to anyone for anything.”295 
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Gilmore used this exaggeration to emphasize that damages in contract  have a history of constant 
limitation and restriction, as explained before. The whole idea of contract and its narrow conception 
of damages would be in danger if damages in tort could be easily obtained by qualifying every breach 
of contract as a tort. 
However, parties to an insurance contract are not only bound by the wording of the contract, they 
are also bound by an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In earlier decisions, it was 
already decided that the covenant of good faith sounded in contract and in tort. The gateway to the 
tort qualification is essential, because remedies in tort also include punitive damages, whereas 
remedies in contract generally do not. The question is whether breach of the insurance contract in 
this case could also be classified as a tort. If that result is achieved, remedies in tort are also 
available, under which punitive damages.  
Taking into account the requirement of a breach needing to be a tort in order to have access to 
punitive damages, the question arises whether deliberateness of the breach as such is sufficient to 
‘upgrade’ the breach to a tort, on the sole aspect of deliberateness. Such clear-cut examples are not 
easily available, but within a specific type of contract, the insurance contract, willful breach may lead 
to qualification as a tort, the tort of bad faith breach, which in turn gives access to punitive damages. 
4.6.4  US law II: Fletcher v Western National Life Insurance Co.  
The development of the bad faith breach doctrine has been a hesitant one. California may be labeled 
as the birthplace of this idea and several states have incorporated elements of the doctrine. The facts 
of the mentioned case provide a good idea of the factual background against which this doctrine 
developed and why punitive damages became a viable option. 
In the Californian case Fletcher v Western National Life Insurance Co Fletcher has a full-time job on a 
construction site as a construction worker.296 He works long days and the work he does is physically 
very demanding. He owns a modest house and some small real estate. He has disability insurance, 
which is supposed to pay him on the level of minimum for a period of 30 years if he becomes totally 
disabled. After an unfortunate accident on his work, Fletcher suffers back injury. According to several 
medical experts he is totally and permanently disabled. However, the insurer refuses to acknowledge 
his claim and denies the cause of the injury is connected to his working activities. The insurer even 
states that Fletcher was negligent in disclosing a back injury from the past and therefore reclaims the 
small amount the insurer already paid him. Fletcher is forced to enter legal proceedings, but suffers 
direct losses. He loses his house and his other real estate and his financial space (and his family’s) 
rapidly decreased. In this case the court eventually not only awarded compensation damages for 
breach of contract, but also awarded punitive damages on two grounds. First, the insurer committed 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This covenant sounds in contract and in tort. 
Secondly, the insurer committed an included, but separate tort, namely the tort of intentional 
infliction of mental distress. 
This decision of the court to award punitive damages based on tort of bad faith breach should be 
examined in more detail in order to assess the influence of the deliberateness of the breach. The key 
                                                          
296
 Facts derived from Fletcher v Western National Life Insurance Co. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78. See 
also e.g. Wetherbee v United Insurance Co. of America, 265 Cal.App.2d 921, 71 Cal.Rptr. 764. 
112 
 
element of the concept of bad faith breach is that it is a specific tort. US law primarily recognizes the 
contractual character of a first party insurance. The refusal to perform any obligation according to 
the contract should primarily be considered as breach of contract. The available tools for the 
aggrieved party are the remedies for breach of contract, primarily expectation damages. However, 
parties to an insurance contract are not only bound by the wording of the contract, they are also 
bound by an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In earlier decisions, it was already 
decided that the covenant of good faith sounded in contract and in tort. The breach of this covenant 
is under circumstances labeled as a bad faith breach and leads to the establishment of the bad faith 
breach. A breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing may sound in contract and in tort297, 
but the question is why specifically in insurance contracts the idea of this specific covenant is needed 
in order to provide the insured with an extra weapon next to the ordinary remedy of expectation 
damages. The court decided that a special relationship between contractual parties is needed in 
order to imply the mentioned covenant. Macintosh analyzes the relationship between the insurer 
and the insured and comes to the conclusion that the insurance contract is not a balanced 
contractual relationship.298 Naturally, in the Fletcher case the insured is an individual with a very 
modest financial and intellectual background and the insurer is a large company and a repeat-player 
in the area of dealing with claims inside or outside the courtroom. However, Macintosh advances 
another, behavioral or economic argument why the insurance contract is not balanced. The insurer 
does not have an intrinsic incentive to pay after the event for which the insurance is bought has 
occurred.  The insured paid his premium to remain insured, but after the insured event took place, 
the insurer does not have an incentive to pay the entitlement on the policy, even if the insured has 
every right to the entitlement based on the policy. The lack of counterweight to incentivize the 
insurer to pay or at least to act timely is on the one hand intrinsically connected with the specific 
insurance contract, because the insurer has nothing to gain from keeping the relationship with the 
insured sound, because the insured has already performed his part of the contract. On the other 
hand, the lack of counterweight has to be found in the absence of sufficient armory for the insured 
to use against the insurer once he refuses to perform his part of the contract –i.e. the traditional 
contract law remedies are not strong enough. The biggest weapon of the insured is the remedy of 
expectation damages, which is often actually the maximum limit of the policy and nothing more, 
because expectation damages should be compensatory and the aggrieved party should not achieve a 
better position than in the case the insurer paid him according to the contract. Naturally, the insured 
may suffer additional and consequential losses due to the absence of payment. In the Fletcher case, 
the insured lost his house and his other small real estate due to his lack of income. Not all of these 
losses are always recoverable, but generally only within the limits of foreseeability and remoteness. 
In addition, according to the court in the Fletcher case, in disability insurance cases the only measure 
of liability and damage is the sum or sums payable in the manner and at the times as provided in the 
policy. In summary, on the basis of probabilities the insurer may well decide to refuse to pay, 
because the insured has to be quite determined to receive what is owed to him and even then, the 
insurer knows well in advance that he does not have to cover all costs and damages of the insured. In 
other words, the vulnerability of the position of the insured is important in order to qualify the 
actions of the insurer as tortious. In the Fletcher case, the court decided that the insurer commits 
bad faith breach of contract, if the insurer consciously abuses the vulnerable position of the insured 
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by denying liability, even though he knows he does not have a viable defense against a claim 
speculating on the ignorance of the insured or his inability to fight for his rights. In this situation, it is 
acceptable that tort remedies are also available, because this type of behavior of the insurer should 
be subject to retribution on the one hand and be deterred on the other hand. 
A disadvantage of the award of punitive damages in insurance law which should be taken into 
account is the potential rise of premiums because insurers should take into account the potential risk 
of facing an unpredictable amount of damages.  However, this disadvantage did not withhold the 
California Supreme Court and subsequently the courts of various other states to introduce the bad 
faith breach as a specific tort or to classify bad faith  breach as a tort with a specific content, such as 
the tort of inflicting serious mental distress, as the court did in the Fletcher case.299 
So far, a ‘normal’ bad faith breach case occurs after conclusion of the contract, but it is also possible 
to discover the so-called institutional bad faith breach of contract. This type of bad faith breach 
occurs when insurance companies are built on policies elaborated in schemes, computer programs 
and job trainings, which deliberately deny claims in order to maximize profits.300 In such a case, 
insurance contracts may be sold when it is clear in advance that the insurance company is not likely 
to indemnify the insured party if the insured event becomes reality and the insured has a sound case.  
Several States did adopt bad faith breach as a specific tort in insurance cases. In the heat of the court 
developments in the 1970’s the question arose whether bad faith breach with its potential access to 
punitive damages could also be applicable in other cases than insurance cases, because the 
requirement of the special relationship between the contracting parties seems to be relatively 
general.   
4.6.5  US law III Seaman’s Direct Buying Service inc. v Standard Oil Co 
Again in California, the limits of the bad faith breach tort were tested. Whereas the bad faith breach 
tort in cases of employment contracts was tested301, the California Supreme Court attempted to 
cover the ground for a general application for bad faith breach of contract. 
The California Supreme Court decided the controversial Seaman’s case in 1974.302 Seaman’s was a 
retailer of supplies for ships and boats. The city of Eureka, California, planned to build a new marina 
in which there would be space for a fuel station for boats. Seaman’s and Eureka negotiated a 
contract under which Eureka would lease space in the new marina to Seaman’s for selling boat fuel, 
but the contract was conditional on Seaman’s providing proof that it had obtained a fuel dealership 
from a reputable wholesale fuel supplier. Seaman’s signed a dealership contract with Standard and 
presented a copy to Eureka as proof, on the basis of which Eureka gave Seaman’s the lease. 
However, before Eureka completed the construction of the marina, the worldwide oil shortage of 
1973-1974 started. New federal regulations prevented Standard from delivering oil to Seaman’s 
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unless Seaman’s filled in specific forms to request delivery. Standard offered Seaman’s help to fill out 
these forms. In the end, the supply order was granted. 
Subsequently, Standard responded by changing its position. The company contended now that no 
binding agreement with Seaman's had ever been reached. Therefore, Standard decided to appeal the 
order “because [it] did not want to take on any new business.” When Seaman's learned of the 
appeal, it twice wrote to Standard requesting an explanation. None was forthcoming. Standard's 
federal appeal was successful. Seaman's then appealed and this decision was, in turn, reversed. The 
new decision provided that an order “direct[ing] [Standard] to fulfill supply obligations to Seaman's” 
would be issued upon the filing of a copy of a court decree that a valid contract existed between the 
parties under state law. Seaman's asked Standard to stipulate to the existence of a contract, 
explaining that it could not continue in operation throughout the time that a trial would take. In 
reply, Standard's representative laughed and said, “See you in court.” Seaman's testified that if 
Standard had cooperated, Seaman's would have borrowed funds to remain in business until 1976 
when the new marina opened. Seaman's discontinued operations in early 1975. 
Seaman’s sued Standard, claiming breach of contract, violation of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing sounding in tort, and tortious interference.303 The tortious interference claim will not be 
discussed in the subsequent parts.304  
The facts of the case evidently show that Seaman’s was rightly awarded expectation damages in 
every instance. The question is whether does the facts in this case give Seaman’s a claim beyond 
expectation damages. Seaman’s also claims compensatory damages for the tortious interference and 
– more importantly – punitive damages for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
which sounds in contract and in tort.  The new aspect of the Seaman’s case is that this case is not 
about insurance contracts.  
The difficult part is how the court justified an eventual larger award of damages. The court awarded 
all claims of Seaman’s, including the claim for punitive damages, but had some difficulty to give 
reasons for its decision. The court established that the contractual relationship was a normal 
commercial contract and did not have the specific characteristics of an insurance contract. In 
principle, the bad faith breach approach which seemed to be reserved for area of insurance 
contracts, did not seem to be acceptable. However, the court ruled that bad faith breach could also 
be established in non-insurance cases if the party in breach: 
“(…) adopted a stonewall position without probable cause and with no belief in the existence of a 
defense. Such conduct goes beyond the mere breach of contract. It offends  accepted notions of 
business ethics.”305 
The struggle with bad faith breach did not end with the Seaman’s case. The quick rise of bad faith 
breach as a specific tort which could trigger several types of damages which were normally not 
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available in contract cases did not stabilize. The decision of the Californian Supreme Court was 
generally not followed by other States, although subsequently, in 1988 and later in 1995, the 
California Supreme Court overruled the Seaman’s decision, because the pressure to refrain from 
qualifying breach of contract as a tort was very high.306 Most courts throughout the country adhered 
to the freedom of parties to keep or breach a contract, at least to the common law fundaments of 
this principle.307  
4.6.6  Dutch law: a step aside; another solution for cases of bad faith insurance; Van 
Rossum/Fortis 
Where the debate in US law on the connection between deliberate breach and punitive damages in 
insurance law is blurred by the tort law aspect, Dutch law has also difficulties with insurers who do 
not comply with their obligations arising from the contract with the insured party – for example by 
intentionally delaying payment. However, these problems are completely different from the type of 
problems in US law. 
In Dutch law, the obligation of the insurer is separated from its legal background. It does generally 
not matter whether the obligation arises from a contract or from another source of obligations, such 
as the law or an unlawful act. What is important is that the obligation of the insurer is one to pay an 
amount of money based on a legal source of authority. The Civil Code contains a specific provision on 
late payment. The aggrieved party may claim interest at a statutory rate according to art. 6:119 BW. 
There is a specific provision for obligations to pay arising from a commercial contract. Art. 6:119a BW 
is specifically written for this situation. What in this context a ‘commercial contract’  is, is defined in 
the provision. The result is more or less comparable with the result arising from the general 
provision. 
 In an insurance case, the solution to solve the problem of overdue payment by the insurer seems to 
be remarkably simple: the insured has a right to claim the statutory interest and nothing more. 
Damages are generally fixed, specifically in order to avoid disputes about the extent of damages 
during the delay. While this solution seems to be an attempt to make legal proceedings economically 
efficient, one may think that this approach is quite harsh for the insured. It could well be that due to 
the late payment the aggrieved party suffers a much higher loss than the loss covered by the policy 
plus the statutory interest. 
The level of the actual damages can be lower or higher than the fixed amount of statutory interest. 
Both situations as such are not sufficient to award more damages or less damages than the monetary 
‘fine’ imposed by art. 6:119 BW.308One of them will be explored in more detail, because although the 
Hoge Raad is not opening the gates for claims above statutory interest, close reading reveals some 
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possibilities for a change in approach in the future. The Van Rossum/Fortis case deals with the upper 
limit – which is the most relevant limit in the perspective of this thesis, because deliberate delay may 
cause more losses – imposed by the statutory interest. This section is interested in the question 
whether the limit of statutory interest can be taken away where the breach of the insurer was 
deliberate. 
The facts are as follows. Van Rossum owned premises which burnt down due to a fire. Van Rossum 
had an insurance contract with Fortis which covered losses due to a fire. The level of damage had 
been established by experts according to the contract. Fortis refused to pay, because according to 
Fortis, the fire could only have been caused by a conscious act of a human being. The only reasonable 
person to set fire was Van Rossum and therefore the insurer refused to pay.  
The court in first instance denies the claim of Fortis and orders Fortis to pay the insured amount. 
Subsequently, Van Rossum claims additional damages due to the refusal of Fortis to pay the insured 
amount. Van Rossum supports his claim by referring – inter alia – to the actions of Fortis in order to 
avoid payment. Van Rossum does not attach the label ‘deliberate’ to these actions, but the 
arguments Van Rossum uses indicate something in that direction, especially because he also claims 
damages due to loss of reputation, because he is falsely accused of setting fire to his own premises. 
The Court of Appeals also denies the claim of Van Rossum and the Hoge Raad confirms the decision 
of the Court of Appeal. The Hoge Raad repeats that the claims for payment of a due amount can only 
be accompanied by a claim of loss of interest at a statutory rate, based on art. 6:119 BW.  Applied to 
the insurance context, the Hoge Raad confirms the strict attitude of Dutch law towards additional 
claims next to the claim based on the policy. Nevertheless, the Hoge Raad does not the close the 
door to an additional claim, but special circumstances – which the Court of Appeal justifiably did not 
establish – may block the restrictive application of art. 6:119 BW based on the principle of good faith. 
It remains questionable. 
The question is whether this case is especially highlighted, because the deliberate behavior is not 
unambiguously established or acknowledged by the court and there is also not a serious trace of a 
specific sanction as a consequence of the behavior of the insurer. The answer to this question is that 
this case illustrates that in insurance law, the insurer must also have opportunities to defend himself. 
The obligation to pay directly on the policy after the insured event occurred conflicts with the 
possibility the insurer should have to defend himself against frivolous claims. In this case, the court 
ex post establishes that the accusation of self-inflicted fire is not sound, but awarding additional 
damages – especially if they can be labeled as punitive damages – may imply a factual limitation on 
the freedom of the insurer to defend himself in litigation.309 
4.6.7  Concluding remarks 
Section 4.6 describes the relation between deliberate breach and the award of punitive damages. In 
continental systems, the award of punitive damages in private law is in general hardly allowed, let 
alone in breach of contract situations. In the US a direct link between punitive damages and willful 
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breach of contract is generally also denied. However, under circumstances and in a limited group of 
cases in the area of insurance contracts, a willful breach of contract may be labeled as a specific tort, 
i.e. bad faith breach, which in its turn gives access to punitive damages. After the 1970’s especially 
California attempted to extrapolate the application of the bad faith breach tort to other than 
insurance cases, but this attempt failed. The influence of deliberateness on the award of punitive 
damages is therefore not absent, but limited. 
4.7  Deliberateness and account of profits 
4.7.1  Introductory remarks 
The question in this section is whether account of profits is awarded in case of deliberate breach of 
contract. A terminological issue is a first step to overcome, because especially in common law 
jurisdictions several terms are used to describe the phenomenon of account of profits. In terms of 
doctrine, the remedy of account of profits is classified as a restitutionary remedy. Restitution and 
contract law is not a logical combination in advance. After termination – see section 4.8 – restitution 
in some form may be awarded, but account of profits is a specific category. As a synonym of account 
of profits, the term disgorgement is also a common term. It is important to realize that in every legal 
system the award of account of profits as an alternative remedy compared with expectation 
damages is a serious step, because the classic objective of compensation of the aggrieved party is not  
‘overserved’ by the remedy of account of profits. On the other hand, it is in a way a logical step to 
deprive the party committing deliberate breach of contract from the profits he gained from that 
deliberate breach. This section shows that this tense contradiction yields interesting case law and a 
serious development in doctrinal thinking on disgorgement of profits as an independent remedy. 
4.7.2  English law I: Surrey County Council and another v Bredero Homes Ltd 
In first instance, English law is reluctant towards awarding other than compensatory damages in the 
case of breach of contract, such as account of profits.310 The remedy of expectation damages is not 
only leading, starting point is that the expectation interest cannot be extended or replaced by other 
damages regimes which are more friendly to the aggrieved party.311 
A vital case to explore the possible influence of deliberate breach of contract on the availability of 
account of profits is Surrey County Council and another v Bredero Homes Ltd.312 Two councils owned 
parcels of land, which were originally destined for road purposes. However, the land was no longer 
required for road purposes and the councils decided to sell the land to be used for housing estates. In 
order to obtain a reasonable amount with an eye to eventual profits, they agreed with the estate 
developing company, the defendants, upon a specific building scheme. The site was sold in January 
1981 subject to the express condition that the defendant would obtain permission to develop the 
site according to the agreed scheme. The defendant agreed to a specific contract clause that he 
would develop the site according to the agreed scheme. However, after the sale he obtained fresh 
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permission to develop the site in such a way that he could build more houses. The site turned out to 
be more profitable than it would have been under the agreed scheme. The defendant committed 
deliberate breach of contract. However, the plaintiffs decided not seek an order for specific 
performance of the contract. Instead, after the defendant had sold the site, they sought damages 
equal to the payment that might have been extracted from the defendant in return for agreed 
modifications to the covenants so as to authorize the more profitable development which had in fact 
been carried out. The defendant recognized he committed breach of contract, but argued that 
damages were meant to compensate any loss of the plaintiffs, which were only nominal. He refused 
to pay damages only because he made more profit by breaching the contract without causing any 
damage to the plaintiff. The High Court of Justice only awarded nominal damages.   
The victim of the breach argues that the aspect of the deliberateness of the breach should be taken 
into account in the assessment of damages, because the party in breach should not profit from his 
deliberate wrongdoing. The victim argues that if he only received ‘conventional’ damages, he might 
lose his bargaining power.  At this point, the victim connects the claim for a higher amount of 
damages than ‘conventional’ damages to the availability of the remedy of specific performance: 
“Damages for loss of bargaining power can be awarded if – but only if – the party in breach could 
have been restrained by injunction from committing the breach of contract or compelled by specific 
performance to perform the contract. Where no such possibility existed, there was no bargaining 
power in reality and no right to damages for loss of it. Hence, damages for loss of bargaining power 
cannot be awarded where there is (for example) a contract for the sale of goods or (generally) a 
contract of employment.”313 
This element is essential, because it becomes clear in a real case that eventual deliberateness of the 
breach can be connected to a claim for specific performance, which in its turn may influence the level 
of damages, because the bargaining power is seriously affected by the eventual availability of specific 
performance as a remedy. The loss of bargaining power is materialized in a claim for account of 
profits of the party supposedly committing deliberate breach. The victim of the breach attempts to 
obtain access to restitutionary damages, because of the deliberateness of the breach.  
However, the loss of bargaining power as a legal relevant element of loss is not recognized by Dillon 
LJ who denies this argument: 
“I find difficulty with that because in theory every time there is a breach of contract the injured party 
is deprived of his 'bargaining power' to negotiate for a financial consideration a variation of the 
contract which would enable the party who wants to depart from its terms to do what he wants to 
do. In addition it has been held in Walford v Miles [1992] 1 All ER 453, [1992] 2 AC 128 that an 
agreement to negotiate is not an animal known to the law and a duty to negotiate in good faith is 
unworkable in practice--and so I find it difficult to see why loss of bargaining or negotiating power 
should become an established factor in the assessment of damages for breach of contract.”314 
Even more elaborate and negatively towards the concept of introducing motive as a relevant 
element in the law of (contract) damages is Lord Steyn: 
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“Despite Sir William's disclaimer it seems to me that the acceptance of the propositions formulated 
by him will inevitably mean that the focus will be on the motive of the party who committed the 
breach of contract. That is contrary to the general approach of our law of contract and, in particular, 
to rules governing the assessment of damages.(…) The introduction of restitutionary remedies to 
deprive cynical contract breakers of the fruits of their breaches of contract will lead to greater 
uncertainty in the assessment of damages in commercial and consumer disputes. It is of paramount 
importance that the way in which disputes are likely to be resolved by the courts must be readily 
predictable. Given the premise that the aggrieved party has suffered no loss, is such a dramatic 
extension of restitutionary remedies justified in order to confer a windfall in each case on the 
aggrieved party? I think not.”315 
In other words, the Surrey case seems to deny the possibility to claim account of profits under 
English law even in the case of deliberate breach.316  
4.7.3  English law II: Attorney General v Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd, third party) 
Although the Surrey case does not create an opening for deliberate breach influencing the court to 
apply a restitutionary remedy in the form of account of profits, English law since then seems to have 
slightly changed its position, not only with regard to account of profits as an available remedy in 
contract, but also with regard to the factor of deliberateness influencing the availability of account of 
profits. A first indication can be found in a case which is already mentioned in section 4.2.2b, the 
Argyll case. In the Court of Appeal case Millett LJ says in the last paragraph of his opinion: 
“Withholding equitable relief does not, of course, mean that a covenant to keep a shop open could 
safely be ignored. The covenant would sound in damages; such damages could be substantial; and it 
is an open question whether in an appropriate case they might not include an element of what are 
sometimes – I believe erroneously – called restitutionary damages.”317 
Millett LJ seems to suggest that in an ‘appropriate case’ the victim of deliberate breach has access to 
account of profits as form of – apparently – compensatory damages. However, although he mentions 
the deliberateness of the breach as a signal (“safely ignoring a covenant”), he does not elaborate on 
the exact role of this element in the decision to award the victim more damages. Moreover, he does 
not explain what he means with restitutionary damages, which may not be called as such and why 
these damages seem to be compensatory to his opinion.   
In the landmark Blake case, which appeared a few years later, the House of Lords did not shut the 
doors for taking into account motives as a factor of relevance in the decision to award account of 
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profits. The reason for its landmark status is as mentioned earlier nevertheless the fact that the 
House of Lords for the first time recognized account of profits as a legitimate source of damages for 
the victim of breach of contract.  The facts of the case were quite special, so the applicability of the 
decision of the House of Lords on the treatment of deliberate wrongdoing in contractual situations in 
general should not be exaggerated. Blake had been an employee of the British Secret Intelligent 
Service between 1944 and 1961. However, from 1951 on, Blake worked for the Soviet Union as a spy. 
In 1961 he was convicted for spying, but in 1966 he escaped from prison and fled to the Soviet 
Union. Before he became an agent for the British Intelligence Service he signed a contract and 
promised not to divulge any official information gained as a result of the employment, either in the 
press or in book form. In 1989 Blake wrote his biography, by which date the information disclosed 
was not considered confidential, damaging to the public interest. The publisher agreed to pay Blake £ 
150,000. However, after publication in 1990, the Attorney-General started legal proceedings against 
Blake. At this moment, Blake had received £ 60.000. The Attorney-General was determined to 
prevent payment of the rest of the amount by reclaiming the whole amount as account of profits.318 
These facts do not a priori disclose an intention to breach the contract of several decades ago. Blake 
breached the duty of confidentiality in those days. The question remains if confidentiality still 
operates, if the presumed confidential information is not really relevant any longer. As Blake did not 
ask permission, which would have been slightly surprising after having lived in the Soviet Union for 
more than 20 years, the breach may still be considered deliberate. However, one could not avoid the 
thought that the spying activities from several decades ago influenced the idea of self-evidence of 
the deliberateness of the breach in 1990. The claim was dismissed in first instance and by the Court 
of Appeal. 
It is interesting, that Lord Nicholls does not qualify account of profits as a claim of damages, but as a 
specific monetary remedy. 319Although account of profits has an official remedial status since this 
case has been decided, the precise consequences for a deliberate breach of contract situation are 
not clear. The restrictions formulated by Lord Nicholls, combined with the exceptional facts of the 
case suggest a careful approach to any generalization of the judgment, especially because Lord 
Nicholls explicitly limits the sole influence of the nature of the breach on any change in remedial 
relief: 
“Lord Woolf MR (one of the Lord Justices in this case before the Court of Appeal, MvK) also suggested 
three facts which should not be a sufficient ground for departing from the normal basis on which 
damages are awarded: the fact that the beach was cynical and deliberate; the fact that the breach 
enabled the defendant to enter into a more profitable contract elsewhere; and the fact that by 
entering into a new and more profitable contract the defendant put it out of his power to perform 
his contract with the plaintiff. I agree that none of these facts would be, by itself, a good reason for 
ordering an account of profits.”320 
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Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough dissents, partly because he thinks that the account of profits route 
is chosen to punish Blake and that is not what remedies in contract should be about according to 
him: 
“The answer given by my noble and learned friend does not reflect the essentially punitive nature of 
the claim and seeks to apply principles of law which are only appropriate where commercial or 
proprietary interests are involved. Blake has made a financial gain but he has not done so at the 
expense of the Crown or making use of any property of or commercial interest of the Crown either in 
law or equity.”321 
Furthermore, Lord Hobhouse argues that the claim should not be allowed on restitutionary grounds, 
because the equitable jurisdiction which governs restitutionary interests already offers a range of 
remedies, which the Crown for some reason chose not to seek. If the Crown had sought to prevent 
publication by way of injunction, he would probably have succeeded, but they should not have the 
possibility to repair their own conduct by relying on this ‘new’ remedy. Furthermore, the classical 
notion of damages does not apply either, because damages are a substitute for performance. This 
traditional view does not allow account of profits as a basis for damages.322 
4.7.4  English law III: Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc. and another 
The Blake case is a landmark case for the award of account of profits in breach of contract cases in 
general. For the specific position of deliberate breach, the Blake case is relevant, because the House 
of Lords acknowledges the phenomenon of deliberate breach, but not as a basis for the award of 
account of profits. The more recent case of Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc. and another 
shows a new attempt to connect deliberateness to account of profits.323  
PPX as a producer concluded an agreement with Hendrix which bound him to PPX and ordered him 
to play and record a certain amount of tracks per year for PPX. Hendrix and, after his death in 1970, 
his estate, claimed that this was a too harsh agreement. PPX and the estate concluded a settlement 
in 1973 about the rights of PPX to the mastertapes and the royalties paid to the estate. According to 
the settlement PPX had only licensing rights to a limited amount of mastertapes. On all other tapes, 
PPX should ask the estate for permission if it wanted to grant licenses and agree upon a new royalty 
fee. From 1973 PPX sold licenses for tapes of doubtful quality and licenses without having obtained 
permission of the estate, all against the agreement made in 1973. The estate’s lawyer was aware of 
the breaches, but no claim was filed until halfway the nineties. The manager of PPX claimed to be the 
one who had discovered Hendrix and alleged that he had therefore justified reasons to exploit the 
musical legacy of Hendrix the way he chose to do. The estate filed a claim against the granting of 
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licenses to two companies in 1995 and 1999. In first instance, the court ordered PPX to perform the 
agreement correctly, but dismissed any claim of damages and/or account of profits. The Court of 
Appeal had to decide on this matter. 
The Court of Appeal refers to the Blake case and repeats that only under extraordinary circumstances 
a claim for account of profits can be awarded. All opinions recognize that PPX commits deliberate 
breach, but they do not deem the deliberateness of the breach as sufficiently ‘extraordinary’ to 
award the claim for account of profits. Peter Gibson LJ formulates the reluctant attitude as follows: 
“No doubt deliberate breaches of contract occur frequently in the commercial world; yet something 
more is needed to make the circumstances exceptional enough to justify ordering an account of 
profits, particularly when another remedy is available.”324 
This assessment of the legal reality is not without relevance. Peter Gibson LJ not only recognizes the 
breach by PPX as deliberate, but he also states that deliberate breaches occur frequently in the 
commercial world. It is not clear whether he justifies the ‘normality’ of deliberate breach – and the 
subsequent refusal of the award of account of profits – by referring to the fact that deliberate breach 
frequently occurs.  
Mance LJ also stated that the Hendrix case was a commercial one, where no state or other 
confidentiality interests played a role.  Furthermore, awarding a full account of profits would be quite 
a large step beyond any compensatory function of damages, because in the case any agreement on 
licensing all mastertapes had been concluded, the estate would have negotiated for a reasonable 
royalty fee. This fee would only have been a percentage of the profits PPX had made. According to 
Mance LJ, such a remedy would not fit in a commercial setting. Nevertheless, the party committing 
deliberate breach which gained profit for him, should not get away without any account towards the  
original creditor. Consequently, Mance LJ chose to follow the decision in the Wrotham case. The 
applicable remedy can be considered as compensatory, namely as a loss of bargain. The applicable 
test is, whether both parties had concluded a settlement about granting a license in the particular 
two cases concerned, what the royalty fee would have been.325 This test is a hypothetical exercise, 
and in more than one way. It is hypothetical, because it has never happened, but it is also 
hypothetical, because it is very unlikely that the estate would have ever considered concluding a 
settlement about all tapes available. Mance LJ has not overlooked this problem and he gives due 
consideration to the consequences of this double hypotheticality. Although he does not want to 
elaborate on the outcome of the hypothetical negotiations, he assumes that the percentage would 
have been considerably larger than the percentage agreed upon in the settlement. By increasing the 
potential loss of bargain, the factual unwillingness to conclude a bargain is taken into account.  
In conclusion, the attitude of English law towards account of profits as a remedy in case of breach of 
contract is a difficult one, whereas the clear recognition of the remedy of account of profits as a 
result of deliberate breach is even more difficult. In addition, it should be emphasized that in English 
legal doctrine the position of disgorgement of profits as a contractual remedy has been thoroughly 
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debated as well, but a clear link with deliberate breach of contract has only been mentioned, though 
not clearly accepted.326 
4.7.5  US law I: Earthinfo, Inc v. Hydrosphere  Resource Consultants, Inc.327 
Disgorging profits from the party committing breach of contract is possible in US law, but it is not an 
easily accessible remedy for the aggrieved party. The question in this subsection is whether 
deliberateness – in common US language, willfulness – of the breach may help the aggrieved party to 
claim disgorgement of profits. First, a case law example shows that current law may connect 
disgorgement and willfulness of the breach. Second, developments in legal scholarship show a 
tendency to acknowledge the link between willfulness and disgorgement more firmly. The 
development of this debate seems to be confirmed by a quite sharply formulated provision in a Draft 
Restatement on unjust enrichment which will also be briefly explored. 
The Earthinfo case concerned a contract between Earthinfo and Hydrosphere. Hydrosphere 
developed certain products for a predecessor of Earthinfo. Earthinfo used the technology in its own 
products and paid Hydrosphere royalties for the use of a range of specifically mentioned products 
developed by Hydrosphere. In the course of time, Hydrosphere claimed royalties for a derivative 
product, not mentioned on the original list. Earthinfo refused to pay royalties for a new product and 
also refused to pay all royalties for the products mentioned on the list, apparently because Earthinfo 
did not trust the way Hydrosphere calculated the royalties. This dispute led to litigation and parties 
wanted to rescind the contract. As a result of the rescission, Earthinfo had to return all the 
technology, but the trial court also awards a claim for full payment of realized profits after the 
breach of contract by Earthinfo. For this section, the only relevant issue is that the Supreme Court of 
Colorado had to decide whether Hydrosphere could claim at least a part of the profits made by 
Earthinfo, because they used products developed by Hydrosphere. One could say that in this case, 
the account  of profits is a result of the remedy rescission. In this case, disgorgement of profits does 
seems to be a form of damages after rescission, although the Supreme Court does not seem to pay 
attention to this particular issue. 
The court starts by comparing principles of expectation damages and restitution: 
“If, on breach, the injured party's lost expectation equals or exceeds the gain by the party in breach, 
then damages based on expectation strip the party in breach of all gain, and make the injured party 
whole. But if the injured party's lost expectation is less than the gain realized by the party in breach, 
then damages based on expectation do not strip the party in breach of all gain. This situation brings 
the two principles into conflict.”328 
The question for this subsection is whether willfulness of the breach may force the party in breach to 
pay the realized profits above the level of expectation damages. The first question is whether the 
Supreme Court assesses the particular breach as willful. It does: 
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“We agree that EarthInfo must be required to disgorge the profits it accrued as a result of its breach 
since its breach was conscious and substantial.”329 
The court in this case uses the terms ‘conscious’ and ‘substantial’. The first one may be equalized 
with willful in this case in the light of the whole decision, whereas the term ‘substantial’ refers to the 
doctrine of material breach and substantial performance. The quotation of the court also reveals the 
outcome of the decision, because it says that disgorgement of profits is awarded. The second step to 
be made is how the court comes to this conclusion. The court repeats a principle of US law that 
disgorgement of profits is not available in case of a mere breach of contract. A breach should be 
more ‘upgraded’ in a certain way to open the door for disgorgement. The court explains how: 
“If, however, the defendant's wrongdoing is intentional or substantial, or there are no other means 
of measuring the wrongdoer's enrichment, recovery of profits may be granted.”330 
Again, another synonym is used, but the court refers to the breach being intentional in order to make 
account of profits available for the aggrieved party. The connection between the remedy of account 
of profits and deliberateness of the breach is openly acknowledged and applied in practice. 
4.7.6  US law II: appraisal and criticism on the Draft Third Restatement: deliberate breach 
directly and firmly connected to disgorgement 
The exploration in this chapter on signs in current and existing law on the acknowledgement of 
deliberate breach as an independent legal phenomenon with its own, specific legal consequences has 
not been very fruitful so far. Sometimes, deliberate breach has been recognized as a manifestation of 
breach, but a clear and direct connection to a special remedial regime has not been found, let alone 
encouraged.  
This section shows that US law plans to introduce a straightforward connection between deliberate 
breach – in US terms in this case ‘opportunistic’ breach – and disgorgement of profits.331 The most 
direct source of this section is the Tentative Draft Third Restatement of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment, in which a § 39 is incorporated. The Restatement should be a guideline and a basis for 
the state of the law in a specific area. Although not embodied with a formal status, a Restatement is 
an authoritative source. The Third Restatement has still a Draft status, but nevertheless it represents 
the line of thinking of US law on restitutionary measures. The explicit recognition of the relevance of 
the breach received appraisal and criticism in various academic contributions. Without elaborating 
too much on the individual contributions, it is relevant to notice that a difference in approach 
between English and US law seems to be traced, because English attitude towards disgorgement in 
breach of contract seems to more reluctant. 
Although it is a long provision, it is relevant to quote § 39 in full: 
“§ 39. Profit Derived from Opportunistic Breach 
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1. If a breach of contract is both material and opportunistic, the injured promisee has a claim in 
restitution to the profit realized by the defaulting promisor as a result of the breach. Liability in 
restitution with disgorgement of profit is an alternative to liability for contract damages measured by 
injury to the promisee. 
2. A breach is "opportunistic" if 
a) the breach is deliberate; 
b) the breach is profitable by the test of subsection (3); 
and 
c) the promisee's right to recover damages for the breach affords inadequate protection to the 
promisee's contractual entitlement. In determining the adequacy of damages for this purpose, 
(i) damages are ordinarily an adequate remedy if they can be used to acquire a full equivalent to the 
promised performance in a substitute transaction; 
and 
(ii) damages are ordinarily an inadequate remedy if they cannot be used to acquire a full equivalent 
to the promised performance in a substitute transaction. 
3. A breach is "profitable" when it results in gains to the defaulting promisor (net of potential liability 
in damages) greater than the promisor would have realized from performance of the contract. Profits 
from breach include saved expenditure and consequential gains that the defaulting promisor would 
not have realized but for the breach. The amount of such profits must be proved with reasonable 
certainty. 
4. Disgorgement by the rule of this Section will be denied 
(a) if the parties’ agreement authorizes the promisor to choose between performance of the contract 
and a remedial alternative such as payment of liquidated damages; or  
(b)to the extent that disgorgement would result in an inappropriate windfall to the promise, or 
would otherwise be inequitable in a particular case.”332 
Before analyzing several comments on this provision, it is necessary to put this provision into the 
perspective of this chapter and the research so far. This provision contains the first – albeit  in a draft 
Restatement – semi-official definition of opportunistic breach. The term ‘willful’ is avoided, but a first 
step towards unanimity on the term has been made. Opportunistic breach should be deliberate and 
‘profitable’. The definition is comparable to the working definition of deliberate breach of contract 
provided in Chapter 3 of this thesis.333 Nevertheless, the added requirement in subsection 3 also 
includes a difference. The remedy of disgorgement is limited to the cases where expectation 
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damages as a remedy are not adequate. The wording of this additional requirement is an important 
one, because the limitation is the one which is the clearest deviation from classic thinking in the law 
of contractual damages. This requirement allows the remedy of disgorgement replacing the remedy 
of expectation damages, but nothing is said on an eventual upper limit based on the maximum of 
expectation damages. This way of introducing disgorgement as a monetary remedy means that the 
remedy is not a subsection of expectation damages – in other words as another way of calculating 
expectation damages. This section means a total breach with the Holmesian approach towards the 
law of contract. Not only is the absolute limit of expectation damages abandoned, but the idea 
behind distinguishing opportunistic breach from other breach of contract in fact emphasizes that the 
contract itself is valued differently than the financial value of the obligation concerned. The real 
impact of this section depends on the definition of opportunistic breach. The attentive reader also 
sees that the problem of evidence, which has been signaled in Chapter 3, is partly tackled. Instead of 
proving deliberateness or opportunism as an internal state of mind – which has been defined in 
objective terms: material breach, profitable breach and the limitation in subsection 3 – it is now 
relevant for the aggrieved party to prove the breach to be ‘profitable’. Although the term ‘profitable’ 
is not dependent on a state of mind and therefore in theory easier to prove, in practice, this 
requirement may cause sufficient difficulty for the aggrieved party, because the aggrieved party does 
not always know the exact reasons behind non-performance. 
A supporter of this new approach is Roberts, who extensively wrote on the application of 
disgorgement of profits in the law of contract. In several contributions she defended the new 
approach towards the law of remedies and she connected the new approach to an ethical 
revaluation of the contract. The consequences for the role of the law of contract are large. According 
to Roberts, 
“this section is breathtaking in its potential transformation of the traditional contractual landscape 
from a choice model of contract law to a perspective that values keeping promises and condemns 
certain breaches. Condemnation may support the aims deterrence and punishment, conventional 
goals for criminal and tort law but foreign to contract law. The choice model emphasizes individual 
freedom to choose behavior including contract breach, without fear of punishment.”334 
Roberts defends the new approach by emphasizing the need for certainty for parties. If parties agree 
to conclude a contract, they must be able to count on the intrinsic will of the parties to perform. A 
system which allows parties to – financially – escape from performance if they choose to do so does 
not pay sufficient tribute to the instrument of contract. Roberts chooses for a moral approach to 
defend the new § 39. 
Not everyone, however, hails the introduction of restitutionary remedies in the law of contract as a 
desirable development. Campbell strongly disagrees with the new attitude which proposes a new 
stability for the contract and a re-establishment of the moral importance of performance of the 
contract connected to the introduction of restitutionary remedies.335 It should be emphasized that 
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Campbell predominantly criticizes the development from the perspective of English law. His most 
important criticism is the view of breach as a wrong. According to this opinion, the Blake case caused 
many problems, because no unanimous line could be found which dealt coherently with the type of 
breach which should be remedied by disgorgement. A further criticism is that the new § 39 seems to 
consider expectation damages as an amoral remedy. Campbell argues that expectation damages 
should be considered as the highest standard of a moral remedy, because they institutionalize the 
cooperative response to breach that it is at the heart of the success of the law of contract. He 
supports his view by referring to the fundamentally cooperative nature of the law of contract. This 
conception of the law of contract has paradoxically been blurred by the strongest supporters of the 
remedy of expectation damages, namely the supporters of efficient breach of contract, because they 
present the law of contract as a primarily egocentric system.336 It is clear that Campbell writes his 
contribution with the Blake case in the back of his mind. This case indeed hardly provides concrete 
information on the availability of disgorgement of profits as a remedy for breach of contract and the 
case is explicit on the sole factor of deliberateness on the potential availability: there is none. This 
state of English law leads to the systematical conclusion of Campbell that disgorgement of profits as 
a contractual remedy is not a logical part of the law of restitution. 
The last word has not been spoken on this development. This chapter and this thesis are not the 
place to criticize individual authors on their opinion on the relevance of deliberateness and § 39 of 
the Draft Third Restatement. In order to do so, like Campbell does, each author deserves lots of 
attention and it would not fit into the structure of this chapter. The developments in the common 
law on the remedy of disgorgement of profits at least show that deliberate breach of contracts is a 
phenomenon which receives structural attention. 
4.7.7  Dutch law: Huurder/Stichting Ymere 
Art. 6:104 BW mentions account of profits in the section of the Civil Code on damages, though in a 
limited way: 
“If a person who is liable towards another on the ground of a tort or of a failure in performance of an 
obligation has derived proftis from that tort or failure, the court may assess the damage, upon the 
demand of such other person, at the amount of such profit or at a part thereof.”337   
The provision does not recognize the relevance of deliberateness as an element to award a particular 
type of damages. Nevertheless, the comments of the lawmaker on the provision explicitly mention 
that the degree of ‘culpability’ can be relevant for the court to use its discretionary powers.338 
Nevertheless, it should be remarked that the lawmaker explicitly aimed at covering specific cases, 
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such as for example an employee gaining profits due to violation of a non-competition clause. The 
Dutch law of damages formulated in the Civil Code, including art. 6:104 BW, is applicable to the law 
of contract as well as to the law of torts. This provision is therefore certainly not specifically written 
to cover contract law cases. The influence of this provision should not be exaggerated. This provision 
is not meant to be an alternative or an addition to compensatory damages. Damages can be 
estimated on the basis of account of profits as a form of compensatory damages if the court allows 
the aggrieved party to this claim. In other words, the victim of the breach cannot claim account of 
profits when he did not suffer  any damages.339 
Whereas the lawmakers and the doctrine are clear on the position of account of profits as a concrete 
application of compensation, but nothing more340, case law may shed some more light on the 
relevance of the behavior of the breaching party as far as the remedy of account of profits is 
concerned. This may be done by considering this remedy, but also in deciding the extent of the 
damages. Recent examples are the cases of Huurder Stichting Ymere and Setel NV/AVR Holding.341 In 
the first case, the housing corporation Ymere owns many buildings in the city of Amsterdam for 
potential tenants. In the contracts between tenants and Ymere subletting by the tenants is 
prohibited. Because there is an enormous shortage in living space in Amsterdam, many tenants 
nevertheless sublet their homes for amounts of money which are double or triple the rent they owe 
to Ymere. In other words, the tenants accrue large profits, although they deliberately commit breach 
of contract. Ymere starts proceedings and claims damages for breach of contract. Ymere claims the 
account of profits the tenant obtained during the period of subletting.  
The first question is whether Ymere may claim account of profits as a form of expectation damages. 
Expectation damages, as explained earlier, should bring Ymere financially in the state as if the breach 
would not have taken place. Ymere claims all the profits made by the defendant. However, as the 
court in first instance says, that is not a right way of applying the hypothetical ‘what if’ test. In that 
case, as the courts reasons, the defendant would have cancelled the contract once he left the house. 
The corporation would have let the house to another tenant. Due to the general increase of rent, 
Ymere could have concluded a new contract with a new tenant against a higher price. According to 
the court of first instance, damages should be calculated on the basis of the difference between the 
estimated new rent and the rent actually received. According to this line of reasoning, Ymere should 
have claimed expectation damages. The calculation of missed profits is only a method which may be 
helpful to calculate the compensatory damages of the aggrieved party. The court of first instance 
awards a part of the claim of Ymere. 
Nevertheless, Ymere claimed the whole account of profits again in appeal. The Court of Appeal does 
not follow the argument of the court of first in instance. The Court of Appeal argues that the damage 
suffered by Ymere cannot be established as easily as the court of first instance considers, because 
Ymere also incurs costs in order to track down the practice of illegal subletting. Because it is difficult 
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to calculate the exact size of the damage, damages may be estimated at the size of the accrued 
profits of the illegal subletting. 
The Hoge Raad follows the Court of Appeal, but adds a few statements of his own. The Hoge Raad 
confirms that account of profits should be considered as a form of calculation of damages. The Hoge 
Raad seems to deny the possibility that account of profits can also be as an alternative for 
expectation damages, in the sense that it may replace expectation damages. This starting point on 
the one hand means that account of profits as a way of calculating damages may be available, even 
though the concrete level of damage cannot exactly be established. On the other hand, the creditor 
must show an indication that he suffered at least some damage.342  
The Hoge Raad emphasizes that account of profits is not a measure with a punitive character, not 
even partly.343 If the level of profits largely oversteps the loss of the creditor, the court may establish 
the level of damages on a part of the profits gained by the debtor. Because account of profits is not a 
separate remedy, the same requirements for ‘normal’ expectation damages apply which are all 
discussed in section 6.1.10 of the Civil Code. The Hoge Raad explicitly mentions art. 6:98 Civil Code, 
which implicitly includes the degree of fault as a relevant factor to establish whether a specific type 
of loss should be recovered as damages.344 In this case, the Hoge Raad considers that for application 
of the remedy of account of profits a specific level of fault is not required. Nevertheless, the court 
may take into account the level of fault as a relevant factor when he decides to apply art. 6:104 BW 
at all and when he decides whether to award he whole account of profits or only a part. 
Finally, the court argues that a reasonable relation between the concrete damage and the level of 
profits is not a necessary requirement, just because this remedy should be used when the damage 
can only be estimated. Again, the Hoge Raad repeats the sentence on the possibility of the court to 
limit the awarded amount in the case of an obvious disbalance between damage and profits. 
4.7.8  Concluding remarks 
Section 4.7 describes the connection between deliberateness and the award of account of profits in 
case law, but also in academic developments.  In current case law, a connection is still hard to 
establish, though hints of development in several jurisdictions are visible. However, in exploring the 
developments in legal scholarship. In US law, this section struck a ‘goldmine’. The draft of the Third 
Restatement on unjust enrichment reveals a very explicit link between deliberate breach and the 
award of disgorgement of profits. In English law the Blake case offers an implicit connection between 
deliberateness and the remedy of account of profits, though the case has its own peculiarities and it 
is questionable whether a general rule can be derived from the case in this sense. Dutch law only 
recognizes a limited applicability of account of profits in the first place, holding via art. 6:104 that 
account of profits can be nothing more than calculation of damages and not a replacement of 
compensatory damages. If the aggrieved party suffered no losses, account of profits cannot be 
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awarded according to Dutch law. Although the link between deliberateness and account of profits is 
not mentioned in the Ymere case, the facts of the case lead to a careful conclusion that 
deliberateness may trigger the court relatively easy to award account of profits. 
4.8  Deliberateness and (partial) termination 
4.8.1  Introductory remarks 
The question is whether the law c.q. the courts pay attention to the deliberateness of the breach 
when parties invoke the remedy of termination. In many legal systems, a creditor who wants to 
terminate the contract, should prove that the breach is somewhat more serious than a common 
breach. This threshold is frequently mentioned as the fundamental breach or a similar qualification. 
This section especially focuses on the question whether deliberate breach is a fundamental breach 
or, slightly more modest, whether deliberateness of the breach is a factor to label a breach as 
fundamental. Several examples show that such an explicit link may indeed be established.345  
4.8.2  US law: deliberateness and material breach; a few case law examples 
In US law a connection can be established between termination of the contract and potential 
deliberateness of the breach. It is slightly tricky to mention this particular legal manifestation under 
the header of termination, because the common law approaches this issue somewhat differently, 
namely as a problem of restitution. As section 4.2 has shown, US  law recognizes the doctrine of 
substantial performance. If performance is deemed to be substantial, but not complete, a party is 
nevertheless able to claim payment or recovery on the basis of the contract. If a party does not 
substantially perform a contract and commits breach of contract, he is generally not allowed to claim 
restitution of eventual benefits conferred on the other party due to the partial performance. For 
example, a buyer partially pays the sum provided in the contract, but defaults on the whole payment 
without receiving the good. He sues the seller for recovery of the part payment. In the old days, such 
a request was denied. A comparable situation arises when a defaulting employee sues the employer 
for the benefits conferred on him due to the work the employee had performed. The Supreme Court 
of Massachusetts states in 1824: 
“It will not admit of the monstrous absurdity that a man may voluntarily and without cause violate 
his agreement, and make the very breach of that agreement the foundation of an action which he 
could not maintain under it.”346 
However, the Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire took a very different view on this 
matter in the case of Britton v. Turner. In this case in the area of labor law, employee Britton had 
agreed to work for Turner for a year for 120 dollars, but defaulted without cause after 10 months. 
According to the court, the traditional view would entail that part performance may be worse for the 
breaching debtor than total non-performance, because in the first case the debtor attempted to 
perform, but did not succeed, whereas he receives nothing from the benefit conferred on the other 
party. In the second case, the breaching party does not act and he does not receive. The court 
concludes: 
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“If a party actually receives labor, or materials, and thereby derives a benefit and advantage, over 
and above the damage which has resulted from the breach of the contract by the other party, (…) the 
law thereupon raises a promise to pay to the extent of the reasonable worth of such excess.”347 
This decision has been followed, but the question was raised whether it is not only applicable in 
personal service contracts. Nevertheless, in, building contracts as well as contracts where sale of 
goods or sale of land is at stake, courts have also reluctantly recognized the possibility that the 
breaching party may recover a sum as restitution.348 
This figure could be compared with the continental notion of the consequences of termination. 
These consequences are generally that the obligations arising from the terminated contract should 
be made undone by the parties.349  
This background is necessary to introduce the relevance of deliberateness. The question arises 
whether the breaching party retains a right to a form of restitution once he deliberately commits 
breach of contract. In this type of situation, the deliberate breach occurs by deliberately performing 
the obligation in an incorrect way. 
In US law, this question raised problems. Some courts denied restitution to the party in breach, 
because the breach was willful instead of accidental or negligent.350 Other courts declined to include 
the quality of the breach as a relevant factor to decide whether restitution should be allowed.351 As 
Farnsworth states, the argument for taking into account of the quality of the breach is stronger when 
the claim is for payment of the value of some benefit conferred by the party in breach than when it is 
for the return of money paid. The reason is that allowing restitution in the former case imposes on 
the injured party both an obligation different from the one for which that party bargained and the 
burden of proving damages resulting from the breach.352 
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The already mentioned notion of material breach sounds familiar, because it reminds the European 
lawyer of the notion of fundamental breach in for example the DCFR, the PECL, the PICC and the 
CISG. The question immediately arises what exactly amounts to ‘materiality’. To a large extent, as 
was also the case in order to determine the notion of substantial performance, parties can decide for 
themselves which breach is material and which is not. However, the question remains when parties 
fail to determine which potential breach is material and which is not. According to Calamari and 
Perillo, materiality of the breach depends on a potential range of factors. One of the factors, they 
mention is the following: 
“A willful breach is more likely to be regarded as material than as a breach caused by negligence or 
by extraneous circumstances”. 353 
A good example is a Wisconsin case, in which Greyhound, a major public transport company willfully 
terminated a deal with a building company about restructuring a bus terminal. The Court found that  
“Greyhound acted in bad faith materially breached an repudiated the Exchange Agreement when it 
decided to “undo the deal” in March 1982”.354  
It seems that the factor of willfulness plays a role in the decision of the court to label the breach as 
material, especially because the Court also refers to the contract itself and considers that Greyhound 
may rely on various reasons not to agree with the plan of the building company according to the 
contract. However, the contract does not provide that Greyhound may terminate the contract 
merely because it determines that this would be financially beneficial.355 
Another example of the connection between deliberateness of the breach and termination is the 
case of Wasserburger v. American Scientific Chemical, INC. et al.356Wasserburger was a salesman 
working for American Scientific, selling products to United Medical Laboratories. The oral contract 
between Wasserburger and American Scientific foresaw in payment of a commission of a certain 
amount of money for every order United would place at American Scientific. Two problems arose in 
the course of time. The first was that American Scientific contended that part  of the contract was 
the duty of Wasserburger to find more clients. Wasserburger more or less admitted he did not put in 
much effort to find new clients contrary to the contractual obligation. The second point was that 
several problems arose with payments. Wasserburger thought he received his payments too late. As 
a consequence, Wasserburger started to work for another employer and persuaded United to buy 
the same products from his new employer. United notified American Scientific about the new 
contracts and the role of Wasserburger.  Thereupon, American Scientific terminated the contract 
with Wasserburger. The issue of the case was that United for a certain period of time still bought 
products from American Scientific after the termination of the contract between Wasserburger and 
American Scientific and before United entered into a contract with the new supplier. American 
Scientific did not pay commission to Wasserburger for the deliveries in this period of time. 
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Wasserburger filed a case and argued that the he had a right to payment of commission after 
termination, because the deliveries would not have been possible without the previous effort of 
Wasserburger, in other words that he substantially performed his obligations.  
The Supreme Court of Oregon decides that the breach of Wasserburger is deliberate or willful and 
material on both points. Wasserburger did not seek other clients as he was supposed to do and the 
attempt to persuade United into a contract with his new employer is even a clearer sign of willful 
breach. The consequence of willful breach for the contractual claim of Wasserburger is not entirely 
clear, because a claim for recovery is only possible if Wasserburger substantially performed his 
obligations. According to the court, he did not, because he committed a material breach. As we have 
seen, willfulness may be a factor to conclude that a breach is material, but it is not the only factor. 
Nevertheless, the court seems to derive the materiality of the breach especially from the willfulness 
of the conduct of Wasserburger. 
The influence of willfulness of the breach seems to be present in a more visible way. The claim of 
Wasserburger to receive the commission for the deliveries after termination can also be based on a 
quasi-contractual claim for payment of commission, because American Scientific should pay some of 
its profits to Wasserburger, because he would not have earned the profits without Wasserburgers 
effort. Wasserburger would have a right to recovery of the value of the work performed, but only if 
the breach is not willful. Unfortunately, the court only alleges that there is substantial evidence that 
the breach was willful, but it does not conclude anything on the denial of the claim, because the trial 
court in first instance did not pursue this matter, because the plaintiff then did not sue on a quasi- 
contractual basis. 
In conclusion, it is clear that US law recognizes willfulness of the breach as a relevant element in 
establishing material breach. The question whether breach is material is important to assess the 
access of the aggrieved party to the remedy of termination and there are serious traces in US case 
law which acknowledge the relevance of willfulness in connection to the requirement of ‘materiality’. 
4.8.3  Deliberate breach and termination in a convergent soft law vehicle: the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference 
If the DCFR is to be considered as a result of comparative research it is not remarkable that the 
notion ‘deliberate breach’ turns up in several places in the provisions of the DCFR, because in several 
influential civil codes, the element of deliberateness returns in their provisions.357 In the DCFR, the 
synonym used for ‘deliberate’ is ‘intentional’. With respect to remedies in contract there are two key 
provisions where the intent of the party committing breach is relevant. The first one is on 
termination of the contract.  Art. III.3:502 DCFR states the following: 
“(1) A creditor may terminate if the debtor’s non-performance of a contractual obligation is 
fundamental. 
  (2) A non-performance of a contractual obligation is fundamental if: 
(a) it substantially deprives the creditor of what the creditor was entitled to expect under the 
contract,  as applied to the whole or relevant part of the performance , unless at the time of 
                                                          
357
 Apart from German law, see e.g. the French and Belgian Civil Codes, art. 1150. 
134 
 
conclusion of the contract the debtor did not foresee and could not reasonably expected  to have 
foreseen that result; or 
(b) it is intentional or reckless and gives the creditor reason to believe that the debtor’s future 
performance cannot be relied on.” 
In first instance, the ‘fundamental’ requirement of the remedy of termination only seems connected 
with the lack of performance itself and not with the intention of the debtor committing breach. It is 
possible to deliberately breach a non-fundamental part of the contract and it is also possible to 
unintentionally breach the most important obligation of the contract.  However, section 2b states 
that non-performance is also fundamental, if it is intentional or reckless, but only if the intentional 
non-performance gives the creditor reason to believe that the debtor’s future performance cannot 
be relied on. The comments on this article reveal the meaning of term ‘intentional’ by providing 
several examples.358 The situation whereby A agrees to sell B’s products as a sole distributor and 
where A subsequently also sells C’s product, thereby violating the contract with B, is enough for B to 
terminate the contract on the basis of fundamental non-performance. In this situation, it is not 
relevant that A does not make any additional profits when selling C’s products. His intentional breach 
triggers B to reasonably believe A’s future performance cannot be relied on and that is sufficient.  
However, the additional connection of intention to expected future performance limits the possibility 
of the debtor to rely on termination of the contract. The comments specifically mention an example 
in the area of building and construction contracts, where A intentionally uses another type of brick 
than the one specified in the contract. If B points out the discrepancy and A removes the cheaper 
type of brick and promises to use the proper one in the future, A has no right to terminate, because 
he can rely on proper performance in the future. On the basis of this provision, it is fair to conclude 
that intention of the contract breaker is legally relevant for applying the remedy of termination. The 
consequence of establishing intentional breach is an easier access to the remedy of termination of 
the contract.  
In conclusion, the DCFR pays attention to the motive of the party committing breach, especially 
intentional breach. However, a closer look into these provisions and their background reveals some 
doubts about the value of these provisions for the future. For example, the illustrations clarify the 
purpose of the provisions, but they do not represent real case law. The background notes on the 
different European legal systems do not provide much support for the argument that intent is 
considered to be an important factor playing a role in applying the remedy of termination for breach 
of contract. Secondly, termination of the contract is in many European jurisdictions not considered as 
a remedy which is easily accessible for the creditor. It is generally considered as a last resort 
remedy.359 
Not in every legal system should the non-performance be fundamental, but it is accepted that the 
breach should have an increased level of seriousness in most legal systems. In other words, the 
creditor must overcome a certain threshold to invoke this remedy.   
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4.8.4  Concluding remarks 
This section analyzed the relation between deliberateness and the remedy of termination. The 
analyzed case law provides sufficient ground to consider that deliberateness at least sometimes – 
e.g. in US law and in the DCFR – is a factor to constitute a fundamental or material breach. 
Establishing a fundamental breach is often necessary for a party to invoke the remedy of 
termination. The explicit mentioning of deliberateness by the courts or in legal provisions in this 
respect does not necessarily reveal anything of the overall importance of the factor of deliberateness 
in cases where termination as a contract plays a role. The cited cases and provisions, again, serve as 
illustrations of situations where deliberateness plays a role in current law. 
4.9  Deliberateness and recovering costs for legal representation 
4.9.1  Introductory remarks 
The question to be answered in this section is whether the deliberateness of the breach influences 
the law c.q. the court to award a claim for costs for legal representation. This specific question is 
difficult to answer, because it is tempting to get lost in other debates, which may be interesting, but 
not directly relevant for the answer to this question, such as the question whether costs for legal 
representation should be recoverable at all and if so, under which “heading”. For the purposes of this 
chapter, the relevant issue is whether the deliberateness of the breach may trigger the law c.q. the 
court to incorporate costs for legal representation into the award for damages.  Explicit references to 
this type of connection are not easy to find. At least US law offers an example which illustrates the 
practical relevance of this connection. 
4.9.2  US law:  James T. Wellman et.al. v. Energy Resources Inc.  
In the case James T. Wellman et.al. v. Energy Resources Inc.360 a lease contract for an oil field is 
concluded. Energy Resources promised to drill new wells in a specified period of time and to pay 
royalties to Wellman. However, Energy Resources failed to drill the wells in the specified period of 
time, but instead reopened an old well and extracted some gas out of this well. It also failed to pay 
the required amount of royalties according to the lease contract. After Wellman repeatedly 
requested Energy Resources to fulfill its obligations according to the contract and Energy Resources 
failed to comply with these requests accordingly, the lease contract provided that the contract was 
terminated. Subsequently, Wellman had to regain possession of his own property in order to dispose 
of the oilfield as he wished. The court acknowledged that Energy Resources committed breach of 
contract by not drilling the wells according to the contract and not paying enough royalties. Among 
other claims, Wellman claimed attorney fees as a result of willful breach of contract. The court 
decided in favor of Wellman: 
“This Court has indicated that an award of attorney fees is appropriate where there has been a willful 
breach of contract and where a lessor is forced to take legal action against its lessee to recover 
possession when the lessee improperly holds the lease over after termination.”361 
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Although the award of attorney fees depends on several case specific elements, some sort of general 
rule is also formulated. The termination and the enforced legal action to recover possession are 
relatively simply to prove in this case. However, the court also indicates that the presented facts 
contain sufficient evidence to qualify this type of breach by Energy Resources as willful. The court 
does not bother itself with the question whether Energy Resources had the intrinsic idea to commit 
breach of contract and simply stated that the refusal to drill new wells and the reopening of an old 
well constituted intentional breach of contract. 
It is also interesting to note that the court links the necessity of the aggrieved party to go to court in 
order to establish his property right and the willfulness of the breach. In other words, the idea that 
the party committing willful breach forces the other party to enter legal proceedings under 
circumstances justifies the decision that the aggrieved party need not to pay for this forced legal 
proceedings. In the area of the bad faith breach of insurance companies the court may use a 
comparable line of reasoning. If the insured has a valid claim and the insurer refuses to pay, the 
insured is also forced to enter into legal proceedings in order to claim what he is entitled to. 
4.9.3  Concluding remarks 
This section analyzed a more specific potential connection between deliberateness and the 
possibility to recover costs for legal representation. The issue of claiming costs for legal 
representation is an issue with its own dynamics. Usually, these costs do not automatically qualify as 
expectation damages. Under each jurisdiction specific system, the possibility to claim this kind of 
legal costs is different. The assumption of this section is that the cause of being drawn into legal 
proceedings influences the possibility of claiming the extra costs to be able to participate in legal 
proceedings. At least in the US case law can be found where a claim for recovery of attorney fees 
least partly depends on the willful breach of contract of the “losing” party. 
4.10  An outsider: exclusion clauses limiting liability in a contractual context 
4.10.1  Introductory remarks 
Especially in a commercial context, it is common for parties to attempt to control the consequences 
of breach of contract in advance. An example has been shown in section 4.3, where penalty clauses 
were discussed. Another, perhaps even more common, manifestation of ‘breach’ control is the use of 
exclusion and limitation clauses. As explained in Chapter 2, many variants of this type of clause exist. 
This section briefly explores the potential influence of deliberateness of the breach on the use of the 
exclusion clause. If a party cannot rely on an exclusion clause, because deliberate breach of contract 
caused the damage, the availability or the extent of the standard remedy of expectation damages is 
at least partly decided by the element of deliberateness. Because exclusion and limitation clauses 
frequently return in contracts, it is relevant to pay attention to the connection between 
deliberateness and exclusion clauses in this chapter. However, it should be emphasized in advance, 
that the possible prohibition of reliance on an exclusion clause due to deliberateness of the breach – 
the most explicit connection which may be found – only leads to a ‘normal’ access to expectation 
damages. An eventual influence of deliberateness on the applicability of exclusion clauses does not  
in itself have consequences for the application of the standard remedies, although it is not 
impossible. This systematic statement is relevant in order to understand the exceptional status of the 
section at the end of this chapter. 
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4.10.2  English law: Astrazeneca UK Ltd v Albemarle International Corporation 
English law, as has been shown in previous sections, recognizes the phenomenon of deliberate 
breach, but is quite reluctant in accepting legal consequences of deliberateness of the breach. Lord 
Wilberforce in the case Suisse Atlantique Société d’Armement SA v NV Rotterdamsche Kolencentrale 
has formulated this in clear wordings, which are especially relevant for the connection between 
deliberateness and exclusion clauses: 
“The ‘deliberate' character of a breach cannot, in my opinion, of itself give a breach of contract a 
‘fundamental' character, in either sense of that word. Some deliberate breaches there may be of a 
minor character which can appropriately be sanctioned by damages: some may be, on construction, 
within an exceptions clause (for example, a deliberate delay for one day in loading). This is not to say 
that ‘deliberateness' may not be a relevant factor: depending on what the party in breach 
‘deliberately' intended to do, it may be possible to say that the parties never contemplated that such 
a breach would be excused or limited: and a deliberate breach may give rise to a right for the 
innocent party to refuse further performance because it indicates the other party's attitude towards 
future performance. All these arguments fit without difficulty into the general principle: to create a 
special rule for deliberate acts is unnecessary and may lead astray.”362 
According to Lord Wilberforce, there may be a certain influence of deliberateness on contractual 
sanctions. A recent example may indicate that such a statement may be clear in theory, but not so 
easy to execute in practice. 
In English law the question whether exclusion clauses may be relied upon in case a breach is 
considered to be deliberate is not easy to answer. Case law in which reliance on exclusion clauses is 
the core question often comes down to interpretation of the wordings of the exclusion clause and 
the contracts as a whole. In this respect too, English law explicitly recognizes the problems of a 
difficulty of defining the term ‘deliberateness’, whereas English law also seems to acknowledge that 
parties cannot rely on an exclusion clause after having committed deliberate breach.363 
In the case Astrazeneca UK Ltd v Albemarle International Corporation an example is provided of a 
situation in which a party cannot rely on an exclusion clause. 364 The facts are as follows. Astrazeneca 
– AZ – is a pharmaceutical company which produced an anaesthetic called Diprivan. Diprivan 
contains propofol, which has to be distilled from the substance DIP. AZ bought DIP from Albemarle. 
In 2005 a new contract was signed between AZ and Albemarle, which was a continuation of a long-
term relationship between the two companies. At the time of the contract, AZ contemplated the 
possibility of buying propofol directly and stripping the distillation process. A clause in the contract 
with Albemarle foresaw in the possibility that AZ switched from requesting DIP to propofol and the 
clause offered Albemarle the first opportunity to negotiate on a new contract and the first right to 
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refusal. In 2008, AZ concluded an agreement with Sochinaz for the supply of propofol without having 
offered Albemarle the opportunity to negotiate on propofol, i.e. without having offered Albemarle 
the opportunity to match the offer of Sochinaz.  
 Albemarle sued AZ for breach of contract and claimed loss of profits due to the missed opportunity 
of a new contract with AZ. AZ denied the breach and relied on an exclusion clause in the contract 
which would allegedly render the claim of Albemarle without success. The core question is whether 
according to the court AZ could rely on the exclusion clause. This question is only relevant for the 
argument in this thesis, when the preceding breach is considered to be a deliberate breach. Only 
then can the influence of the deliberateness on the validity of the exclusion clause be tested. 
The question is whether AZ deliberately committed breach of contract by not giving Albemarle the 
opportunity to conclude a contract with AZ. This case is if all specific circumstances are not taken into 
account, a fair example of a “double sale” situation. AZ was contractually bound to offer a new 
contract on propofol to Albemarle. However, AZ negotiated with Sochinaz. The negotiation itself is 
not prohibited by the contract, but Albemarle was entitled to match the offer of Sochinaz. This case 
is a rare illustration of a situation where the whole process of negotiation and contracting has been 
reconstructed  by  the court and where the court clearly showed that AZ had not been honest in this 
negotiations towards Albemarle. In brief, they acted as if Albemarle had an opportunity to match the 
offer of Sochinaz, whereas the courts showed that internal policy of AZ never included the possibility 
that AZ would conclude a contract with another party than Sochinaz. This conclusion is based on 
deep research by the court who heard many witnesses. One quote is included in this thesis in order 
to illustrate the opinion of the court in this respect: 
“Given that Albemarle had matched the offer, the obvious question is why AZ did not proceed with 
negotiations either at the meeting on 15 February 2008 or immediately thereafter. It seems clear 
that the answer is that Mr Hadfield  -  an employee at AZ, MvK  - attended the meeting with the 
intention (probably on instructions from his superiors in AZ), that even if Albemarle did match the 
Sochinaz offer, he would not negotiate any sort of deal or agreement in principle with Albemarle.”365 
The court realizes that English law – by the wordings of Lord Wilberforce – is not too eager to deny 
reliance on an exclusion clause as a result of deliberateness of the breach. Therefore, the court has 
to carefully approach this issue. In order to understand what the court does, it is necessary to quote 
the exclusion clause itself: 
“No claims by BUYER of any kind, whether as to the products delivered or for non-delivery of the 
products, or otherwise, shall be greater in amount than the purchase price of the product in respect 
of which such damages are claimed; and failure to give written notice of claim within sixty (60) days 
from the date of delivery, or in the case of non-delivery, from the date fixed for delivery, shall 
constitute a waiver by BUYER of all claims with respect thereto. In no case shall BUYER or SELLER be 
liable for loss of profits or incidental or consequential damages.”366 
It should be emphasized  that Albemarle is the seller and AZ is the buyer. The exclusion clause itself 
logically seemed to only exclude liability for breach of Albemarle, because Albemarle was the party 
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to deliver the DIP to AZ. The exclusion clause was included in order to protect Albemarle if Albemarle 
failed to comply with his contractual obligations. It is now AZ who relies on the exclusion clause and 
especially on the second sentence. However, the court disagrees with AZ and argues that the second 
sentence can only be connected to the delivery of DIP, because another interpretation would leave 
Albemarle virtually without any remedy as far as the breach of the specific obligation to  be able to 
contract with AZ on delivery of propofol, because the essential consequence of that specific breach 
of contract is loss of profits. The court formulates this element as follows: 
“Viewed cynically, if any right of Albemarle to claim for its loss of profits suffered as a consequence 
of AZ's breach of that obligation is excluded, there is little incentive for AZ to comply with that 
obligation.”367 
Therefore, the court does not allow AZ to rely on this exclusion clause. The point is that no explicit 
reference towards the deliberateness of the breach of AZ is made, because such a reference would 
not lead to the desired conclusion. Instead, the court emphasizes the necessity of the construction of 
an exclusion clause. Nevertheless, against the background of the elaborate analysis of the court of 
the way AZ committed breach of contract – i.e. deliberately – this case seems to be an excellent 
example of an implicit reference to the relevance of deliberateness for the validity of an appeal on an 
exclusion clause. The case is also relevant, because the deliberate behavior which in this case 
obstructs the validity of an appeal on the exclusion clause is a  ‘pure’ deliberate breach of a primary 
obligation of  the contract as on economic and policy grounds. The strict approach of Lord 
Wilberforce remains perhaps a starting point in English law for application of exclusion clauses cases 
like these, but the result in this case shows that it is questionable whether the reluctant approach 
may hold in every situation of deliberate breach. 
4.10.3  US law: William D. Huggins and Dona. G. Huggins v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. 
This section does not describe the law of exclusion clauses in US law. US law is in general common-
law based and does not differ from English law in a way that should be elaborated on extensively 
given the objective of this section. 
The case law example from a Florida court highlights two aspects. First, in US law one cannot escape 
the thought that deliberateness of the breach and applicability of exclusion clauses do not fit in easily 
together. This aspect has also become clear while exploring the English case. The particular feature of 
the following case is that parties themselves acknowledge the difference between ‘termination by 
written notice’ and ‘willful breach of contract’ in the exclusion clause incorporated in the contract.  
In the Florida case William D. Huggins and Dona. G. Huggins v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc.,  the 
contract contained a long clause describing the rights of the Purchaser: 
“(…) if Seller fails to perform under this contract (…) Purchaser may seek specific performance or 
elect to terminate this contract by written notice to Seller, in which event (…) Seller and Purchaser 
shall be relieved of any and all  further obligations to each other under this Contract, and  Purchaser 
may commence an action to recover only actual and direct damages (…). Under no circumstances 
may Purchaser seek or be entitled to recover any special, consequential, punitive, speculative or 
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indirect damages (…). Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event of the willful non-performance by 
Seller under this Contract, Purchaser’s remedy shall not be limited to a return of Purchaser’s Deposit 
or a return of Purchaser’s Deposit plus interest accrued thereon.”368 
The facts of this case are not relevant for the case, it is only an example of acknowledging deliberate 
breach in an exclusion clause. This clause is not only an exclusion clause, it is a clause which attempts 
to arrange the access to remedies in case the contractual obligations are not performed as expected. 
The clause illustrates a variety of limitations and extensions to potential liability of the seller in the 
case of breach of contract depending on the circumstances of the specific situation. The clause 
contains a severe limitation on the potential recoverable damages in case of ‘termination by written 
notice’. Not only punitive damages are excluded, but also so-called “special” damages and 
consequential damages, which may perhaps be normally labeled as compensatory damages. Punitive 
damages are never recoverable independent of the type of breach or motive of the breaching party. 
The possibility of the buyer to claim damages in the case of ‘termination by written notice’ – which 
my also be possible in case of ‘normal’ breach of contract –  is more or less limited to recovery of 
some payments already made added with some interest. In the case of willful breach however, this 
clause explicitly waives this strict limitation. This clause seems to reveal a specific position for willful 
breach, which is – at least according to the parties – a more serious manifestation of breach which 
justifies application of a more creditor-friendly exclusion clause. This exclusion clause effectively 
allows for every claim for damages, except for a claim for punitive damages. 
4.10.4  Dutch law: Telfort/Scaramea 
In Dutch law, a party who acts deliberately or in gross negligence, in general cannot invoke an 
exclusion clause, as briefly explained in Chapter 2. This section more explicitly attempts to illustrate 
the connection between deliberate breach of contract and the applicability of the exclusion clause. 
In the case of Telfort /Scaramea  Scaramea claims damages based on breach of contract of the 
telephone company Telfort.369 Scaramea concluded a contract with Telfort on the delivery of so-
called ‘interconnection capacity’. In brief, Telfort promised Scaramea wide access to a specific 
position of the Internet on a specific date. The extent of the access could only be provided when 
Scaramea had sufficient ‘interconnection capacity’. This contract was concluded in July 1999 for 
delivery of the interconnection capacity in September 1999. At the moment of the conclusion of the 
contract, Telfort had serious doubts whether they would be able to comply with the obligations they 
were about to undertake, because they had serious indications that KPN, the telephone company 
where they themselves had to buy the capacity, could not deliver the capacity. Telfort did not notify 
Scaramea on these doubts and instead continued concluding the contract. In September, Telfort was 
indeed not able to perform the obligations according to the contract. For Scaramea, the non-
performance was a disaster, because they had counted on having access to the Internet, because 
they sent CD-ROM’s around the country which the receivers could use to access a specific website. 
This plan completely fell apart due to the breach of contract. Subsequently, Scaramea claimed 
damages from Telfort as a result of this breach of contract. However, Telfort referred to an exclusion  
clause in the contract which limited their potential liability to a maximum. For this section, the 
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opinion of the Hoge Raad is relevant. The first question is how the Hoge Raad qualifies the breach of 
contract – is it qualified as a deliberate breach? – and the second question is whether this type of 
breach influences the applicability of the exclusion clause. 
With regard to the first question, the Hoge Raad confirms the view of the Court of Appeal that Telfort 
should have reconsidered the conclusion of the contract in July, because there were serious 
indications that KPN would not be able to enable Telfort to unconditionally perform the obligations, 
whereas Telfort also knew that a correct performance was extremely important for Scaramea. In the 
words of the Hoge Raad, this type of behavior which ultimately led to breach of contract, qualified as 
‘grossly negligent’ behavior. The use of the term ‘gross negligence’ in Dutch law is not uniform.370 
This is not the place to go into detail on this analysis, but the term ‘deliberateness’ is not used by the 
Hoge Raad in this case and with a reason. Telfort attempted to create a different image of its actions 
before the conclusion of the contract  and Scaramea – and the Court of Appeal – were not able to 
establish that Telfort deliberately took the risk of non-performance. Telfort attempted to prove that 
they had good reasons to conclude the contract with Scaramea, because they sincerely expected that 
KPN would be able to provide the capacity. According to the Hoge Raad, this discussion is not 
relevant, because the Court of Appeal could have come to the decision to deny the applicability of 
the exclusion clause without establishing that Telfort had serious doubts about the possibility to 
perform. Gross negligence in this respect is a term with a lower burden of proof, because problems 
of evidence seem to stand in the way of labeling the actions of Telfort as deliberate. Nevertheless, 
‘gross negligence’ also seems a label to a certain extent. For example, the Hoge Raad especially 
circumscribes the behavior of Telfort as ‘consciously careless’. Terminology again decides what type 
of conduct is labeled as deliberate or not. In this case, no explicit reference to deliberateness has 
been made, but it is also clear that the Hoge Raad qualifies the conduct of Telfort as a serious 
manifestation of gross negligence. 
A difficult aspect of this case is that the qualification of the behavior of Telfort primarily regards the 
actions of Telfort around the moment of the conclusion of the contract and not of the breach itself. 
In this case, the breach of contract naturally resulted from the conclusion of the contract. The doubts 
on KPN being able to provide the interconnection capacity at the moment of the conclusion of the 
contract directly resulted in the risk that the obligations could not be performed. It is at least 
questionable, whether Telfort at one moment sincerely wanted to perform the contractual 
obligation. 
The second question is whether the Hoge Raad allows the applicability of the exclusion clause in this 
specific situation. The lower courts – the court of first instance and the Court of Appeal – both denied 
the appeal on the exclusion clause. The Hoge Raad confirms the view of the Court of Appeal and 
connects the grossly negligent behavior to the application of the exclusion clause. Telfort cannot rely 
on the exclusion clause, because the principle of good faith blocks application of the exclusion clause 
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due to the grossly negligent behavior of Telfort. Telfort could have verified whether KPN was able to 
provide the capacity in September 1999, but it did not and therefore acted ‘consciously carelessly’.371 
A strong connection between deliberateness and applicability of the exclusion clauses can be found 
in theory – deliberate behavior blocks applicability –372 , but is more difficult to find examples of 
specific deliberate breach of contract connected to exclusion clauses. The Telfort/Scaramea case is a 
good example of a situation which approaches the idea of deliberate breach of contract.  
4.10.5  Concluding remarks 
It is not a surprise that exclusion clauses cannot be upheld in case of deliberate behavior of the party 
attempting to rely on the exclusion clause. Although it is generally acknowledged that especially in a  
commercial context, parties should have the freedom to shape the contractual relationship – 
including the use of exclusion clauses in order to limit damages – it is also true that deliberate actions 
to frustrate performance combined with a successful reliance on exclusion clauses make a 
contractual agreement practically without value. This section especially focuses on the deliberate 
foregoing of the core contractual obligations – which is a very specific category of deliberate 
behavior – and the existence of exclusion clauses. A direct and explicit connection is still difficult to 
establish, but in various legal systems implicit hints to such a connection can be found. English law 
attempts to hide the connection by emphasizing the construction of an exclusion clause. In case of a 
deliberate breach, a small gap can often be found and as a result the party relying on the clause 
cannot succeed. Dutch law on the other hand seems to acknowledge the relevance of the notion of 
deliberateness in connection with exclusion clauses, but deliberateness in general may be something 
else than deliberate breach of contract. Terminology seems to confuse the real issue on a clear 
connection between deliberate breach of contract and the application of exclusion clauses. In the 
end, the highest goal for an aggrieved party to achieve is that the court renders the exclusion clause 
inapplicable. If a court does so on the basis of deliberate breach of contract, it is still not clear that 
deliberate breach of contract results in stricter sanctions, because the standard remedy of 
expectation damages still remains without any addition. In that sense, the meaning of this section for 
the existing recognition of the relevance of deliberateness is limited. 
4.11  Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to answer the following research question: 
Does deliberateness of the breach of contract play a role in existing contract law, more specifically in 
contract law related legal provisions or in case law, in the sense that deliberateness as a relevant 
factor influences the choice or application of remedies in contract and if so, how? 
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It is relevant to repeat the statement in the introduction that the answer to this question, which 
comes between the question what deliberate breach of contract is and how deliberateness of the 
breach should influence remedies in contract, should provide material in order to build an analytical 
framework on which the answer to the normative research questions of this thesis may be 
developed. 
Although this chapter has not provided a representative picture of the influence of deliberateness on 
remedies in contract in any analyzed jurisdiction in a statistical sense, it has aimed to choose 
examples which provide a coherent idea of how the law and the courts deal with the notion of 
deliberateness as far as the use of remedies in contract is concerned. The conclusion of this exercise 
is that sufficient concrete examples in law exist to argue that deliberateness as part of breach of 
contract at least in some jurisdictions is already taken seriously as far as some key remedies in 
contract law are concerned. Nevertheless, in none of the jurisdictions mentioned in this chapter can 
a coherent and consistent recognition of the relevance of deliberateness of the breach be found for 
all or at least the standard remedies in contract. 
First, the strongest examples of explicit recognition of deliberateness combined with a serious and 
noticeable adaption of the standard remedies are can be found in French law, English law and in US 
law. In French law, deliberateness of the breach directly influences the standard remedy of 
expectation damages. Art. 1150 Cc shows that unforeseeable losses become available inter alia in 
case of deliberate breach of contract, whereas in a case of a breach which is not accompanied by 
deliberateness or gross negligence only foreseeable losses can be recovered. In English law, 
deliberateness of the breach is relevant in deciding the question whether the debtor committing the 
breach may successfully request specific performance. Deliberateness of the breach may help the 
aggrieved party to successfully argue that the debtor is not relieved from forfeiture. In US law, 
deliberateness of the breach explicitly triggers the availability of punitive damages. Punitive damages 
are generally not available in contract. The link between deliberate breach and punitive damages is 
not direct, because the tort of bad faith breach has to be established in between. Labeling the 
deliberate breach as a tort opens the gate to punitive damages, though in a very limited amount of 
cases, i.e. specific cases of insurance law. The Fletcher case is a good example. Furthermore, § 39 of 
the Draft Third Restatement on Unjust Enrichment in US law offers a direct link between 
deliberateness of the breach and the availability of account of profits as a standard alternative for 
expectation damages. This provision does not have any binding force at the moment, but it is the 
strongest example of the relevance of motive for remedies in contract. Opportunism in deciding to 
perform cannot be left without a serious sanction. The choice for this unorthodox approach rendered 
critical comments from others. The existence of the strong academic debate on this specific issue 
reveals the current tension in the law of contract regarding the potential relevance of deliberateness. 
Second, deliberateness may be mentioned explicitly, whereas a potential influence on the application 
of remedies is explicitly denied. The strongest examples are visible in Dutch law and US law. In Dutch 
law, the Hoge Raad in the Ymere case explicitly mentioned the existence of a breach being 
deliberate, but confirmed the traditional view that motive cannot justify the award of account of 
profits. Account of profits in Dutch law remains a way of calculation of damages – shaped as a 
discretionary competence of the court at the request of one of the parties – according to art. 6:104 
Cc, and it is not a separate remedy next to expectation damages. In US law, the influence of motive 
on the remedy of expectation damages is explicitly denied by courts.  
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Third, deliberateness of the breach may be explicitly recognized by courts as an existing fact, but the 
influence on remedial relief remains unclear. Examples can be found in Dutch law, English law and US 
law. In Dutch law, deliberateness of the breach in insurance cases is mentioned as a fact, but the 
remedy – award of statutory interest – is not influenced by deliberateness and only a theoretical 
escape in specific circumstances remains. In English law, deliberateness of the breach is mentioned in 
several cases which dealt with the remedy of account of profits, but the courts do not seem to accept 
to use the argument of deliberateness of the breach as an element in deciding on the award of 
account of profits. In US law, deliberateness of the breach is acknowledged as a potential factor in 
order to establish material breach. The fulfillment of the requirement of material breach may trigger 
the remedy of termination. Whether deliberateness of the breach renders a breach material is not so 
clear, but it is likely that a certain connection between deliberateness and termination in US law 
exists. 
Fourth, in some situations deliberateness of the breach is left undiscussed by the court, whereas it 
seems to play an implicit role in the decision of the court. Dutch law and English law provide strong 
examples. In Dutch law, the Hoge Raad in the Vos/TSN case seems to deny the party committing 
breach of contract access to a debtor-friendly way of calculating expectation damages. An explicit 
reference to the deliberateness of the breach is absent, whereas the arguments to support the strict 
application of the full expectation damages are technical. In English law, a similar reluctance towards 
acknowledging a breach as deliberate can be found in the Golden Victory case, although the minority 
of the House of Lords is less reluctant.  
A specific position in this debate is reserved for contractual remedies arranged by parties such as the 
penalty clauses and the exclusion clause and the influence of deliberateness thereon. In the area of 
exclusion clauses deliberateness of the breach negatively influences the possibility of the party to 
rely on an exclusion clause. In English law, the Astrazeneca case is an example. In the area of penalty 
clauses, there are examples in Dutch law where the courts specifically deny mitigation of the penalty 
due to the deliberateness of the breach, such as the Buck case. Although in several jurisdictions an 
explicit link between deliberateness and the application of the contractual remedy can be 
established, the aggrieved party can generally only achieve full application of the contractual remedy  
- i.e. enforced performance – in the case of the penalty clause or full application of the standard 
remedy – in case of denying the validity of an exclusion clause – but nothing more. 
Finally, taking in account the modest ambition of this chapter in being descriptive and eclectic, this 
chapter delivers sufficient material to answer the research question asked in this chapter. The 
answer is affirmative with restrictions. Deliberateness plays a role in current law in different 
jurisdictions as a relevant factor in deciding which remedy should be awarded in a breach of contract 
case and to what extent it should be awarded. On the other hand, the influence of deliberateness is 
limited. Its influence is sometimes explicitly denied. In other cases, a specific breach of contract 
situation is not labeled as a deliberate breach by the court itself. The label of deliberate breach is 
attached by the author of this chapter, which makes the specific case perhaps less convincing. 
Furthermore, even if deliberateness is explicitly mentioned in relation to a specific remedy, it is not 
always clear how it influences the concerned remedy, for example because there is no concrete case 




5  A framework for solving cases of deliberate breach: Four 
arguments and six recommendations for adaptations in remedies in 
contract 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the two following normative questions: 
Why should deliberateness of the contractual breach influence the availability and the extent of 
remedies in contract? 
How should deliberateness of the contractual breach influence the availability and the extent of 
remedies in contract? 
The law of contract in its current state in general wrongfully denies or neglects that deliberateness of 
the breach should be a relevant factor which influences the availability and/or the extent of remedies 
for breach of contract. The reluctance towards the relevance of deliberateness of the breach for the 
availability and extent of remedies in contract is explained and directly invalidated by presenting four 
arguments:  a moral, a systematic, a practical and an economic argument. According to this chapter, 
the reluctant attitude towards deliberateness as a relevant element for deciding on the availability or 
extent of remedies in contract reveals a structural fallacy of the law of contract. This chapter shows 
that all four arguments lack sufficient power to deny the relevance of motive for the availability or 
extent of remedies in contract. This chapter advocates the opinion that deliberateness of the breach 
should be a relevant element in deciding on the availability or extent of a concrete contractual 
remedy in a concrete case.  
When the relevance of deliberateness for application of remedies in contract is established, it is also 
necessary to explain how deliberateness as a relevant element returns in the application of remedies 
in contract. Therefore, the second normative research question, which is a solution-seeking question, 
needs to be answered in this chapter as well. If deliberate breach is labeled or qualified as a 
particular type of breach of contract being something else than breach of contract in general, to 
which results in the area of remedies in contract should it lead? The box with moral, systematic, 
practical and economic arguments offers tools in order to improve the law of remedies in contract. In 
other words, this chapter also explains how remedies in contract should be adapted in order to deal 
with a deliberate breach of contract in terms of remedies in another and improved way. The four 
reasons why deliberateness of a breach is relevant are a necessary preparation for several concrete 
recommendations on the application of remedies in the case of deliberate breach of contract 
depending on the circumstances of the specific case. This chapter presents the recommendations in 
a more general way, whereas the next chapter tests the recommendations on concrete cases. Six 
main recommendations in order to solve cases of deliberate breach are analyzed and discussed.  
By assessing the current attitude of the law in the books and the courts towards deliberate breach as 
fundamentally wrong and presenting recommendations to improve the law of contract on this point, 
this chapter builds an analytical framework upon which concrete deliberate breach cases can be 




5.2  The moral argument 
The moral argument counters the thesis that deliberate breach of contract is not an act which should 
have consequences for the award of a remedy in contract on moral grounds.373In other words, in 
terms of remedies in contract deliberate breach should not be treated differently from any other 
type of breach of contract as far as motive of the breaching party is concerned. 
The moral argument considers that deliberate breach is morally wrong and that the immorality of 
deliberate breach is legally relevant, i.e. that the immorality should have consequences for the 
availability and the extent of remedies in contract. The law of contract is generally based on the idea 
of trust at least in the area of breach of contract and performance of contractual obligations.374 
Parties rely on each other when they conclude a contract and they naturally expect performance. 
They expect that promises formalized in the contract are kept.  Parties also rely on the system of 
contract law which fills any gaps left by the parties in their contracts and which provides sufficient 
remedial relief in case of breach of contract.375 A system of contract law which allows calculated 
deliberate breach of contract yielding sufficient gain in order to be advantageous compared with 
performance undermines the level of trust of parties involved in a contract.376  
This thesis does not have any philosophical aspirations. It does not have any pretention to conclude 
anything on the connection between morality and the law in theory. A moral assessment of certain 
behavior – in case of deliberate breach of contract – means an assessment on whether certain 
behavior is ethically acceptable in society. Such norms and values are never static, but dynamic. 
What people accept as morally acceptable conduct differs from time to time and from place to place. 
Nevertheless, this thesis argues that the law of contract in every legal system has moral implications, 
which should have consequences for remedies in contract. This thesis argues that deliberate breach 
is morally wrong and that this moral wrongfulness should be made visible in remedies in contract. 
This fundamental argument is based on the following line of reasoning.  
Contracts are instruments in order to create a secure environment in which parties are able to 
enhance their economic position. Contracts themselves do not ameliorate the economic position of 
parties; the performance of the obligations arising from the contract realizes the financial advantage 
or, more precisely, the certainty that parties will perform their obligations. Contracts are instruments 
in order to achieve this advantage. From this perspective, the core element of a contract is trust on a 
double level. Trust in the other party that he will perform according to the contract (1) and trust in 
the contract and the system of contract law that it provides a reliable mechanism in order to 
stimulate performance and in order to minimize the negative consequences of non-performance (2). 
                                                          
373
 Consider Posner 2009, p. 1363. Posner does not qualify deliberateness of the breach per definition as 
amoral, but he considers a possible immoral status of deliberate breach not relevant for action in remedies. 
Whether deliberate breach of contract is considered to be amoral or immoral is less relevant in this 
perspective, because a moral assessment is not relevant for remedial consequences anyway.  
374
 See for example Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron 2010, p. 1041. 
375
 Asser/Hartkamp & Sieburgh 6-III, 2010/40. According to Smith a rights-based approach to the law of 
contract – and the systems subject to research in this thesis can be viewed as ‘rights-based’in the sense that a 
contract in all systems  primarily confers (enforceable) obligations on parties involved in a contract –  an 
intentional breach should be approached more forcefully in the sphere of remedies, but contract law 
apparently does not. This is “puzzling” according to Smith. See Smith 2004, p. 127, 154, 155. 
376
 Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron 2010, p. 1041. Barnett 1992, p. 891. 
147 
 
The element of trust can be translated into legal provisions and contractual arrangements377, but it 
also holds a moral component. A contract creates a relationship of mutual dependence. Parties only 
want to be dependent on each other if they can trust each other. A party who deliberately lets his 
own interests prevail over the obligations in the contract proves he does not respect the contractual 
bond of dependence.  
The law of contract contains a structural wrong if the contract itself is a construction which aims at 
securing performance of the obligations in the contract, whereas the law of contract does not 
sufficiently prevent the possibility for a party to deliberately avoid performance of the obligations in 
a situation where the party committing deliberate breach can achieve financial advantage. The 
freedom of contract as a principle underlying the law of contract is matched by the principle of the 
binding force of the contract. If freedom of contract also implies the freedom of parties to forego 
performance and make a deliberate and cynical decision to commit breach – only under the 
condition of payment of expectation damages –  the added value of the legal instrument of contract 
other than a financial security is absent. A choice is not possible either, because an unambiguous 
choice for a system where parties can easily commit breach of contract completely disrupts the 
primary function of the law of contract, which is – as mentioned before – upholding the confidence 
of parties in their own contractual relationship. 
Whereas mutual commitment and voluntariness may generally be elements of a contract which can 
be found in any jurisdiction, the focus on the content of commitment and the specific aspects of 
voluntariness may differ and so may the two key principles. These differences are of interest for the 
topic of this thesis. Essentially, this thesis assumes that the law should recognize somewhere that 
parties may act consciously inconsistently. One moment they commit themselves to a contract, the 
next moment the obligation arising from the contract is violated on purpose. The breach of trust 
following from such inconsistent behavior is assumed to undermine trust in the system of contracts 
as such, because contracts are made to be enforceable.  
However, these assumptions can only make sense if a deliberate breach of contract is legally 
perceived as consciously inconsistent behavior which causes lack of trust in contracts. 
The instrument of contract in every legal system is available for parties in order to create certainty 
about their economic position. Parties agree on the creation of obligations which they promise to 
perform. A agrees  with B to sell him a house for E 400,000. At least at the moment of conclusion of 
the contract, they both expect to obtain a better financial position after performance of the 
obligations, because they both attach a higher value to the performance of the obligation of the 
other party than to the performance of their own obligation. In this sense, every commercial contract 
is a bargain, as a representative of a common law system would say.378 The advantage will only be 
materialized for both parties if all obligations are correctly performed. Consequently, both parties do 
not only expect a profit from the contract, they also implicitly expect the obligations to be 
performed. A expects that B pays the agreed price. B expects that A delivers the house. A contract 
works as a protection mechanism against the risk that one of the parties does not fulfill his 
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obligations. If, for example, A does not deliver the house, the law of contract and, more specifically, 
the law of remedies offers possibilities to deal with the negative consequences of the failure to 
perform.  In essence, these remedies are designed in order to facilitate the disappointed creditor to 
achieve the same situation as if the contractual obligation had been correctly performed, either by 
enforcing performance of the original obligation or/and awarding expectation damages. 
Describing the law of contract this way, a contract is a value-neutral instrument designed to deal 
with risks in the future. The failure to perform always triggers the same consequences, because the 
objective of remedies is aimed to repair the negative consequences of the breach without paying 
attention to the cause of the failure to perform. The motive of the breaching party does not seem to 
be relevant. However, this description is an oversimplification of the legal construction of the 
contract and its remedial consequences. 
A contract is a legal manifestation of a relationship of trust between parties. Parties would not 
conclude a contract with each other if they did not trust each other. The basic assumption in order to 
conclude a contract at all is that the other party performs. Exceptions such as coercive contracts and 
contracts concluded in bad faith exist, but they do not play a role in building the trust argument. A 
contract contains provisions which seem to address a lack of trust, because they provide for solutions 
in the case one of the parties or both do not perform their obligations correctly such as penalty 
clauses, exclusion clauses et cetera. Depending on the type of jurisdiction, the law of contract fills the 
gaps left by the parties, which means in this perspective that the law of remedies as a silent risk 
insurance is part of practically every contractual relationship. One may even argue that parties wish 
to conclude a contract, because they do not trust sufficiently on a good performance result. Parties 
take into account that “things” may go wrong, as a result of which one of the parties or both cannot 
perform. Even if parties themselves do not take into account that things go wrong, the implied law of 
remedies silently offers solutions if things go wrong. According to this way of reasoning contracts are 
manifestations of trust and of distrust at the same time.  
A closer look at the trust-distrust relationship which the contractual bond between parties 
represents is necessary to make the step to assessing the relevance of deliberateness in connection 
with remedies in contract. The element of trust is present on two levels. The first level is the one just 
explained. Parties must have a basic level of faith in each other to enter into a contractual 
relationship. A second level of trust is the trust in the contract itself, the law of contract and its 
enforcement mechanisms. The primary reason to convert the first level of trust in a legal, contractual 
relationship is the idea that the formalization in itself attributes valuable instruments to parties to 
enforce the rights resulting from the contract.379 These rights or remedies must have an added value 
for the parties subject to the law of contract in order to be trustworthy as an instrument of authority. 
In fact, this statement forces us to formulate objectives of the law of contract, because the law of 
contract can only support the contractual bond optimally if it is clear what a contract wishes to 
achieve.  
Breach of contract may or may or not in itself destroy the trust of the aggrieved party in the specific 
contractual bond. It depends on the circumstances of the case whether trust is diminished or even 
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destroyed. For example, in case of an excusable breach of contract or an imputable breach of 
contract due to risk attribution instead of personal fault, the trust in the reliability of the party in 
breach need not be fundamentally damaged. A breach committed in order to achieve a better 
financial position certainly destroys the trust of the aggrieved party, because the party in breach 
exercises contradictory behavior. Conclusion of a contract means commitment to the obligations 
involved. Consequently, a deliberate move in order to avoid performance is not an expected move.  
Against this line of reasoning, the famous quote of Holmes can be cited, because the connection 
between contracts, remedies and trust depends on the expectation parties may have from being 
contractually bound.380 Do parties expect the other party to perform what he has promised or does 
he only expect to have created a right to be financially compensated if the other party does not 
perform? As a US common law legal scholar, Holmes states the last.381 Civil law jurisdictions 
intrinsically refuse to adopt this approach. Dutch, French and German law all in one way or another 
attach a principled value to the right to performance of the contract. This right does not follow from 
the breach, but from the contract itself and is therefore not a simple remedy, but a right. These 
systems attempt to emphasize that contracts primarily are to be performed. The primary position of 
the right to performance, at least in theory proves the relevance of morality in contract law. Trust in 
performance is essential and trust in performance is inevitably linked with the ethical norm that you 
should do what you have promised. 
The claim in this thesis that deliberate breach violates a moral norm and should therefore be dealt 
with explicitly by the law of contract differently from any other breach of contract also includes the 
common law legal systems. The trust argument via the right to performance cannot be made in these 
systems. The quote of Holmes may be true and its potential consequence, formulated by Posner may 
also be true: Let us not blame the contract breaker.382  The fundamental question beyond the 
systematic and traditional differences between civil law and continental legal systems is whether 
parties making use of the common law jurisdiction indeed experience a contractual relationship as a 
relationship which offers nothing more than a right to the monetary value of the obligations agreed 
to. Modest empirical research tends to show that this is not the case.383 A victim of deliberate breach 
in common law jurisdiction expects that a contract he concluded would have been performed 
correctly. He is willing to accept that in case of non-performance a claim for damages remains, but if 
he is forced into the situation for the financial benefit of the party committing deliberate breach, he 
feels abused as in a malicious tort situation. In other words, the common law structure of remedies 
in contract is a good reflection of commercial reality – because it is often commercially sound to 
claim damages instead of performance –, but it does not prove that parties who conclude contracts 
expect anything else than performance of the contract.  The trust argument in common law 
jurisdictions is therefore not only upheld by empirical research, but also by the argument that the 
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remedial structure does not necessarily reflect the way parties interpret the commitment to the 
contract.384 
From the perspective of the moral argument, deliberate breach of contract should ideally be 
prevented. A strong right to performance combined with a more ‘victim of breach’-friendly approach 
of damages in contract and a more aggressive application of account of profits as a reasonable 
alternative for performance or expectation damages serves this purpose. 
5.3  The systematic argument 
The systematic argument deals with the thesis that motive for breach of contract should not be 
relevant for determining the appropriate contractual remedy, because the aggrieved party has a 
right to enforced performance of the contract or a right to expectation damages in case of any 
breach of contract, which should completely compensate him for his losses. Motive is irrelevant, 
because the aggrieved party receives what he expects based on the contract.  
The systematic argument reasons that the general absence of attention to motive for breach of 
contract is not compatible with the function of remedies in contract in the law of contract in various 
legal systems. Leaving the common law jurisdictions aside for a moment, the main problem is that 
within the law of contract civil jurisdictions generally position the right to performance as a strong 
right, but it is a theoretical right, because parties face many procedural or practical problems which 
discourage them from using this right. Although a strong right in theory is not without value and 
although there are good justifications to limit the right to performance in certain situations, parties 
often claim damages instead of performance after breach of contract.385 The second limb of the 
argument against the relevance of deliberateness is that perfect compensation does not trigger the 
aggrieved party to emphasize the relevance of deliberateness. The objective of perfect compensation 
is practically never achieved, partly due to generally justified limitations on damages, such as rules on 
foreseeability and limitation of damages for immaterial losses or recovery for costs of legal 
representation. The imperfections of the law of remedies are understandable from a systematic 
point of view in a general sense, but not if the law of remedies does not deal with motive as a 
relevant and separate element in assessing claims for performance or damages. The ideal of the law 
of contract that the aggrieved party receives performance or equal financial compensation is often 
not achieved. Therefore, it makes sense that an aggrieved party who is confronted with deliberate 
breach of contract has more remedial possibilities to approach the ideal situation as close as 
possible. If he could claim more than the usual expectation damages within the usual limits taking 
into account motive, i.e. the deliberateness of the breach, the system of contract law would make 
more sense. Widening the scope of expectation damages may include a more lenient application of 
the foreseeability limit, a more lenient approach to the award of damages for immaterial losses and a 
more lenient award of costs for legal representation.  
In common law jurisdictions, the right to performance does not even in theory prevail. The claimant 
has long had only a right to expectation damages. In the common law jurisdictions, the problem of 
undercompensation is even more urgent, because the absence of the right to performance puts the 
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aggrieved party in a potentially worse position to negotiate about the consequences of breach. The 
urgency to improve the position of the aggrieved party by emphasizing the interest of performance is 
in theory less clear, because the contracting parties would not expect the other party to perform in 
the common law, because they know in advance they only acquire a right to damages. However, 
modest empirical evidence from common law countries contradicts this Holmesian assumption.386 
Expectation damages as a remedy are not sufficient to counter the problem of the substantial risk of 
undercompensation, because the law of damages in any legal system, including common law 
jurisdictions, recognizes limits on foreseeability, remoteness and so on.  Therefore, the objective 
which should exclude deliberateness as a relevant element for awarding damages, i.e. perfect 
compensation, is not achieved in common law jurisdictions either. Because these limits are generally 
justified in common law jurisdictions, a serious argument should be presented in order to overstep 
these limits. Deliberateness of the breach as an aggravating factor in terms of remedies in contract is 
a good reason which may systematically overturn the limits on the remedy of damages.387 
5.4  The practical argument 
The practical argument deals with one of the potentially strongest arguments against relevance of 
deliberateness for deciding on availability or extent of remedies in contract. This argument is that the 
aggrieved party can practically never prove that a specific concrete breach of contract is deliberate, 
because subjective intent is an internal state of mind of the party committing breach and therefore 
impossible to prove for the aggrieved party. According to this line of reasoning deliberateness can 
only be proved if the party allegedly committing deliberate breach himself admits that he committed 
the breach on purpose. This situation practically never occurs; therefore the relevance of 
deliberateness is a theoretical issue apart from any other substantive argument against the relevance 
of deliberate breach. In order to prove the subjective intention aimed at committing breach of 
contract, the burden of proof would be too heavy. The argument is that even if the law of contract 
would take into account deliberateness as a relevant element in deciding how to respond on breach 
of contract, it would be generally useless, because the aggrieved party could not prove deliberate 
breach anyway.  
The practical argument reasons that deliberate breach of contract is not a single-definition term and 
that the most relevant types of deliberate breach for this thesis and its remedy- based approach may 
be made plausible by the aggrieved party without proving actual subjective intent. The type of 
deliberate breach which yields financial gain for the party committing breach may be established by 
pointing out the relevant circumstances:  canceling of the contract without a good intrinsic reason in 
the first place and second, if possible, the existence of an external financial reason – a more 
advantageous contract other relevant circumstances, such as excessive delay in case of payment on 
an insurance policy. The core of this argument is that every case of potential deliberate breach of 
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contract should be judged on its merits. Courts may use insights from other disciplines, such as 
criminal law, in order to deal with the notion of intent, but existing court practice shows that 
deliberateness is sometimes difficult to prove and sometimes easy to establish. Nevertheless, in 
order to open a larger box of remedies, the aggrieved party has to build a serious argument on why 
the involved breach should be considered to be deliberate. 
5.5  The economic argument 
The economic argument deals with two counterarguments. The first is that the law of contract 
should allow efficient breach of contract. This argument is somewhat different than the previous 
three arguments against the relevance of deliberateness of the breach for determining the 
appropriate contractual remedy. The economic argument is not used to argue in favor of an equal 
treatment of all breaches in the sense that deliberate breach should not be dealt with more severely, 
but that a specific type of deliberate breach, i.e. efficient breach, should be encouraged or at least 
allowed by the law of contract. This argument distinguishes between efficient breach and any other 
breach for which the party committing breach is liable. The argument is generally that breach should 
be allowed if the party in breach compensates the victim of breach for the non-performance, i.e. 
pays the added value of the obligation above the contract price. The second counterargument is that 
the availability of a box of extended remedies –  from an easier accessible right to performance to 
larger amounts of expectation damages, account of profits, let alone the availability of punitive 
damages – entails a risk of overcompensation. A substantial risk of overcompensation creates an 
economic inefficient law of remedies in contract, because parties will be cautious to enter into 
transactions of which they cannot predict in advance the amount of damages in case of breach of 
contract. Furthermore, a too generous box of remedies leads to undesirable conduct of the victim 
preceding breach of contract, because he has incentives to trigger a situation of breach of contract 
which may render a financial advantage for him. 
The economic argument firstly argues that efficient breach is not a concept which should be 
implemented in the law of contract, because it based on assumptions which are all disputable. The 
first economic assumption is that parties are indifferent towards receiving compensatory damages 
instead of performance of their obligations. Although there may be some isolated transactions in 
which this assumption may be correct, it is wrong to found the law of contract upon this assumption 
because in general contracts are concluded because parties expect performance. Civil law 
jurisdictions acknowledge this principle, because they have generally incorporated the right to 
performance into their law of contract. In these systems, efficient breach is simply not possible – at 
least not without cooperation of the aggrieved party –, because breach can be blocked by a claim for 
performance. Only in common law jurisdictions has efficient breach in theory a chance to survive. 
The second economic assumption is that the act of performance of a contractual obligation can be 
completely ‘translated’ into a financial value. This assumption again may be correct in some simple 
cases, but in slightly more complicated transactions breach of contract triggers a range of 
consequences which are hard to quantify, if possible at all. Many of these consequences are 
connected to trust problems. If due to a so-called efficient breach, a party does not receive the 
object he was entitled to, he will not be able to resell it, to use the object to produce and sell the 
goods he wants to produce and sell in time. These isolated situations may be valued and the party 
committing breach may compensate the victim for them, but the trust relationship between the 
victim and his contractual partners which he disappoints is not easy to attach a value to. The third 
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economic assumption is that the aggrieved party receives perfect compensation paid voluntarily by 
the party committing breach. This assumption may be correct in certain situations, but again, in more 
complicated contractual relationships perfect compensation is rarely achieved. The fourth economic 
assumption is that the way the financial advantage is distributed among the parties involved is legally 
not relevant, because the law of contract only exists to secure their economic rights resulting from 
the contract. This assumption essentially argues that the fact that the party committing efficient 
breach gains from the breach and makes a profit is legally not relevant for the remedial possibilities 
of the victim of the breach. Modest empirical evidence supports the idea that victims of breach of 
contract feel especially betrayed if the breach of contract yields a gain for the party committing 
breach.388 Efficient breach is therefore a situation which can practically never be achieved. Efficient 
breach without efficiency is a plain deliberate breach or willful breach in US legal terminology and 
should be dealt with accordingly. 
The economic argument also rejects the argument of the risk of overcompensation.  Too be precise, 
it is correct that a more generous approach in terms of remedies of deliberate breach creates a risk 
of overcompensation. However, the risk is not endangering the economic and systematic stability of 
the law of contract. The proposals for adapting the law of remedies are primarily aimed at bridging a 
gap of effective enforcement of the remedial possibilities of the victim of the breach. The existing 
reality is one of undercompensation in case of breach of contract. Some of the reasons which have 
led to a practice of undercompensation are understandable, sometimes even justifiable, but the 
general conclusion is that a party who is confronted with breach of contract is practically always 
worse off than if the contract had been correctly performed.  
A first point to discuss in this light is a possible reinforcement of a claim for performance, which is 
most relevant in common law jurisdictions. In principle, a claim for enforced performance cannot 
directly lead to a situation of overcompensation of the claimant, because the ultimate consequence 
of exercising the claim is that the claimant exactly receives what he contracted for. However, 
changed circumstances after conclusion of the contract can make actual performance of the 
contractual obligation extremely burdensome for the party committing breach of contract. For these 
cases, the law should have possibilities to limit the right to performance.389 In common law 
jurisdictions, this problem is less urgent, because specific performance is a secondary remedy 
anyway. In the case of deliberate breach of contract, the situation just described is not relevant. In a 
situation of deliberate breach of contract because of the reason to obtain a financial gain, a difficult 
situation can occur. Although the deliberateness of the breach should entail that an eventual burden 
to perform cannot be a justified excuse to limit the power to exercise the right to performance, 
reality also asks a reasonable solution.  In case of a double sale or a breach of a long-term contract, 
the party having committed the deliberate breach is often practically not able to perform any longer. 
He has to rebuy the object sold to a third party if that is possible at all and in case of breach of a long-
term contract such as the English Argyll case performance of the original obligation is also practically 
impossible. A possible solution for this situation can be found by acknowledging the secondary 
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purpose of a strong right to performance. A strong right to performance increases the possibility for 
the victim of the breach to claim full instead of undercompensatory damages, because he can always 
threaten to use this right in order to negotiate a an amount of damages which approaches the 
subjective value of the obligation. This consequence of the right to performance is especially relevant 
when the obligation does not have a market value which can be objectively assessed. Two things are 
important in order to avoid excessive overcompensation as well as the still existing risk of 
undercompensation. First, in order to effectively be able to use the right to performance in order to 
receive an appropriate amount of damages it is undesirable to limit the right to performance in the 
situation of deliberate breach in advance, because it would undermine the negotiation position of 
the victim of the breach.  An additional argument is that it may be practically impossible for the party 
committing breach to perform, it is often not absolutely impossible. Second, a risk of 
overcompensation may also exist when the victim of the breach does not have a reason to limit the 
subjective value of the breached obligation. The court should offer some assistance to limit the 
extent of the subjective value attached the obligation if a market value cannot be established.390 A 
second risk of overcompensation may occur once a claim for expectation damages or any other 
monetary remedy, such as a claim for account of profits or even punitive damages, is extended 
beyond limits which are applicable in case of any other breach of contract. The argument of potential 
overcompensation in case of a claim for expectation damages may be justified, because these limits 
attempt to prevent the victim of the breach from claiming damages for losses which cannot be 
connected to the breach. However, this argument is somewhat inaccurate, because the term 
expectation damages in itself contains a limit. This limit is that the victim can only claim damages for 
losses or missed profits he would not have had if the party committing breach had performed 
correctly. In case of deliberate breach, it is not unimaginable that costs of legal representation in 
order to deal with the breach of contract are recoverable to a larger extent than in a case of 
‘ordinary’ breach of contract. Any limits with regard to foreseeable damages or – if accurate – 
immaterial losses should be considered with the utmost reluctance. A second argument is a policy 
argument which results from this analysis. The risk of undercompensation remains far more likely 
than the risk of overcompensation. 
5.6  Intermezzo: three remarks 
Before the five recommendations for adapting the law of remedies in contract in case of deliberate 
breach of contract are presented, three preliminary remarks need to be made, because the 
recommendations are not all suitable in every case of deliberate breach of contract in every legal 
system. The appropriate solution depends on the concrete circumstances of the case. The arguments 
as presented  in the previous sections help to categorize and structure the level of deliberateness.  
First, as Chapter 2 already indicated, deliberate breach is not a term with a single definition and the 
appropriate remedial solution may be adapted accordingly. The majority of authors and courts use 
this term or a synonym of this term to indicate a breach of contract which yields a financial 
advantage for the party in breach. The party in breach commits breach deliberately if the advantage 
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is larger than the advantage he would have had if he had performed correctly. According to this 
description, deliberate breach of contract includes the law and economic concept of efficient breach. 
The type of remedial solution which is appropriate to deal with this type of deliberate breach may be 
different from other manifestations of deliberate breach such as the malicious breach according to 
which the party intentionally aims to inflict harm on the aggrieved party without the aim to gain 
financial advantage. The majority of the solutions presented attempts to deal with the financial 
variant of deliberate breach, because this variant seems to be the most frequent one occurring. If 
another variant of deliberate breach is meant to be addressed, an explicit reference will be made. 
Second, in order to assess a specific solution as “appropriate”, it should be clear in advance what the 
objective of a specific remedial solution is. Because deliberate breach of contract is in essence an 
undesirable way of behavior as has been shown by moral, systematic, practical and economic 
arguments, it should ultimately be prevented. Therefore, an appropriate remedial solution should 
have a deterrent effect in order to prevent parties to consider deliberate breach of contract as a 
possible option with advantages and disadvantages. Prevention and deterrence suggest an ex ante 
approach. Remedies are primarily designed to be invoked ex post, i.e. after a breach of contract 
occurred. The threat of a severe remedy may however prevent a party from committing deliberate 
breach so that the actual remedy does not have to be invoked at all. The paradox of this line of 
reasoning is that the ideal situation would be that the law of remedies would be adapted in line with 
this objective of prevention and deterrence, whereas the success of this adaptation would be 
maximal, when the presented solutions are practically never used. Apart from the deterrent effect of 
the remedy in order to be appropriate, it should also have another effect if deliberate breach of 
contract despite the deterrent effect takes place. An appropriate remedial solution should guarantee 
a smooth and easy way for the victim of the breach to receive full compensation. The generally 
legitimate thresholds limiting the possibility to receive full compensation should be lowered as the 
concrete solutions provide in order to guarantee that the victim of the deliberate breach does not 
have to bear any negative financial consequences of the deliberate breach of contract. Prevention, 
deterrence and maximal compensation are the key notions in terms of objectives of the 
recommendations and adaptations in the remedies in contract. At the same time, the remedies 
should not be out of line with the underlying systematic coherency and economic feasibility of the 
law of remedies in contract. In other words, the remedial solutions should fit into the concrete 
applicable legal system, whereas parties should not be deterred from relying on the law of contract. 
Third, the following recommendations are not applicable on an equal basis in every legal system. An 
eclectic approach followed by this thesis can be well defended, but it remains necessary to take into 
account that breach of contract in every legal system and in every legal family – e.g. civil law or 
common law – requires different answers. The arguments reveal part of the variety of the possible 
perspectives, but the explanation of the various recommendations also reveals the differences in 
application of the specific recommendation. 
5.7  Recommendation I: Deliberate breach and actual performance 
In case of deliberate breach of contract a claim for performance of the contractual obligation should 
be accessible and strong. 
Taking into account the third preliminary remark, this recommendation renders different results in 
civil law jurisdictions compared with common law jurisdictions. The right to performance in civil law 
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jurisdictions is stronger than the remedy for specific performance in common law jurisdictions. In the 
latter, a right to performance does not exist, it is a remedy granted by the courts on a discretionary 
basis. The basis for a strong and easily enforceable claim for performance in case of deliberate 
breach of contract in general is based on the idea that contracts are concluded in light of the 
expectation that they are going to be performed. Deliberate breach of contract in every 
manifestation – either the financial or the malicious version – is a direct violation of the relationship 
of trust between contractual partners and in a law of contract which does not appropriately react to 
this type of breach. A strong and enforceable claim for performance directly resulting from the 
contract, not from the breach of contract, prevents deliberate breach of contract in the first place. 
The existence of a right to performance in civil law jurisdiction means that this recommendation is 
especially relevant for common law jurisdictions. 
In civil law jurisdictions the discussion about the possibility of efficient breach as a special 
manifestation of deliberate breach largely remains an academic discussion. Efficient breach is a 
manifestation of deliberate breach of contract and should be prevented and deterred and a strong 
and enforceable right to performance guarantees the incentive for parties to refrain from committing 
deliberate breach including efficient breach. In civil law jurisdictions, this recommendation in essence 
already exists. The right to performance as it stands need not be changed in a serious way in cases of 
deliberate breach of contract.  
In common law jurisdictions, the situation is different. The debate about the way the law of contract 
should deal with deliberate breach of contract seems to be more urgent, because of the lack of a 
strong right to performance. Although Chitty starts with this Holmesian premise, it immediately 
scales down its importance with four counterarguments, which are meant to illustrate that English 
law cares for legal assurance that primary promises are kept. First, courts may enforce primary 
obligations, namely in actions for the agreed sum. Second, damages are generally awarded to bring 
the injured party in the position as if the contract had been correctly performed. Third, in certain 
cases where breach is deliberate, but conventional damages cannot heal the injustice, account of 
profits in the sphere of unjust enrichment may be available. Fourth, an order of specific performance 
cannot easily be denied, because denial leads to contempt of court according to procedural law.391 
However, these four arguments do not sufficiently tackle the idea that the principle of binding force 
has to be approached carefully in a common law context. The second and fourth argument are no 
real arguments to counter Holmes, because Holmes does not deny the possibility of monetary 
sanctions – i.e. damages – in the case of breach or even deliberate breach of contract. He even 
emphasizes that damages should be available. The severe punishment of the party breaching an 
order for specific performance does not take away that parties do not have a right to specific 
performance of the contractual obligations or promises. They should request an order from the 
court. The first and third argument are more convincing, but the first is of limited weight, because 
the action for the agreed sum is a very specific action and does not counter the principle that 
damages are the primary remedy. The third argument is very interesting for this thesis, because the 
possibility of the award of account of profits in certain cases of breach of contract may even suggest 
that English law pays attention to the motive of the party in breach. Moreover, it may push parties to 
perform the primary obligations, because it may provide a disincentive to commit breach. If the party 
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in breach should hand over his gain received from the breach itself, why not just perform the 
contractual obligation?392 
As established in Chapter 1, a claim for specific performance is judged by the court, which has a 
discretionary power to award or to deny the claim. The doctrinal rule is that damages as a remedy in 
the specific case are not adequate in order to honor the claim for specific performance. In practice, in 
many situations, the claim for specific performance is assessed on the basis of concrete 
circumstances. In cases of sale of land or in cases where the object of the contractual obligation is 
unique, specific performance is generally available. The practical differences between common law 
and civil law jurisdictions are not very large.393However, when a stronger right to performance in 
reaction on deliberate breach of contract is proposed, it is the principled difference between civil law 
and common law which needs to be emphasized. Especially under US law, a principled discussion has 
recently been developed. The US debate on deliberate breach of contract and its influence on 
remedies in contract can be summarized by contrasting two contradictory views on the law of 
contract. At this point, it is necessary to repeat that US law developed a nuanced approach towards 
deliberate breach. The exact meaning of deliberate breach is not easy to detect, if it can be done at 
all. In US case law, deliberate breach may be allowed in court decisions, as long as it is efficient, 
whereas willful breach is considered as a term with a more negative connotation. From a remedy 
point of view, in both cases it is questionable whether courts treat both manifestations of deliberate 
breach differently from any other non-excusable breach with regard to the remedy of specific 
performance.  
On the one hand, one may argue that contract law does not incorporate assessment of moral 
behavior.394 Consequently, willful breach of contract does not require any other treatment under the 
law of contract than any other breach of contract, for which the debtor can be held liable. Willful 
breach of contract may be morally dubious and the creditor may feel worse after willful breach than 
after any other breach, but that is not what contract law should respond to. In case of breach of 
contract, as a main rule, full expectation damages should be awarded, no more and no less. 
Therefore, no good reason can be given for an extension of the right to actual performance of the 
contract.  According to this line of reasoning, efficient breach is a normal result of the view on the 
law of contract. Even stronger, whereas efficient breach is in line with the law of contract structure 
and should therefore be stimulated, inefficient breach should be deterred, even if it is accidental.  
On the other hand, a more ‘ethical’ perspective can be chosen.395Contract law cannot be considered 
as amoral. In short, motive counts, not only morally, but also legally. The supporters of this view are 
convinced that damages should be more readily available in the case of deliberate breach of 
contract. Moreover, actual performance of the contract is the goal of every contract, so the strength 
of the remedy of specific performance should be revalued. Furthermore, perfect expectation 
damages do not exist in reality. Even if perfect expectation damages can be awarded, a form of 
‘punitive’ damages should be considered to prevent debtors from coldheartedly breaching.  
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Other recommendations explore the area of damages, but it is clear that this recommendation aims 
at the heart of the contractual relationship. The certainty of receiving what the creditor is entitled to 
should be visible in the law of remedies in contract, especially in case of deliberate breach of 
contract. According to this recommendation, the law of contract should not be considered as a pure 
economy driven structure, but as a structure with an own identity. According to the 
recommendation, revaluing the remedy of specific performance should be taken seriously. 
5.8  Recommendation II: Deliberate breach and expectation damages 
Expectation damages should be assessed in favor of the aggrieved party in case of deliberate breach 
of contract. Limits on recovery of unforeseeable damages, costs for legal representation, 
consequential losses, damages for immaterial losses should be applied with reluctance in case of 
deliberate breach of contract. 
A more open acknowledgement of a breach of contract as deliberate offers the law of damages a 
stronger foundation to lift some of the justified limits on expectation damages. It has been argued 
previously that expectation damages do not compensate the victim of the breach completely in 
practically any case which is slightly more complicated than the sale of a loaf of bread on the market. 
Maintaining those limits in general is justified. The law of contract should not be a resort for victims 
of breach of contract attempting to dwell on their losses and above all attempting to get better after 
the breach than before the breach. In general, this situation should be avoided. The law of contract is 
not a goal, it is designed to help parties conclude contracts in order to be able to enhance their 
economic welfare. Limits to damages with regard to foreseeability, with regard to recovery of costs 
of legal representation or with regard to recovery of immaterial losses are generally logical. 
Contracting with parties is a risk and this risk may materialize when something goes wrong. When a 
party is not able to perform correctly, he has to pay, but the victim of the breach will always bear 
some of the burden as well. This picture changes when a party commits breach of contract 
deliberately. The focus is again on a breach which renders a financial advantage for the party 
committing breach.  Be it a case of double sale or a deliberate breach of a long-term contract without 
a good reason except the opportunistic financial one, the victim of the breach could not have taken 
into account such a step when the contract was concluded, because it is not logical. The contract is 
concluded with the idea to make a gain for both parties. Circumstances can change afterwards which 
will possibly make one of the parties regret the decision to conclude a contract, but that by itself 
cannot be sufficient for simply committing breach of contract. The problem with deliberate breach of 
contract is that the party considering breach of contract will only do so because performing is less 
advantageous than committing breach. This decision includes the consideration on the amount of 
damages due after the breach. If the damages are foreseeable and only incorporate the difference 
between the market value of the performance and the contract price, the decision to commit breach 
because of a financial motive is not a difficult one. The trust argument is again important to 
emphasize the gravity of the violation in case of deliberate breach. It is very easy for a victim of 
deliberate breach to lose trust in the institution of contract, if he is not compensated adequately. 
However, it is also important that the threshold for the party considering breach is high.  
5.9  Recommendation III: Deliberate breach and account of profits 
Account of profits as a remedy after breach of contract should be more readily available in case of 
deliberate breach of contract. 
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Account of profits or “disgorgement” of profits is potentially an effective remedy in order to react to 
deliberate breach of contract. It is effective, because it potentially deprives the party committing 
deliberate breach of contract from the profits he made from the breach. As explained, the motive  to 
commit breach is often a financial one in case of a deliberate breach. If a credible remedy exists in 
order to take away the profits of the party committing deliberate breach, this remedy would have 
the preventive, deterrent effect which should make parties think twice before committing deliberate 
breach.  
This recommendation as formulated above suggests that it is already possible at least in some legal 
systems to claim account of profits. The question arises if the current law is already capable of 
dealing with deliberate breach of contract. The remedy of account of profits reveals a deep struggle 
of the law of contractual damages, be it in civil law or common law jurisdictions. The problem with 
account of profits is that it is a remedy naturally aimed at the position of the party in breach.  
However, the law of remedies in contract, and the law of damages especially, in civil law and 
common law jurisdictions are primarily aimed at the position of the victim of the breach.  The victim 
should receive what he contracted for – materialized by a right to or at least a possibility to claim 
performance of the obligation – or the victim should be compensated for his losses by a claim for 
damages.  Account of profits is often presented as a manifestation of a type of damages. This way of 
approaching the remedy of account of profits leads to systematic problems. The primary objective of 
the law of damages is compensation of the victim of the breach. Other objectives, such as 
prevention, deterrence, let alone punishment are not primary objectives of the law of damages, at 
least in contractual situations. This statement formulated in this wide sense is applicable in civil law 
as well as common law jurisdictions. The primary objective of compensation does not rule out the 
possibility that a remedy may also have preventive or deterrent effects. Although these effects are 
taken into account, it is questionable whether prevention, deterrence or punishment may be 
understood as secondary objectives of the law of remedies. The reluctance towards such an 
approach will be discussed below.  
The primary objective of the law of remedies aimed at compensation of the victim of the breach 
allows the possibility of account of profits as a possible alternative for classic expectation damages in 
the sense of covering losses and missed profits of the victim of the breach. Dutch law, for example, 
allows for the possibility to award account of profits. Nevertheless, this possibility is limited by the 
primary objective of the law of damages, because the remedy may only be used as an alternative to 
compensate for damage, i.e. losses incurred and profits foregone. In other words, in this situation 
account of profits is a compensatory remedy. The position of account of profits as a remedy in 
common law jurisdictions is more complicated. English law does not seem fond of awarding account 
of profits in any breach of contract situation. There are some examples in a relatively recent past, but 
since the Blake case, the attitude of the House of Lords c.q. the Supreme Court towards account of 
profits in breach of contract situations has been reluctant, certainly as far as the connection between 
deliberate breach and account of profits is concerned.396 In US law, the situation is somewhat 
different, because a new view seems to arise from the Draft Third Restatement on Unjust Enrichment 
and from legal scholarship. The link between account of profits and deliberate breach is made 
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explicitly in both academic publications, although the Third Restatement uses the term 
‘opportunistic’, ruling out as it seems situations of efficient breach of contract.  As Thel and 
Siegelman argue, a fundamental shift in approach is necessary in order to apply this remedy as 
adequate as possible. They argue that not the expectation of the victim of the breach should be 
leading in assessing damages, but the expectation of the party committing breach of contract. In 
other words, the party committing breach of contract should be placed in the position as if he had 
correctly performed. Therefore, he may be deprived of his profits. This approach means that in the 
near future US law may allow the victim of the breach to claim account of profits as a complete 
alternative to classic expectation damages. 
The struggle of the law of remedies in contract now becomes apparent. The reluctance towards 
other objectives than compensation in the area of remedies in contract is based on the idea that the 
victim of the breach should not receive more than he expected to receive if the obligation concerned 
had been performed correctly. The risk of overcompensation and the possible anticipation of the 
victim of the breach to receiving an overcompensatory remedy by causing a breach of contract 
himself are a first reason to emphasize the objective of compensation for the law of remedies in 
contract in all legal systems. A second reason to be reluctant in this respect is a matter of principle. 
The law of contract is considered to provide a framework structuring – mostly commercial – 
relationships between private parties. As a branch of private law, the law of contract law should in 
contrast with public law, not incorporate any sanctions which contain elements of maintaining public 
order, when the sanctions would lead the party in breach to pay of an amount exceeding the level of 
damage suffered by the victim. Objectives such as deterrence and punishment are therefore not 
suitable to be incorporated as objectives of the law of contract. As the classic theory according to this 
line of reasoning would argue, account of profits cannot be used as a separate remedy as a reaction 
on the deliberateness of the breach and not connected to the disadvantage caused by the breach to 
the victim.397 The benefits of the sanction would be attributed to the victim of the breach, in this case 
the disgorgement of the profits, without the necessity of substantial damage to be compensated. 
Giving the victim a monetary remedy without giving him the duty to prove why he needs the money 
– i.e. the losses incurred and/or profits foregone due to the breach –  means that the victim of the 
breach is provided with other powers than those needed to restore his own financial position.  
This issue is a very essential one, because it reveals another dichotomy which is different from the 
classic common law versus civil law dichotomy. This dichotomy exists between the US legal system 
and the European legal systems. As Hodges argues, the US legal system historically attributes more 
power to private parties in order to fortify his own position, but also as a serious instrument to 
correct their fellow citizens.398 Historically, the reason for the emphasis on private vindication of the 
law can be explained by the traditionally small role of the state in practically every part of society 
compared to European states. The other closely related reason is that the confidence in public 
defense and vindication of the law is far less developed in the US than in Europe. Accordingly, 
European states are built on a strong public confidence which reduces the necessity of private parties 
to enter into the domain of taking preventive, deterrent or even punitive action towards their fellow 
citizens in private law disputes. Although for example the English jurisdiction is very different from 
                                                          
397
 Hodges 2011, p. 104, 105. 
398
 Hodges 2011, p. 104, 105. 
161 
 
the Dutch or French jurisdiction, the idea that the law of damages primarily serves a compensatory 
purpose and not a vindictive or punitive purpose is present in all these systems. As explained, the 
idea of giving the victim of deliberate breach the possibility of claiming account of profits because of 
the deliberateness without taking into account the level of damage at the side of the victim is 
therefore in US law a more logical option than in European systems. 
Approaching the relationship towards the remedy of account of profits from a private versus public 
enforcement perspective seems to emphasize the differences between the legal systems mentioned 
above. The opportunities for using account of profits in European jurisdictions in order to deal with 
situations of deliberate breach also seem to be very limited accordingly. From this perspective, it also 
seems logical in the US legal system to widen the scope of applicability of account of profits as 
proposed by the Third Restatement in case of deliberate breach of contract. However, reality is 
always more complicated. It is far too simple proposing to introduce a claim for account of profits in 
case of deliberate breach in European legal systems without any substantial further condition.   
The existing differences between the application of account of profits as a remedy in the US legal 
system and the European legal systems are smaller than it seems. As Chapter 4 showed in some 
cases account of profits is already available under European legal systems. The Dutch Ymere case is a 
good example. The Dutch remedy of account of profits is limited by art. 6:104 BW. This provision, as 
discussed, only allows account of profits as a way of assessment of damages, whereas it is also at the 
discretion of the court to award this remedy. In other words, the victim has to show any damage and 
there should also be a good reason to claim account of profits instead of ‘normal’ expectation 
damages. The Ymere case is special, because Ymere suffered damage in the form of missed rent due 
to illegal subletting.399 The claim for account of profits was substantially higher than the amount of 
missed rent. The victim of the breach – Ymere – had to develop a system in order to detect the 
practice of subletting. This argument justified a higher claim and the claim was honored by the courts 
whereas the argument was upheld by the Hoge Raad.  It is clear that although there should be a 
minimum level of damage, the claim for account of profits need not per se match the actual level of 
damage. In this case, it seems that the party committing the breach at least partly pays for 
vindication of policy set out in all contracts with tenants other than himself. However, the Hoge Raad 
emphasized that Dutch law of damages does not contain a punitive element. Unfortunately, the 
breach as such was not labeled specifically as deliberate, whereas on the other hand the Hoge Raad 
ruled that the level of fault may be a relevant element in deciding on the applicability of art. 6:104 
and also on the level of the awarded amount. In my opinion, this decision shows that labeling the 
breach as deliberate can solve the complicated issue of positioning deliberateness of the breach of 
contract as a core element for the availability of account of profits. 
The plea for a more accessible remedy of account of profits in case of deliberate breach of contract is 
a nuanced proposal. A more direct acknowledgement of deliberateness of the breach will give the 
court a more credible argument in order to award a claim of account of profits. The justification for 
the award of account of profits must be found in the violated trust of the victim in the contract and a 
minimum level of actual damage suffered as a consequence of the deliberate breach. It is essential 
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that the court labels the breach concerned as deliberate if the party committing the breach acquires 
a financial advantage resulting from the breach. The aggravated level of fault justifies a remedy 
which in a limited way oversteps the compensatory objective of the law of remedies in contract. The 
system of remedies in contract needs to be able to respond to the direct violation of the mutual trust 
in order to be able to deal adequately with deliberate breach of contract. 
5.10 Recommendation IV: Deliberate breach and punitive damages 
Punitive damages in exceptional cases may serve as a last resort for excessive deliberate breach 
situations. 
The area of punitive damages in contract law is a dangerous one. Systematically, the law of contract 
refuses to incorporate punitive damages as a remedy after breach of contract. Of all potential 
purposes next to compensation, the objective of punishment is resented the most of all. It is evident 
that in European legal systems punitive damages in the law of contract are rejected. Next to the 
argument that punitive action is a public enforcement issue and not a private enforcement issue, 
European legal systems generally do not need punitive damages. The existence of a right to 
performance in most continental systems which at least gives the victim of breach a good position to 
negotiate on the level of damages takes away an immediate reason to provide the victim of the 
breach with such a powerful monetary weapon. The option to include a penalty clause into the 
contract in order to enforce performance at the cost of a substantial penalty is also an option which 
would make the availability of punitive damages slightly over the top. Furthermore, taking into 
account the primary objective of compensation of the law of damages in contract situations, which 
has already been discussed, it is not a surprise that punitive damages do not fit into the box of 
remedies in contract. The question is whether punitive damages should be allowed for deliberate 
breach of contract in European legal systems, including English law. The answer would be in general 
negative for several reasons. The most important reason is that although deliberate breach of 
contract is an underestimated legal phenomenon, a change of remedies in contract which would 
address this problem involving the introduction of punitive damages, would simply be a step too far. 
In European legal systems, the concept of punitive damages in general is only accepted in a limited 
way in tort situations. Liability in tort is generally considered as more serious than liability in contract, 
because of the involuntary relationship between the victim and the tortfeasor. Systematically, the 
law of contract would be out of balance, if a victim of breach of contract had access to a remedy 
which is generally not even available in situations of tort liability. Furthermore, the risk of deterrence 
to  the commercial market, not to commit deliberate breach , but to incorporate the law of contract 
of a European legal system as the law governing the contract, would be large. Another argument is 
that punitive damages do not assist sufficiently in achieving the objectives which would make a 
remedy appropriate in order to deal sufficiently with deliberate breach of contract. 
In general, this recommendation in the area of damages is of relatively minor importance for the 
reasons just mentioned. However, the recommendation is made with a reason. In US law, punitive 
damages in contract is more openly discussed than on the European continent. An important reason 
is again as explained before the difference between private and public enforcement. In tort law, 
punitive damages are a structural part of the remedial possibility of the claimant. Nevertheless, the 
general attitude is that punitive damages in contract law are even in the US not a logical option, 
because of commercial and economic stability reasons. Parties should be able to calculate which risks 
they run and the possibility of facing punitive damages would not encourage commercial parties to 
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conclude contracts. There is one exception and that is the insurance contract as explained in Chapter 
3, although the possibility of punitive damages is only accessible via the tort of bad faith breach. The 
core idea is that insurance companies should not have the possibility and the economic freedom to 
procrastinate payments on legal claims based on the policy, only because the insurance companies 
know that they only need to pay the insured amount. This problem, especially when it is an 
institutionalized policy instead of a random mistake is not limited to the US territory. In the US under 
strict circumstances, the claimant has the option to claim punitive damages if he can prove that the 
breach of contract also qualifies as the tort of bad faith breach. The tort is the deliberate non-
payment on a valid claim in the hope that the claimant does not have sufficient financial assets to 
start and continue with legal proceedings. The insurance company hopes to get away with his 
behavior, because it can be financially attractive. This is a good example of the type of deliberate 
breach the law of contract should respond to adequately. US law does so by introducing punitive 
damages under strict conditions. This recommendation does not primarily plead for an extension of 
punitive damages in the US legal system to other cases of deliberate breach of contract, because 
other recommendation should largely be able to fill the gaps. In European jurisdictions, there is a 
serious lack of adequate response to this conduct. Payment on a policy constitutes an obligation to 
pay money. Not every legal system is able to deal with this specific problem adequately, because the 
only serious sanction on late payment is the additional payment of interest. Such a provision is too 
predictable and not deterring the insurance company from committing deliberate breach. A lack of 
adequate response in European jurisdictions may allow for introduction of punitive damages in this 
specific area of contract. 
5.11 Recommendation V: Deliberate breach and termination 
Termination should be more easily accessible for the aggrieved party in case of deliberate breach of 
contract. 
The remedy of termination is generally not considered to be available as of right after breach of 
contract. A simple breach of contract is often not sufficient to trigger the remedy of termination. 
Terminating the contract in essence means that one of the parties does not have sufficient 
confidence in correct and complete performance of the agreed contractual obligation. Terminating 
the contract causes problems once one or both parties have already started to perform. If 
termination is meant to be remedy for breach of contract, the loss of confidence which triggers a 
party to terminate the contract only starts at the moment of the breach of contract and not at the 
moment of the conclusion of the contract. Suppose that A agreed to build a house for B. A starts 
building, but he fails to complete his tasks. B wants to terminate. B does not question that he wanted 
to conclude a contract. However, after the termination, the part performances should – at least in 
principle – be undone. This simple example shows that undoing the part performances can be a 
problematic and complex issue. Because termination is considered to be a severe remedy, many 
jurisdictions, but also for example the DCFR and the CESL, recognize a certain threshold in order to 
have access to termination. In the DCFR as well as in many common law jurisdictions, a breach 
should be fundamental in order to trigger the availability of termination.400In civil law jurisdictions, 
the party committing breach should in general be granted a second chance to perform before the 
aggrieved party has access to the remedy of termination. 
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The motive of the party committing breach should influence the assessment of the importance of the 
breach or the importance of the breached term.  In other words, the existing thresholds in various 
legal systems may in general be justified, but not in case of a deliberate breach of contract. For civil 
law jurisdictions, this point of view lead to the suggestion that a debtor who commits deliberate 
breach of contract wastes his second chance to perform, because he deliberately avoids to attempt 
to perform correctly the first time. In other words, the debtor should not have a second chance in 
case of deliberate breach of contract. In jurisdictions working with the requirement of fundamental 
breach, deliberateness of the breach should generally make a breach fundamental in order to grant 
the aggrieved party access to termination. In common law jurisdictions, a deliberate breach of any 
term – be it a condition, an innominate term or a warranty – should be sufficient to grant the 
aggrieved party access to termination. Termination seems to be the most logical remedy for the 
aggrieved party, because he will lose any confidence in performance. If the aggrieved party lost 
confidence in the debtor it does not seem realistic or logical in economic terms to grant him another 
chance to perform.  Moreover, from an economic perspective it is not logical to deny access to 
termination because access to termination will grant the aggrieved party a better negotiation 
position in order to cover the losses incurred after the first, deliberate breach.  
5.12 Recommendation VI: Deliberate breach and penalty clauses 
Penalty clauses should not be mitigated in case of deliberate breach of contract. Penalty clauses 
should not be declared invalid if the breach concerned is deliberate.  
This recommendation is slightly different from the first five, because it is on the party-arranged 
remedy – the penalty clause – and not on the standard remedies after breach of contract. 
Enforcement of penalty clauses is systematically hard to label, because there are elements of actual 
performance involved –enforcement of the clause itself –, but also elements of damages – how to 
assess the validity of the clause and the mitigation powers of the court – as well as purely contractual 
elements which do not refer to the law of remedies – parties agreed to this clause, why would the 
court interfere?  
As the previous chapters show, the most relevant distinction in approaching the penalty clause is the 
common law-civil law one. Common law does not allow penalty clauses unless they contain a 
genuine pre-estimate of potential damages, whereas civil law allows penalty clauses, but also allows 
courts to mitigate the penalty. The recommendation attempts to address both variations and adds a 
third one with regard to deliberate breach of contract. A party who commits deliberate breach of 
contract defies the confidence of the other party in the contract, but also defies the economic value 
of the contract as a document to rely on and to make further economic decisions. In order to 
diminish the risk of non-performance parties incorporate penalty clauses into their contracts. It 
would be an anomaly, when a party deliberately avoids performance, whereas he maintains a chance 
in court that the penalty will be mitigated. In such a case, the penalty clause would miss its goal. In 
common law jurisdictions, the potential strength of penalty clauses is been undone by the possibility 
of parties to litigate in court over the clause being a penalty clause or a liquidated damages clause.  
Lengthy proceedings are something parties always want to avoid. If a breach is deliberate, a common 
law court should automatically label the clause as a penalty clause in order to avoid arguments on 
the status of the clause. If the sanction on deliberate breach is not sufficiently clear and severe, the 
debtor can strategically attempt to consider committing breach without immediately facing the 
penalty he himself agreed to.  
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5.13 Conclusion: 4 arguments, 6 recommendations;  a general approach or case-by-case 
solutions? 
This chapter offers an answer to two fundamental research questions of this thesis: 
Why should deliberateness of the contractual breach influence the availability and the extent of 
remedies in contract?  
How should deliberateness of the contractual breach influence the availability and the extent of 
remedies in contract? 
The first question is answered by presenting four arguments which explain the necessity of 
recognizing the relevance of deliberateness as an element of influence on the availability and extent 
of remedies in contract: a moral, a systematic, a practical and an economic argument. All of these 
arguments reject counterarguments in their own area. 
The moral argument reasons that mutual trust between parties to the contract and the trust of the 
parties in the system of contract law proves the moral relevance of deliberate breach and the need 
to prevent parties from being confronted with deliberate breach of contract. 
The systematic argument reasons that the general absence of attention for motive of breach of 
contract is not compatible with the function of remedies in the law of contract in various legal 
systems. 
The practical argument reasons that deliberate breach of contract is not a single-definition term and 
that the most relevant types of deliberate breach for this thesis and its remedy- based approach may 
be made plausible by the aggrieved party without proving actual subjective intent. 
The economic argument argues on the one hand that efficient breach is not a concept which should 
be implemented in the law of contract, because it is based on assumptions which are all disputable 
and on the other hand that the risk of overcompensation in the case of specifically dealing with 
deliberate breach of contract is not a good reason to deny the relevance of deliberate breach. 
Undercompensation still remains a larger risk than overcompensation and the risk of 
overcompensation in specific cases of deliberate breach of contract does not threaten the systematic 
and economic stability of the law of contract. 
The second research question is answered by presenting five recommendations which are based on 
the four arguments mentioned before. These recommendations are proposals for adaptation of the 
law of remedies in contract in several ways in order to deal with deliberate breach in an appropriate 
way, taking into account preconditions such as the vagueness of the term “deliberate breach”, the 
variety in legal systems and the objectives which should be achieved with the adaptations. 
I In case of deliberate breach of contract a claim for performance of the contractual obligation 
should be accessible and strong. 
II Expectation damages should be assessed in favor of the aggrieved party in case of deliberate 
breach of contract. Limits on recovery of unforeseeable damages, costs for legal 
representation, consequential losses, damages for immaterial losses should be applied with 
reluctance in case of deliberate breach of contract. 
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III Account of profits as a remedy after breach of contract should be more readily available in 
case of deliberate breach of contract. 
IV Punitive damages in exceptional cases may serve as a last resort for excessive deliberate 
breach situations. 
V Termination should be more easily accessible for the aggrieved party in case of deliberate 
breach of contract. 
VI Penalty clauses should not be mitigated in case of deliberate breach of contract. Penalty 
clauses should not be declared invalid if the breach concerned is deliberate.  
Based on these general recommendations, it is necessary to make a last step. The recommendations 
are not generally applicable on every single case of deliberate breach, because this legal 
phenomenon occurs in many different situations and the recommendations regard various solutions. 
The value of a general approach is to signal that the law of contract needs to refocus on breach of 
contract and this chapter offers arguments and tools in order to shape a structured framework to be 
able to solve individual cases of deliberate breach of contract. The next chapter will use this 
framework in an attempt to solve five different and concrete cases. At the same time, links with 
current legal systems are inevitable and suggestions on a concrete level will be the last step in order 









6  Eight case studies on deliberate breach of contract: the 
pudding and the eating 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter attempts to answer the second normative research question: 
How should deliberateness of the contractual breach influence the availability and the extent of 
remedies in contract? 
As Chapter 5 provided a first step in answering this question in a theoretical way by formulating 
recommendations on how remedies in contract should be applied in case of deliberate breach of 
contract, this chapter illustrates how these recommendations may work out in concrete case studies. 
This chapter presents case studies which are designed in order to show the way deliberateness of the 
breach can be part of a remedial solution. The case studies are not randomly chosen and designed. 
Most of them are loosely based on existing cases, some of them are specifically designed for this 
chapter, but they are all created to illustrate the various ways deliberateness can be incorporated in 
the law of remedies in contract in concrete cases. 
The case studies illustrate that deliberate breach should be a relevant element in deciding on the 
application of remedies in contract. This chapter is essential, because a general approach towards 
the influence of deliberateness on remedies as provided in Chapter 5 is not sufficient. Although the 
general recommendations formulated in the previous chapter may serve as guidelines, case by case 
solutions are often inevitable. Differences in solution inter alia depend on the type of contract, on 
the type of invoked remedies, on the capacity of the parties and on the exact reason for breach. It 
has been said before, but deliberateness is not a notion with a single definition and the nature of the 
deliberateness is a serious indication for the applicable remedy.  
The 8 case studies attempt to deal with all these variables. The main thread is that deliberateness 
should be taken into account in the decision on the application of the remedies. Nevertheless, type 
of contract, type of specific obligation breached, the capacity of the parties – professional or non-
professional –, the preference of the remedy invoked by the aggrieved party, they all affect the exact 
remedial solution and the influence of deliberateness of the breach on the solution on a case by case 
basis. The classic example of the deliberate breach is dealt with in the first case study, the double 
sale case. The tension between performance and damages needs a satisfactory solution. The second 
case study also deals with a sales contract, albeit sale of land, but the type of violated obligation is 
different: not the primary, but a secondary obligation has been deliberately violated. This difference 
has consequences for the influence of the deliberateness on the remedies invoked. The third case 
study centralizes a long-term service contract. Moreover, the obligation deliberately breached is one 
to pay money. Both circumstances should be taken into account, once the effect of deliberateness on 
the remedial solution is assessed. The fourth case study also deals with a contract concerning rent of 
a premises and an attached obligation to run a business in the premises for a longer period of time. 
This specific type of obligation, which is part of a long-term contract is again a different and relevant 
circumstance to take into account. The fifth case study is an example of deliberate breach in a 
building and construction contract. This case study provides a good example of a deliberate breach 
which causes only minimal material damage, when a swimming pool is built with only minimal 
deviations from the contractual specifications. The sixth case study is concerns an overbooking case 
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with strong resemblances to the first classic double sale case. This case study is relevant for 
demonstrating the influence of deliberateness on the remedy of damages, when the consequences 
of the breach are severe, perhaps even beyond the foreseeability limit, whereas the airline company 
also relies on an exclusion clause. The seventh case study reveals an unexpected feature of the 
influence of deliberateness, once the remedy of specific performance is invoked as defense 
mechanism. The eighth case study on bad faith insurances reveals the potential influence of 
deliberateness on the availability of punitive damages, which is a far from regular remedy in the area 
of contract law in general.   
The case studies show that deliberate breach can often be retraced to a decision with financial 
motives. Nevertheless, not every deliberate breach is similar to the other. A breach in order to obtain 
a profit differs from a breach in order to avoid a loss. A breach in order to obtain a profit, preceded 
by a certain policy – such as in the airline tickets case or in the bad insurance case – differ from the 
single breach. The differences materialize in the degree of influence of deliberateness on the 
remedy. The conclusion of this chapter attempts to categorize the breaches against a ‘severity’ 
yardstick in terms of remedies. 
This way of presentation justifies a general exoneration clause. These case studies are presented 
with the objective to visibly implement deliberateness as a relevant element in remedial solutions to 
breach of contract. They are designed to convincingly show the effect of the possible manifestations 
of deliberateness.  Therefore, the cases are short and per definition simplifications of a more 
complex reality. The case studies are intentionally designed in order to emphasize the relevance of 
the element of deliberateness. The presented solution is a solution to the case, supported with 
arguments, but without extensive references to academic contributions, because this chapter 
presents the solutions of the author. 
6.2  Case study 1: the double sale case 
A sells an old but complete collection of Dostoyevsky writings in Russian to B for the amount of EUR 
5000. B values the collection at EUR 6500. A complete collection in this type of print is rare, but not 
unique.  After the conclusion of the contract between A and B, C approaches A and offers him EUR 
7500 for the same collection. A sells and delivers the collection to C for EUR 7500.  
a. B claims account of profits from A. Should his claim be allowed? 
b. Suppose A and B have incorporated a penalty clause of EUR 8000 into the contract if A 
cannot deliver. Can B claim the entire amount after the breach? 
Type of contract: sales contract  
Primary obligation A: selling and delivering the collection to B 
Primary obligation B: Paying EUR 5000 
Breach of contract: A does not deliver the collection to B 
Element of deliberateness in breach: A sells collection to C for a larger sum of money. Aim of A to 
achieve a larger profit as a result of the breach 
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Remedial solutions: Account of profits and on validity and granting the amount in the penalty clause 
to prevent the double sale. 
Ad a 
The breach in this case can be considered as a deliberate breach. A commits breach of contract, 
because he wants to achieve a financial advantage which he misses if he performs instead of 
committing breach of contract. The motive for the breach is not to inflict damage on B – although A  
apparently does not care what the consequences of the breach for B are –, but for opportunistic 
reasons.  
The claim for account of profits seems somewhat unusual compared to the ‘ordinary’ remedies such 
as a claim for performance or a claim for compensatory or expectation damages. Both claims are 
considered to be standard remedies in case of every breach of contract. It is to be assumed that B is 
primarily interested in the collection. However, although B seems to have a theoretical right to 
performance, a straightforward claim for performance is not a logical step for B, because A already 
sold and delivered the collection to C. Performance of the original obligation is therefore difficult. A 
claim for performance is therefore not effective. Furthermore, the collection may not be completely 
unique, but it is assumed to be not easy for A to find an exact copy on the market. The availability of 
a right for performance in cases like these should however not be underestimated. As we shall see, a 
strong right to performance will help B to sustain his claim for account of profits. 
If B claims expectation damages (EUR 1500), he may be adequately compensated in this specific case, 
but this remedy in general does not prevent A from committing breach, because A still profits from 
the breach (EUR 1000).  
A claim for account of profits in this case serves a double purpose. If the claim is allowed, this remedy 
adequately compensates B, disgorges the profit from A and prevents future breaches. Both 
objectives are justified once the breach is labeled as deliberate.  
If B claims account of profits, i.e. the profits which A gained as a result of the breach of contract. He 
effectively claims EUR 2500. The decision to allow this claim in full would mean a visible 
manifestation of the relevance of deliberateness of the breach in establishing remedies in contract as 
described in the third situation. Account of profits is not a standard remedy in cases of breach of 
contract. Allowing the claim would increase the remedial possibilities of B. B should have access to 
this remedy, because of the two reasons mentioned above. B wants adequate compensation and he 
wants to minimize the risk that A or any other future contracting party may be tempted to sell twice. 
Seeking the right reasons for allowing B access to account of profits can only be explained if the two 
standard remedies performance and expectation damages are addressed again. B in essence wants 
to obtain the collection. That means that the so-called adequate compensation according to the 
standard criteria may be adequate in financial terms, but it is never the same as receiving the 
collection itself. Especially because it is hard for B to buy another similar collection, the difference 
between performance and adequate compensation is large. C offered EUR 7500 for the collection. 
Although the case does not offer any additional information, C probably attaches an even higher 
value to the collection; otherwise he would not have bought it for this price. If B can claim 
performance, the only feasible way for A to answer this claim is to rebuy the collection. He should at 
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least pay EUR 7500 to C in that case and probably more.  However, allowing this claim in this 
situation is problematic, because the claim is too burdensome for A and too uncertain for B. A does 
not know whether C is willing to resell the collection to him and if he does not succeed, the claim 
itself is worthless. For B, it is highly unlikely that he receives the collection A promised to him.  
A claim for account of profits is feasible in this case, because A commits a deliberate breach of 
contract. The factor of deliberateness justifies a remedy which is compensatory and preventive as 
well. The value of the claim overrides the compensation limit (EUR 2500 and EUR 1500), but the 
overcompensation can be justified by two reasons. First, the incentive to commit breach again is 
taken away by disgorge the profit from A if the claim is allowed. Second, the value of the claim may 
not represent the value B attaches to the collection, but it is – apparently – the most up-to-date 
market value, because C paid EUR 7500 for the collection. 
Ad b 
If A fails to deliver the collection to B, B in essence wants to have the books. Unfortunately, as argued 
under Ad a, the practical and formal problems to enforce performance will not invite B to choose this 
option as a remedy.  In this example, A and B anticipated on a possible breach of contract by 
incorporating a penalty clause into their contract. The value of the penalty oversteps the value both 
parties attach to the collection, so it is clear that the clause not only pre-estimates potential damages 
but also serves as a trigger to perform correctly. Nevertheless, A ignores the clause and delivers the 
collection to A. Dependent on the type of jurisdiction – civil law or common law, but the presentation 
of this concrete case law solution does not require a full explanation of both systems again –  the 
contract is subject to, A may rely on two possible escapes. The first is mitigation of the penalty. In a 
jurisdiction where penalty clauses are allowed, they are in general enforced without interference of 
the court. However, under circumstances, the court may interfere. A discrepancy between concrete 
damages and the amount mentioned in the penalty clause is often not sufficient to justify mitigation, 
but a large discrepancy sometimes allows the court to interfere, certainly when other circumstances 
point in the direction of mitigation, such as the role of B or the potential bad financial position of A. 
No indication of extra circumstances is given. In cases like these, the suggestion for a solution is that 
the court avoids mitigating the penalty, if breach is deliberate, even if the amount of the penalty is 
substantially larger than the incurred losses or missed profits. Parties exercised their freedom of 
contract to secure performance in their own contract. Circumstances may justify that a court 
afterwards interferes, but not in case of deliberate breach, because the party committing deliberate 
breach takes into account the possibility of mitigation once he decides to commit breach. In this 
case, A should be prevented to sell the collection to C. The threat of full payment of the penalty, a 
threat parties themselves included into the contract, should be clear in advance.  
The second ‘hope’ for A after his deliberate decision to sell the collection to C is the decision of a 
court to label the clause as a forbidden penalty clause, because a clause may only be legitimate once 
it represents a genuine pre-estimate of damages – a liquidated damages clause. In case of deliberate 
breach, this discussion on the validity of penalty clauses should be avoided, because it is a source of 
uncertainty on which the debtor, A, can gamble once he decides to commit breach. Litigation on the 
nature of the clause scares both parties and A has a good chance of a good position to negotiate 
even though he is the one committing breach of contract. If the clause is rendered invalid, B still has 
the possibility to claim expectation damages, but A may have taken into account this option, because 
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he obtains a profit after selling the collection to C and paying B expectation damages  (EUR 7500 – 
EUR 6500 = EUR 1000). In other words, if the court renders the breach to be deliberate, as it is in this 
case, a clause foreseeing in payment of a certain amount of money, should be declared valid and not 
subject to mitigation as argued in the previous paragraph. 
6.3  Case study 2: the farmland case 
Farmer A, sells a piece of his land to his neighbor B. B’s piece of land is situated next to A’s land. Both 
pieces are farm land at the time of the sale. B has non-material interests in order to agree on a clause 
in the contract with A that A will not use the piece of land sold by B for building purposes – B has an 
attractive view from his own house. At the time of the conclusion of the contract A is not allowed to 
build houses on his piece of land due to public law. The public law situation changes shortly after the 
sale and A is allowed to build houses. He starts to build immediately, because he is able to make a 
large profit from building and selling the houses. Although the value of B’s own farmland is not 
affected, the view from his house is less attractive. 
a. B claims account of profits from A. Should his claim be allowed? 
b. B claims non-pecuniary damages, because of the loss of the view due to the building 
activities. Should his claim be allowed? 
Type of contract: Sales contract 
Primary obligation B: transferring the piece of land 
Primary obligation A: Paying the price  
Breach of contract: Although A paid the price according to the contract, B commits breach of the 
secondary obligation not to build any constructions on the sold piece of land by building several 
houses on it. 
Element of deliberateness: B consciously deviated from the contract, because he can obtain a larger 
profit from the piece of land by buying houses on it instead of leaving the land in its original state.  
Remedial solutions: Account of profits and/or damages for non-pecuniary losses 
Ad a 
Although this case is completely different from the previous case study, the aggrieved party – in this 
case B – invokes similar remedies. B claims account of profits in the sense that he claims the full 
profits A has earned by building houses on his land contrary to the contractual obligation he has 
towards B. This case study is included to illustrate that the concrete circumstances of the case, such 
as the type of contract and the object of the contract, are relevant in deciding which remedies are 
allowed taking into account the deliberateness of the breach. 
The breach in this case can be considered as a deliberate breach. A concluded a contract with B and 
agreed to the specific clause not to build on his land. Once he got the opportunity, he built houses on 
his land anyway. This decision is conscious and the reason for A to build houses and neglect his 
contractual obligation towards B is the promise of financial gain. By building houses A obtains a profit 
which he would not have received if he had abided by the contractual obligations. 
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Although this analysis does not differ from the analysis in the previous case study, the circumstances 
under which A commits deliberate breach in this case are different.  The most important difference is 
that A fulfills his main obligation of the contract, whereas he breaks a secondary obligation. A’s main 
obligation is to pay the money for the piece of land he obtained. The obligation he did not fulfill is a 
secondary obligation – i.e. the obligation to use the piece of land in a specific way. This circumstance 
is relevant, because the deliberateness of the breach is not aimed at the destruction of the contract 
with B, whereas it is in the first case study. Although A does not fulfill all his obligations according to 
the contract – and A does so deliberately – the trust argument is not as strong in this case as in the 
previous case study. Another circumstance which may decrease the influence of the deliberateness 
in this case is that B as the selling party in the process of negotiations – the object is a piece of land, 
so these contracts are not concluded overnight – could have negotiated for more contractual or 
property-related guarantees in order to be sure that A would not commit breach of contract. Taking 
into account these circumstances, the approach to a claim for account of profits differs from the 
approach in the previous case. B would perhaps also like to claim performance of the contract, but 
this option is not discussed in this case, because the contractual claim for performance may interfere 
with the freedom of A as the owner of the land to build on his own land. It may not be easy to force B 
to demolish the buildings based on a contractual claim. 
As explained in the first case study, perfect compensation for B and prevention of future deliberate 
breaches should be the core objective of the remedy of account of profits. However, B again will 
probably be overcompensated once his claim is allowed in full. He already received the price for the 
piece of land. A suffers damage on a non-material level, but no measurable other material losses. A 
on the other hand obtains a large financial gain. The gap between the compensation of the non-
material losses and the profits of A is considerable. The overcompensation B receives is not in 
general an insurmountable problem in case of deliberate breach as the previous case study. 
Nevertheless, the circumstances of the specific case should justify the overcompensation specifically 
taking into account the validity of the objective of prevention of future deliberate breaches. The 
circumstances in this case do not justify a quite severe remedy such as account of profits in this case. 
Allowing this remedy would not only give an incentive to B to lure A into committing breach of 
contract, because he would have access to a too generous remedy, but allowing account of profits in 
this case would frustrate A in his capacity as the owner of the piece of land, because he is factually 
deprived of the possibility to make a profit of his own property. Taking also into account that A fulfills 
his primary obligation by paying the price and only commits deliberate breach of a secondary 
obligation, the conclusion that account of profits should not be available in this case is justified. 
All in all, in this case B should not be allowed to receive account of profits in case of deliberate 
breach of contract.  
Ad b 
The conclusion under 1 raises the question whether deliberateness of the breach is relevant at all for 
the availability of remedies. The second remedy B invokes is a more modest one. The case study 
assumes that B does not suffer any material damages. The value of his own land did not decrease as 
a consequence of the breach. The only type of damage is that B has not the attractive view from his 
window. A claim for expectation damages does not seem to be too useful, because there is no 
difference between the current situation and the situation when A would have performed correctly.  
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B suffers a loss which, as the English courts would say, can be qualified as a ‘loss of an opportunity to 
bargain’. In general, courts are not too eager to award damages for non-pecuniary losses in cases of 
breach of contract. In this case, the claim for non-pecuniary losses, consisting of the loss of an 
attractive view, as a result of the breach of contract should be allowed, because the breach was 
deliberate. It is strongly advised to include the deliberateness of the breach as a reason for awarding 
this type of damages. Non-pecuniary losses in a voluntary transaction are normally not recognized as 
losses to be claimed by the aggrieved party. However, denying the claim in this situation would mean 
that B is deprived of any serious possibility to react on the breach of contract committed by A. 
Because the breach is assumed to be deliberate, contract law would fall short of its task if it allows 
this situation. The incorporation of the specific provision in the contract would not have any value at 
all, if B cannot claim damages. Another question may be whether it is most convenient to label the 
suffered losses as non-material and to allow a claim for damages for non-material losses. In this 
situation, it seems logical to do so. A loss of view could perhaps also be construed as a material value. 
In that case, B may also be able to claim expectation damages. In short, it seems that the 
deliberateness of the breach should be made visible by allowing B to have access to an increased box 
of remedies, in this case consisting of damages for non-pecuniary losses. This solution falls into the 
third category mentioned in the introduction. 
In conclusion, this case study shows that general rules on the influence of deliberateness on 
availability and extent of remedies in contract are not a good way to tackle the problem of motive. In 
other words, there is no rule that every deliberate breach of contract should allow the aggrieved 
party to have access to the remedy of account of profits. On the other hand, it seems unwise in many 
situations, even in cases of deliberate breach of secondary obligations, not to pay attention to the 
motive of the party committing breach. This case study shows that a claim for damages for non-
pecuniary losses is justified by the deliberateness of the breach. This justification should be included 
as such in a positive decision on B’s second claim. 
6.4  Case study 3: the car service case 
A runs a transport company. A has 30 vans. He decides to conclude a contract with B, who runs a van 
maintenance company. Both parties agree to a contract, according to which B has the obligation to 
service A’s fleet of cars for a period of 5 years for EUR 40000 each year. After 2 years A decides that 
he can do most of the maintenance himself and he terminates the contract with B. 
B claims expectation damages, which consists of missed profits during the remaining three years 
(EUR 45000 in total). During the litigation B concludes contracts with other parties. A argues that 
profits resulting from contracts with other parties in the three year period after termination should 
be deducted of the amount of missed profits claimed by B.  
Type of contract: long-term service contract  
Primary obligation A: payment for servicing fleet of cars 
Primary obligation B: servicing fleet of cars 
Breach of contract: A terminates without explicit reason after two years. He stops paying.  
Remedial solution: Expectation damages 
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Element of deliberateness: A terminates in order to achieve a financial advantage or at least to avoid 
a financial disadvantage by servicing the cars himself instead of hiring B. The financial advantage is 
achieved as a result of the breach. 
Remedial solutions: Expectation damages. B claims expectation damages. His claim should be 
allowed, because the breach is deliberate. Deliberateness is relevant and the court should pay 
attention to the motive of the party committing breach in order to justify the remedy. This case study 
reveals that the relevance of deliberateness can be made visible only by explicit reference to 
deliberateness in the solution itself (situation 1 in the introduction). The remedy of expectation 
damages is a standard remedy after every breach of contract. 
The reference to deliberateness is necessary, because the extent of the expectation damages 
depends for a substantial part on the deliberateness of the breach. However, it is not the 
deliberateness which increases the extent of the remedy itself. This case study is therefore not a 
‘situation 3’ example. In this case study, it is problematic that B seems to cash twice as a result of the 
award of full expectation damages. He receives missed profits from the contract and he receives 
profits from the contracts he concluded with other parties in at least part of the time he could have 
worked for A. Question is whether profits incurred from the contracts with other parties should be 
deducted from the claim. Apart from the issue whether the claim for full expectation damages can be 
qualified as overcompensation – this issue is mainly a technical one – it is morally, systematically and 
economically not conceivable that A’s conscious decision to breach would be without any serious 
consequence towards B, because B attempted and succeeded to remain active in his business. The 
argument is that A deliberately walks away from the core obligation in order to avoid a financial loss. 
This type of deliberateness may be one level less severe than the profit-driven breach such as in the 
first case study, but in this case the avoidance of the loss could be reconstructed as an incurred profit 
as a result from the breach as well. Furthermore, the primary obligation and consequently the core 
of the contract is affected by the decision. Any award less than full expectation damages would 
provide an incentive for A and any other party in a similar situation to commit a breach like this 
again. This situation would undermine the trust in the law of contract, it would systematically 
damage the position of the aggrieved party and the economic loss is evident, because the costs of 
additional guarantees in new contracts – transaction costs – will increase in the future, whereas in 
the concrete situation B would not receive the profits he is entitled to .  
In conclusion, B’s claim for expectation damages should be allowed in full without deduction. The law 
of contract in general allows this possibility, although it also leaves room for application of 
exceptions. Access for A to any exception should be a priori closed under reference to the 
deliberateness of the breach for the reasons just mentioned. 
6.5  Case study 4: the supermarket case 
 A runs a supermarket chain. He opens a supermarket in town X. He rents a building in the city 
center. In the contract between A and the owner of the building B, a duty to run the supermarket for 
a period of 15 years is incorporated.  This duty to run the supermarket is incorporated, because the 
owner of the building operates as a shopping mall. If the supermarket, the largest store, closes down, 
the other stores do not have a chance to survive. A suffers losses, because the supermarket in X is 
not profitable. Keeping the supermarket open would financially damage A, but he would not face a 
serious risk of bankruptcy. He decides to close down the supermarket after 10 years.  
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B claims enforced performance from A in the sense that A should run the supermarket for the 
remaining 5 years. Should this claim be allowed? 
Contract: long-term contract for rent and exploitation of a building 
Primary obligation A: running a supermarket in the building for the agreed period and paying the rent  
Primary obligation B: To make the part of the shopping mall available for A. 
Breach of contract: A leaves the building before the end of the agreed period. 
Element of deliberateness: A deliberately closes the supermarket because of financial reasons. He 
does so in order to avoid any further financial loss.  
Remedial solution: Enforced performance 
The main problem in this case is that both parties have good reasons to follow the line of action they 
chose. B wants to keep his shopping mall open on a profitable basis. He negotiated for contractual 
guarantees in order to secure the participation of A for a specific period, so that he could make 
calculated decisions on the accompanying stores and the type of contracts with every party.  It is 
therefore logical, that B’s first concern is that there will be a comparable supermarket in the 
shopping mall. For A, on the other hand, it makes sense that he does not want to continue to run a 
loss-making business. The decision not to continue is a conscious one and a deliberate breach of 
contract. However, A does not commit breach in order to make a larger profit, but to avoid an 
obvious loss. A commits breach of contract and is liable in damages. However, B’s position entails 
that he is not primarily interested in damages. In situations like these it is very hard for B to indicate 
his economic losses due to the breach. He does not only miss payments of rent, but the future for 
the shopping mall has also changed significantly. Other stores may move or close down due to 
financial difficulty, which in turn affects the value of the mall and the economic position of B. It is not 
certain that B can prove that it is only A’s breach of contract which caused these losses. 
In various legal systems contracts which involve renting premises for personal or professional use are 
subject to specific rules. Specific provisions take into account the long-term character of these 
contracts and the problem of cancellation of the contract before the due period. These system-
specific rules are not included in the solution of this case study, because the focus in the presented 
solution is on the relevance of the element of deliberateness in applying the remedy of enforced 
performance. 
B’s claim for performance is logical, because he has an interest in A staying in the rented premises. At 
first sight it does not seem easy to qualify the type of situation mentioned in the introduction once 
the claim is allowed. According to a civil law approach, B has a strong right to performance, although 
it is not certain that taking into account the specific rules regarding the rent of premises, such a claim 
would be honored by the courts. According to common law, specific performance is generally not 
available as a remedy in cases like these.  
This case requires a nuanced approach. Starting point should be that the claim for performance 
represents the desired reality of both parties at the moment of the conclusion of the contract. The 
reality in practice – well after conclusion of the contract – reveals that the contract has become a 
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burden for A. However, the situation A faces is far from a case of ‘unforeseen circumstances’. 
Circumstances such as changing markets or ex-post disadvantageous economic decisions are 
examples of situations the institution of contract is made for. These circumstances are fixed in the 
contract and parties are assumed to be able to assess the risks of concluding the contract. The case 
study explicitly denies the immediate risk of bankruptcy which would make the decision of A to 
commit breach still conscious, but forced. Under the current circumstances, A decides to commit 
breach of contract to minimize his financial losses at the expense of B without a sound justification B 
is able to understand in order not to run the risk of losing his faith in the contract he concluded. It is 
also questionable whether it would make economic sense if A would have the opportunity to commit 
breach of contract without a proper sanction under reference to economic malaise.  
However, the solution to award B’s claim for performance without any further conditions would be 
somewhat severe too. It is also a reality that A – if the supermarket would have done well financially 
– would not have terminated the contract and, perhaps even more important, that a legal 
mechanism forcing parties to continue running a loss-making business meets resistance. Therefore, 
the eventual solution could be that the right to performance is interpreted as A having the 
responsibility within a reasonable period of time to find a replacement for himself. In other words, if 
A can find another supermarket to replace him, he is released from the duty to perform. This solution 
does not rule out the relevance of the deliberateness of the breach. This solution is still aimed at 
minimizing the negative consequences of the breach for B. A should find a replacement and bear any 
costs involved and if he does not succeed, he is still compelled to continue to run the supermarket. 
Whether A will continue to run a loss-making business is questionable, but his position to negotiate is 
sufficiently weaker than in a case where he does not run the risk of facing a claim for performance. 
The exact conditions of the way the claim for performance may be exercised may differ from case to 
case, but it is obvious that the deliberateness of the breach as an element which steers the severity 
of the solution for A should play a decisive role. 
6.6  Case study 5: the swimming pool case  
B concludes a contract with builder A to construct a swimming pool. The depth of the intended pool 
is specified in the contract and so is the type of stones. The pool is built and afterwards it turns out to 
be 10 cm shallower than agreed, a small deviation. The swimming pool can be used for the same 
purposes as if it had the intended depth: swimming is possible, diving is not. B decreased the depth 
of the pool, because he stumbled upon a layer of stones at the intended depth. Digging through this 
layer would have been more costly and the builder would not have agreed on the same price as he 
actually did, had he known the layer existed. Furthermore, B used a cheaper type of stones, because 
the market price of the contractually specified type of stones unexpectedly rose to a level at which A 
would incur a loss instead of the estimated profits. The type of stones used in practice is less 
exclusive, but of comparable quality. As a consequence, the value of the pool decreased a fraction as 
a result of this deviation. B only learns of the double deviation after the pool is finished. The pool can 
only be adapted to its contractual specifications, if it is completely rebuilt. The value of the existing 
pool is not significantly higher than the value of the virtual pool in the contractual specifications.  




b. B claims partial termination or – in other words – price reduction. Should his claim be 
allowed? 
Type of contract: building and construction contract 
Primary obligation A: building a swimming pool 
Primary obligation B: paying the price for the construction 
Breach of contract: A deviates twice from the contractual specifications: he builds a shallower pool 
and he uses a different type of stones. 
Element of deliberateness:  A deviates twice. The first time the deviates consciously, but not per se 
for opportunistic reasons, when he discovers the layer of stone. The second time he deliberately 
deviates because he uses a cheaper type of stone in order to make a larger profit. 
Remedial solutions: Enforced performance, costs for reinstatement or partial termination/price 
reduction 
Ad a 
B’s primary objective is to receive a swimming pool built according to the contractual specifications. 
The current swimming pool deviates from the intended pool: it is slightly shallower than intended 
and a different type of stone is used. Both deviations can be labeled as breach of contract. The 
nature of each particular breach differs. The first breach – building the pool at a depth not according 
to the specifications – was not conscious in the sense that B deviated in order to make a larger profit. 
At the building site he was confronted with an unexpected, solid layer of stone. Digging through this 
layer would be far more expensive than originally thought. Therefore, A’s thought not to dig through 
the layer of stone seems logical, especially because he could foresee that the contractual deviation 
would be minimal. Nevertheless, the deviation is a breach and there is also an element of 
deliberateness to it. The decision not to dig deeper was taken by A alone without informing B. B only 
realized the pool was shallower after it had been completed. This circumstance entails that the 
breach of contract should have consequences, because without a sanction it is not clear why A 
should take into account contractual specifications at all. The second breach is a profit driven 
decision made by A. A cheaper type of stone yields larger profits for A. This breach is clearly 
deliberate in a more serious way. With regard to the second breach, it is also necessary that B has 
access to a form of remedial relief in order to visualize the relevance of a building contract with 
detailed specifications. 
The claim for enforced performance and the claim for costs for reinstatement are in this respect 
comparable. In the first case, A has to rebuild the pool himself, in the second case, he has to pay the 
amount for rebuilding the pool. Both remedies are equal in financial terms and they are equally 
severe. The case study states that the value of the pool did not significantly decrease after the two 
deviations. Nevertheless, B did not receive the pool he was entitled to according to the contract. In 
principle, the claim should be allowed. Reference to deliberateness is necessary, because it is the 
deliberateness of the breach which justifies this remedy. A cannot pay the difference in value of the 
intended pool and the existing pool, because there is hardly any difference. Awarding only this 
difference would mean that no sanction follows on the breach of contract the same time, A himself 
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decided to deviate from the contract before informing B that he was going to do so. By committing 
deliberate breach, A cannot claim that B is not entitled to the pool he has paid for. If the claim is not 
awarded, A knows in advance he can force B to accept a pool which is not built according to his own 
contractual specifications. As for a claim for costs of reinstatement, a defense could be that B did not 
suffer any serious damage, because the value is nearly intact. This defense is not sufficient in order to 
justify a calculated deviation from the contract. 
Ad b 
B’s claim for price reduction would be a modest claim, because he at least partly gives up his 
expectations resulting from the contract. By claiming price reduction, B in fact argues that A’s 
performance has not been up to standard. Therefore, it is logical that A does not pay the full price for 
the construction of the swimming pool. Price reduction can also be formulated as partial termination 
of the contract. B only pays for what A delivers. Because A builds a complete swimming pool, it is not 
easy to assess which part of the contract should be partly terminated. In other words, it is not easy to 
apply a yardstick to assess the level of price reduction. The difference in value between the cheaper 
stone and the intended stone is a good start. Furthermore, B could argue that a shallower pool is per 
definition smaller and therefore cheaper to build for A. This difference can also be taken into account 
in deciding the level of price reduction. These two considerations can lead to a first step to price 
reduction. These steps do not involve the deliberateness of the breach as a relevant element. The 
deliberateness should also have an independent effect on the level of price reduction. A should be 
deterred from taking one-sided decisions on the construction of the pool. The problem is that A 
would have probably faced the same consequences if he had informed B of the problem with the 
layer of stones at the moment of discovery and if he had informed B of the use of another type of 
stones in advance. A renegotiation would probably have resulted in a price reduction on the basis 
just explained. A should be encouraged to inform B on potential deviations he plans as a basis for 
renegotiation. A remedy after this deliberate breach of contract should therefore be more 
burdensome for A than the most probable renegotiation result. The level of extra reduction is not 
easy to establish. The result of application of this remedy is in any situation preferable for A 
compared to the first option, because the cost of performance or payment of costs of reinstatement 
would be considerably larger. 
 B’s claim for price reduction should be allowed. In order to effectively apply this remedy, 
deliberateness should be assessed as a relevant element in deciding on the level of price reduction. 
Deliberateness as an element becomes visible, because the price will be more seriously reduced as a 
result of the deliberateness. The exact level of extra reduction depends on the concrete 
circumstances of the case.  
6.7  Case study 6: the airline tickets case 
B books a flight on a suitable website of airline company A on the Internet from Amsterdam to 
Barcelona. The conditions attached to the sale of the ticket include a limitation clause in the contract 
on the booking contract, limiting liability of the airline company for damages as a result of breach of 
contract to a maximum amount of EUR 1000. On the day of the flight B arrives at the airport and he 
cannot board the flight, because the flight is overbooked. A offers A EUR 150 for his additional 
expenses and books a flight for him 5 hours later.  
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B claims expectation damages at the amount of EUR 10.000 consisting of extra costs. 
Should his claim be allowed? Assess the relevance of the defense of B based on firstly the limitation 
clause and secondly on the argument that the damages claimed are not foreseeable. 
Type of contract: service contract 
Primary obligation A: transporting B from Amsterdam to Barcelona on the time specified on the 
ticket. 
Primary obligation B: paying the price for the airline ticket 
Breach of contract: A does not offer the airline services on the agreed time, because the plane is 
overbooked. 
Element of deliberateness: A deliberately allows the possibility of overbooking as a company policy 
because it is financially efficient. In this concrete case, A wants to delivers his service to B on the one 
hand, but on the other hand his interest is primarily aimed at keeping the company efficient and 
profitable at a maximum level. 
Remedial solution: Expectation damages without application of a contractually agreed limitation 
clause or without application of a rule limiting damages to foreseeable damages 
This case study provides an example of the relevance of deliberateness on generally justifiable 
possibilities to contractual and legal limitations on the remedy of damages. International rules on air 
law are ignored; it is not relevant for solving this case study. 
In this case B cannot achieve any longer what he would have wished most, namely a timely arrival on 
schedule. This case study is an example of a situation where correct performance is simply not 
possible any longer. A certain delay would minimize the default, but as time passes, the impossibility 
of a correct performance becomes an undeniable fact. A’s default is a breach of contract and a 
deliberate breach of contract as well. A has a formal policy which allows overbooking. This calculated 
risk is taken in order to make the largest profit possible on every flight. A attempts to minimize the 
negative financial consequences as a result of the frequent breaches of contract by incorporating 
limitation clauses into the contract. As an alternative or subsidiary defense he may rely on a general 
foreseeability limit on damages. Furthermore, A also offers some compensation to the unlucky 
passengers such as B in order to enable them to cover the direct delay expenses.  
B claims full expectation damages. This claim should be allowed because the breach is deliberate. 
The most important argument is that B concludes the contract – i.e. buys the ticket – because he 
primarily believes he can board the booked plane at the time on the ticket. He realizes that 
something can frustrate the journey. The plane can be broken, the weather can be bad etc. Some of 
these circumstances lead to breach of contract for which A can be held accountable. However, in 
these cases, it is reasonable that A limits his liability. Although B has a justified claim for damages in 
these cases, B also takes into account that something can go wrong. If he seriously wants to minimize 
the risk that the plane does not fly, he should book a private jet. However, B does not take into 
account that A can choose not to perform his primary contractual obligation. If the law does not 
compensate B for his losses, A has the relative freedom not to perform. That is incomprehensible, 
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because in that case B does not know what he buys. The risk for non-performance cannot be 
dependent on the will of a party. The incorporation of a limitation clause is the tool for A to be able 
to commit breach at will. A deliberate breach should block the possibility to rely on such clauses in 
that situation. The deliberateness of the breach is therefore vital to incorporate into the decision, 
because limitation clauses as such are not ‘bad’, but in cases of deliberate breach of contract they 
cannot be relied upon by A. A same line of reasoning can be followed once A relies on the defense 
that damages are not foreseeable in case of absence of a limitation clause or in addition to invoking 
the limitation clause. A general rule that only foreseeable damages can be claimed – or a similar rule 
– covers justified objectives. However, this rule is abused in this situation of deliberate breach of 
contract. Nevertheless, in case of a calculated decision not to perform according to the contract, A 
should not be able to rely on this rule for the same reasons. 
In conclusion, B may claim full expectation damages. Deliberateness is essential to mention in order 
to justify this specific mix of existing remedies. The box of remedies is not increased, the application 
of limitation clauses and rules is only denied under explicit reference to deliberateness of the breach. 
6.8  Case study 7: the aluminium pipes case 
A runs a transport company and concludes a contract with van driver B to transport 200 aluminium 
pipes for EUR 2000. When B arrives at A’s terrain to pick up the pipes, A insists on loading 220 pipes 
without paying an additional amount of money. The overload causes a risk for B, because he does 
not have the license to transport more than 200 pipes on this van. A threatens to conclude a contract 
with another party to transport the pipes if B does not agree with the extra overload. B refuses to 
accept the extra overload and leaves A’s property without anything to transport. 
B claims enforced performance of the contract. Should his claim be allowed?  
Type of contract: contract of carriage 
Primary obligation A: paying the price for carriage of the 200 aluminium pipes. 
Primary obligation B: transporting 200 aluminium pipes. 
Breach of contract: A refuses to pay the price after conclusion of the contract, while attempting to 
force B to carry more pipes for the same price. 
Element of deliberateness: A attempts to exploit his position as a company towards a sole carriage 
driver. He consciously attempts to change an existing contract to his favor and terminates the 
original contract when he does not succeed. The motive seems to be financial. A can make a larger 
profit once B carries more pipes for the same price. 
Remedial solution: Enforced performance without the duty to perform of the aggrieved party 
This case study is included in order to emphasize the versatile relevance of deliberateness of a 
breach of contract. A’s behavior is aimed at two consequences. First, he does not want to perform 
his obligation of the original contract. The refusal to pay is a breach of contract and a deliberate one. 
The financial motive of the breach becomes apparent, once the reason for the refusal is given. 
Second, A wishes to conclude another contract, but he attempts to force B to agree with his own 
conditions: a larger amount of pipes for the same price.  
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B faces a practical problem in this case which cannot only be solved by law. B is the weaker party 
once he arrives on A’s property, because his opportunity to earn money at that moment depends on 
the cooperation of A. If B has to make a choice on the spot between accepting the new contract – 
included the risk to be fined for the overload – and leaving without a job, B is likely to be forced to 
choose the first option. If B refuses to agree to the new terms and walks away, as the facts state in 
this case, it is questionable whether B in practice would start legal proceedings, but if he does, the 
law should pay relevant attention to the element of deliberateness of the breach in the sphere of 
remedies. 
If B had the opportunity, he would have carried the pipes according to the contract. Although A did 
not frustrate the possibility for B to carry the pipes, he stated that he would not pay on the original 
contract. Neither A nor B performs correctly in this situation. A does not pay and B does not carry the 
pipes. In the current situation, B nevertheless claims payment on the contract – i.e. performance of 
the obligation to pay – without having to perform his side of the contract. In other words, he claims 
performance and at the same time relief from performance of his own obligation, which in fact 
means performance ‘for free’. 
The claim for performance in this case study should be allowed with a reference to the 
deliberateness of the breach of contract. A deliberately speculates on the weak position of B as a 
negotiation partner and he attempts to make a profit by committing breach and subsequently by 
exercising pressure to conclude a new contract. 
In any situation, it is relevant to mention the deliberateness of the breach when the claim for 
enforced performance is awarded. A attempts to abuse B’s position, not only his economic position, 
but also his legal position. B’s decision to walk away is the only right decision he could make, because 
accepting the new contract would mean surrender to economic threats and exercise of unlawful 
behavior. B should be encouraged in law to take the right decision, whereas A should be discouraged 
to exercise oppressive behavior.  The decision to enforce A’s original contractual obligation is a good 
solution, as long as B suffers no losses from the breach of contract. The decision to block A’s defense 
that B should perform according to the original contract prevents A from attempting to force B or 
another party into a new contract again. 
6.9  Case study 8: the bad faith insurance case 
B is a construction worker. He often works with heavy building materials in dangerous environments. 
He receives several periods of training provided by his employer during his career. He has obtained a 
disability insurance with disability insurance company A. After 10 years, B falls off a roof in a moment 
of distraction. He has severe back injuries and he cannot work as a construction worker. B contacts 
the disability insurer in order to claim loss of income and prospective income, which are covered by 
the policy. Insurer A conducts an elaborate investigation and refuses to pay on the policy. He offers 
an extensive research report and raises many objections, including a reference to gross negligence of 
the construction worker. A is compelled to consult a lawyer and to start legal proceedings. After 
lengthy proceedings, which take more than 4 years, the courts in first instance and in appeal decide 
in favor of B. Although the courts express their understanding for the necessary possibility for A to 
defend himself, the courts also refer to the accusation of gross negligence as regrettable considering 
the lack of evidence in the research report. After the court decisions A and B start negotiations and a 
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part of the money is paid, but  it takes another several years and litigation for B to receive what he is 
entitled to.  
a. B claims full recovery of costs for legal representation as a result of a continued delay of 
payment of the insured amount on the policy, to which A is entitled. Should his claim be 
allowed? 
b. B claims punitive damages as a result of a continued delay of payment of the insured amount 
on the policy, to which A is entitled. Should his claim be allowed? 
Type of contract: Insurance contract 
Primary obligation B:  paying the insurance premium 
Primary obligation A: Paying the insured amount on the policy once the insured event has taken 
place 
Breach of contract: Refusing to pay the whole insured amount on the policy within a reasonable 
period  
Element of deliberateness:  A consciously applies delaying tactics in order to demotivate B to attempt 
to cash in the whole insured amount. Not having to pay the whole insured amount would mean a 
larger profit for insurance company A.  
Remedial solutions: Costs for legal representation and/or punitive damages 
Ad a 
The solution to the first question could raise many issues on the various approaches to costs for legal 
representation in legal systems. In other words, and this argument is more or less applicable for all 
case studies, it is impossible to say anything coherent on an award for costs of legal representation 
without knowing anything of the concrete legal background against which the claim is decided. 
According to English law for example the principle of ‘the winner takes it all’ generally applies. In that 
case, A would be entitled to receive the whole sum for legal representation even without taking into 
account the deliberateness of the breach. 
However, this solution only generally offers an approach to a connection between claim for costs of 
legal representation and the notion of deliberateness without taking into account the system 
specifics on this topic. The relevance of deliberateness can be made visible in more general terms. 
This case offers an example of the potential powerlessness of the standard remedies and – more 
specifically – of the primary objective of the law of remedies in contract. The idea that remedies in 
contract should enable parties to receive what they have contracted for or at least its financial value 
- no more, no less - does not solve the problem in this case. The problem is that enforcement of the 
contract in practice means payment of the insured amount on the policy. All extra costs made in 
order to receive payment are often not covered by a claim for performance. A standard claim for 
costs of legal representation in cases of delay of payment is also not feasible. Insurance companies 
should be able to defend themselves and they can have good reasons not to pay on the insurance 
policy. Under these circumstances, A would not succeed in claiming costs for legal representation. 
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However, it would be convenient for an insured party to know in advance that he can claim all 
incurred costs once he can prove that an insurance company showed deliberate unwillingness to pay 
the insured amount, because the delay of payment continued after establishing the justification of 
the claim in court or because the insurance company does not pay the complete amount or if he – as 
he does in this case – evidently attempts to use frivolous defenses which are used to discourage the 
claimant to proceed  with litigation. This type of deliberateness nearly closes the gap between the 
deliberate breach as an opportunistic, profit-driven act and the deliberate breach as a malicious act, 
which may be labeled as a form of tortious conduct as well.  In these cases, from a perspective of 
compensation and from a perspective of prevention it would be wise to allow a claim for full 
recovery of costs for legal representation. The tempting idea for insurance companies as repeat 
players to increase the threshold for the insured to claim on their policy may not be encouraged by 
systematic flaws in the law of remedies in contract.  Even stronger, the deliberate attempt to prevent 
insured parties to have access to justified claims on their policy by implementing conscious delaying 
tactics and expensive procedural hurdles should be discouraged by the law of remedies in contract. 
In conclusion, A’s claim should be allowed under explicit reference to the deliberateness of the 
breach.  
Ad b 
A claim for punitive damages in contract law is generally not allowed. In general, punitive damages 
should not be available even in cases of deliberate breach of contract. As the previous case studies 
have shown, the aggrieved party can achieve his primary or his next-best objective with a mix of new 
and old remedies connected to the notion of deliberate breach of contract without the use of the too 
severe tool of punitive damages. It is worth repeating that only US law openly recognizes punitive 
damage, albeit somewhat reluctantly, in some cases of contract law, whereas the notion of punitive 
damages in private law in general is approached very carefully, if accepted at all in other legal 
systems.  
This caution should warn A. His chances to succeed on the claim for punitive damages are minimal. If 
a case has certain specifics, the remedy may be appropriate. A bad faith breach case may be such a 
case. It is evident that delaying tactics and putting up frivolous defenses in order to avoid payment to 
which the insured is entitled is a deliberate breach as stated in the previous section. It is in the 
interest of A and in the interest of all future insured parties that B will not decide to act in the same 
way again. In this respect, the preventive aspect of a possible remedy is important. Allowing a claim 
for costs for legal representation may be burdensome for the insurance company, but it is 
questionable whether it will deter B from attempting to commit breach again in the same way, 
because the costs for legal representation can be estimated at any time during the process of 
litigation. The problem with public authority maintaining rules which insurance companies have to 
follow in a specific case is that insurance companies have the strong argument that they should be 
able to defend themselves against frivolous claims. Public authority may be able to act after a 
concrete case, but it is not clear whether the private insured parties are sufficiently certain that 
public authority will deal adequately with this problem of bad faith breach. Allowing the possibility of 
punitive damages in cases of established and proven deliberate breach of contract such as in this 
case study with multiple and subsequent acts of conscious misbehavior in order to avoid paying on 
the policy, the mere threat of having to pay a considerable amount of money to a private party may 
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deter insurance companies from exercising such behavior. Furthermore, it should not be 
underestimated that A’s confidence in one of the key players in modern capitalistic market 
economies, the insurance companies is severely damaged. If contract law does not respond 
adequately, he also feels abandoned by the law.  
In conclusion, A should only be able to claim punitive damages in exceptional circumstances. The 
case study provides sufficient material to argue that B grossly abused his own position in order to 
avoid paying the insured amount. Under these circumstances, A’s claim should be allowed.  
6.10 Conclusion 
Eight case studies in which concrete solutions to cases of deliberate breach are proposed justify the 
following general conclusion.  Deliberate breach of contract is not only in general terms a concept 
which is difficult to grasp or to define, it also returns on a concrete level in a variety of different 
cases. The case studies show that the general recommendations provided in Chapter 5 are not easily 
applicable in all cases. A case-by-case approach is needed to solve cases of deliberate breach in a 
satisfactory way. 
Nevertheless, the case studies also show that deliberate breach of contract is a concept which 
requires attention and concrete solutions. These solutions need to ‘fit’ into a specific case, but a 
general structure in formulating concrete answers to deliberate breach of contract is not only 
possible, but also necessary in order to provide a framework with general and case-by-case elements 
which can be used to solve problems of deliberate breach of contract. Based on the insights created 
in the previous chapter and based on the proposed solutions for the case studies in this chapter, 
deliberateness of the breach can be categorized in three ways from a perspective of remedies. 
First, the solution does not imply another or a more severe remedy than in any other breach of 
contract situation, but the solution supports its remedy choice under explicit reference to 
deliberateness of the breach. In other words, deliberateness as a factor determining application of a 
specific contractual remedy should be acknowledged in a more explicit way. Explicit reference to 
deliberateness in a decision without changing anything in the sphere of remedies is a first 
manifestation of the relevance of deliberateness.  
The aluminium pipes case is a good example. B has a right to performance, but in practice it is 
difficult to exercise the right. If the court explicitly acknowledges the deliberateness of the breach, 
the step towards performance may be easier to make. Another example may be the enforcement of 
the penalty clause in the double sale case. Parties may enforce the clause, but an explicit reference 
to deliberateness of the breach makes the position of the aggrieved party – as well in eventual 
negotiation after the court’s decision – stronger. 
Second, deliberateness can manifest itself in a solution when a mix of possible remedies is different 
from the available mix in non-deliberate breach of contract situation. For example, where enforced 
performance is not – or only theoretically – available in a non-deliberate breach of contract situation, 
it may be available in case of deliberate breach of contract. Availability of another mix remedies 
compared with a non-deliberate breach of contract situation is the second manifestation of the 
relevance of deliberateness. 
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A good example is the servicing vans case. The remedy of expectation damages should be available in 
full without too many – in other, non-deliberate, breach cases justifiable – limits and deductions. The 
airline tickets case also provides an example of this type of remedial relief: it already exists, but with 
too many limits in a case of deliberate breach of contract. One could also mention the swimming 
pool case here and the remedy of enforced performance or cost of reinstatement, because in theory 
enforced performance could be available to the creditor – in a civil law jurisdiction – and cost of 
reinstatement as well – in a common law jurisdiction. The deliberateness of the breach increases the 
position of the aggrieved party to rely on a stronger version of existing remedies. 
Third, the solution implies availability of more severe remedies than in the case of a non-deliberate 
breach situation. For example, in case of a claim for damages, the rules on application of this remedy 
may be less strict in case of deliberate breach, such as with regard to the exclusion of unforeseeable 
damages, the application of exclusion clauses, the restricted availability of account of profits or the 
availability of punitive damages. Availability of more severe remedies in deliberate breach cases 
compared with a non-deliberate breach situation is the third manifestation of the relevance of 
deliberateness. It is logical that in both the second and third situation an explicit reference to 
deliberateness of the breach should be made in order to justify the different mix or more severe 
remedies. 
The most explicit example would be the award of punitive damages in the bad faith insurance case. It 
is evident that punitive damages are generally not available in the law of contract. The insurance 
relationship is a special one and it requires prudent behavior of both parties. If a claimant justifiably 
claims and a court decides on the basis of specific circumstances of the case that the insurer showed 
an unwillingness to pay by excessively delaying payment, a claim for punitive damages may be 
considered to be a good remedy. Another good example is the availability of account of profits as a 
standard, alternative remedy next to expectation damages. This option returns in the first case study, 
but perhaps, as the US debate on account of profits in case of deliberate breach shows –  see Chapter 
4 and 5 – this remedy is the most adequate vindication of contractual rights – apart from enforced 
performance. The remedy of account of profits – which cannot be labeled as such in many 
jurisdictions – would offer the law of remedies in contract the useful perspective of the loss of 
expectation of the promisor instead of the loss of the promise. The latter justifies expectation 
damages, but although they are systematically most convenient in the current system, they do not 
seem to fulfill parties’ expectations once they are confronted with deliberate breach of contract. 
Finally, a common denominator in finding adequate remedies for cases of deliberate breach of 
contract seems to be that aggrieved parties do not want to be confronted with deliberate breach in 
the first place. The paradox is that the ultimate objective of the increase of severity of remedies is 
that they will ideally not be used, because debtors will dismiss the option to commit breach in 







7  Summary 
7.1  Principal argument and research questions 
Four research questions and the according answers are the construction on which the principal 
argument of this thesis is built: 
1. What is deliberate breach of contract?  
2. Does deliberateness of the breach of contract play a role in existing contract law, more 
specifically in contract law related legal provisions – ‘law in the books’ –  or in case law –‘ law 
in action’ – , in the sense that deliberateness as a relevant factor influences the choice for 
application of remedies in contract and if so, how? 
3. Why should deliberateness of the contractual breach influence the availability and the extent 
of remedies in contract? 
4. How should deliberateness of the contractual breach influence the availability and the extent 
of remedies in contract 
This thesis argues that motive in committing breach of contract should matter in the application of 
remedies in contract. Deliberate breach of contract requires a different and sterner answer from the 
law of contract than any other breach of contract, because equally remedying all breaches of 
contract threatens parties’ trust in the law of contract. This statement should be reflected in the law 
of remedies in contract. The box of remedies available to the victim of deliberate breach of contract 
should be designed accordingly. In general, this thesis argues, that the victim of contractual breach 
should have a stronger right to enforced performance of the contract and that he should have easier 
access to damages and to a larger amount of damages as a result of deliberate breach of contract. 
7.2  Deliberate breach of contract: a notion with many faces  
The concept of deliberate breach can be approached from various perspectives. The notion of 
deliberate breach of contract is not well-defined in any legal culture. Exploring the notion is 
necessary and useful, but it is questionable whether it is useful to unequivocally define the concept. 
This thesis has shown that a clear, one-sentence definition of deliberate breach of contract does not 
prove to be a feasible way of defining deliberate breach. 
A working definition for purposes of clarity and as a point of reference for author and reader is 
introduced, but further analysis and exploration shows that such a one-sentence definition does not 
suffice to explain the variety of interpretations of the notion of deliberate breach of contract. 
“Breach is considered to be deliberate when the party in breach commits breach of contract in order 
to obtain a financial advantage or to avoid a financial disadvantage, which he would have missed or 
incurred in the case of performance of the contract.” 
The definition provided as a guideline may have seemed to be adequate at the beginning of the 
exploration, it has lost its clarity at the end of it. Various perspectives on deliberate breach 
differently emphasize and contextualize specific aspects of the definition. 
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First, the borderline between excusable and non-excusable breach of contract shows that the 
existence of a lawful excuse does not always mean that the excused party did not realize he was 
committing breach of contract. In other words, even excusable breach may be deliberate in the sense 
that a party knew what he was doing, but also in the sense of the definition. He may have had a 
lawful excuse to commit breach in order to prevent a substantial loss. A deliberate breach need not 
always be a non-excusable breach. The borderline between deliberate and non-deliberate breach 
gets a new dimension especially if the last part of the provisional definition is focused upon. When a 
breach is deliberate in order to avoid a financial loss which would be large but bearable or so large 
that financial breakdown is inevitable is not so easy to determine. A first shade of grey in defining 
deliberateness is established. 
Second, the relationship between deliberate breach and its reception until now in US legal doctrine 
on the one hand and the theory of efficient breach on the other hand reveals interesting information 
on the content of the term deliberate breach of contract. The terminological chaos regarding 
deliberate breach is paramount, although the notion of willful breach is most common. Efficient 
breach is regarded as a positive notion in US law and economics scholarship, whereas deliberate 
breach is generally not. Efficient breach can generally be circumscribed as deliberate breach plus the 
efficiency aspect which means that the aggrieved party should be paid full compensation after 
deliberate breach. Once the efficiency component is stripped from the definition, willful breach 
generally remains according to many academic contributions. The problem of assessing efficiency 
and the problem of undercompensation are well-known arguments to question the efficient breach 
theory. However, the law and economics theory tends to neglect the intentional aspect of the act of 
breach. Only recently in several contributions, the aspect of deliberately neglecting the contractual 
bond between the parties resulted in a fierce academic discussion. 
Third, the notion of deliberateness within the area of tort law may also have a sharp edge. An 
element of maliciousness may be added to the deliberate economic consideration to commit breach 
of contract. Although maliciousness and economic reasoning at a first glance may be two separate 
manifestations of deliberateness, they may also coincide and catalyze each other as the example of 
bad faith breach of contract in insurance cases shows. The example of bad faith breach shows in its 
own way that the dynamics of defending against a claim by an insured cannot be completely shut 
down by awarding high punitive amounts for delay in payment. The freedom for parties to litigate 
and build their own defenses according to the applicable procedural rules may not too easily be set 
aside. On the other hand, the example of bad faith breach already shows that proving deliberate 
misconduct may be extremely difficult.  
Fourth, the perceptions of the parties concerned are also relevant in determining the meaning of 
deliberateness and, moreover, its potential legal relevance. Empirical research on contracts, in the 
socio-legal experiments in the US, but also in sociological experiments in Europe, shows that the 
element of trust in the contractual relationship is very important. Contract and trust are not 
synonyms. Contracts are partly used to fill in the gaps trust cannot fill between the parties. However, 
a contract between parties may only be concluded once there is an element of trust between the 
contracting parties. Contracting parties experience a serious feeling of deceit once they discover the 
other party deliberately committed breach of contract in order to achieve a larger financial gain. It is 
not to be said that an immediate increase of legal remedies would be a good solution in all cases, 
because parties would also like to postpone the moment they have to invoke legal assistance almost 
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at any cost, especially when more forceful extra-legal remedies are available, such as causing 
reputation damage. On the other hand, parties may experience a feeling of understanding once they 
discover the other party had to breach in order to avoid a destructive financial loss. The empirical 
legal studies mentioned in this section seem to cover the ground for the assumption that 
deliberateness of the breach in the sense of a more severe loss of mutual trust is a factor which 
should be taken into account in the assessment of legal remedies after the breach occurred. 
Finally, it is clear that the provisional working definition may be used in order to communicate in a 
simple sentence what a general interpretation of deliberate breach may imply, but it definitely falls 
short in providing a complete account of the range of aspects deliberateness as a notion may imply. 
A start of a more detailed analysis of the concrete features of deliberate breach of contract is only 
possible once the notion of deliberateness is examined further in relation to the law of remedies in 
contract.  
7.3  Deliberate breach of contract in current practice: a denied reality? 
The second research question this thesis attempts to answer is the following: 
Does deliberateness of the breach of contract play a role in existing contract law, more specifically in 
contract law related legal provisions – ‘law in the books’ –  or in case law –‘ law in action’ – , in the 
sense that deliberateness as a relevant factor influences the choice or application of remedies in 
contract and if so, how? 
The answer to this question, which comes between the question what deliberate breach of contract 
is and how deliberateness of the breach should influence remedies in contract, should provide 
material in order to build an analytical framework on which the answer to the normative research 
questions of this thesis may be developed. 
In a selection of case law examples a picture is drawn of how the law and the courts deal with the 
notion of deliberateness as far as the use of remedies in contract is concerned. The conclusion of this 
exercise is that sufficient concrete examples in current law exist to argue that deliberateness as part 
of breach of contract at least in some jurisdictions is already taken seriously as far as some key 
remedies in contract law are concerned. However, in no jurisdiction explored a coherent and 
consistent approach towards deliberate breach of contract in relation to all remedies or at least the 
standard remedies in contract is found.  
First, the strongest examples of explicit recognition of deliberateness combined with a serious and 
noticeable adaption of the standard remedies are can be found in French law, English law and in US 
law. In French law, deliberateness of the breach directly influences the standard remedy of 
expectation damages. Art. 1150 Cc shows that unforeseeable losses become available inter alia in 
case of deliberate breach of contract, whereas in a case of a breach which is not accompanied by 
deliberateness or gross negligence only foreseeable losses can be recovered. In English law, 
deliberateness of the breach is relevant in deciding the question whether the debtor committing the 
breach may successfully request specific performance. Deliberateness of the breach may help the 
aggrieved party to successfully argue that the debtor is not relieved from forfeiture. In US law, 
deliberateness of the breach explicitly triggers the availability of punitive damages. Punitive damages 
are generally not available in contract. The link between deliberate breach and punitive damages is 
not direct, because the tort of bad faith breach has to be established in between. Labeling the 
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deliberate breach as a tort opens the gate to punitive damages, though in a very limited amount of 
cases, i.e. specific cases of insurance law. The Fletcher case is a good example. Furthermore, § 39 of 
the Draft Third Restatement on Unjust Enrichment in US law offers a direct link between 
deliberateness of the breach and the availability of account of profits as a standard alternative for 
expectation damages. This provision does not have any binding force at the moment, but it is the 
strongest example of the relevance of motive for remedies in contract. Opportunism in deciding to 
perform cannot be left without a serious sanction. The choice for this unorthodox approach rendered 
much criticism, but the recent academic debate reveals the current tension in the law of contract 
regarding the potential relevance of deliberateness. 
Second, deliberateness may be mentioned explicitly, whereas a potential influence on the application 
of remedies is explicitly denied. The strongest examples are visible in Dutch law and US law. In Dutch 
law, the Hoge Raad in the Ymere case explicitly mentioned the existence of a breach being 
deliberate, but confirmed the traditional view that motive cannot influence the award of account of 
profits. Account of profits in Dutch law remains a way of calculation of damages – formulated in the 
Civil Code as a discretionary competence of the court at the request of one of the parties – according 
to art. 6:104 BW and it is not a separate remedy next to expectation damages. In US law, the 
influence of motive on the remedy of expectation damages is explicitly denied by courts.  
Third, deliberateness of the breach may be explicitly recognized by courts as an existing fact, but the 
influence on remedial relief remains unclear. Examples can be found in Dutch law, English law and US 
law. In Dutch law, deliberateness of the breach in insurance cases is mentioned as a fact, but the 
remedy – award of statutory interest – is not influenced by deliberateness and only a theoretical 
escape in specific circumstances remains. In English law, deliberateness of the breach is mentioned in 
several cases which dealt with the remedy of account of profits, but the courts do not seem to accept 
to use the argument of deliberateness of the breach as an element in deciding on the award of 
account of profits.  In US law, deliberateness of the breach is acknowledged as a potential factor in 
order to establish material breach. The fulfillment of the requirement of material breach may trigger 
the remedy of termination. Whether deliberateness of the breach renders a breach material is not so 
clear, but it is likely that a certain connection between deliberateness and termination in US law 
exists. 
Fourth, in some situations deliberateness of the breach is left undiscussed by the court, whereas it 
seems to play an implicit role in the decision of the court. Dutch law and English law provide strong 
examples. In Dutch law, the Hoge Raad in the Vos/TSN case seems to deny the party committing 
breach of contract access to a debtor-friendly way of calculating expectation damages. An explicit 
reference to the deliberateness of the breach is absent, whereas the arguments to support the strict 
application of the full expectation damages are technical. In English law, a similar reluctance towards 
acknowledging a breach as deliberate can be found in the Golden Victory case, although the minority 
of the House of Lords is less reluctant.  
A specific position in this debate is reserved for contractual remedies arranged by parties such as the 
penalty clauses and the exclusion clause and the influence of deliberateness thereon. In the area of 
exclusion clauses deliberateness of the breach negatively influences the possibility of the party to 
rely on an exclusion clause. In English law, the Astrazeneca case is an example. In the area of penalty 
clauses, there are examples in Dutch law where the court specifically denies mitigation of the penalty 
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due to the deliberateness of the breach, such as the Buck case. Although in several jurisdictions an 
explicit link between deliberateness and the application of the contractual remedy can be 
established, the aggrieved party can generally only achieve full application of the contractual remedy 
- i.e. enforced performance – in the case of the penalty clause or full application of the standard 
remedy – in case of denying the validity of an exclusion clause – but nothing more. 
Finally, taking in account the modest ambition of this chapter in being descriptive and eclectic, this 
chapter delivers sufficient material to answer the research question asked in this chapter. The 
answer is affirmative with restrictions. Deliberateness plays a role in current law in different 
jurisdictions as a relevant factor in deciding which remedy should be awarded in a breach of contract 
case and to what extent it should be awarded. On the other hand, the influence of deliberateness is 
limited. Its influence is sometimes explicitly denied. In other cases, a specific breach of contract 
situation is not labeled as a deliberate breach by the court itself. The label of deliberate breach is 
attached by the author of this chapter, which makes the specific case perhaps less convincing. 
Furthermore, even if deliberateness is explicitly mentioned in relation to a specific remedy, it is not 
always clear how it influences the concerned remedy, for example because there is not  concrete 
case law example available. 
7.4  Deliberateness of the breach, a factor to take into account: why and how? 
The descriptive analysis in the first part of the thesis offers sufficient material to answer the two 
following normative questions: 
1. Why should deliberateness of the contractual breach influence the availability and the extent 
of remedies in contract? 
2. How should deliberateness of the contractual breach influence the availability and the extent 
of remedies in contract? 
The law of contract wrongfully underestimates or denies the relevance of deliberateness as an 
element in breach of contract cases in formulating and awarding remedies for breach of contract. In 
every legal system touched upon in the previous chapters the law of contract generally denies the 
relevance of motive – more specifically deliberateness – for the availability and extent of remedies in 
contract in case of breach of contract. Four arguments are presented which explain the reluctance 
towards the relevance of motive for availability and extent of remedies in contract, a moral, a 
systematic, a practical and an economic argument. This thesis shows that all arguments mentioned 
lack sufficient power to deny the relevance of motive for the availability or extent of remedies in 
contract.  
The moral argument reasons that mutual trust between parties to the contract and the trust of the 
parties in the systems of contract proves the moral relevance of deliberate breach and the need to 
prevent parties from being confronted with deliberate breach of contract. The systematic argument 
reasons that the general absence of attention for motive of breach of contract is not compatible with 
the function of remedies in contract in the law of contract in various legal systems. The practical 
argument reasons that deliberate breach of contract is not a single-definition term and that the most 
relevant types of deliberate breach for this thesis and its remedy- based approach may be made 
plausible by the aggrieved party without proving actual subjective intent. The economic argument 
argues on the one hand that efficient breach is not a concept which should be implemented in the 
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law of contract, because it based on assumptions which are all disputable and on the other hand that 
the risk of overcompensation in the case of specifically dealing with deliberate breach of contract is 
not a good reason to deny the relevance of deliberate breach. Undercompensation still remains a 
larger risk than overcompensation and the risk of overcompensation in specific cases of deliberate 
breach of contract does not threaten the systematic and economic stability of the law of contract. 
The second research question is answered by presenting five recommendations which are based on 
the four arguments mentioned before. These recommendations are proposals for adaptation of the 
law of remedies in contract in several ways in order to deal with deliberate breach in an appropriate 
way, taking into account preconditions such as the vagueness of the term “deliberate breach”, the 
variety in legal systems and the objectives which should be achieved with the adaptations. With 
these recommendations, this thesis advocates a new approach towards the concept of deliberate 
breach of contract in relation to remedies in contract, because it attempts to offer a coherent and 
consistent package of outcomes in the sphere of remedies in contract as a result of deliberate breach 
of contract. 
I In case of deliberate breach of contract a claim for performance of the contractual obligation 
should be accessible and strong. 
The certainty to receive what the creditor is entitled to should be visible in the law of remedies in 
contract, especially in case of deliberate breach of contract. According to this recommendation, the 
law of contract should not be considered as a pure economy driven structure, but as a structure with 
an own identity. According to the recommendation, revaluing the remedy of specific performance 
should be taken seriously. In case of deliberate breach, the formal requirements to have access to 
the remedy of performance should minimal. Furthermore, cost and benefit considerations should not 
be paramount in the decision to grant the aggrieved party the remedy of enforced performance in 
case of deliberate breach of contract. 
II Expectation damages should be assessed favor of the aggrieved party in case of deliberate 
breach of contract. Limits on recovery of unforeseeable damages, costs for legal 
representation, consequential losses, damages for immaterial losses should be applied with 
reluctance in case of deliberate breach of contract. 
In case of deliberate breach of contract, limits on the remedy of expectation damages which are 
generally justifiable, such as limits on foreseeability and remoteness of damages, should be applied 
with the utmost reluctance. Full compensation is already a second best option for the aggrieved 
party, so the remedial structure should allow the victim of deliberate breach access to the smoothest 
way to minimize the risk of undercompensation. 
III Account of profits as a remedy after breach of contract should be more readily available in 
case of deliberate breach of contract. 
Account of profits should be revalued as a standard alternative remedy next to expectation damages 
in case of deliberate breach of contract. The ground for such a remedy should be the expectation of 
the debtor who committed breach. He should be brought in the position as if he had performed 
correctly, which means that he does not incur the extra gain achieved by committing deliberate 
breach of contract 
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IV Punitive damages in exceptional cases may serve as a last resort for excessive deliberate 
breach situations. 
Whereas this thesis does not advocate the introduction of punitive damages in general into the law 
contract, because the negative effects would be too large, the ban on punitive damages should be 
not absolute in extreme cases of deliberate breach of contract, especially in the area of insurance 
contracts.  
V Termination should be more easily accessible for the aggrieved party in case of deliberate 
breach of contract. 
Termination is a remedy with severe consequences, because the contractual relationship comes to 
an end. Certain general thresholds, such as the requirement of a breach being fundamental or the 
requirement of giving the debtor a second chance to perform are understandable and justifiable. In 
case of deliberate breach of contract, these thresholds are no longer relevant, because a deliberate 
breach of contract may trigger the aggrieved party to end a contractual relationship because he does 
not longer have confidence in the debtor. Deliberateness of the breach should be a good reason to 
grant the aggrieved party a more direct access to the remedy of termination. 
VI Penalty clauses should not be mitigated in case of deliberate breach of contract. Penalty 
clauses should not be declared invalid if the breach concerned is deliberate.  
Complete enforcement of penalty clauses is a form of enforcement of the contract and in general 
available in civil law jurisdictions. Nevertheless, a court has a power to mitigate the penalty if 
circumstances point into that direction.  According to this recommendation the court should not 
make use of his power to mitigate the penalty if the breach concerned is deliberate. The main reason 
is that parties secured performance of the primary obligation by incorporating the penalty clause 
into their contract. Deliberate breach of contract is the most severe violation of the primary 
obligation, so mitigation of the penalty would not be logical. Deliberateness of the breach should also 
lead to automatic validation of the clause, because otherwise a party considering committing 
deliberate breach could calculate in his decision the chance that the penalty clause is declared 
invalid. Such a ‘gamble’ should be prevented.  
Based on these general recommendations, it is necessary to make a last step. The recommendations 
are not generally applicable on every single case of deliberate breach, just because this legal 
phenomenon occurs in many different situations. The value of a general approach is to signal that 
the law of contract needs to refocus on breach of contract and this chapter offers arguments and 
tools in order to shape a structured framework to be able to solve individual cases of deliberate 
breach of contract. This framework provides sufficient material to solve eight different and concrete 
cases.  
7.5  The pudding and the eating: case studies to explore the effects of deliberateness on 
remedies in contract. 
The fourth research question needs also an answer on a more concrete level by a concrete 
application of the thoughts presented in the previous section on a concrete level. The fourth 
research question is repeated again for purposes of clarity:  
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How should deliberateness of the contractual breach influence the availability and the extent of 
remedies in contract? 
The case studies illustrate that deliberate breach should be a relevant element in deciding on the 
application of remedies in contract. Case by case solutions are often inevitable, although the general 
recommendations formulated in the previous section may serve as guidelines. Differences in solution 
inter alia depend on the type of contract, on the type of invoked remedies, on the capacity of the 
parties and on the exact reason for breach. It has been said before, but deliberateness is not a notion 
with a single definition and the nature of the deliberateness is a serious indication for the applicable 
remedy. The way of presentation of the case studies justifies a general exoneration clause. These 
case studies are presented with the objective to visibly effectuate deliberateness as a relevant 
element in remedial solutions to breach of contract. They are designed to convincingly show the 
effect of the possible manifestations of deliberateness.  Therefore, the cases are short and per 
definition simplifications of a more complex reality. The case studies are intentionally designed in 
order to emphasize the relevance of the element of deliberateness. The presented solution is a 
solution to the case, supported with arguments, but without extensive references to academic 
contributions, because this chapter presents the solutions of the author. 
Eight case studies in which concrete solutions to cases of deliberate breach are proposed justify the 
following general conclusion.  Deliberate breach of contract is not only in general terms a concept 
which is difficult to grasp or to define, is also returns on a concrete level in a variety of different 
cases. The case studies show that the general recommendations provided in the previous section are 
not easily applicable in all cases. A case-by-case approach is needed to solve cases of deliberate 
breach in a satisfactory way. 
Nevertheless, the case studies also show that deliberate breach of contract is a concept which 
requires attention and concrete solutions. These solutions need to ‘fit’ into a specific case, but a 
general structure in formulating concrete answers to deliberate breach of contract is not only 
possible, but also necessary in order to provide a framework with general and case-by-case elements 
which can be used to solve problems of deliberate breach of contract. Based on the insights created 
in the previous chapter and based on the proposed solutions for the case studies in this chapter, 
deliberateness of the breach can be categorized in three ways from a perspective of remedies. 
First, the solution does not imply another or a more severe remedy than in any other breach of 
contract situation, but the solution supports its remedy choice under explicit reference to 
deliberateness of the breach. In other words, deliberateness as a factor determining application of a 
specific contractual remedy should be acknowledged in a more explicit way. Explicit reference to 
deliberateness in a decision without changing anything in the sphere of remedies is a first 
manifestation of the relevance of deliberateness.  
The aluminium pipes case is a good example. B has a right to performance, but in practice it is 
difficult to exercise the right. If the court explicitly acknowledges the deliberateness of the breach, 
the step towards performance may be easier to make. Another example may be the enforcement of 
the penalty clause in the double sale case. Parties may enforce the clause, but an explicit reference 
to deliberateness of the breach makes the position of the aggrieved party – as well in eventual 
negotiation after the court’s decision – stronger. 
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Second, deliberateness can manifest itself in a solution when a mix of possible remedies is different 
from the available mix in non-deliberate breach of contract situation. For example, where enforced 
performance is not – or only theoretically – available in a non-deliberate breach of contract situation, 
it may be available in case of deliberate breach of contract. Availability of another mix remedies 
compared with a non-deliberate breach of contract situation is the second manifestation of the 
relevance of deliberateness. 
A good example is the servicing vans case. The remedy of expectation damages should be available in 
full without too many – in other, non-deliberate, breach cases justifiable – limits and deductions. The 
airline tickets case also provides an example of this type of remedial relief: it already exists, but with 
too many limits in a case of deliberate breach of contract. One could also mention the swimming 
pool case here and the remedy of enforced performance or cost of reinstatement, because in theory 
enforced performance could be available to the creditor – in a civil law jurisdiction – and cost of 
reinstatement as well – in a common law jurisdiction. The deliberateness of the breach increases the 
position of the aggrieved party to rely on a stronger version of existing remedies. 
Third, the solution implies availability of more severe remedies than in the case of a non-deliberate 
breach situation. For example, in case of a claim for damages, the rules on application of this remedy 
may be less strict in case of deliberate breach, such as with regard to the exclusion of unforeseeable 
damages, the application of exclusion clauses, the restricted availability of account of profits or the 
availability of punitive damages. Availability of more severe remedies in deliberate breach cases 
compared with a non-deliberate breach situation is the third manifestation of the relevance of 
deliberateness. It is logical that in both the second and third situation an explicit reference to 
deliberateness of the breach should be made in order to justify the different mix or more severe 
remedies. 
The most explicit example would be the award of punitive damages in the bad faith insurance case. It 
is evident that punitive damages are generally not available in the law of contract. The insurance 
relationship is a special one and it requires prudent behavior of both parties. If a claimant justifiably 
claims and a court decides on the basis of specific circumstances of the case that delaying tactics of 
the insurer caused the unwillingness to pay,  a claim for punitive damages may be considered to be a 
good remedy. Another good example is the availability of account of profits as a standard, alternative 
remedy next to expectation damages. This option returns in the first case study, but perhaps, as the 
US debate on account of profits in case of deliberate breach shows –  see Chapter 4 and 5 – this 
remedy is the most adequate vindication of contractual rights – apart from enforced performance. 
The remedy of account of profits – which cannot be labeled as such in many jurisdictions – would 
offer the law of remedies in contract the useful perspective of the loss of expectation of the promisor 
instead of the loss of the promise. The latter justifies expectation damages, but although they are 
systematically most convenient in the current system, they do not seem to fulfill parties’ 
expectations once they are confronted with deliberate breach of contract. 
Finally, a common denominator in finding adequate remedies for cases of deliberate breach of 
contract seems to be that aggrieved parties do not want to be confronted with deliberate breach in 
the first place. The paradox is that the ultimate objective of the increase of severity of remedies is 
that they will ideally not be used, because debtors will dismiss the option to commit breach in 





8.1 Aanleiding, onderzoeksvragen en doel 
Dit proefschrift behandelt het verschijnsel ‘opzettelijke contractbreuk’ en de mogelijke en wenselijke 
invloed daarvan op de toepassing van contractuele remedies. Aanleiding voor dit proefschrift is het 
tot op heden structurele en ongewenste gebrek aan coherente belangstelling voor het motief van de 
tekortschietende schuldenaar als relevant element bij de sanctiebepaling in het contractenrecht. De 
volgende onderzoeksvragen staan in dit proefschrift centraal: 
1. Wat is opzettelijke contractbreuk? 
2. Speelt de opzet van de schuldenaar ten aanzien van de contractbreuk een rol in het huidige 
contractenrecht, zowel in de wet als in de rechtspraak,  in de zin dat opzet ten aanzien van 
de contractbreuk de mogelijke acties van de schuldeiser mede invulling kan geven? Zo ja, hoe 
ziet deze invulling er dan uit? 
3. Waarom zou het element ‘opzet’ de beschikbaarheid en de omvang van contractuele 
remedies moeten beïnvloeden? 
4. Hoe zou het element ‘opzet’ de beschikbaarheid en de omvang van contractuele remedies 
moeten beïnvloeden? 
Over het verschijnsel opzettelijke contractbreuk is wel een en ander geschreven, met name in Anglo-
Amerikaanse jurisdicties, maar in Europese continentale jurisdicties heeft ten aanzien van de 
mogelijke betekenis van de opzettelijkheid van de contractbreuk voor toepassing voor sancties in het 
contractenrecht al dan niet bewust praktisch nauwelijks gedachtevorming plaatsgevonden. Dit 
proefschrift beoogt door zijn rechtsvergelijkende invalshoek een bijdrage te leveren aan het debat 
over opzettelijke contractbreuk – binnen de Europese continentale jurisdicties door dit verschijnsel 
op de agenda te zetten en binnen de Anglo-Amerikaanse jurisdicties door een poging te doen de 
mogelijke invloed van opzet van de schuldenaar ten aanzien van de contractbreuk ten aanzien van 
een breed scala van remedies te toetsen.  
Dit proefschrift betoogt dat opzettelijkheid van de contractbreuk een relevant element zou moeten 
zijn bij de toepassing van sancties in het contractenrecht in die zin dat de bestaande sancties – 
nakoming, schadevergoeding in de vorm van het positief contractsbelang en ontbinding -  in het 
algemeen vlotter en strenger moeten worden toegepast dan in andere gevallen van tekortkoming in 
de nakoming van de contractuele verbintenis. Bovendien zou in het geval van opzettelijke 
contractbreuk het sanctiearsenaal in bepaalde gevallen moeten worden uitgebreid. Te denken valt 
daarbij aan een eenvoudiger toegang tot winstafdracht en in zeer specifieke gevallen 
privaatrechtelijke boetes (‘punitive damages’). Het belangrijkste argument voor dit standpunt is dat 
de schuldenaar die opzettelijk een contractuele verplichting schendt niet alleen het vertrouwen van 
zijn wederpartij in de contractuele band beschaamt, maar – indien juist aan die opzettelijkheid geen 
aandacht wordt besteed in termen van contractuele sancties – ook het vertrouwen in de werking van 




8.2 De betekenis van het begrip ‘opzettelijke contractbreuk’ 
De  beantwoording van de eerste onderzoeksvraag beoogt de lezer ervan te doordringen dat het 
begrip opzettelijke contractbreuk geen afgebakend concept is. OM daaraan invulling te geven wordt 
de volgende ‘werkdefinitie’ gehanteerd: 
“Contractbreuk wordt als opzettelijk beschouwd wanneer een partij contractbreuk pleegt om 
daarmee financieel voordeel te verwerven dat hij zou hebben gemist dan wel financieel nadeel te 
vermijden dat hij zou hebben opgelopen als hij zijn contractuele verplichtingen correct zou zijn 
nagekomen.” 
Deze werkdefinitie wordt tegen  andere specifieke vormen van opzettelijk (wan)gedrag in het recht 
aangehouden. Deze exercitie maakt duidelijk dat definities geen zekerheid bieden, terwijl wordt 
benadrukt dat de betekenis van opzettelijke contractbreuk van situatie tot situatie kan verschillen. 
Deze definitie geeft duidelijk een economisch calculerende invulling aan het begrip opzettelijke 
contractbreuk. Dit hoofdstuk zet deze definitie ten eerste af tegen het onderscheid tussen 
toerekenbare en niet-toerekenbare tekortkoming, waarbij naar voren komt dat veel vormen van 
contractbreuk bewust geschieden, zelfs al is een succesvol beroep op overmacht niet uitgesloten. 
Ook komt de verhouding tussen opzettelijke contractbreuk en het zeker in Anglo-Amerikaanse 
jurisdicties en in de rechtseconomie bekende begrip efficiënte contractbreuk aan de orde. Op dit 
terrein bestaat echter veel terminologische verwarring. Elke efficiënte contractbreuk is opzettelijk, 
maar de duiding van beide begrippen verschilt niet alleen per rechtssysteem, maar ook per auteur. 
Het Amerikaanse recht staat het meest positief ten opzichte van efficiënte contractbreuk, maar dat 
geldt niet voor elke Amerikaanse auteur en ook niet voor elke opzettelijke contractbreuk. De houding 
van het Engelse recht ten opzichte van efficiënte contractbreuk is in het algemeen onduidelijk, maar 
niet erg welwillend, terwijl Europese continentale systemen negatief staan ten opzichte van dit 
fenomeen. Ten derde blijkt uit een vergelijking tussen de opzettelijke contractbreuk en de 
onrechtmatige daad dat de opzet niet per se financieel van aard hoeft te zijn, maar ook gericht kan 
zijn op het schade toebrengen aan de positie van de wederpartij. Ten vierde komt uit een analyse 
van enkele emirische studies naar voren dat partijen motief van de schuldenaar bij tekortschieten als 
belangrijk kenschetsen, met name voor het bestaan van vertrouwen in de contractuele relatie. Ten 
slotte brengt de vergelijking met het strafrechtelijke opzetbegrip een belangrijk bewijsprobleem naar 
voren en tegelijkertijd een werkbare oplossing. Een belangrijk probleem is dat de vermeende opzet 
van de schuldenaar moeilijk kan worden bewezen – het gaat bij een stricte interpretatie van dit 
begrip immers om de interne gemoedstoestand van de schuldenaar. Niettemin geeft juist het 
strafrecht ook aan dat de opzet ook geobjectiveerd kan worden. In het geval van de werkdefinitie 
kan dat bijvoorbeeld betekenen dat als een schuldenaar meer winst heeft behaald door het 
schenden van zijn contractuele verplichtingen dan hij zou hebben behaald wanneer hij correct zou 
hebben gepresteerd, de opzettelijkheid van de contractbreuk zou kunnen worden aangenomen. 
 
 8.3 Opzettelijke contractbreuk als erkend verschijnsel in het bestaande recht? 
De beantwoording van de tweede onderzoeksvraag biedt inzicht in de wijze waarop de 
opzettelijkheid van de contractbreuk als mogelijk relevant element in de sanctiebepaling in het 
bestaande recht van verschillende systemen een plaats krijgt. Deze descriptieve en 
rechtsvergelijkende analyse, die eclectisch van aard is en geen volledigheid nastreeft, biedt een 
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fundament voor de beantwoording van de derde en vierde onderzoeksvraag, die meer normatief van 
aard zijn. De invloed van opzettelijkheid wordt per sanctie onder de loep genomen aan de hand van 
wetgeving en rechtspraak en, indien relevant,  literatuur. Een preliminaire vraag is steeds of 
opzettelijkheid van de contractbreuk op zichzelf als verschijnsel wordt erkend.  Vervolgens wordt de 
koppeling met de sanctie gemaakt, te weten de nakoming, de schadevergoeding in de zin van het 
positief contractsbelang, de vergoeding van immateriële schade, de winstafdracht, de 
privaatrechtelijke boete (‘punitive damages’) en de ontbinding. Voorts wordt de relatie tussen 
opzettelijkheid van de contractbreuk en de toepassing van boetebedingen en exoneratieclausules 
nader geanalyseerd.  In hoofdlijnen dienen zich ten minste vier varianten aan. 
A. De sterkste voorbeelden van signalering van het verschijnsel opzettelijke contractbreuk 
gecombineerd met een heldere doorwerking in de sancties zijn te vinden in het Amerikaanse 
recht en in het Franse recht. In het Franse recht beïnvloedt de opzettelijkheid van de 
contractbreuk de vergoeding van het positief contractsbelang, omdat niet alleen 
voorzienbare verliezen maar ook niet-voorzienbare verliezen voor vergoeding in aanmerking 
komen (art. 1150 Cc). In het Amerikaanse recht kan de opzettelijkheid van de contractbreuk 
de beschikbaarheid van ‘punitive damages’ beïnvloeden, zij het onder zeer bijzondere 
omstandigheden, met name in de sfeer van verzekeringsovereenkomsten, in het bijzonder 
wanneer verzekeraars weigeren uit te keren of lang wachten met uitkeren, terwijl duidelijk is 
dat zij aansprakelijk zijn. Bovendien lijkt het Amerikaanse recht steeds ontvankelijker voor de 
winstafdracht als sanctie na opzettelijke contractbreuk. Een bewijs daarvan vormt § 39 van 
het Draft Third Restatement on Unjust Enrichment.  
B. De tweede groep voorbeelden kenmerkt zich door signalering van het verschijnsel 
opzettelijke contractbreuk zonder dat daaraan rechtsgevolgen in de toepassing van sancties 
worden verbonden. In het Amerikaanse en Nederlandse recht zijn daarvan voorbeelden te 
vinden. In het Amerikaanse recht is de invloed van het motief van de schuldenaar niet 
relevant bij het vaststellen van de omvang van het positief contractsbelang (‘expectation 
damages’). In het Nederlandse recht heeft de Hoge Raad expliciet ontkend dat een 
bijzondere mate van verwijtbaarheid van het gedrag van de schuldenaar relevant is voor de 
toepassing van de sanctie van winstafdracht, onder meer in de zaak Doerga/Ymere, hoewel 
die verwijtbaarheid dan wel weer een rol kan spelen bij de invulling van die remedie. Het 
laatste voorbeeld is aldus minder sterk, omdat de Hoge Raad hier weinig duidelijkheid 
schept. 
C. De derde groep voorbeelden kenmerkt zich door de expliciete signalering van het 
verschijnsel opzettelijke contractbreuk, terwijl de invloed daarvan op de toe te passen 
remedies onduidelijk blijft. Voorbeelden daarvan kunnen in elk rechtsstelsel worden 
aangetroffen. In het Engelse recht is winstafdracht mogelijk na contractbreuk, zoals blijkt uit 
bijvoorbeeld de landmark case Attorney-General v Blake. De relevantie van opzettelijkheid 
van de contractbreuk voor toepassing van die sanctie is op zijn minst onduidelijk, en 
waarschijnlijk zeer gering. 
D. De vierde groep voorbeelden kenmerkt zich doordat het verschijnsel opzettelijke 
contractbreuk niet in concrete situaties benoemd wordt, terwijl het erop lijkt dat bij de 
toepassing en vormgeving van de sanctie het gedrag van de schuldenaar wel een rol heeft 
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gespeeld. In het Nederlandse recht kiest de Hoge Raad in de zaak Vos/TSN Logistics voor een 
schuldenaar-onvriendelijke oplossing bij de vaststelling van het positief contractsbelang met 
een louter technische onderbouwing zonder het gedrag van de schuldenaar te kwalificeren 
laat staan die kwalificatie van invloed te laten zijn op de vormgeving van de sanctie. In het 
Engelse recht wordt in de zaak The Golden Victory ook vermeden om de opzettelijkheid van 
de contractbreuk als relevant element te benoemen bij het vaststellen van de 
schadevergoedingsverplichting, althans door een meerderheid van de House of Lords. 
De algemene conclusie die na dit hoofdstuk kan worden getrokken is dat opzettelijkheid van de 
contractbreuk in een beperkt aantal gevallen als relevant element bij de sanctiebepaling betrokken 
wordt. 
 
8.4 De noodzaak van erkenning van opzettelijke contractbreuk als relevant juridisch verschijnsel 
De descriptieve analyse in en de antwoorden die voortvloeien uit de eerste hoofdstukken noopt 
ertoe antwoord te geven op de vraag waarom opzettelijkheid van de contractbreuk relevant zou 
moeten zijn  als afzonder element bij de toepassing van contractuele remedies. Dit is noodzakelijk, 
omdat uit de eerste hoofdstukken blijkt dat het in het algemeen het contractenrecht ten onrechte de 
relevantie van de opzettelijkheid van de contractbreuk miskent dan wel bagatelliseert wanneer het 
aankomt op de toepassing van contractuele remedies. Het contractenrecht neemt ten opzichte van 
dit verschijnsel terughoudendheid in acht. Daarvoor kunnen vier argumenten worden aangedragen: 
een moreel, een systematisch, een praktisch en een economisch argument. Niettemin is geen enkele 
van deze argumenten overtuigend. Ter beantwoording van de vierde onderzoeksvraag worden deze 
vier argumenten besproken en weerlegd.  
1. Het morele argument dat kan worden aangevoerd is dat het contractenrecht geen duidelijk 
morele lading heeft. Het doel  van het contractenrecht is het soepel laten verlopen van het 
handelsverkeer. Contractuele relaties kunnen daarom zonder morele bezwaren worden 
verbroken zolang de schuldeiser maar adequaat wordt gecompenseerd. Daartegen kan 
worden aangevoerd dat partijen op basis van vertrouwen met elkaar een contract aangaan. 
Vertrouwen is een functioneel begrip, maar het heeft ook een morele lading. Een contract is 
in die zin een paradox, omdat partijen pas met elkaar contracteren als zij vertrouwen in 
elkaar hebben, terwijl het contract er juist  onder meer toe dient om die situaties te regelen 
wanneer partijen niet doen wat zij hebben toegezegd. Partijen houden dus wel rekening met 
contractbreuk, maar niet met opzettelijke contractbreuk, omdat anders de ratio van het 
sluiten van het contract in het geding komt. Het is slecht voorstelbaar dat partijen bij het 
sluiten van het contract – zij hopen beiden daarvan de vruchten te plukken – al stilstaan bij 
de vraag wat te doen wanneer een van de partijen opzettelijk niet nakomt. Daar komt bij dat 
er bescheiden empirisch bewijs is voor de stelling dat schuldeisers die geconfronteerd 
worden met opzettelijke contractbreuk zich ernstiger benadeeld voelen dan  wanner zij te 
maken krijgen met een ‘gewone’ contractbreuk of zelfs een onrechtmatige daad. Als het 
contractenrecht niet adequaat reageert op een opzettelijke contractbreuk door dat 
verschijnsel niet te erkennen en er geen gevolgen aan te verbinden in termen van aanpassing 
van de contractuele remedies, dan kunnen partijen het vertrouwen in de helende werking 
van het contractenrecht kwijt raken. Die functie is essentieel, omdat het contractenrecht pas 
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werking krijgt als een van partijen in eerste instantie al niet nakomt en in het contract of 
gebrekkig is voorzien in een oplossing. Het contractenrecht heeft dus ten minste ook een 
morele grondslag en daaraan dient in geval van opzettelijke contractbreuk gevolg te worden 
gegeven. 
2. Het systematische argument is dat het motief van de schuldenaar niet relevant is, omdat het 
niet past in het systeem. In de Europese continentale jurisdicties staat het recht op nakoming 
van de schuldeiser voorop. Het motief van de schuldenaar bij contractbreuk is dan niet 
relevant, omdat de schuldeiser toch krijgt waarop hij recht heeft. Voor de sanctie van 
schadevergoeding geldt – in zowel Europese als Anglo-Amerikaanse jurisdicties –  kortweg 
dat deze is gebaseerd op de gedachte dat de schuldeiser gecompenseerd wordt. Als dat doel 
is bereikt, is het motief van de schuldenaar voor het plegen van contractbreuk minder 
relevant. Aangezien recht op nakoming vaak lastig te effectueren is als – al was het maar 
omdat de schuldeiser zijn vertrouwen is kwijtgeraakt in de schuldenaar – en volledige 
schadevergoeding in compensatoire zin zeker in gecompliceerde zaken vaak geen haalbare 
kaart is, is juist de weging van het motief van de schuldenaar in geval van contractbreuk een 
reden om het recht op nakoming in die gevallen te versterken door barrières voor de 
effectuering ervan weg te halen en bepaalde limieten op de vaststelling van de 
schadevergoeding te relativeren, zoals de grens van de voorzienbaarheid van de schade. 
3. Het praktische argument is dat opzettelijkheid van de contractbreuk moeilijk, zo niet 
onmogelijk te bewijzen is. Of contractbreuk opzettelijk is, kan daarom theoretisch relevant 
zijn, maar vanwege een onmogelijke bewijspositie van de schuldeiser kan dat element 
nauwelijks van invloed zijn op de toe te passen concrete sanctie. Dit argument kan worden 
weerlegd door te stellen dat opzettelijke contractbreuk niet eenduidig is te definiëren. 
Bovendien kan opzet in veel gevallen – zeker in financieel-economische  zin – worden 
geconstrueerd en geobjectiveerd, waardoor het bewijsprobleem niet wordt weggenomen, 
maar wel wordt gerelativeerd. 
4. Het economische argument is dat in veel gevallen partijen baat kunnen hebben bij 
contractbreuk, ook de teleurgestelde schuldeiser, met name in het geval van de efficiënte 
contractbreuk.. Dit argument kan afdoende worden weerlegd. De figuur van de efficiënte 
contractbreuk is een interessante rechtseconomische constructie om bepaalde 
gedragspatronen van partijen te verklaren, maar het is geen werkbare rechtsfiguur dat ten 
grondslag zou moeten liggen aan het contractenrecht. De belangrijkste redenen zijn dat de 
theorie van de efficiënte contractbreuk aanneemt dat alle prestaties op geld waardeerbaar 
zijn en dat het de schuldeiser om het even is of hij de prestatie zelf ontvangt of het 
equivalent van de prestatie in geld. Dat is, zelfs in het op handelsverkeer gerichte 
contractenrecht, een illusie. Niet alle prestaties zijn op geld waardeerbaar en partijen lijken 
dat ook niet aldus te ervaren, getuige het eerder genoemde bescheiden empirische bewijs. 
Bovendien gaat de theorie van de efficiënte contractbreuk uit van volledige compensatie van 
de schuldeiser. De praktijk leert dat lang niet alle geleden schade na contractbreuk voor 
vergoeding in aanmerking komt. Dus zelfs als de schuldeiser op zichzelf de vervangende 
waarde van de prestatie even hoog waardeert als de prestatie zelf, dan blijft hij nog met 
kosten zitten die niet vergoed worden, terwijl wel wordt aangenomen dat hij ‘volledig’ 
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gecompenseerd is. Te denken valt aan kosten van juridische bijstand, kosten van het zoeken 
naar andere contractspartijen enzovoort.  
 
8.5  De invloed van opzettelijkheid van de contractbreuk op de toepassing van contractuele 
remedies 
Deze verklaring voor de relevantie van opzettelijkheid van contractbreuk als relevant element bij 
sanctiebepaling biedt een ingang voor de beantwoording van de vijfde onderzoeksvraag. De 
beantwoording van de vijfde onderzoeksvraag valt in twee delen uiteen. Ten eerste geeft dit 
proefschrift een aantal algemene aanbevelingen, waaruit blijkt hoe opzettelijkheid van de 
contractbreuk doorwerkt in remedies bij niet-nakoming in het contractenrecht. Ten tweede geeft dit 
proefschrift acht ‘case studies’ waaruit blijkt hoe die algemene aanbevelingen in concrete gevallen 
hun toepassing vinden. De algemene aanbevelingen worden als volgt geformuleerd: 
I. In geval van opzettelijke contractbreuk zou een recht op nakoming sterk en gemakkelijk 
toegankelijk moeten zijn. 
II. De omvang en begroting van het positief contractsbelang zou in het voordeel van de 
schuldeiser moeten uitvallen wanneer sprake is van opzettelijke contractbreuk. Ten aanzien 
van in het algemeen gerechtvaardigde limieten die bestaan ten aanzien van de bepaling van 
de omvang van de schadevergoeding, bijvoorbeeld ten aanzien van het causaal verband, de 
voorzienbaarheid,  maar ook ten aanzien van de vergoeding van immateriële schade of 
gevolgschade, dient in het geval van opzettelijke contractbreuk terughoudendheid te worden 
betracht. 
III. Winstafdracht als vervangende dan wel aanvullende remedie voor vergoeding van het 
positief contractsbelang dient eenvoudig toegankelijk te zijn wanneer sprake is van 
opzettelijke contractbreuk. 
IV. Voor specifieke en ernstige gevallen van opzettelijke contractbreuk dient als ultimum 
remedium een privaatrechtelijke boete (‘punitive damages’) als sanctie tot de mogelijkheden 
te behoren. 
V. Ontbinding zou toegankelijker moeten zijn als remedie in het geval van opzettelijke 
contractbreuk. 
VI. Boetebedingen zouden niet ongeldig mogen worden verklaard dan wel worden gematigd in 
het geval van opzettelijke contractbreuk. 
Het spreekt vanzelf dat deze aanbevelingen niet steeds van toepassing kunnen zijn op elk geval van 
opzettelijke contractbreuk. Voor de hand ligt natuurlijk dat dat in ieder geval geldt voor cumulatie 
van deze aanbevelingen, maar ook dient zorgvuldig te worden bezien welke sanctie en welke vorm 
van een sanctie per geval dient te worden toegepast. De gemene deler van deze aanbevelingen is dat 
de opzettelijke contractbreuk als afzonderlijk privaatrechtelijk verschijnsel signalering krijgt in de 
toepassing van contractuele remedies. De relevantie van dit verschijnsel blijkt ook uit de 
gepresenteerde acht ‘case studies’. De gemene deler van zowel de aanbevelingen als de case studies 
is dat partijen niet geconfronteerd willen worden met opzettelijke contractbreuk.  De bedoeling van 
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de aanbevelingen is dan ook in ultimo dat zij niet in concrete gevallen tot toepassing hoeven  te 
leiden, omdat er een afschrikwekkende werking vanuit gaat. De schuldenaar die overweegt 
opzettelijke contractbreuk te plegen zal na een afweging met het oog op de (strenge) sancties 
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